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Growth and Transition in the Cleveland Iron and 
Steel Industry, 1850 to 1914. 
 
Stephen James 
 
Abstract 
The dramatic expansion of the iron industry in Cleveland from 1850 propelled the 
district briefly to the position of the world’s largest iron-producing centre and brought 
about the formation of a major industrial cluster in a previously unindustrialised area.  
By the end of the 1870s, however, its prosperity was threatened by developments in 
steel-production technology and the growth of iron and steel output in the US and 
Germany. The first part of this thesis examines the initial development and early 
expansion of the industry.  Using a data set of firms that entered the iron and related 
sectors between 1850 and 1880, the study assesses the contribution of business 
networks to growth.  It is suggested that an important part was played by an existing 
network of Darlington-based Quaker business interests, and that development may have 
taken a different form without the presence of the network.  The second part 
investigates the transition of the industry from the 1870s to 1914 to determine how 
effectively the district’s firms responded to significant changes in technology, 
international competition, corporate legislation and financial markets.  The study finds 
that some firms did adapt and grow, and the district made the transition to steel 
successfully.  Steel technology was adopted when technical and commercial 
circumstances allowed, and in particular the basic open hearth process was actively 
investigated from an early stage.  Flexible use was made of the free availability of 
incorporation and of access to securities markets.  An extended case study of one 
company, Dorman Long, illustrates the beginnings of the development of corporate 
enterprise in the industry. 
  
2 
 
 
  
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growth and Transition in the Cleveland Iron and 
Steel Industry, 1850 to 1914. 
 
Stephen James 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted for the degree of: 
Doctor of Philosophy 
History Department 
Durham University 
March 2013 
4 
 
Contents 
 
Abstract 1 
Figures 6 
Tables 6 
Abbreviations 9 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction 12 
1.1 Aims and background 12 
1.2 Relationship to previous studies 13 
1.3 Plan of the work 16 
1.4 Limitations and omissions 20 
1.5 Sources    21 
 
 
 
Part 1: Development and Growth  
Chapter 2: Conceptual Issues in Business Networks and Industrial Clusters 24 
2.1 Introduction 24 
2.2 Explanations 26 
2.3 Networks and Theory 29 
2.4 Location and Agglomeration Economies  37 
2.5 Dynamics of Clusters 42 
2.6 Networks, Knowledge Spillovers and Cluster Development 46 
2.7 Conclusions 49 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Networks and the Development of the Cleveland Iron Industry 
Cluster from 1850 to 1880 
51 
3.1 Introduction 51 
3.2 Development of the Cleveland Iron Industry Cluster 51 
3.3 Networks of Firms and Investors 61 
3.4 Networks and Performance 80 
3.5 Conclusions 87 
 
 
 
Part 2: Transition 90 
Chapter 4: Iron and Steel in Transition – An Outline of the Issues 90 
4.1 Introduction 90 
4.2 Trends in Output and Trade in Iron and Steel 92 
4.3 Explanations: Entrepreneurial Failures and Institutional Constraints 98 
4.4 Market and Resource Constraints 108 
4.5 Conclusion  115 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: The Effects of Changes in Corporate Legislation on the Iron and 
Steel Industry in Cleveland 
117 
5.1 Introduction 117 
5.2 Trends in Company Registration in Cleveland 121 
5.3 Bolckow Vaughan: the first five years of incorporation 131 
5.4 Long-term Finance and Capital Expenditure: a comparison between Bolckow 
      Vaughan and Dorman Long 
139 
5.5 Conclusions 150 
5 
 
  
Chapter 6: Technology and Products  154 
6.1 Introduction 154 
6.2 Trends from 1880 155 
6.3 From Iron to Steel 162 
6.4 The Development of the Basic Open-Hearth Process 172 
6.5 Networks and the use of the BOH process in Cleveland 206 
6.6 Conclusions 213 
 
 
 
Chapter 7:  Case Study of Dorman Long 215 
7.1 Introduction 215 
7.2 The Growth of Dorman Long in Outline 216 
7.3 Organisational and Management Developments 224 
7.4 Products, Distribution and Marketing 239 
7.5 The Rudiments of a Strategy 255 
7.6 Conclusion 266 
 
 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusions 268 
 
 
 
Appendices 277 
Appendix 1 277 
Appendix 2 297 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
304 
  
 
6 
 
Figures and Tables 
 
Figures 
Figure 2.1: Population in Middlesbrough and Stockton, 1831-81 
 
26 
Figure 2.2: Trust, Transactions Costs and Growth. 
 
35 
Figure 2.3: Business Networks, Social Capital Externality Effects and Growth 
 
36 
Figure 4.1: Unit Value of Exports and Imports (£ per ton), 1870-1913 
 
95 
Figure 4.2: Exports, Imports and the Balance of Trade by Volume, 1887-1913 
  
97 
Figure 4.3: Exports, Imports and the Balance of Trade by Value, 1887-1913 
 
97 
Figure 5.1: Incorporation of Cleveland Iron, Steel and Related Engineering  
Companies, 1860-1912 
 
 
122 
Figure 5.2: Business Failures in Cleveland Iron and Steel, 1850-99 
 
123 
Figure 6.1: Manufactured Iron Output in Cleveland, 1872-1900 
 
157 
Figure 6.2: British Steel Output, 1889-1918  
 
161 
Figure 6.3: Bessemer and Open Hearth Steel Output in Cleveland, 1889-1900 
  
161 
Figure 6.4: Cleveland and Hematite Pig Iron Production (tons), 1883-1907 
 
170 
Figure 6.5: Cleveland Hematite Pig Iron Production (per cent), 1883-1907 
  
171 
Figure 6.6: Cleveland Ore Production and UK Ore Imports, 1870-1913 
  
171 
Figure 7.1: Capital Expenditure Monthly Returns – An Example from 1908 
 
232 
Figure 7.2: The Dorman Long Group, c1910 
 
238 
Figure 7.3: Extracts from Dorman Long Pocket Companion, 1910 
 
241 
Figure 7.4: Dorman Long Profits, 1890-1914 
 
266 
Figure 7.5: Return on Capital Employed, 1885-1914  266 
  
Tables  
Table 2.1: Pig Iron Output, 1854-84 
  
26 
Table 3.1: Cleveland Pig Iron Output and Shipments from Teesside  
 
53 
Table 3.2: Blast Furnaces in Cleveland and North East England, 1855-71 
 
54 
Table 3.3: Puddling Furnaces in Cleveland and North East England, 1850-71 
 
54 
Table 3.4: Iron and Engineering Firms Established on Teesside, 1760-1879  
 
55 
Table 3.5: Connections between Cleveland Investors, 1850-79  58 
7 
 
 
Table 3.6: Connections between Cleveland Firms, 1850-79 
 
58 
Table 3.7: Characteristics of Investors Entering the Cleveland Iron and 
Engineering Industries, 1850-79 
 
 
60 
Table 3.8: Characteristics of Firms Entering the Cleveland Iron and Engineering 
Industries, 1850-79 
 
 
60 
Table 3.10: Coefficients for Logistical Regression Models 
 
86 
Table 3.11: Survival Odds (Model 4) 
 
86 
Table 3.9: Model Variables 
 
82 
Table 4.1: British Iron and Steel Output, 1860-1414 
  
92 
Table 4.2: Pig Iron Output in Britain, Germany and the USA, 1870-1913 
 
92 
Table 4.3: Steel Output in Britain, Germany and the USA, 1870-1913 
 
92 
Table 4.4: British Iron and Steel Exports and Imports 
  
94 
Table 4.5: Iron and Steel Output, Imports and Import Penetration 
  
94 
Table 4.6: Unit Value of Exports and Imports of Plates and Bars, 1913 
 
96 
Table 4.7: Exports and Imports of Plates and Bars, 1910-1913 
 
96 
Table 4.8: Steel Output by Process, 1889-1914 (selected years) 
 
110 
Table 4.9: British and US Prices after Duty and Freight Charges (per ton), 1883 
  
111 
Table 4.10: US Output and Imports of Rails, 1870-1884 
  
112 
Table 4.11: German Tariffs on Iron and Steel, 1879 
  
113 
Table 5.1: Joint Stock Company Registration in the Cleveland Iron and Steel 
Industry 
 
 
122 
Table 5.2: Regional Distribution of Bolckow Vaughan Shareholders 
 
132 
Table 5.3: Flotation of Bolckow Vaughan in 1864-5 
 
134 
Table 5.4: Bolckow, Vaughan Dividend Payments, 1865-69 
 
138 
Table 5.5: Dividends and Interest on Vendors’ Shares 
 
139 
Table 5.6: Sources of Funds – Bolckow Vaughan 1870-1914 
 
141 
Table 5.7: Examples of Bolckow Vaughan Bank Borrowing 
 
144 
Table 5.8: Sources of Funds – Dorman Long, 1889-1914 
 
145 
Table 5.9: Dorman Long Expenditure on Acquisitions, 1898-1914 146 
8 
 
 
Table 5.10: Dorman Long Companies’ Gearing 
  
148 
Table 6.1: Manufactured Iron in Cleveland, 1872-1884  
 
156 
Table 6.2: Finished Iron (puddled/bar iron), 1881-1900 
  
158 
Table 6.3: Firms Using or Experimenting with Basic Open-Hearth Production up 
to the mid-1890s 
 
 
177 
Table 6.4 Steel Output by Process, 1900 and 1910  
 
178 
Table 6.5: Bell Brothers Basic Open-Hearth Experiments (1889-91) – Average 
Charge Composition 
  
 
183 
Table 6.6: Bell Brothers Basic Open Hearth Experiments (1889-91) – Costs, 
Revenues and Output 
 
 
184 
Table 6.7: Official British Minimum Standards for Steel Plates, c1896 
 
188 
Table 6.8: Iron Ore Prices, 1870-1913 
 
194 
Table 6.9: Clarence Steelworks Basic Open Hearth - Costs, Revenues and Output, 
1901-02 
 
 
197 
Table 6.10: Clarence Steelworks Charge Composition, 1899-1902 
  
197 
Table 7.1: The Expansion of Dorman Long’s Interests, 1876-1914 
 
216 
Table 7.2: Sales and Profits, 1882-1889 
 
219 
Table 7.3: Board Membership for Dorman Long, Bell Brothers and NESCo, 1903 
 
226 
Table 7.4: Capital Spending on the Construction and Bridge Department, 1890-
1905 
 
 
246 
Table 7.5: Dorman Long Branches and Agencies in 1910 
 
250 
Table 7.6: Overseas Branches, Agencies and Yards, 1892-1913 
 
251 
Table 7.7: Comparative Financial Performance, 1890-1914 265 
9 
 
Abbreviations 
 
AGM Annual General Meeting 
BBA Bell Brothers Accounts 
BBAR Bell Brothers Annual Report and Accounts 
BBDM Bell Brothers Directors’ Minutes 
BH Business History 
BHR Business History Review 
BS Teesside Archive British Steel Collection 
BSDM Bowesfield Steel Company Directors’ Minutes 
BVAR Bolckow Vaughan Annual Report and Accounts 
BVDM Bolckow Vaughan Directors’ Minutes 
CIE Cleveland Institution of Engineers Proceedings 
DLAR Dorman Long Annual Report and Accounts 
DLDM Dorman Long Annual Directors’ Minutes 
EcHR Economic History Review 
HWDM Head Wrightson Directors’ Minutes 
ICE Institution of Civil Engineers Proceedings 
ICTR Iron and Coal Trades Review 
IME Institution of Mechanical Engineers Proceedings 
JISI Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute 
NER North Eastern Railway 
NESAR North Eastern Steel Company Annual Report and Accounts 
NESCo North Eastern Steel Company Limited 
NESDM North Eastern Steel Company Directors’ Minutes 
S&DR Stockton and Darlington Railway 
 
  
10 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.  No quotation from it should be published 
without the author’s prior written consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Acknowledgements 
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors, Professor Ranald Michie and Dr Gill Cookson 
for their guidance, advice, encouragement and enthusiasm throughout this study.  Staff at 
Teesside Archives and Dr Joan Heggie and Simon Sheppard of the British Steel Archive Project 
provided considerable help and allowed me access to un-catalogued material. Last, but not least, 
I thank my wife, Lynne, and children, Daniel and Esther, for their support; without it, the work 
never would have been finished.  Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of 
our daughter, Anna.   
  
12 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Aims and background 
 
Of the many examples of a district’s development being founded on a single industry, Britain’s 
industrial history offers few better than Teesside.  Here growth was driven by the dramatic 
expansion of the Cleveland iron industry after 1850.
1
  It transformed the undeveloped marshy 
lower reaches of the River Tees, with its two coal shipping ports – Stockton and Middlesbrough 
– and the largely agricultural surrounding area into the largest iron-producing centre in the 
world in less than twenty-five years.  By 1873 over 10 per cent of the world output of pig iron 
was smelted in Cleveland, and a cluster of iron-based industries had become established in the 
towns and along the banks of the river.   
 
There is little dispute that the district’s industrialisation was based on natural resources: the 
conjunction of coal, limestone and especially iron ore close to the Tees.  Indeed, the ‘event’ that 
triggered expansion was the discovery of a rich, thick bed of iron – the Main Seam – a few 
miles from Middlesbrough.  Locating this ore bed, which had been known about and used, but 
which was under-utilised as it was either inaccessible or because only the poor, thin seams had 
been identified, made commercial exploitation viable.  But while natural resources, and the 
presence of a railway system that had been built to link the coalfields to the ports, were 
necessary, they were not in themselves sufficient.  One of the principal aims of this thesis is to 
consider other factors that contributed to the nature of development in Cleveland.  Specifically, 
the role of business networks is examined to determine whether and how the connections 
between businesses and entrepreneurs influenced the process and pattern of expansion.   
 
Areas based on a single or narrow range of industries tend to expand rapidly but then contract 
just as quickly.  The extreme example is a gold rush town, and it is no coincidence that Briggs 
called Middlesbrough, the town at the centre of the Cleveland iron industry, the ‘British 
Ballarat’.2  Yet Cleveland’s industry did not evaporate almost as quickly as it had appeared.  In 
part this was due to the abundance of the iron and coal resources, but it was more than this.  
Industrial districts are often seen as passing through a life cycle in which, after the initial take-
                                            
1
 Cleveland and Teesside are often used interchangeably.  In this study Cleveland will normally refer to 
the iron and steel industry that initially developed from, and depended on, Cleveland ironstone.  Teesside 
will usually be used for the geographical area where the industry developed, including the towns of 
Middlesbrough, Stockton and Hartlepool.  Darlington is not taken to be part of Teesside.     
2
 A. Briggs, ‘Middlesbrough: the growth of a new community’, originally published in Victorian Cities 
(London, 1963) and reprinted in A.J. Pollard (ed.), Middlesbrough: Town and Community, 1830-1950 
(Middlesbrough, 1996), p. 10. 
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off and rapid expansion stages, the growth trajectory levels off as districts mature.  Maturity 
may then give way to decline as changes in supply conditions, technology or demand shift the 
balance of advantage to other districts.  Similarly, there may be non-economic factors that have 
economic effects, including legal changes or shifts in attitudes towards business that affect 
entrepreneurial effort.  But decline is not inevitable.  Thus the other principal aim of the thesis is 
to consider whether and how well Cleveland’s iron and steel industry made the transition to a 
more mature sector after the early stages of development and initial prosperity had passed.  That 
is, it is proposed to examine how Cleveland’s firms responded to changing external 
circumstances and how the responses extended the district’s life cycle. 
 
 
1.2 Relationship to previous studies  
 
This examination of Cleveland’s iron and steel industry draws on three discernible but 
overlapping areas of research.  First is the work on the importance of networks and clusters to 
the history of industrial districts, as exemplified by the studies in Wilson and Popp’s Industrial 
Clusters and Regional Business Networks in England.
3
  Second, and closely related, are the 
histories of local and regional economic development in north east England, such as those by 
Kirby, Orde, Cookson, Yasumoto and Milne.
4
  The third area is the extensive and long-standing 
debate on the performance of Britain’s iron and steel sector, an issue that is almost as old as the 
industry itself.
5
 
 
Many network and cluster studies emphasise agglomeration economies and the importance of 
trust, and both aspects are prominent in this work.
6
  A more general framework for analysing 
networks, proposed in a series of articles by Wilson, Popp, Toms and Filatotchev, relates 
network features to two underlying factors.
7
  One is the degree of openness and hence 
                                            
3
 J.F. Wilson, and A. Popp, (eds.), Industrial Clusters and Regional Business Networks in England, 1750 
– 1970, (Aldershot, 2003). 
4
 M.W. Kirby, Men of Business and Politics (London, 1984); M.W. Kirby, The Origins of Railway 
Enterprise (Cambridge, 1994); A. Orde, Religion, Business and Society in North East England: The 
Pease Family of Darlington in the Nineteenth Century (Stamford, 2000); G. Cookson, ‘Quaker families 
and business networks in nineteenth-century Darlington’, Quaker Studies, 8 (2004); G. Cookson, ‘Quaker 
networks and the industrial development of Darlington, 1780-1870’, in Wilson and Popp, Industrial 
Clusters, pp.155-73; M. Yasumoto, Victorian Ironopolis: Middlesbrough and Regional Industrialization 
(Woodbridge, 2011); G.J. Milne, North East England, 1850-1914:the Dynamics of a Maritime-Industrial 
Region (Woodbridge, 2006). 
5
 For full references see notes 14 to 16 below and Chapter 4. 
6
 For agglomeration economies see Yasumoto, Victorian Ironopolis, pp. 41-51; on trust see M.C. Casson, 
‘An economic approach to regional business networks’ in Wilson and Popp (eds.), Industrial Clusters, pp. 
19-43. 
7
 Wilson and Popp (eds.), Industrial Clusters; A. Popp, S. Toms and J. Wilson, ‘Industrial districts as 
organizational environments: resources, networks and structures’, University of York Department of 
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accountability of firms to outsiders, principally investors, which in turn is determined by firms’ 
dependence on external resources; in general, the higher the degree of dependence, the more 
transparent and accountable the network.  The second factor is the resource base of firms.  This 
may be extensive, where there are technologically determined internal economies of scale and 
economies of scope; or narrow, where specialised firms benefit from external economies as a 
result of geographical proximity.  Both factors can vary along a continuum, giving rise to 
networks with different characteristics and with developments in either or both producing 
changes in the nature of the networks.  The framework is therefore dynamic and has 
implications for economic performance; it may be used to explain the evolution of industries 
and districts over time and to investigate whether networks facilitate or impede transition and 
adaptation.  Using this approach, Toms and Filatotchev have provided a cogent analysis of the 
rise and slow decline of the Lancashire cotton industry.
8
  The present study concentrates on the 
contribution of networks to the early stages of an industrial cluster’s development, emphasising 
the importance of networks for the transmission of information and incentives and their 
relationship to trust and to family and religious groups.  But it may also be seen as another case 
study that provides further evidence on whether it is possible to explain the workings of 
networks in a general model. 
 
As a case study, this investigation also adds to the work of Kirby, Cookson and Orde on the 
contribution of Quaker business-cum-family networks to the development of industry in north 
east England.
9
  By contrast with the earlier studies, with their concentration on family 
businesses and on early railway development, this case looks at the growth of a staple industry 
in a new industrial district.  Moreover, the area and period under consideration are extended 
beyond those investigated in Yasumoto’s recent examination of Middlesbrough to encompass 
the wider district of Teesside as well as to incorporate the transition to steel after the ending of 
the dominance of iron in the 1880s.
10
 
 
In another recent study Milne combined the approaches of maritime with industrial and regional 
history to consider whether the North East – defined as stretching from the southern edge of 
urban Teesside to the northern limit of the Northumberland coalfield, and from the coast to the 
                                                                                                                                
Management Studies Working Paper no. 22, (York, 2006); S. Toms, S. and I. Filatotchev, ‘Networks, 
corporate governance and the decline of the Lancashire textile industry’ in Wilson and Popp (eds.), 
Industrial Clusters, pp. 68-89; S. Toms, S. and I. Filatotchev, ‘Corporate governance, business strategy, 
and dynamics of networks: a theoretical model and application to the British cotton industry, 1830-1980’, 
Organisation Studies, 25 (2004), pp. 629-51. 
8
 Toms and Filatotchev, ‘Networks’, pp. 76-89; Toms and Filatotchev, ‘Corporate governance’, pp. 637-
46. 
9
 Kirby, Men of Business; Kirby, Origins; Orde, Religion, Business and Society; Cookson, ‘Quaker 
families’; Cookson, ‘Quaker networks’. 
10
 Yasumoto, Ironopolis. 
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western edge of the Durham coalfield – constituted a cohesive and identifiable region.11  
Unsurprisingly, Milne stressed the importance of the port districts on the three principal rivers – 
Tees, Wear and Tyne – and of Hartlepool, as separate foci of economic activity rather than the 
region being an integrated maritime-industrial complex: ‘(the) individual riparian districts 
seem… to have offered sufficiently effective and coherent clusters for the purpose of the 
maritime-oriented economy…Those centres of activity …(were) “meso”-spaces, far more 
important than the North East as a whole’12  A detailed investigation of one of these (Teesside) 
through one industry (iron and steel) contributes additional detail to Milne’s broader approach, 
not least because Milne’s emphasis was on shipbuilding and coal.  An analysis of the early 
formation of the Cleveland cluster also offers an opportunity to identify the balance of influence 
between local, regional and wider national networks in establishing the new industrial district, 
and thus determine whether there were any identifiable North East regional networks operating 
at that time.  And by considering the later transition, it is possible to evaluate Milne’s claim that 
it was ‘riparian geography’ that drove the merger movement among iron and steel companies at 
the turn of the century.
13
   
 
In fact, Milne, like Yasumoto, had little to say about the transition from iron to steel and from 
small to large firms in the Cleveland iron and steel cluster.  It is through an examination of 
changes such as these that the current study aims to extend earlier work and in doing so explain 
how an industry’s and thus an industrial district’s prosperity may be sustained in the face of 
external and internal challenges.  The challenges, which came after about twenty-five years of 
growth, were primarily due to the combined technological and market pressures that arose from 
advances in bulk steel production.  In addition there was growing international competition 
along with considerable change in the inter-related areas of the legal, financial and 
organisational framework within which business operated.  By investigating the responses of 
Cleveland’s iron and steel firms to these changes the study addresses some of the recurring 
issues both in the performance of Britain’s iron and steel industry, and more generally in 
Britain’s economy in the last quarter of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth 
centuries.  In particular these include the impact of changes in corporate legislation and in the 
financial markets; the widespread, but not unanimous, view that technologically Britain’s firms 
lagged behind their German and US rivals; and the more general proposition that there was a 
decline in the ‘industrial spirit’ which was reflected not only in technological backwardness, but 
also in a failure to make the organisational and market-orientated adjustments necessary to 
modernise business.   
                                            
11
 Milne, North East England, p. 7. 
12
 Ibid., p. 202. 
13
 Ibid., pp. 196-7. 
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The approach here relies on a detailed investigation of the technological knowledge available to, 
and decisions made by, firms rather than neoclassical economics-based international 
productivity comparisons.  It complements, but also questions, the earlier industry-wide studies, 
such as Burn’s and Allen’s damning judgements on entrepreneurial performance, and the highly 
critical firm-based research of Boyce and Abé.
14
  By looking at Cleveland, the study adds a 
district dimension to the reappraisals of the industry by McCloskey, Tolliday and Wengenroth, 
and one that is broadly supportive of their revisionist conclusions, i.e. entrepreneurialism had 
not deserted the most important Teesside firms in the years before 1914.
15
  It is not suggested 
that a study of Cleveland iron and steel is able to provide definitive answers to all aspects of 
industrial performance; after all, it was just one part of a major national industry, albeit a large 
one accounting for between one-fifth and one-quarter of the bulk iron and steel output.  
Nevertheless, an examination of a segment of the industry offers additional evidence with which 
to make a more detailed and balanced assessment of its performance. 
 
 
1.3 Plan of the work 
 
Following the two main aims, viz. to examine the contribution of business networks to the early 
growth of the Cleveland iron industry, and then the transition the industry made from the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, the thesis is divided into two parts.  The chapters in Part 1 
look at the role of networks in the process of industrial growth and clustering.  Chapter 2 briefly 
reviews the explanations for the initial development of the industry in Cleveland.  Earlier 
studies have tended to emphasise the locational advantages of the proximity to natural resources 
and the availability of railway transport and harbour facilities that were enhanced by the effects 
of clustering as firms in closely related industries benefitted from agglomeration economies.  
These were, and are, powerful forces, but in the chapter it is suggested that Cleveland’s 
development could have taken a different course.  What underlay its particular path were the 
pre-existing business networks in the region and it was these that encouraged the clustering of 
the industry.  The concepts of networks and clusters, how they contribute to growth and how 
they are related to cluster formation are examined in the rest of the chapter.  It is proposed that 
                                            
14
 D. Burn, The Economic History of Steelmaking, 1867-1939: A Study in Competition (Cambridge, 
1961), first published in 1940; R. Allen, ‘International comparisons in iron and steel, 1850-1913’, Journal 
of Economic History 39 (1979), pp. 911-37; G. Boyce, ‘The development of the Cargo Fleet Iron 
Company, 1900-14: entrepreneurship, costs, and structural rigidity in the Northeast coast steel industry’, 
BHR, 63, (1989), pp. 839-75; E. Abé, ‘The technological strategy of a leading iron and steel firm, 
Bolckow Vaughan & Co Ltd: late Victorian industrialists did fail’, BH, 38 (1996), pp. 45-76.  
15
 D. N. McCloskey, Economic Maturity and Entrepreneurial Decline: British Iron and Steel, 1870-1913 
(Cambridge MA, 1973); S. Tolliday, ‘Competition and maturity in the British steel industry’, in E. Abe 
and Y. Suzuki (eds.), Changing Patterns of International Rivalry: Some Lessons from the Steel Industry 
(Tokyo: 1991); U. Wengenroth, Enterprise and Technology (Cambridge, 1994). 
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although clustering can generate growth that is self-sustaining, there needs to be some means 
through which signals about opportunities are transmitted and resources made available.  It is 
the linkages between entrepreneurs and businesses, i.e. the networks, that provide the essential 
information channels. 
 
Chapter 3 applies these ideas to the growth of Cleveland’s iron industry up to 1880 by 
investigating the characteristics and backgrounds of the investors and entrepreneurs who entered 
the district during this period.  The data is drawn from a sample of firms that is as close as 
possible to the population of iron and engineering businesses.  In total, useable data have been 
identified for 130 firms, and by examining the nature of the firms setting up in Cleveland, it is 
possible to provide a measure of the clustering process in the industry based on business 
formation.  The data also indicates that most of the new entrants were linked to at least one of 
four groups.  Foremost among these was the railway, coal, banking and Middlesbrough Estate 
interests of two Darlington-based Quaker families, the Peases and Backhouses.  These 
connections are further illustrated by a series of short histories of some of the firms and 
ironmasters who set up in Cleveland.  How effective these networks were in promoting 
expansion through attracting new entry is almost impossible to measure as it is not possible to 
predict what would have happened in their absence.  However, an attempt is made to assess the 
contribution of networks indirectly.  To do this the final section of Chapter 3 tests a logistical 
regression model that relates business survival to Quaker network membership and other 
characteristics.  On the assumption that longer-lived firms contribute more to growth than short-
lived ones, the results offer some evidence that Quaker-linked firms had a distinct and positive 
impact.  The test, however, is not able to distinguish efficient from inefficient firms, and thus 
not able to determine the impact of the network on overall efficiency. 
 
In Part 2 the focus switches from growth and development to the transition of a mature industry 
and district.  To set the context for Cleveland, Chapter 4 reviews and assesses the literature on 
the performance of Britain’s iron and steel industry as a whole.  The sector is often seen as a 
prime example of relative industrial decline, exhibiting the effects of a waning in 
entrepreneurial vigour or the outcome of an inappropriate institutional structure in the industry – 
relatively small, family-owned firms in a highly competitive market.
16
  The effect was to 
produce either a resistance to, or a constraint on, the adoption of new technology, business 
methods and organisational forms that were more readily embraced in the US and Germany.  
With lower productivity and the wrong technology – mainly the failure to exploit the basic 
Bessemer steel process as in Germany and hard-driving and mechanisation in America – 
                                            
16
 For example see B. Elbaum, ‘The steel industry before World War 1’, in B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick 
(eds.), The Decline of the British Economy (Oxford, 1986), pp. 51-81.   
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Britain’s industry lost its lead to its two larger rivals.  However, as is pointed out, there is some 
disagreement over such highly critical judgements, especially over the reasons for thinking that 
the technological choices were entirely inefficient or unjustifiable.  Comparative studies of 
relative productivity levels and growth often show a lag in British performance, with the effect 
of ever-rising imports.  But when the trade data is measured in value rather than volume terms, 
it is clear the industry’s position remained strong and the balance of trade healthy in a difficult 
international environment characterised by protection and dumping. 
 
Chapter 5 assesses the effects of changes in corporate legislation on the organisation and 
financing of firms.  The freer access to incorporation and to launching joint stock companies 
that followed the Joint Stock Acts of 1855, 1856 and 1862 is often associated with providing 
firms with an improved means of raising finance for capital investment.  Indeed, in some 
explanations, it was the pressure for greater funds as capital requirements of industry increased 
that supplied the impetus for the changes.  In Cleveland, however, there were a variety of 
reasons for incorporation, ranging from the need to raise funds for capital projects, to re-floating 
failed businesses, or more basically obtaining the protection of limited liability.  And for some, 
a public flotation enabled the original partners to liquidate their capital without losing control of 
the business, as is illustrated in the case of Bolckow Vaughan.  Detailed studies of two of the 
industry’s largest incorporated firms also investigate how use was made of the developing 
equity and debt securities markets.  It is therefore possible to consider whether capital 
investment, and thus the adoption of new technology, modernisation and expansion were 
constrained by restricted access to sources of finance.  In this way, the study adds some 
additional evidence to the role of the financial system in promoting or retarding economic 
growth. 
 
It was the failure to adopt new technology that is the focus of much of the criticisms of the 
British iron and steel during this period.  Chapter 6 therefore looks at one aspect of the debate – 
the choices Cleveland producers made as steel began to replace wrought iron from the 1870s.  
The aim is to assess whether, and if so why, iron and steel firms were slow to adjust to major 
shifts in production technology, and whether this hampered transition in Cleveland.  Problems 
of using Cleveland pig iron in steel production hindered the changeover to steel considerably as 
the presence of impurities in the iron, especially phosphorus, made both acid Bessemer and acid 
open hearth processes infeasible.  Cleveland’s firms, however, were quick to respond using 
imported hematite ore for acid open hearth furnaces and also in developing the basic Bessemer 
process.  Nevertheless, these were essentially temporary solutions; it was the development of 
the basic open hearth method that provided the longer-term answer.  The chapter demonstrates 
that far from being neglectful, or tardy in their decision to adopt it, there was interest across the 
19 
 
British steel industry in applying the basic process to the open hearth furnace from an early 
stage.  Some of Cleveland’s firms not only made a contribution to the developments that 
enabled Cleveland iron to be used in the process, they also invested in large scale production as 
soon as it became technically feasible and profitable. 
 
An important aspect of the transition of the Cleveland’s iron and steel industry was the 
increasing concentration of the sector into fewer, larger firms, either through internal growth, 
acquisition, or a combination of the two.  Chapter 7 presents a case study of Dorman Long, 
which became not only one of the largest firms in Cleveland, but also in Britain.  Its growth was 
part of the combination movement of the 1890s and early 1900s, the effect of which has been 
subject to considerable criticism as many of the businesses that were formed out of the mergers 
were neither reorganised nor restructured.  In some cases the resulting companies were almost a 
haphazard collection of independent firms lacking strategic direction.  The examination of 
Dorman Long, however, indicates there were strategic elements to its growth.  Part of this was 
to integrate operations vertically as the original steel company acquired iron smelting capacity 
and mineral resources; it also diversified its final output from girders and steel plate to wire, 
construction and bridge building.  But alongside the expansion there were organisational and 
managerial changes put in place to control the larger and more diverse enterprise.  These 
marked the beginnings of a group identity among the three main component companies of 
Dorman Long even though the subsidiaries remained nominally separate.  Moreover, there were 
considerable advances in the firm’s approach to marketing, with the company taking steps to 
exert increasing control over the distribution of its products and obtain direct access to 
customers.  Before 1914 these organisational developments were not on the scale or of the 
scope of the Chandler-type strategy that occurred in American manufacturing, but they marked 
a shift to a more corporate form of enterprise among a number of Cleveland’s iron and steel 
firms.
17
   
 
The concluding chapter (Chapter 8) proposes a way of looking at the clustering and growth 
process that gives a central role to business networks.  There is also an assessment of the 
performance of Cleveland’s iron and steel firms and their contribution to the transition and 
sustainability of the industry in the district.  It is suggested that rather than marking the 
beginnings of decline, the evidence from a number of firms shows that there was a willingness 
to adopt new technology and methods of production when appropriate, to look for new markets 
and products, to expand businesses through acquisitions and internal growth, and to make 
organisational changes.  In short, while the vitality of the early iron industry may have faded in 
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some firms, there remained plenty of entrepreneurial vigour in others to maintain the dynamism 
of the sector; in general the industrialists had not failed. 
 
 
1.4 Limitations and omissions 
 
The history of an industry or district is the product of many influences, but it is not possible or 
necessary to include all aspects of Cleveland’s development in this thesis.  Four major areas 
have been omitted from consideration.  First, there is the labour market.  Owing to the newness 
and rapid growth of Cleveland’s industry, there was no pre-existing pool of labour on which 
firms could draw.  Consequently, labour supply was closely associated with substantial 
population movements and is therefore most appropriately analysed by the methods of 
demographic historians.  Yasumoto for instance, using record linkages to follow population 
movements between censuses, has demonstrated the substantial turnover levels in 
Middlesbrough as a result of high rates of both in- and out-migration.
18
  The effect, while 
beneficial in the expansionary stage, may have been deleterious for longer-term growth as there 
was a reduced incentive for workers to acquire skills and for firms to provide training.  On the 
other hand, with a Board of Arbitration and Conciliation established in 1869 and the 
introduction of a sliding scale for the determination of wages, the industrial relations system in 
the district gave rise to relative industrial peace for much of the period.
19
 
 
Second, the discussion of technological advance in Chapter 6 focuses on the development of the 
processes for bulk steel production, especially by the basic open hearth method.  There were, of 
course, many other technical changes in the industry, ranging from blast furnace design and 
practice to the mechanisation and electrification of production, and the rate at which these were 
adopted had a substantial impact on the relative performance of firms in Cleveland.   However, 
as a principal aim of the thesis is to investigate the transition of Cleveland’s industry from iron 
to steel that was so crucial to the district’s continued prosperity after the 1870, it is the 
technology of steel production that warrants special attention. 
 
Third, there is no analysis of the extent and effects of collusion or cartel agreements.  There 
were many attempts to control prices and production, but as McCloskey has noted, these were 
largely short-lived and unsuccessful, and the industry was ‘substantially competitive’ at the 
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regional and national level.
20
  For the purposes of the present study, therefore, it is assumed that 
collusive agreements in Cleveland, e.g. by members of the Cleveland Iron Masters Association, 
or between Cleveland firms and those elsewhere had little overall impact on the district’s 
development. 
 
Fourth, in the analysis of business networks in Chapters 2 and 3 the emphasis is on the fact that 
entrepreneurs, investors and their firms were connected in some way rather than on the 
attributes of any particular network.  Thus, when examining the Quaker-based business network 
centred on Darlington, which it will be argued, played a central role in the early growth of the 
Cleveland industry, the proposition that there were special Quaker characteristics that made 
their approach to business particularly efficient or effective is not explored.  Indeed, as Cookson 
has shown, there are good reasons for thinking that ‘[these attributes] were largely mythical and 
have been over-rated as a general phenomenon.’21 
 
 
1.5 Sources    
 
As there have been many studies of Britain’s and Cleveland’s iron and steel industry, some of 
this thesis is based on a re-examination of previously researched material.  For the business 
records of Cleveland companies the most important source was the British Steel Collection at 
Teesside Archives, formerly Corus Records and, prior to privatisation, part of BSC’s Northern 
Records Centre.  The collection contains extensive records of the companies based on Teesside, 
principally Dorman Long and South Durham Steel, when the industry was nationalised (1967), 
along with the firms’ subsidiaries and the businesses acquired since the beginnings of the 
industry.  Recent re-cataloguing (2007-11) has made access to the archive easier and revealed 
some previously un-investigated or overlooked material. 
 
The data on business formation, entry into Cleveland, incorporation and failure used in Chapters 
3 and 5 have been assembled from a variety of sources.  In addition to the British Steel 
Collection, archival sources include Teesside Archives’ Index of Teesside Businesses, the 
Industrial and Engineering Company Records collection also at Teesside Archives and the 
National Archives Records of Defunct Companies (BT31). However, the surviving records of 
many of the smaller firms are limited, especially those that were partnerships, but also for most 
of the larger companies before incorporation.  The archival sources therefore have been 
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supplemented by business directories, previously (often privately) published company histories 
and local newspaper reports available from the 19
th
 Century British Library Newspapers and 
Middlesbrough Central Library’s newspaper collection.  As a result the data posed a number of 
significant difficulties including: the identification of partners; the formation and closure dates 
of businesses; and even the precise nature of firms’ output.  This was often made more difficult 
as iron firms were frequently referred to by the name of the works rather than the business 
operating them, a problem that was exacerbated when works changed hands or businesses 
changed names as new partners were taken on, or old ones retired and the partnership 
reconfigured.  There are also inaccuracies over, and confusion between, firms and plants with 
similar names in both newspaper reports and earlier histories.  Consequently, much of the data 
have been pieced together from several sources and is often incomplete, especially in the case of 
small businesses’ financial details.  Even for incorporated and the larger businesses, there is 
considerable variability in detail available.  As Cookson has recorded, the files for some 
dissolved companies in BT31 no longer exist.
22
  Where annual reports, directors’ minutes and 
other company files are accessible, they are more detailed for some companies than for others, 
and there are often significant differences in the type of information that has survived.  For Bell 
Brothers, for instance, detailed cost and output data for iron production are available from the 
1870s but there is no equivalent for Dorman Long’s steel production.  For these reasons it has 
been impossible to obtain a consistent sample, and the composition of the samples of firms 
analysed and included in the tables and graphs varies throughout the study.  A list of firms with 
the data sources is provided in Appendix 1, including those that have been identified but for 
which there are no records available. 
 
Technical details on the development of steel processes and statistics on production and plant 
have been drawn from the publications of the iron and steel and engineering industry 
organisations.  Chief among these are the journals of the professional institutes, the Iron and 
Steel Institute (ISI), Cleveland Institution of Engineers (CIE), Institution of Civil Engineers 
(ICE) and Institution of Mechanical Engineers (IME), as well as the publications of the trade 
organisations, the British Iron Trade Association (BITA) and the National Federation of Iron 
and Steel Manufacturers (NFISM).  For some products, notably iron, a complete set of output 
data are available at regional and national level, and are subdivided by product type – hematite, 
Cleveland and basic pig iron.  For manufactured iron and for steel, however, variations from 
year to year in the level of detail that was published has meant that it has not been possible to 
construct a series disaggregated by region and process over the period studied.  Lastly, the other 
                                            
22
 G. Cookson, ‘The Public Record Office and the record of limited companies: some problems and 
issues’, Association of Business Historians website: http://www.abh-net.org/archive9.htm (last accessed: 
12 Mar. 2013). 
23 
 
major sources drawn on include the weekly trade journal Iron and Coal Trades Review (ICTR), 
published from 1868 and several official reports into the industry, e.g. Royal Commission into 
the Causes of the Depression in Trade (1886). 
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Part 1: Growth and Development 
 
Chapter 2: Conceptual Issues in Business Networks and Industrial Clusters 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The discovery of the main ironstone seam in the Eston Hills in 1850 marks the beginning of the 
startling and dramatic growth of the Cleveland iron industry.  By the mid-1860s pig iron output 
on Teesside was almost half a million tons, 10 per cent of the UK’s total (1865).  Just eight 
years later, in 1873, the district was the country’s largest producer, with production of 1.2 
million tons, 17 per cent of UK output, and by the end of the decade it had risen to one-fifth.
23
  
With some 46 blast furnaces and 160 puddling furnaces spitting sparks and flames, and belching 
smoke and fumes along the banks of the River Tees and almost into the towns,  it was with good 
reason that Gladstone, on his visit in 1861, referred to Middlesbrough as the ‘infant Hercules’.24 
Indeed, in barely 25 years the area had seen not only the creation of a major new iron producing 
centre, but also a significant local cluster of iron related industries including railway 
engineering, shipbuilding, bridge building and design, and other engineering trades.  Table 2.1 
and Figure 2.1 provide two basic measure of the expansion – the output of the pig iron and the 
populations of the two major towns on Teesside.   
 
This rapid acceleration stands in sharp contrast to the district’s early development.  The town 
was the focus of industrialisation, Middlesbrough, was established in 1830 as a port for shipping 
coal brought down from the South Durham coalfield by the Stockton and Darlington Railway 
(S&DR).
 25
   Concerned about the navigational problems of the river to Stockton, some of the 
main investors in the railway, led by the Quaker businessman and banker Joseph Pease, along 
with a group of other Quaker investors, bought the 520 acre Middlesbrough estate for £30,000. 
On the land located downstream from Stockton on the south bank of the river, the Owners of the 
Middlesbrough Estate, as they named their firm, established a port – Port Darlington – with coal 
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staithes to load the coal onto the ships.  At the same time the railway, bridging the Tees at 
Stockton, was extended to terminate at the new the town of Middlesbrough.  What had been a 
collection of no more than four houses before 1830 became a hamlet of 383 people by 1831, 
expanding to a small town a decade later, with a population of 5,709 (1841).
26
  This new town, 
sited on slightly higher ground above the marshes that lay along the banks of the river as it 
looped through several large meanders down the Tees valley towards the sea, was initially 
planned and laid out on a symmetrical grid.  Later development took a rather haphazard form as 
industry spread out along the river both to the east and west, and the town itself expanded 
southwards.  Other early industries besides the coal trade included a pottery (1834), a 
brickworks and some businesses associated with shipping (e.g. rope makers), along with a 
variety of local traders that might be expected to be found in a nascent town with a growing 
population.
27
  Iron and related industries such as engineering, particularly those connected with 
the railways, appeared in Middlesbrough from about 1840.  One of the most notable, at least 
with regard to future developments, was the partnership between Henry Bolckow and John 
Vaughan, who opened a malleable ironworks in 1841.  Development remained relatively slow 
and narrowly focused, however, and it was not until the Bolckow and Vaughan partnership 
started to exploit the ironstone deposits near Middlesbrough, blowing-in their first blast furnace 
in 1851, that Cleveland’s growth finally took-off. 
 
In 1850 therefore there was a sharp improvement in Cleveland’s fortunes.  The standard 
interpretation is that it marked a distinct break with the immediate past, or as Bullock put it, ‘a 
major historical discontinuity’.28   This chapter briefly reviews the explanations that have been 
put forward to account for the development of Cleveland’s iron industry (Section 2.2), and it 
argued that some important aspects of the growth process have been omitted from earlier 
accounts.  In particular it is suggested that industrialisation of the district was not solely a 
product of its resource endowments, but that pre-existing business networks guided and 
coordinated development.  The notion that business networks make an essential contribution to 
economic activity has become increasingly widespread.  They have been used to explain the 
success or otherwise of anything from individual entrepreneurs and businesses to the growth 
and development of industrial sectors, districts and regions.
29
  The main conceptual issues in 
business networks and the relationship with industrial clusters are set out in Sections 2.3 to 2.6 
as a prelude to a fuller examination of Cleveland’s growth in the next chapter.  Section 2.7 
offers a brief conclusion. 
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Table 2.1: Pig Iron Output, 1854-84 (thousand tons) 
 
North Riding 
of  Yorkshire UK 
NRY  
per cent of 
UK 
NRY 
percentage 
change  
UK 
percentage  
change   
1854 101 3,070 3.3 - - 
1859 216 3,713 5.8 113.9 20.90 
1864 409 4,768 8.6 89.4 28.40 
1869 766 5,446 14.1 87.3 14.20 
1874 1,158 5,991 19.3 51.2 10.00 
1879 1,210 5,995 20.2 4.5 0.07 
1884 1,729 7,812 22.1 42.9 30.30 
Note: As some of County Durham’s production can be classified as part of the Cleveland district, North 
Riding of Yorkshire (NRY) data tend to understate the output for Cleveland. 
Source: Mitchell, Historical Statistics, pp. 281-3. 
 
Figure 2.1: Population of Middlesbrough and Stockton, 1831-81 
 
Source: Census data from North, Economic Heritage, pp. 147-64. 
 
2.2 Explanations 
 
A standard supply-side explanation for Cleveland’s development is that it was an inevitable 
consequence of the geological and geographical conditions that gave iron production in the 
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district a significant cost advantage over other areas.  The presence of a vast and easily 
workable deposit of ironstone so close to the Tees was a ‘geological accident’, which, in 
conjunction with a easily accessible sources of coal and limestone provided the essential 
ingredients for an iron industry.
30
  In addition, by the mid-nineteenth century the usual 
economic-cum-geographical factors associated with industrialisation were in place: the railway 
network, a growing coal trade based on a well-established mining industry, port facilities, a few 
local iron and engineering firms and a rapidly growing town with space for industry and 
population to expand.   That the development of Cleveland was entirely predictable is a far from 
uncommon view and one with a long history, as shown by Frey (1929), Gleave (1938) and Isard 
(1948) among others.
31
 
 
A complementary explanation emphasises demand conditions.  Iron, as the fundamental 
material of mid-Victorian industry, faced high and rising demand, especially as the railway 
systems in Britain and abroad were initially developed and then extended.  Thus for Bullock 
growth was essentially export-led, sustained by the expansion of both home and overseas 
markets.
32
  Putting supply and demand together, the development of Cleveland can be seen as a 
serendipitous co-incidence, both temporally and spatially, of natural locational advantages, 
transport infrastructure and the necessary demand conditions.   
 
In the mid-nineteenth century, however, there were numerous disadvantages to siting an iron 
industry in the lower Tees valley.  The river was shallow and difficult to navigate; the land 
marshy and unsuitable for building without reclamation; there was no labour force to speak of; 
and the railway infrastructure was limited.  It is possible therefore to argue that the development 
of a major industry in the district was far from inevitable.  Indeed, following the discovery of 
the ironstone there were other possible routes for the exploitation of Cleveland’s resources. One 
was for the ore to be exported and processed elsewhere.  This was the approach adopted by 
Palmers, the Jarrow shipbuilders when they built Port Mulgrave to ship ore to their blast 
furnaces on the Tyne.
33
  Bell Brothers similarly transported Cleveland ore to their furnaces at 
Walker on the Tyne and at Washington on the Wear.
34
  Another possibility was to smelt and 
export pig iron from Teesside without the corresponding development of iron processing and 
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other ancillary industries.  A contrast can be made here between Cleveland and the early 
Lincolnshire iron industry that developed after 1864. Because of institutional factors and a lack 
of an extensive network of interrelated business interests, a substantial iron and steel using 
industry failed to take root in Lincolnshire in the way that it did on Teesside.
35
  Most of the 
output of the Scunthorpe-based industry was exported out of the region as semi-manufactured 
goods – pig iron and steel ingots – for finishing elsewhere.  This also occurred at Whitby, where 
there were two iron smelting works inland at Glaisdale and Grosmont.  These plants produced 
pig iron only and exported their output through the port, and later by rail.
36
 A third possibility is 
that there was at least one alternative site for the industry to develop – Hartlepool.   At the time 
of the discovery of the main iron deposits, the coal trade in Middlesbrough was under 
significant challenge from Hartlepool; the town had just as good railway links to the coalfields 
and superior harbour potential.  The riverside sites at Middlesbrough and along the Tees were 
therefore not necessarily the obvious local choice for the industry.   
 
An additional supply-side element in the industry’s and district’s growth was needed and one 
explanation that has been offered is that it was provided by the entrepreneurial efforts of a few 
men of great energy and vision who encouraged or set up their businesses in the new industrial 
area.  This ‘industrial heroes’ interpretation in the Samuel Smiles vein is exemplified by J.S 
Jean’s Pioneers of the Cleveland Iron Trade (1875) and H.G. Reid’s Middlesbrough’s Jubilee 
(1881), and in the twentieth century by Gott’s biography of Henry Bolckow.37  And once the 
development began, Cleveland benefitted from the effects of clustering as firms in the same and 
related industries located close together.  As Yasumoto has shown, this was not just a result of 
the duplication of iron smelting capacity, although there was that; it also occurred through the 
specialisation of firms in different stages of the production of iron goods, some (limited) 
diversification, the creation of supporting institutions – the warrant stores, the iron exchange, 
technical institutes and ironmasters’ organisation – and the dissemination of technical advances 
between firms in the area.
38
  The benefits, stemming from the resulting agglomeration or 
external economies, meant that the (cost) advantages of the location were cumulative; as 
Teesside grew it developed the conditions necessary for the sustained expansion of an integrated 
and interdependent group of industries and firms. 
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The combination of locational advantages, clustering and astute entrepreneurial decisions offers 
a cogent explanation for the creation of Cleveland’s iron industry and its subsequent expansion.  
This chapter and the next, however, suggest that these factors miss some important aspects of 
the development process and that neither impersonal market forces nor the vision of a few 
businessmen can fully account for the pattern of expansion.  It is argued that the reason why 
Cleveland’s industrial history did not take one of the alternative courses was primarily because 
of the entrepreneurial decisions made at the time, but that it was not so much the individual 
entrepreneurs who were important, but how their activities were guided and coordinated through 
the linkages that existed, and which were later created, in the industry.  That is, central to the 
investment decisions that led to industrial development was the operation of the business 
networks.  These networks stimulated development by transmitting information and incentives 
that at first drew the iron firms and entrepreneurs to the district and later provided the 
mechanism for the creation of a more diversified and sustainable industrial cluster. 
 
The remainder of this chapter examines some of the underlying analysis of business networks 
and how they contribute to economic activity.  In particular it considers the role networks play 
in the process of growth, and most especially in the development of industrial clusters.  It is 
suggested that networks are an important aspect of the growth of an industrial cluster as they act 
as the channels through which information about business opportunities are disseminated, 
incentives transmitted and resources organised.  Understanding the role of business networks 
therefore adds the detail to the explanations of what triggers the start of a cluster, what causes it 
to grow and whether it survives and adapts or declines.
39
 
 
 
2.3 Networks and Theory 
 
A business network is essentially a description of the connections between businesses, the 
people in businesses, or between individual entrepreneurs who are known to each other.  What 
is important is not so much the connections per se, but the nature of the connections, how and 
why these arise, and the underlying theoretical explanations of what benefits networks provide 
their members and the wider economy.  A useful starting point is to consider the nature of 
impersonal market transactions. 
 
All traders incur costs in market transactions as they can never be certain that counter-parties 
will honour their side of contracts.  Prior to entering a contract it may be difficult to determine 
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the reliability or honesty of counter-parties or to distinguish the reliable, high quality ones from 
the unreliable.  After contracts have been signed it may also be costly to monitor and enforce 
their terms in order to ensure that goods are delivered, repayments made or the terms of the 
contract are not changed.  In other words, it is costly to eliminate the potential for opportunistic 
behaviour.  It is the existence of these transactions costs that has been used to explain why some 
activities are organised within firms rather than through market transactions.
40
  Although 
internalisation of market activities does not eliminate transactions costs, the relative costs of 
organising production through market exchanges compared to internal, bureaucratic 
organisation can be thought of as a major determinant of the boundaries of a business 
organisation. 
 
A business network can be seen as a way of organising transactions that lies somewhere along a 
spectrum between impersonal market exchange at one end and internal transactions within a 
firm at the other.  The central element, by definition, is that economic agents in the network are 
known to each other, or are at least closely connected to a member of the network, i.e. there is a 
‘web of relationships’.41  This reduces the cost of market transactions as the information on 
which decisions about trade are made is both easier to obtain and more reliable.  As Casson has 
emphasised, however, it is also crucial that members of the network trust each other.
42
  This can 
be defined more precisely as ‘warranted mutual trust’ – the trust that each member invests in 
others is justified and reciprocated.  The effect is to produce a ‘high trust’ equilibrium in which 
there is no incentive for anyone to change their beliefs about the trustworthiness of others in 
future dealings.  Consequently, each transaction confirms agents’ expectations about others in 
the network and this creates a climate in which further transactions are encouraged. 
 
The sources of trust are to be found in the social institutions and relationships that determine the 
interaction between members of a network.  These may be formal or informal.  Commonly cited 
examples include kinship groups, co-religionists, and the membership of other organisations and 
clubs, which may be connected with business (e.g. trade associations, chambers of commerce) 
or not, or at least not directly (e.g. freemasons, charities, fraternities, scientific, literary and 
philosophical societies and the like).  From a sociological perspective economic activity is 
embedded in the social structure, thus what is important in networks is how codes of behaviour 
and shared backgrounds, attitudes and values generate trust, and therefore influence the nature 
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and direction of business activity.
43
  Where there is a high degree of shared values and common 
identity, and the ties are close, then a high-trust culture is more likely to develop.  In turn, this is 
conducive to a greater frequency and variety of business transactions, and thus more economic 
activity, within the network than with outsiders. 
The importance of cultural and institutional factors for the operation of business networks and 
their effects on reducing transactions costs has been applied to a wide variety of cases.  It is 
especially powerful in finance, and this is easy to see why.  Moral hazard and adverse selection 
are potential problems in finance as the normal market mechanisms such as raising price 
(interest rates) to ration credit can have perverse effects.  Higher interest rates for example may 
induce hazardous behaviour by borrowers or make it more difficult to identify borrowers’ 
creditworthiness.  As a result lenders and investors may well look to non-market means of 
allocating funds, including giving preference to known customers, business associates, family 
members and so on.  For borrowers it may also be difficult to signal creditworthiness to lenders, 
and thus tapping funds through a network of family members or members of the same social 
group may often be the sole source of finance.  This is especially so in economies and financial 
systems at relatively early levels of development where there are no sophisticated or systematic 
ways of assessing credit risk. 
 
Two classic examples of the importance of social relationships that underpinned the provision 
of finance are the Lancashire cotton and West Riding of Yorkshire woollen textile industries in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
44
  In both of these there was a ‘web of credit’ 
connecting merchants and manufacturers that was cemented by inter-marriage, often 
membership of the same sect (e.g. the Unitarian church in Manchester) and other civic 
organisations.  Similarly, Prior and Kirby, and also Cookson, emphasise the importance of 
extended family contacts – the Quaker ‘cousinhood’ – as a source of credit for the financing of 
the Stockton and Darlington Railway (S&DR) and later the purchase of the Middlesbrough 
estate.
45
  This credit was not only highly personal, coming from family contacts within the 
Quaker community, but also geographically spread, stretching from Darlington to Norwich and 
London.  Another example is Lamoreaux’s study of banking in New England at the end of the 
                                            
43
 M. Granovetter, ‘Economic action and social structures: the problem of embeddedness’, American 
Journal of Sociology, 91 (1985), pp. 481-510; M. Granovetter, and R. Swedburg, The Sociology of 
Economic Life (Boulder, 1992). 
44
 P. Hudson, The Genesis of Industrial Capital: a study of the West Riding wool textile industry c.1750-
1850 (Cambridge, 1986); M.B. Rose, Firms, Networks and Business Values: The British and American 
Cotton Industries Since 1750, (Cambridge, 2000). 
45
 A. Prior and M.W. Kirby, ‘The Society of Friends and business culture, 1700-1830’, in D.J. Jeremy 
(ed.), Religion, Business and Wealth in Modern Britain (London, 1998), pp. 116-36; Kirby, Men of 
Business; M.W. Kirby, The Origins of Railway Enterprise (Cambridge, 1994); G. Cookson, ‘Quaker 
networks’, in Wilson and Popp, Industrial Clusters, pp.155-73; Cookson, ‘Quaker families’. 
32 
 
eighteenth century.
46
  She shows how early corporate banks were effectively ‘the financial arm 
of kinship groups’, with the major shareholders related by blood and marriage.  The banks 
raised funds for their owners (shareholders) to invest in their own industrial enterprises, often by 
selling stock to insurance companies and savings banks controlled by other family members.   
 
Although emphasis is often placed on transactions costs, i.e. the costs of opportunistic 
behaviour, these are not the only costs associated with market activity.
47
  More generally there 
are information costs, of which transactions costs are a subset.  These include the costs of 
collecting, monitoring and analysing market information, and are the basis for making decisions 
on investments, production, suppliers, pricing and so on.  One way of looking at the economy is 
to see it as a cybernetic system, that is, as a system of information flows.
48
  Successful 
entrepreneurs and firms are those who make the best use of the information available, spotting 
and acting on opportunities as they arise.  Indeed, Casson suggests that entrepreneurs can be 
regarded as specialist intermediaries in information.
49
  They link buyers with sellers, not just as 
brokers or market makers, but as organisers of finance, production and sales and even 
innovation.  Applying conventional economic reasoning, their success is ultimately dependent 
on minimising information costs without reducing the quality of decisions.  Alternatively, this 
could be restated as increasing the quality of information and decisions without raising costs; or, 
more generally, increasing the former greater than the latter. 
 
Business networks are important in this scheme since it is through the connections between 
businesses, customers, suppliers and others that information about profitable opportunities 
flows.  Information is not floating around somewhere in the ether, ready to be tapped, but 
generated as a result of contact between economic agents.  For an individual entrepreneur, 
success depends on how the information is used, but before that, how it is obtained or created; 
this is the familiar idea of networking to develop contacts and generate useful information.  The 
connections between people may well already exist, as in the membership of a religious group 
or part of an extended family, but these connections have to be developed and exploited if the 
information, and with it the flow of resources, are to result in an effective business network and 
successful enterprise.  In this view social connections are important not because they determine 
the nature of economic activity, the form of business organisation or the relationships between 
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them, as the sociological approach would suggest.  It is because they provide lower cost, more 
reliable and trustworthy sources of information.  As in the case of transactions costs, greater 
quantity and improved quality of information at lower cost raises the level of economic and 
business activity. 
 
From the perspective of the individual entrepreneur, business connections within a network are 
developed and used for private gain.  Social structures and institutions, however, exist 
independently of entrepreneurs and their businesses, and the strength of social ties within them 
is not dependent solely on the networking efforts of entrepreneurs.  Similarly, trust in such 
groupings is an attribute of the community and its benefits are available to all members.  For 
this reason, networks – defined as high trust linkages– and the formal and informal institutions 
that support them can be regarded as the social capital, social infrastructure or cultural assets of 
an economy.
50
 
 
There has been considerable research on the beneficial effects of social capital on business 
performance, economic growth and development, but there seem to be few satisfactory 
explanations of the precise link between them.  Zak and Knack have emphasised the impact of 
trust.  Higher levels of trust reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour which, by lowering 
transactions costs, generates a greater flow of savings and investment, and hence more growth.  
A simple cause and effect model is shown in Figure 2.2.
51
  Casson characteristically adopts a 
much more comprehensive model, suggesting that that there are beneficial effects both on 
economic efficiency (allocative) and on equity.  As in other approaches, however, the stress is 
more on the details of the connection between trust and economic behaviour than on the precise 
mechanism by which this produces faster growth.
52
 
 
One possible way of looking at the network – trust – growth link is to view social capital as akin 
to the physical capital infrastructure of an economy – its roads, railways, power supplies, 
communication systems and similar assets.  In a sense, these infrastructure investments are all 
networks, with the important common feature that there are major indivisibilities in setting them 
up.  Consequently, there are high fixed costs, but low operating costs.  The effect is that once 
established these assets exhibit significant increasing returns and thus reductions in unit cost as 
the number of users rises.  There are therefore network externalities in infrastructure 
investments: the more users there are in the network, the lower the cost not just to the marginal 
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user, but to existing users as well. The same is also the case as regards the benefits to users of 
networks as is clear from telephone systems, the internet or any other system.  The benefits rise 
as the number of users rises.   
 
In an analogous way to physical capital infrastructure, a business network in which there is a 
high degree of trust (high-trust culture or equilibrium) is accessible to all entrepreneurs and 
investors connected to the network.  And since the benefits of the network are available to all, it 
can be regarded as providing a positive externality or as having public goods attributes.  The 
better the network functions in terms of providing information, the greater the degree of trust; 
and the wider the set of linkages, the greater the will be the benefits to each individual member 
and to the wider economy.  These come in the form of the familiar benefits of: lower 
information costs; increased information flows about investment opportunities; improved access 
to resources, including finance to fund investment; easier coordination of inputs and economic 
activities; more risk taking; potentially greater commitment to risky ventures from partners in 
the network; and a greater ability to draw in new investors and entrepreneurs.  These benefits 
improve the quality of entrepreneurial decisions-making and produce higher levels of 
investment; therefore, rather like a physical infrastructure, the positive externalities associated 
with a business network can give rise to increasing returns.  Once given an initial trigger to start 
the investment process, further entrepreneurial activity can be induced and coordinated through 
the network, giving rise not only to initial economic development, but also to self-sustaining 
growth.  This process is represented in Figure 2.3; it shows a more complex explanation of 
growth than the simple trust model of Zak and Knack in Figure 2.2.  The network provides, a 
greater amount, better and more trustworthy information than is available through impersonal 
market signals.  Feedback effects that stimulate further growth occur as the industrial district 
develops and the network of interconnected businesses and entrepreneurs expands, generating 
both more investment opportunities and stimulating supply.  Furthermore, institutions develop 
to support the effectiveness of the networks’ operation, thus adding to the increasing returns 
effects.  It is precisely because of these increasing returns characteristics of networks that they 
are able to produce growth that results in more growth or, in other words, endogenous growth.
53
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Figure 2.2: Trust, transactions costs and growth (following Zak and Knack). 
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Figure 2.3: Business networks, social capital externality effects and growth 
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In short, business networks are of central importance as a conduit for the information flows that 
help in the organisation of production, and in entrepreneurial activity as a whole.  The nature of 
networks is such that as they grow and are accessed by more entrepreneurs then information 
costs fall and the benefits rise.  They are, however, essentially a supporting structure; the 
presence of a network does not explain fully the mechanism by which localised or regional 
economic development takes place or what may have provided the initial trigger.  
 
 
2.4 Location and Agglomeration Economies  
 
Why and how a localised industry grows in the first place to form an industrial district or cluster 
of firms specialising in related products can be explained by the particular advantages of the 
location.  In terms of basic economic theory, the region may have a comparative advantage in 
the production of certain goods, or in broader terms, a competitive advantage.  In general these 
advantages may stem from one of two sources: the first is that the location possesses specific 
natural resource advantages; and the second arises from the fact that when firms in an industry 
locate in close proximity there are additional advantages for all firms in the locality.  These are 
considered in turn.   
 
The traditional explanation for the location of industry, and indeed its localisation, is the 
presence of special natural resources or other natural conditions that are site-specific.  The 
common reasons include: mineral wealth and energy supplies; natural geographical features (a 
harbour); and the pre-existence of transport and communications systems.  In the economic 
geography approach to location, decisions are made principally with regard to minimising 
transport costs
54
.  A firm will choose to locate at a site where the overall costs resulting from the 
transport of inputs to the firm and outputs to the markets are at their lowest.  Clearly transport 
costs are not the only factor, and decisions will therefore take into account other costs that are 
affected by, or dependent on, location.  These will include such factors as the availability of low 
wage labour, land costs and the nature of the market, that is, whether it is spatially dispersed or 
concentrated.
55
  The degree of competition and the potential to exploit market power in the local 
market is another.
56
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At root, the site specific factors explanation is cost-based (with the exception of the Hotelling 
effect), since costs are determined by locational features specific to the site.  Given that all firms 
in an industry face similar requirements and costs, it is possible to explain the specialisation of a 
region in a particular industry or range of industries by these factors.  There are numerous 
examples of this; for instance shipbuilding on the Clyde, Tyne and Wear can be explained at 
least in part by the need for a sufficiently large river to site the shipyards and dry docks. 
 
Not all industrial clusters can be explained by these factors, however.  Some industries are 
footloose and not dependent on naturally occurring or pre-existing advantages, and rather than a 
single optimum site there may be numerous ones that provide equivalent benefits, i.e. there are 
multiple equilibria.  Also as more firms are drawn to an area to take advantage of special 
factors, costs begin to rise.  The most obvious example of this is the cost of land, particularly in 
city centres, although the same effect can apply to suitable industrial sites.  Finally, clusters 
often persist long after the initial benefits of the site have disappeared.  These points suggest 
that rather than firms being drawn to a location by special external factors, there are benefits to 
be derived from the very fact of being located in close proximity to one another.  The clustering 
of industry at a particular location produces its own benefits; that is there are agglomeration or 
external economies. 
 
Agglomeration economies arise when unit costs of production fall as the scale of an industry 
increases.  The cost reductions or what effectively amount to the same thing, productivity 
increases, are external to each firm but are internal to the industry because they occur as there 
are more firms often in the same industry at a specific location. Much of the analysis of 
agglomeration economies follows Marshall and has been applied widely to the explanation of 
local and regional specialisation, and to the formation of clusters.
 57
  They can  be divided into 
localisation externalities – the benefits from the local concentration of firms in the same 
industry and – urbanisation economies – the benefits arising from firms in different industries 
locating together, and thus from the growth of diversified cities and urban areas.  Four main 
sources of these external economies have been identified: intra-industry specialisation; labour 
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market economies (or ‘pooling’); information and communication economies; and economies 
from public or shared infrastructure.
58
 
 
Intra-industry specialisation: the spatial concentration of industry allows greater specialisation 
by firms which can raise efficiency and reduce costs.  By specialising in one part of the 
production process firms will form part of a localised, vertically linked network of suppliers 
feeding the industry.  In addition, because there are many firms in the same industrial sector 
there is a greater incentive for specialist business services to develop, e.g. marketing, legal 
work, specialist finance, design, maintenance and stock holding.  
 
Labour market economies: the presence of a large number of firms means that there will be a 
pool of skilled and experienced workers available to all firms.  This can reduce the search and 
training costs for each firm.  From the workers’ point of view, the large number of potential 
employers in the industry is likely to make the district attractive to immigrant workers with the 
appropriate skills.  Furthermore, the attraction will be even greater as there will be increased 
chances of finding a job should a worker be laid-off.  Consequently, firms may be able to pay 
lower average wages as workers do not need to be compensated if are lower risks 
unemployment.
59
  Of course, the effect is most likely to be felt in diversified urban economies 
than in specialised industrial districts where layoffs are likely to be highly correlated between 
firms.   
 
Information and communication economies: the location of firms in close proximity is likely to 
improve both the quality and quantity of information passed between them, especially if 
communication costs are sensitive to distance.  Not only can this improve the coordination of 
production between supplier and user firms, but also give access to better information about 
markets and consumers on one side, and about suppliers of inputs on the other.  On the demand 
side, this helps firms identify and respond to changes in consumer tastes and preferences.  In 
addition, the clustering of suppliers reduces the search costs for customers, stimulating industry 
demand, e.g. the clustering of antique shops or estate agents.
60
  On the supply side it enables a 
better assessment and monitoring of the quality of inputs.  Finally, there is the possibility that in 
spatially concentrated industries there will be a more effective transmission of information 
about new ideas and innovations between firms (knowledge spillovers).  The result is a faster 
rate of innovation and adoption of new technology.  This is one interpretation of Marshall’s 
                                            
58
 Henderson, ‘Efficiency of resource usage’. 
59
 David and Rosenbloom, ‘Marshallian factor markets’, pp. 351-2 
60
 , G.M. Peter Swann, M. Prevezer, and D. Stout, The Dynamics of Industrial Clustering (Oxford, 1998), 
pp. 56-58. 
40 
 
famous statement about industrial districts – or at least workers and entrepreneurs in them – 
having a collective understanding of an industry, with the ‘mysteries of the trade being no 
mystery; but are as it were in the air’.61 
 
Economies of public infrastructure refer to the local facilities and infrastructure that are 
available and of benefit to all firms.  These assets are usually indivisible and unit costs fall as 
they are used more intensively.  Examples include physical assets such as transport networks or 
a central meeting place for trade as in the case of an exchange, and intangible assets, e.g. 
educational institutions and local industry associations.  They are often financed collectively by 
public funds, although this is not necessarily the case.  The private provision of some collective 
assets is often feasible and it provides an important incentive to suppliers to encourage their use.  
As will be discussed below, this was an important element in Cleveland.  
 
In each of these cases increased efficiency and reduced costs for each firm arise from a pooling 
of resources.  An individual firm located on its own away from the main centre of the industry 
would face considerable cost increases, putting it at a serious competitive disadvantage.  In 
short, agglomeration economies confer advantages on all firms located in close proximity and 
they can explain why certain regions specialise in particular industries and may retain a 
competitive advantage even when the original reasons for location, say, in the form of natural 
resource availability, have been exhausted.   
 
This idea of competitive advantage and how it relates to agglomeration economies has been 
further developed by Porter.
62
  He has provided a comprehensive and all-inclusive framework 
for analysing why some nations and regions have successfully specialised and maintained an 
economic lead in certain sectors.  It has been used by Tweedale, for example, to explain the 
development of the steel industry in Sheffield ‘in what...seems a somewhat unpromising 
locality’ by a process that ‘transformed ...a small, but vigorous working town into an industrial 
player of the first rank’.63  The approach incorporates both the site-specific locational benefits 
and the effects of agglomeration economies along with other aspects of industrial structure.  
Porter identifies four broad groups of contributory factors, which together determine 
competitive advantage.  First are the factor conditions.  These refer to the resources available 
including natural resources, capital stock, human capital, and the physical infrastructure.  
Second are the home demand conditions.  This includes the size, growth and specialisation of 
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the home market as well as the degree of segmentation in the market.  This last quality allows a 
high level of specialisation by firms, which will contribute to efficiency and help firms find 
niche markets.  Third, there is the presence of supporting and related industries.  This refers to 
the interdependencies between firms, and in particular whether they are vertically linked in the 
supply chain.  Close linkages between clustered firms help to create the benefits of 
agglomeration economies.  Fourth, there is the structure of industry and the strategy and rivalry 
of firms.  Porter stresses the need for an industrial structure that promotes rivalry and 
competition between firms in order to promote efficiency and innovation.  However, 
competition must be balanced by enough cooperation to encourage the spread of innovations 
across the industry and to provide an incentive for firms to invest to upgrade the factor 
conditions.  
 
This is a considerable list of attributes that a region would have to attain if it is to achieve and 
maintain an advantage over competing regions.  In fact, in some interpretations, the sources of 
advantage have been reduced to two crucial conditions: a high degree of specialisation in a 
geographically concentrated industry, as this facilitates knowledge spillovers; and a competitive 
environment to stimulate innovation.
64
  This interpretation suggests that Porter’s scheme 
provides an explanation of the dynamics of the development of a successful locally concentrated 
industry.  But while there are clearly dynamic elements embedded in it, it is in many ways a 
static view.  Indeed, it is essentially a stylised description – albeit an all-encompassing one – of 
a region that has achieved a competitive advantage; it does not say much about what started it 
off or how it got there.  In a similar way, agglomeration economies are also a static explanation 
of the advantages of locational specialisation.  They can explain what determines the pattern of 
industry location and regional specialisation, but on their own say little about the dynamics of 
why a cluster forms, grows and whether it survives or declines.
65
 
 
Naturally, the pattern of specialisation and localisation of industry at any one time is the 
outcome of past growth, and therefore agglomeration economies and Porter’s competitive 
advantage conditions are still relevant to explaining the dynamics.  After all agglomeration 
economies are the product of the past accumulation of economic activity at a particular locality: 
today’s pattern is yesterday’s growth.  But to understand how an industry-region reaches a 
particular point it is necessary to explain how the advantages were initiated and then how they 
build up over time – they need to be placed in a dynamic framework. 
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2.5 Dynamics of Clusters 
 
A commonly observed feature of clusters is the tendency for them to pass through a series of 
stages, initially growing rapidly before slowing,  stagnating and ultimately entering a decline 
during which the industry at the centre of the district contracts.  A common approach to 
analysing this apparent regular pattern is to use the framework of a lifecycle or stages of growth 
model.  It is one that has been widely applied to whole economies, industries, technologies and 
individual products.
66
  Swann for example has applied the life cycle scheme to the investigation 
of high-technology industries (computing and biotechnology), but it can be applied more 
generally to other industries and in different time periods.
67
  The model has four stages: initial 
growth up to a critical mass; take-off when growth accelerates; maturity (or saturation or peak 
entry) when growth slows; and finally decline. 
 
The initial growth of an industry up to a critical mass is the outcome of ‘natural’ factors that 
makes one district more attractive as a location than others.  They arise as a result of climate, the 
presence of natural mineral or energy resources, infrastructure or any of those that are 
considered to be locational factors in traditional economic geography.  These initial attractors 
are what may be called fixed effects as they are independent of the strength of the cluster, i.e. 
the number of firms, employment or output of the cluster.  Once the number of firms (or output 
or employment) at the location reaches a certain size – the critical mass – then the cluster moves 
to the take-off stage of growth. 
 
During the take-off stage growth accelerates as a result of positive feedback effects.  That is, as 
new firms enter and existing firms grow, further growth is promoted by more new entry or 
incumbent growth. The feedback mechanism operates through agglomeration economies, with 
the increasing size of the industry adding to the benefits of agglomeration producing further 
growth.  And as in the static analysis of agglomeration economies, the benefits come from the 
usual sources.  Swann provides a useful classification of the demand and supply side benefits 
(and costs) of agglomeration, but the analysis of growth is too aggregative and lacks the detailed 
explanation of the process by which a district and industry expands.
68
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It is possible to investigate the process of cluster development in more detail by noting that 
there are essentially two dimensions to the growth.  First it may be through the growth of 
incumbent firms or the entry of new ones; and second, it may result from the expansion of the 
existing industry or by diversification into different, though often related products.  The 
importance of distinguishing cluster growth in this way is that it helps to identify those features 
that may lead to rapid expansion that soon peters out or a more sustainable growth that results in 
a longer lasting cluster and a local or regional economy that is able to adapt to changing external 
circumstances. 
 
In the case where growth is through the duplication of the existing industry, whether it is by 
increasing the size of incumbent forms or the replication of production facilities by new 
entrants, the increasing size of the industry is built primarily on the pre-existing advantages – 
the fixed effects.  Larger production units may give rise to internal economies of scale, and for a 
time the industry expands.  There may even be some cooperation between firms to solve 
common problems in order to improve competitive advantage, e.g. over transport systems.  
Nevertheless, the industry and the district is vulnerable on three counts.  The first is to 
technological change.  Large investments in existing (old) technology are costly to replace 
before they are fully depreciated and firms will often resist premature scrapping even if there 
are technological developments that undermine competitive advantage.  Consequently, the 
industry will at some point be overtaken by those located in newer districts that have been built 
on the later technology.  Second, the industry is at risk from shifts in demand towards new 
products, and the same inertia may apply to the choice of products as it does to the technology 
of production.
69
  Third, the initial reasons for an industry’s location may soon become 
exhausted, undermining any advantage of the site of the industry.  The classic case of this is 
gold mining.  A further problem arises when the growth is mainly the result of the expansion of 
the early entrants to the industry rather than through the entry of new businesses.  These old 
firms can become inflexible and unable to adapt to changing economic or other external 
circumstances, especially when they have a dominant local or regional market position.   
 
By contrast, where expansion is through diversification, the cluster will be more soundly based.  
This form of expansion may take various forms, such as diversifying into related products; 
supplying the main industry with inputs such as components or capital equipment; the 
development of supporting businesses; and extending production downstream into user and 
processing industries.  As Jacobs has shown so convincingly, expansion of this nature is much 
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more sustainable.
70
  It is likely to result in the agglomeration economies that produce the 
feedback effects on growth, especially through the creation of interrelated specialist supplier 
and user firms between which there is close communication and coordination and clear 
incentives for the development and use of innovations. 
 
The process of diversification may involve a narrow or a broad range of activities and products.  
In the take-off stage this is most likely to be concentrated in those areas fairly close to the 
principal industry of the cluster, for example on the immediate further processing of its output, 
and in the development of specialist supplying and supporting businesses.  Some of this growth 
will be stimulated by the replacement of previously imported goods, services and expertise.  
And as local expertise and activities develop, additional exports from the district are generated 
adding impetus to the expansion.  Growth proceeds by adding new work to existing work, and 
although Jacob’s description of the process principally applies to the rise of cities, it seems just 
as applicable to industrial clusters.  Thus the take-off stage involves much more than replication 
of existing production; it entails the expansion of economic activity by adding new products and 
services to existing ones: ‘new goods and services...do not come out of thin air.  New work 
arises upon existing work; it requires ‘parent work.’71 
 
At some point the growth of the industry slows as the sector becomes saturated.  This arises 
partly because of congestion effects.  Increasing demand for land, labour and other inputs drives 
up costs and this in turn reduces the attractiveness of the cluster to new entrants as well as 
putting a break on the growth of incumbents by reducing their competitive advantage.  
Additionally, it may be that the technology of the industry matures and begins to be replaced by 
new technologies.  Where these are not developed within the cluster, but by firms in other 
locations, then the adoption is likely to be slower, if it occurs at all, further undermining the 
competitive position.  Market demand factors may also be a contributory factor.  It is unlikely 
that the initial rate of expansion in the use of a product will be maintained, and as demand slows 
then so too will the growth of output.  This effect may be further heightened if the expansion of 
capacity has run ahead of market growth.  With excess capacity, competition increases, there is 
downward pressure on prices and ultimately profitability is undermined. 
 
Finally, the industry-district may enter the decline stage.  Having lost its original advantages to 
new technologies and new areas producing better products more efficiently, production shifts 
away and firms close.  The industry begins to contract and just as expansion had positive 
cumulative effects, contraction has similarly cumulative effects, this time negative ones.  This 
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decline is often accentuated by the nature of the firms and the industry.  If firms are large and 
the district is highly specialised, then it is likely that fewer technological spillovers will be 
generated, both because there is not the diversity of producers ready to take up the new ideas 
and because the existing firms tend to be more introverted.  Moreover, the infrastructure is 
likely to be highly specialised and less useful to newer industries. Consequently, new entrants 
are unlikely to be attracted to the region and there will be no new industry to take the place of 
the declining old one, resulting in serious decline. 
 
Terminal decline, however, is not a foregone conclusion; there are many areas originally built 
on the strength of one industry that maintain their prosperity and growth by developing others.  
There is evidence that the ability of a cluster to revive and generate a new growth industry 
depends on the degree of diversity in the local economy.
72
  A highly specialised industrial 
district that has been built on the duplication of a narrow range of products, while often highly 
efficient in its heyday, will find it difficult to adapt to changing circumstances.  Jacobs contrasts 
the experience of the specialised cotton textile economy of Manchester with that of the more 
diverse Birmingham.  The diversity of Birmingham, with its ‘fragmented and inefficient little 
industries kept adding new work and splitting off new organisations ... some of which became 
very large’, ensured that the city retained its economic vigour and prosperity into the 1960s – 
the time of Jacobs’ study.  Manchester on the other hand stagnated as it had lost its advantage in 
cotton production to other centres and had little to replace it.  Detroit similarly became 
excessively specialised and reliant on the motor industry from the early twentieth century, but 
found its economic fortunes on the wane by the 1960s in the face of growing competition from 
new centres of production.
73
 
 
Jacobs explains this relationship between the ability to adapt and the diversity of the economy 
by reference to the way in which new ideas and innovations are initiated and taken up.  In many 
cases (most, in Jacobs’ view) new innovations are not directly related to existing industries, 
even if they emanate from them; they tend to be offshoots into new areas.  In a specialised 
cluster there is little interest or incentive to take these up as the focus of firms is on maintaining 
and improving their current position.  New products are unlikely to fit with the existing range or 
the demands of current customers.  New processes require costly adjustments to existing ones.  
And firms are too large and too bureaucratic to finance highly uncertain new ventures.
74
    It is 
in the diversified and fragmented industrial districts where there are more opportunities for the 
new ideas that cut across existing industries’ interests to be taken up and developed.  In such 
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economies firms are also likely to be smaller and more entrepreneurial, and with the pressures 
of competition and survival, may well be more open to adopting, or imitating, new innovations.  
Swann also identifies these cross-sectoral effects, where an older industry attracts a newer one, 
the result of what he calls technological convergence.
75
   Effectively, this is where there is close 
technological complementarities between the sectors, such as between computing and 
publishing or biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. 
 
The development and adoption of new ideas and innovations is the key to cluster growth and to 
sustainability and rejuvenation in the face of a decline in the primary industry.  And the basis of 
this is a diverse and competitive economy.  There is, however, and alternative view.  Porter for 
example suggests that innovation will be greater in a highly specialised cluster.
76
  An intense 
focus on developing an industry generates innovations that are rapidly taken up and passed on 
from one firm to another in the cluster, thus improving the overall efficiency and competitive 
advantage of the cluster’s industry and raising its growth rate.  In fact it is fairly straightforward 
to reconcile these two views, i.e. whether it is specialisation or diversity in the industrial district 
that is more conducive to the development of innovations, by noting that the effects are likely to 
operate at different stages in a cluster’s lifecycle.  At the take-off stage in a specialise cluster 
there is likely to be rapid innovation and the development of a narrow range of products and 
services around the main industry, while a more diverse economy will experience a slower 
initial rate of growth.  At the mature stage it is likely to be in a diversified economy that 
innovations will find sponsors and thus produce new industries to replace the ailing one.  In 
other words, there is something of a trade-off between specialisation and diversity.  The former 
promotes rapid early growth, but an early decline; the latter slows initial development but 
ensures that the industrial district is more sustainable. 
 
 
2.6 Networks, Knowledge Spillovers and Cluster Development 
 
One explanation of how the development of new innovations produces growth in clustered 
industries is that within clusters there are greater knowledge spillovers between firms.
77
 
Knowledge can be regarded as having many of the properties of a public good, notably that it is 
non-rival in consumption and, relatively speaking, it is non-excludable.  This ‘publicness’ by 
itself means developments in knowledge (and innovations) are likely to have spillover effects, 
with benefits accruing to others besides the creators.  The benefit of clusters is that as firms are 
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located in close proximity, ideas can flow more easily between them: ‘intellectual 
breakthroughs … cross hallways and streets more easily than oceans and continents.’78 
 
Knowledge, however, does not just enter the ether ready to be tapped by anyone, or, like a radio 
transmission, ready to be picked up by all with receivers.  It needs to be communicated between 
members of different firms.  There is, therefore, a more fundamental condition for knowledge to 
be spread: it is that it requires a network of linkages between firms to act as a channel through 
which the knowledge and information can pass from person to person.  This has been 
demonstrated clearly in Saxenian’s comparative study of the US computer and electronics 
industry in Silicon Valley and along Route 128 (near Boston, Massachusetts).
79
 
 
In the 1970s both districts were locations for leading firms in the innovative electronics sector, 
with Silicon Valley specialising in semiconductors (memory chips) and Route 128 a cluster of 
minicomputer companies.  By the early 1980s each had begun to suffer from competition from 
overseas and new products. In semiconductors Japanese firms had made substantial inroads into 
the standardised mass-produced chip market, and the route 128 firms saw the minicomputer 
market decline in the face of competition from the newly developed personal computer.  At this 
point there was a clear contrast in the development of the two regions.  In Silicon Valley both 
start-up businesses and the existing firms developed new high-technology products including 
specialised, as opposed to standardised, chips, and other computer hardware and software.  As a 
result the district continued to grow and prosper.  Route 128 on the other hand, while remaining 
an important centre for the computer industry, lost its advantage and leadership in terms of the 
number and size of firms, employment and technological innovations, not only to the 
Californian centre of the industry, but to other developing districts ( e.g. Austin, Texas).  
 
Saxenian has explained this differing experience by reference to the contrasting industrial 
structures of the two districts.  In Route 128 the industry was dominated by a small number of 
large integrated companies in which secrecy, loyalty and self-reliance were emphasised.  
Information tended to flow vertically within organisations and therefore the extent to which 
knowledge spillovers could generate and spread new innovations outside the main businesses 
was severely limited.  Ultimately this reduced the dynamism and flexibility both of the firms 
and the whole district.  In contrast to this ‘firm-based’ industrial system, Saxenian suggests that 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s Silicon Valley had a ‘regional network-based’ industrial 
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system.  There were a much larger number of independent specialist firms and even though 
some were sizeable, or later grew large, there was in general an absence of vertical integration.  
Instead businesses operated by subcontracting work through networks of interconnected but 
independent firms.  This provided competition – for contracts – but also encouraged cooperation 
as information for product specifications and the like had to be shared.  Moreover, the linkages 
between firms were reinforced by a high degree of horizontal communication, with companies 
tied together by teams of innovators and entrepreneurs drawn from the different businesses.  
The rapid turnover of skilled workers and the high rate of new firm creation, as entrepreneur-
innovators with novel ideas left one company to establish their own businesses, also added to 
the inter-firm linkages as did what Saxenian calls the ‘dense social groupings’ in the district.  
The effect was to create a highly flexible industrial system that could not only produce a great 
number of innovations, but which could also incorporate these quickly into products and 
processes ready for commercial exploitation.  For these reasons the firms in Silicon Valley were 
able to adapt to changing outside pressures and reinvigorate the growth of the cluster. 
 
In short, it is the flexibility of the business networks that enabled Silicon Valley to maintain its 
competitive advantage and technological leadership.  Similar explanations have been given for 
the persistence of a number of industrial clusters in continental Europe, including France 
(mechanical engineering in Lyon), and northern Italy (Prato and Biella: textiles; Bologna: 
packaging machinery; Sassuolo: ceramic tiles).
80
  As with Silicon Valley, these districts all have 
a large number of specialised, often small, vertically linked firms between which there is 
considerable degree of subcontracting.  As well as formal contracts, much subcontracting work 
is undertaken on the basis of informal agreements that are based on mutual trust built up over 
time by repeated contact between businesses.  It is also  is supported by strong networks of 
business and social institutions to which employers and employees, and their families, all 
belong, giving rise to the business relationships being ‘embedded’ in the Granovetter sense in 
the social structure of the district.  The effect is to create a common business language and 
purpose in the district and hence improve efficiency and cooperation. 
 
Business networks, however, are important not only for maintaining the effective operation of 
an existing cluster, as in the European examples, or for the revivification of a mature one.  They 
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also play a crucial part in the early stages of cluster development.  Indeed, there are close 
similarities between the critical mass to take-off stage and the process of renewal.  As noted 
above, diversification is central to the acceleration of growth in a cluster, even when it is within 
a fairly narrow range of goods and services that are closely related to the main industry.  But in 
the same way that knowledge spillovers are not ‘in the air’, information about business 
opportunities offered by the process of diversification in a growing cluster need to be 
communicated through some channel.  This is done through the linkages between businesses 
and entrepreneurs, that is, through business networks.  It is only as a result of some form of 
inter-personal communication that information can be transmitted and economic activity 
organised and coordinated.  Information may be communicated to those currently outside the 
industry, attracting new entrants into a growing industrial district, or between insiders to 
stimulate new investment, facilitating the founding of new firms, joint ventures, and re-
combinations of existing firms and entrepreneurs.  And as well as  providing resources for 
existing firms to expand, the networks will be the means for promoting the development of user 
and supplier industries and the development of spin-off activities.  There is also a need to 
provide the collective physical infrastructure assets that are useful to all firms. Where these are 
not supplied collectively by public funds, but as privately owned and financed ventures, then 
there will be strong incentives for the suppliers to maximise their use.  One way to do this is to 
use contacts through business networks to attract new firms and hence encourage the 
development of the industrial cluster since the more intensively fixed assets are used, the greater 
the returns. 
 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
Locational advantages may explain the initial siting of an activity and agglomeration economies 
how cumulative growth is produced in clustered industries, but they do not explain all the 
processes and mechanisms behind the industrialisation of a previously economically 
undeveloped area.  There needs to be some means through which new firms are attracted into a 
district and the resources for investment made available, either by being brought in from outside 
or developed locally.  This process operates through business networks, the links between 
entrepreneurs through which signals and incentives for new business opportunities are sent.  As 
part of the process there is a powerful incentive for existing businesses to use their network of 
contacts to attract new entrants in order to maximise the utilisation of the existing infrastructure, 
to develop the industrial sector further by providing suppliers of inputs and users of outputs, and 
to take advantage of innovations and spin-off activities.  A model to show how the interaction 
between networks, information and trust can promote development, and how feedback effects 
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arise as a result of growing investment opportunities, more extensive network connections and 
the development of supporting institutions is outlined in Figure 2.3 (p. 36).  These feedback 
effects support the clustering process to stimulate further expansion. 
 
Although the claims for the importance of networks should not be over emphasised, they 
provide more than a descriptive tool for illustrating the details of economic development.  By 
documenting and assessing the inter-connections between entrepreneurs, investors and their 
business, it is possible to use networks as an analytical framework that can help uncover both 
why development took place and the form it took.  In the next chapter this is applied to the early 
growth of the Cleveland iron industry. 
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Chapter 3: Networks and the Development of the Cleveland Iron Industry Cluster, 1850 to 
1880 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
An important implication of the analysis of previous chapter is that the process of clustering 
alone cannot explain the growth of an industry or district.  Networks of businesses and 
entrepreneurs provide crucial channels for the transmission of information about profitable 
opportunities and the means for coordinating and organising the necessary resources. In this 
chapter the links between networks and cluster formation are explored through an examination 
of the beginnings and subsequent expansion of the Cleveland iron industry.  It is shown that 
interconnected business networks made an important contribution to the formation of the iron 
cluster in the district.   
 
Section 2 examines the expansion of the industry up to 1880 using detailed data on up to 130 
iron and engineering firms that were established in the district between 1840 and 1879 and the 
entrepreneurs and investors involved with them.
81
  It offers some basic quantitative measures of 
the pattern of entry and the connections between firms and between investors.  Section 3 
complements the numerical data with brief histories of several businesses that were set up in the 
Cleveland iron industry at this time.  Together these sections provide a discussion of the 
contribution of networks to clustering; it is suggested that central to Cleveland’s development 
were the interconnected networks of business and family – often Quaker – interests, and of 
north east and national ironmasters.  Drawing on the data, Section 4 attempts to test the effects 
on the performance of firms of connections to the business networks using a logistical 
regression model.  Section 5 offers some conclusions. 
 
 
3.2 Development of the Cleveland Iron Industry Cluster 
 
Within twelve weeks of Marley’s and Vaughan’s discovery of the main ironstone seam on 
Eston Nab, the Middlesbrough iron firm Bolckow and Vaughan had run a tramway down the 
hillside to carry the bulky rock from the mine.  This was to meet a short railway extension 
running from the Middlesbrough and Redcar Railway at Eston Junction, later to become the site 
of numerous iron and steel works.  It is a measure of their confidence they had struck ‘ferric 
gold’ that Bolckow and Vaughan were able to contemplate such capital expenditure on so little 
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evidence of the ironstone’s worth.82  The firm had after all only recently been bailed out by 
Joseph Pease (in 1847, see below) and a more risk-averse approach might have been expected.  
Their optimism is also indicated by the celebratory manner in which the first consignment of 
ironstone was taken by rail to the blast furnaces at Witton Park near Bishop Auckland.  The 
Mining Journal described the celebrations at the official opening to include a party of fifty 
‘gentlemen’ who witnessed ‘six loaded wagons rushing down the 1,000 yard incline at a fearful 
rate’.  Their contents were then loaded onto a special train and taken to the Witton Park furnaces 
accompanied by a brass band drawn from Bolckow and Vaughan’s workers.  There then 
followed a ‘sumptuous repast’ for the party at the Globe Inn at which Henry Bolckow gave a 
speech in the typically hyperbolic terms of a businessman promoting a new venture: he ‘looked 
forward to the time when Middlesbrough would become the second Birmingham.’83  The 
feeling of the time is also indicated by the name given to the new hamlet of cottages erected for 
the ironstone miners – California.  
 
Bolckow’s optimism was well-founded as a wave of economic expansion followed the 
discovery of the main ironstone seam.  Iron ore output rose tenfold between 1854 and 1880, 
from 650,000 tons to 6.5 million tons; pig iron output exceeded 1.2 million tons by 1871 and 2.2 
million tons by 1881.  Much has been made of the fact that a substantial proportion of the output 
was shipped out of Teesside, and as Table 3.1 shows, at just short of half a million tons in 1871, 
exports to other parts of Britain and overseas were considerable.
84
  But even though 40 per cent 
of pig iron was exported this still left 60 per cent processed by firms in Cleveland.
85
 Of course, a 
high proportion of the intermediate and finished iron products were also shipped out, but the 
important point here is that so much of the processing took place locally.  It suggests that there 
was much more to the district’s economic development than is explained by comparative 
advantage based on factor endowments.  As Yasumoto has shown convincingly, clustering 
explains the growth of the iron industry up to the 1870s.
86
  The district benefited not only from 
the cost advantages of resource availability and transport links, but also from external 
economies as firms in the same industry located close together, and supply and user industries 
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sprung up.  Moreover, the effects were cumulative as local supporting institutions developed 
and technological advances in blast furnace practice were shared, the latter part of a process 
Allen identified as collective invention.
87
  
 
Table 3.1: Cleveland Pig Iron Output and Shipments from Teesside (tons) 
 
1861 1871 1881 
1871-81 
% change  
Output 334,000 1,270,545 2,190,557 72 
 
UK shipments -- 214,000 501,000 134 
Export shipments -- 269,000 430,000 60 
Total shipments 62,311* 483,000 931,000 93 
     
Shipments % of output 19* 38 43 +5% 
Shipments to UK % of output -- 44 54 +10% 
Shipments exported% of output -- 56 46 -10% 
Source: Bullock, ‘Origins’, pp. 87-8; author’s calculations.  *Shipments are the average for 1857 and 
1858 (Mining Journal, 1, Feb. 1859). 
Note: Shipments refer to those from the Port of Middlesbrough; output figures refer to the total for 
Teesside, including Hartlepool and Darlington. 
 
An indication of how iron processing followed in the wake of the expansion of iron smelting 
capacity is indicated in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.  The number of blast furnaces on Teesside more than 
doubled in the ten years between 1861 and 1871, and given the increase in the size of furnaces, 
the growth in capacity was even greater.  It was processing, however, that showed an even more 
dramatic expansion, with the number of puddling furnaces increasing five-fold over the same 
period.  By the peak year for the production of malleable iron in1873, output was in excess of 
600,000 tons, the greatest proportion of which was rolled into rails (53 per cent), the rest made 
up of plates (27 per cent), bars (13 per cent) and angles (7 per cent).
88
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Table 3.2: Blast Furnaces in Cleveland and North East England, 1855-71 
 1855 1861 1871 1871* 
Teesside 29 49 89 112 
Other Cleveland 15 33 27 29 
Total Cleveland 44 82 116 141 
Darlington 3 3 6 6 
Total 47 85 122 147 
Other N. East 27 30 15 15 
North East Total 74 115 137 162 
* Includes furnaces under construction.   
Note: ‘Teesside’ includes Middlesbrough, Stockton, Redcar and Hartlepool; ‘Other Cleveland’ includes 
works using Cleveland ironstone, mainly in south Durham and Whitby and on the Tyne. 
Sources: 
1855: J. Marley, ‘Cleveland ironstone’, p. 21. 
1861: Bell, ‘Manufacture of iron’, p. 148. 
1871: ‘Statistics of the iron and steel trades’, JISI, 2 (1871), p. iii. 
 
 
Table 3.3: Puddling Furnaces in Cleveland and North East England, 1850-71 
 Before 
1850 
 
1862 
 
1871 
 
1862-71 
Percentage 
increase 
 Furnaces Furnaces Capacity   
(tons) 
Furnaces Capacity 
(tons) 
Teesside -- 143 71,500 881 440,500 516 
Other Cleveland -- 135 67,500 187 93,500 39 
Total Cleveland -- 278 139,000 1,068 534,000 284 
Darlington -- 45 22,500 316 158,000 602 
Total -- 323 161,500 1,384 692,000 326 
Other North East  -- 323 161,500 606 303,000 88 
       
Total North East 300 646 323,000 1,990 995,000 208 
Sources:  
1850 and 1862: Bell, ‘Manufacture of iron’, p. 149. 
1871: ‘Statistics of the iron and steel trades’, JISI, 2 (1871), p. lxii-iii. 
 
A fuller picture into the process of cluster formation and growth that complements the usual 
measures (output, employment and capital investment) can be obtained by examining the 
pattern of business formation.  Table 3.4 shows the establishment of new firms in the iron and 
engineering industry in the three decades following the ironstone discovery, classified according 
to type of output.  In some cases these were completely new firms, while in others they were 
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existing businesses that moved into the district.  In a few instances existing local businesses 
expanded into iron or iron-related production.  
 
Table 3.4: Iron and Engineering Firms Established on Teesside, 1760-1879  
 
Sector 
 
1760-1850 
 
1850-59 
 
1860-69 
 
1870-79 
Total 
1850-79 
Pig iron production 
 
0 
 
10* 13 10 33 
Iron processing 
 
3 4 14 29 47 
Smelting and Processing  
 
1 3 2 0 5 
Engineering 
 
3 4 6 6 16 
Iron and Engineering 
 
6 5 2 0 7 
Other Metal (non-ferrous) 
 
0 0 2 1 3 
Unknown 
Iron/Engineering+  
1 0 4 1 5 
 
Total 
 
 
14 
 
26 
 
43 
 
47 
 
116 
Memo item:  
Iron Shipbuilding 
 
1 4 1 1 7 
* Includes firms already in existence on Teesside that moved into pig iron production after 1850. 
+ Iron and engineering firms whose activity has not been precisely identified. 
Sources: data for this table are taken from the survey of Teesside iron, steel and engineering firms in 
listed in Appendix 1.  Full references are given in the Appendix. 
 
Table 3.4 reveals that entry rose from the 1850s to the 1860s and again in the 1870s, most 
notably in the first half of the decade.  It indicates a rapid acceleration in growth from the initial 
stages through critical mass to take-off.  Peak entry occurred in the early 1870s with at least 
thirty-six new businesses entering the industry between 1870 and 1874, all but one of which 
were new enterprises.  As would be expected, in the 1850s entry was largely in the production 
of the basic iron product – pig iron – especially in the early part of the decade.  Entry by 
specialist smelting firms also continued right through to 1875, although proportionately they 
became less important, falling from over half of the new firms in the 1850s to a quarter in the 
1860s and one-fifth in the 1870s.  After this time there were to be no significant new entries by 
pig iron smelters; increases in output arose mainly from expansions in capacity by existing 
firms.
89
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 Both the number and size of blast furnaces increased.  See: J.K. Harrison, ‘The development of a 
distinctive “Cleveland” blast furnace practice, 1866-1875’, in C.A. Hempstead (ed.), Cleveland Iron and 
Steel, pp. 93-5; J. Gjers, ‘A description of the Ayresome Ironworks, Middlesbrough, with some remarks 
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There is also a discernible trend to diversification into ‘downstream’ products in the iron 
processing and finishing trades.  In the 1860s and early 1870s the majority of new entrants 
specialised in puddling and rolling to produce wrought iron bars and rails, plates and angles.  
There was a particular emphasis on railway products, especially rails and castings such as fish 
plates and chairs, but also wire, nails and products for the shipbuilding industry – angles and 
ship-plate.  The latter were to become increasingly important.
90
  The process of extending and 
diversifying the district’s industry is also shown by the gradual entry of engineering firms and 
those with combined iron and engineering interests.  This was within a fairly restricted product 
range as most of the firms concentrated at the heavy end of the engineering trades, notably 
bridge design and building, marine engineering and shipbuilding.  However, it did extend to 
more specialist aspects of the industry such as marine engines, boilers and pumps (e.g. Blair and 
Co, established in 1866).  Other specialist firms were in wire production (Richard Hill and Co, 
1868), tubes and pipes (Cochrane, Grove and Co, 1862; Crewdson, Hardy and Co, 1873) and in 
the production and maintenance of blast furnace plant.  There were also a few specialist 
businesses not directly in the iron industry, but in non-ferrous metals, notably copper and brass.  
These firms supplied parts and components to the iron producers (e.g. copper tuyérès for blast 
furnaces) and fittings for shipbuilders. 
 
Some caution needs to be exercised in interpreting Table 3.4 as the data refer to the 
establishment of a business and not of a plant.  On the one hand there is a tendency for the 
figures to understate the scale of the transformation in terms of output, employment and 
investment as no account is taken of the size of firms or the fact that some owned and operated 
more than one plant.
91
  Similarly, no account is taken of internal expansion that occurred after a 
firm was set up.  Both, factors were major contributors to the growth of the district.  On the 
other hand, Table 3.4 may understate the extent to which the district’s interests were extended 
into downstream processing and related activities, and hence the degree of diversification.  First, 
firms have been classified according to their initial or principal activity, which for some 
changed over the years.  Many of the pig iron producers also had processing and finishing plants 
(e.g. Bolckow Vaughan), and others expanded into processing by setting up their own puddling 
furnaces and rolling mills for rails or plates (e.g. W. Whitwell & Co.).  There were also some 
firms that extended their interests in the other direction by building blast furnace plants, as in 
the case of Snowden, Hopkins and Co (later known as Hopkins, Gilkes). Second, the table does 
                                                                                                                                
upon the gradual increase in size of the Cleveland blast furnaces’, JISI, 2 (1871), pp. 206-16; Allen, 
‘Collective invention, pp. 5-13. 
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  See J.F. Hargrave, ‘Competition and collusion in the British Railway Track Fittings industry: the case 
of the Anderston Foundry, 1800-1960’ (PhD thesis, Durham University, 1992). 
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 For example Bolckow and Vaughan had production facilities at Middlesbrough, Eston (Cleveland 
Ironworks and Eston Ironworks) and Witton Park (Bishop Auckland).   
57 
 
not include the firms and industries that developed from the by-products of the iron and steel 
industry, such as gas production and especially chemicals.  The latter sector started to develop 
from the 1870s. 
 
In short, the nature of the firms established over the 1850-80 period reveals a local economy 
that diversified from pig iron production fairly rapidly, as firms looked for profitable ways to 
process their output.  In some cases this was done through internal growth as the larger 
businesses expanded their interests, but in others it was through the entry of specialists into 
distinct market segments.  This process is a clear example of the creation of a cluster of 
interrelated firms.  Not only were they located in close proximity, but they were also 
interdependent, supplying inputs, providing a demand for output and developing and sharing 
technology.   
 
The extent to which the cluster’s development was facilitated by the business networks that 
existed prior to and developed along with the industry can be investigated in more detail by 
assessing the degree to which the entrepreneurs, investors and firms were connected to each 
other. The following tables (3.5 to 3.8) provide the results of research into 130 firms and 
businesses set up in the Cleveland area.  14 existed on Teesside prior to 1850 and 116 entered 
the district between 1850 and 1879.   It includes 126 entrepreneurs and direct investors in the 
industry.
92
   
 
A starting point is to consider the extent to which investors and entrepreneurs invested in more 
than one business, that is, the extent to which they were involved in multiple partnerships or 
there were overlapping directorships.  Table 3.5 shows that at the level of the individual 
entrepreneur involvement in more than one business was fairly limited: only 20 per cent were 
directly connected to more than one firm in the iron industry as partners or directors.  However, 
when connections to firms in other sectors or other types of relationship besides partnership are 
considered, there are clearly much closer linkages.  These links include: connections between 
investors in other business sectors, e.g. the railway company; connections with other businesses 
as an employee (e.g. an employee in one firm was an investor in another); connections through 
family and religious denomination.  
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 Additional investors (shareholders) when partnerships were floated as limited companies are excluded. 
58 
 
Table 3.5: Connections between Cleveland Investors, 1850-79 (per cent of investors) 
 Percentage of investors connected through 
Number 
businesses 
investors with 
which are 
connected  
 
 
Iron and 
engineering 
businesses 
 
Iron, 
engineering and 
other 
businesses
1 
Iron, 
engineering and 
all other 
business 
connection
2 
 
 
 
All 
 connections
3
  
1 80 70 64 53 
2 15                } 
}30 
               } 
               } 
}36 
               } 
               } 
}47 
               } 
3 3 
4 2 
1: Other business connections as investors. 2: All other business connections, includes being an 
employee. 3. All connections; includes family, co-religionist.  Sample size: 126. 
Source: Appendix 1. 
 
The degree of interconnection between investors rises to almost 50 per cent when other possible 
linkages are included: that is, almost half of all investors were linked to at least one other 
investor in at least one way.  This high degree of interconnectedness is confirmed when the 
linkages between firms are considered (Table 3.6).  Over the whole period almost two-thirds of 
firms setting up in the Cleveland had some connection with another business in the district. 
 
Table 3.6: Connections between Cleveland Firms, 1850-79 
 
Total 
number of 
firms 
At least one 
partner* is an 
investor in 
another iron or 
engineering 
firm 
At least one 
partner has 
business 
connections 
with other 
firms 
At least one 
partner is 
connected to 
other 
businesses 
through 
family, 
religion etc. 
Total number 
of firms 
connected
+
 
1850-59 26 11 12 14 16 
(62%) 
 
1860-69 43 16 19 18 20 
(47%) 
 
1870-79 47 26 28 18 28 
(60%) 
 
1850-79 116 53 59 50 64 
(55%) 
 
*Partner includes director for limited companies.   
+
 Rows do not add up as firms are often connected in more than one way. 
Source: Appendix 1. 
 
The significance of these connections is that they reveal the importance of the regional business 
networks in the development of the Cleveland iron industry.  New businesses were formed not 
just by outsiders spotting an opportunity and moving in, but as a result of existing investors 
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extending their interests, attracting or facilitating and financing the entry of new investors and 
entrepreneurs, or establishing new enterprises themselves.  Often the new investors and 
entrepreneurs were family members, part of the same religious group, or already connected to 
the iron and engineering industries in some way.  In other words, they were drawn in through 
the existing business network.  Moreover, Table 3.6 may also understate the connections in 
three ways.  First, it does not include the links to secondary financing, i.e. to the source of funds 
for the new entrants.  If these were local or connected in some other way to the entrepreneurs, 
then the significance of network is reinforced.  Second, the table does not indicate the extent to 
which there were close connections between the entrepreneurs that involved several possible 
linkages – finance, family, and business partnership – all within the same firm.  Third, the table 
omits the links new entrants already had with other regional or local businesses.  There were a 
number of firms with interests in Durham collieries or railways that moved into iron production, 
e.g. Carlton Iron Company. 
 
Further detail is revealed by an examination of the backgrounds of investors and entrepreneurs.  
A common factor in many of these connections is the link with the business and banking 
interests of Darlington-based Quakers, especially the Pease and Backhouse families.  In fact, 
Quaker-related firms occurred with considerable regularity (Tables 3.7 and 3.8).  The data 
shows that in the 1850s around half of investors and firms entering Cleveland’s new iron 
industry had known Quaker links.  These were through family or business interests such as the 
S&DR, and finance, e.g. banking with a Quaker-owned bank.  In many cases the connections 
were multiple.  Even though the Quaker links declined over the following two decades, there 
were still a significant number of new firms with Quaker connections, over 30 per cent in the 
1860s and 1870s.  
 
The other feature of the new firms is that a high proportion had at least one investor (partner or 
director) who had already been involved in the iron or engineering industries.  This is not 
surprising.  The technology of iron production at the time, although essentially practical, was 
becoming increasingly sophisticated.  Any entrepreneur with a financial or merchant 
background needed the support of an experienced engineer to set up in the industry.  Once again 
the influx of experienced ironmasters and engineers demonstrates that information about the 
opportunities in Cleveland was filtering out through the network of north east and national iron 
producers. 
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Table 3.7: Characteristics of Investors Entering the Cleveland Iron and Engineering 
Industry, 1850-79 
 1850-59 1860-69 1870-79 Total 
Total number of new investors 32 
 
49 45 126 
Investors with 
Quaker links 
Quaker family 4 
 
2 - 6 
Railway 4 
 
1 - 5 
Finance 2 
 
1 3 6 
Multiple 6 
 
8 6 20 
Total Quaker  16  
(50%) 
 
12 
(24%) 
9 
(20%) 
37 
(29%) 
Non-Quaker 6 
 
6 11 23 
Unknown 8 
 
31 25 64 
Memo item Previously in 
iron/engineering  
17 
 (53%) 
 
13 
(27%) 
18 
(40%) 
48 
(38%) 
Notes for Table 3.7 and Table 3.8: the categories are defined as follows. 
Investors: sole proprietors, partners and directors of joint stock companies. 
Quaker family: a Quaker meeting member or attender or had Quaker parents, wife or in-laws. 
Railway: investor or employee of the SDR. 
Finance: banked with a Quaker-owned bank. 
Multiple: linked in two or more ways 
Source: Appendix 1.  
 
 
Table 3.8: Characteristics of Firms Entering the Cleveland Iron and Engineering 
Industry, 1850-79 
 1850-59 1860-69 1870-79 Total 
Total number of new firms 26 43 47 116 
Firms with 
Quaker links 
Quaker family 9 14 7 30 
Railway 6 7 2 15 
Quaker finance  9 11 11 31 
Multiple 7 9 5 21 
Total Quaker  13 
(50%) 
 
17 
(40%) 
13 
(28%) 
43 
(37%) 
Memo item Previously in iron/ 
engineering  
21 
(81%) 
 
23 
(53%) 
33 
(70%) 
77 
(66%) 
Source: Appendix 1. 
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3.3 Networks of Firms and Investors 
 
The crucial point revealed by Tables 3.7 and 3.8 is not that the whole development of 
Cleveland’s industry was Quaker dominated; indeed, it was far from that.  It is that, at least in 
the early period, the numbers and influence of Quaker-linked firms and entrepreneurs entering 
the industry were out of proportion to the size of the group, and they were strategically 
important.
93
  The effect was that the closely connected and coordinated local Quaker business 
interests, with extensive links to a wider network of potential entrants to the industry, were 
sufficiently powerful to be able to attract a significant number of businesses and entrepreneurs. 
 
Foremost among the interrelated business networks were the Quaker business and banking 
interests of the Darlington-based Pease family.   As the Peases’ businesses interests have been 
well documented, it is sufficient to outline them briefly.
94
  By the 1840s and 1850s these were 
largely under the control of Joseph Pease (1799-1872), who along with his father Edward Pease 
(1767-1858) and other Quaker businessmen and bankers had played a leading role in setting up 
the S&DR.  With business interests stretching from a private bank (Pease and Co), railways and 
coal mines in south Durham to the new town of Middlesbrough (as shareholders in the 
Middlesbrough estate) and its docks (built in 1846 by the S&DR to improve coal shipping 
facilities), there was a clear incentive to encourage development.  Before 1850 Middlesbrough’s 
and its port were heavily dependent on the coal trade but at that time its position was under 
threat from at least three sources of competition: the port at Hartlepool; an expanding railway 
system that could transport coal to the London market along the main North-South route; and 
from other coal producing areas.  A new industry in Cleveland was a timely development.
95
  
Indeed, an anonymous correspondent from Glasgow, who signed himself ‘No Speculator’ wrote 
to the Mining Journal at the end of 1851: ‘I find the people getting up these joint stock schemes 
as entirely connected with a certain railway greatly in want of traffic, besides being parties 
largely interested in collieries on this line [S&DR] in the west of Durham.’96  The Peases were 
also linked by marriage and religious denomination to the Darlington-based bank of J. 
Backhouse and Co, which had been crucial to the financing of the railway.  They too had 
interests in coal in South Durham, and as the only bank in with branches in both Middlesbrough 
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 There were never more than about 2,000 Quakers in the north east, (Cookson, ‘Quaker families’, p. 
123) and  Darlington Monthly Meeting, which covered the Meetings in Darlington and Teesside, had just 
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and Stockton in the late 1840s and early 1850s, clearly had good reason to encourage the 
development of the district.
 97
   
 
How this network of Quaker family and business interests worked to foster the development of 
the iron industry in Cleveland can be illustrated by considering a number of case histories.  The 
ones outlined below all had particularly strong connections to the business networks in the 
district and are therefore useful for identifying the multiple linkages that existed between 
enterprises and between their owners.   
 
Bolckow Vaughan 
One of the earliest iron firms linked to the Pease-Backhouse network to set up in Cleveland was 
Bolckow Vaughan, although it was not a Quaker business by any stretch of the imagination.  Its 
importance lies not just in its rapid expansion after 1850, or that it became one of Britain’s 
largest iron companies, but also in the part it played at the start of Cleveland’s industry.  
Specifically, there are indications that the firm was attracted to Middlesbrough by the Pease-
Backhouse-S&DR interests, that Joseph Pease had a role in the formation of the partnership in 
the first place, and that the firm was supported financially by the Darlington Quaker 
businessmen during a difficult period in the 1840s and later when it began to exploit the newly 
discovered ore deposits.   
 
The Bolckow and Vaughan partnership (1840) was a classic example of the combination of a 
merchant and financier, Henry Bolckow (1806-78), with a practical industrialist, John Vaughan 
(1799-1868).  Prior to their move to Cleveland the partners were also linked to the Newcastle 
and the north-east networks of iron and other business interests.  John Vaughan was associated 
with Bell Brothers, one of the principal iron firms that moved in to Teesside after 1850.  He was 
the manager of their Walker Ironworks – originally owned by a forerunner to Bell Brothers – 
from the late 1820s until 1840.
98
  The son of an iron worker from Worcester, he had trained at 
Dowlais in South Wales before running a small ironworks in Carlisle.
99
  From there he went on 
to manage the rolling mills at Walker where he and Lowthian Bell were close colleagues.  Bell 
is reputed to have learnt much from the older man, and in his unfinished family history Hugh 
Bell quotes his father: ‘Often and often did I go down to the mill after supper and sit for hours 
watching the bars being rolled and listening to John Vaughan talk about mill practice and 
instruct me in the act.’100  He also relates a trip that John Vaughan and a young Lowthian Bell 
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made to South Wales to recruit puddlers for the Walker works, which he described as a ‘a sort 
of piratical expedition’.  Vaughan left Walker in 1839 or 1840 to found the partnership with 
Bolckow and establish his own a puddling plant and rolling mills in Middlesbrough. 
 
Bolckow, originally Bölchow, was a German-born, Newcastle-based merchant.  He began 
working in a merchant’s office in the Baltic port of Rostock and in 1822 moved to Newcastle 
with a friend and colleague, Christian Allhusen, to work as a clerk in Allhusen’s brother’s 
merchant business.
101
  In the 1820s Bolckow and Allhusen formed a partnership as corn 
merchants (Allhusen and Co) and it appears they successfully speculated in grain.  Estimates of 
the amounts they made vary: for Bolckow, they are put at between £20,000 and £40,000.
102
  
Hugh Bell suggests that Allhusen’s share was £30,000, but gives no indication of Bolckow’s.103  
By the end of the 1830s Bolckow, by now a property owner eligible to vote and in his mid-
thirties, was looking for a new challenge and ended the partnership with Allhusen. 
 
There are numerous explanations as to why Henry Bolckow should have entered into 
partnership with John Vaughan in a cyclically unstable business, iron, and in a virtually 
unknown and underdeveloped town, Middlesbrough.  They were brothers-in-law (married to 
sisters); they may have met during the normal course of business, as both men’s firms (Losh, 
Wilson and Bell and Allhusen and Co) had offices in Newcastle, and discussed new ventures; 
Vaughan may have wanted to leave Walker if he thought his prospects for further advancement 
were blocked by Lowthian Bell; and finally, Jeans suggests that Bolckow chose iron as he was 
looking for ‘a business occupation of a more steady character’, which is a rather odd description 
of a trade renowned for its volatility.
104
  Irrespective of Bolckow and Vaughan’s personal 
motivation, there does seem to be evidence that Joseph Pease made an attempt to persuade them 
to establish a works in Middlesbrough, perhaps acting a little like a modern development agency 
attempting to attract inward investment.  Firstly, Pease was at the meeting in Newcastle between 
Bolckow and Vaughan where the decision to establish their partnership, and for Bolckow to 
dissolve his with Allhusen, was taken.
105
  Secondly, Bolckow and Vaughan, had attempted to 
buy land for an ironworks in Stockton in 1839, but were persuaded by Pease and John Harris, 
the chief engineer for the S&DR, that Middlesbrough provided the superior port facilities and 
generally better prospects.
106
  Pease, as a representative of the Owners of the Middlesbrough 
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Estate, was able to offer land on which to site their works that was close both to the river and 
railway at a cheap rate.
107
  Thirdly, Vaughan is reputed to have received from Joseph Pease a 
letter of introduction addressed to the Durham colliery owners stating that he ‘was likely to 
become an extensive consumer.’108  And lastly, Backhouse’s bank financed the new firm as a 
balance sheet for the firm in 1843 contained in a notebook of one of the bankers shows: 
Bolckow and Vaughan owed the bank £11,500 (a loan or overdraft) and the Middlesbrough 
Owners £2,700 for coal.
109
 
 
Pease was cautious in the help he provided, and he may have been wary of two independent and 
experienced businessmen coming to a town dominated at that time largely by Quaker interests.  
But it was certainly in his own interests and those of his fellow Quaker investors to encourage 
the new business to Middlesbrough.  The iron firm would fit in well, making use of the railway 
for its coal supplies, the harbour for imports of pig iron and exports of finished products, and 
providing the railway with a local supply of rails and other iron components from the rolling 
mill and puddling furnaces.  Moreover, there were the benefits of increased business to the local 
bank. 
 
Although evidence is sparse, there appears to be a continuation of a close financial link between 
the Quaker businesses and Bolckow and Vaughan into the 1850s that enabled the early 
expansion of the iron industry.  This seems to be implied by an entry in Joseph Pease’s diary 
when he wrote: ‘Then to my Counting House.  H. Bolckow quite fast in his financing 
arrangements … liberated by him.’110  Given that it was in the Peases’s interests, it is highly 
likely therefore that Bolckow Vaughan received some support from the Pease’s bank, Pease and 
Co, and Backhouse’s, possibly in the form of short-term loans as the firm expanded rapidly.  
Apart from the investment required to buy leases and open up the mines, Bolckow and Vaughan 
had by 1853 built three blast furnaces at their Middlesbrough ironworks, six at the Cleveland 
works (Eston Junction) and acquired three more from Thomas Elwon (Eston Ironworks).
111
  
Long-term capital outlay on the works and for new houses for the mine and iron workers 
therefore would have been substantial, as would short-term working capital.  Thus, external 
financing would have been essential as it is unlikely that the revenue generated from sales was 
sufficient: the time lapse between the start of construction and the blowing-in of a furnace was 
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some months, and while the firm already had four furnaces operating at Witton Park (see below) 
and the puddling and forge works and rolling mills in Middlesbrough, revenues were low at the 
time.  Iron prices in the early 1850s were below the average for the previous decade; in the 
1840-49 period pig iron prices averaged about 60s per ton, but fell to 40s in 1851, although they 
rose steadily thereafter.
112
   In addition, Bolckow and Vaughan’s own resources would have 
been insufficient.  These had been depleted in the late 1840s when the business almost failed.  
Indeed, this earlier incident reveals that some of the financial arrangements between the 
ironmasters and Joseph Pease, even if sporadic, were long-standing.  The collapse of the railway 
boom in 1847 led to what Jeans called Bolckow and Vaughan’s ‘most trying crisis.’  With 
falling iron prices and output at 4,500 tons, down from 20,000 in 1846, the business faced 
financial problems severe enough for the banker’s, Backhouse and Co, to send in the bailiffs to 
take possession of the works in Middlesbrough.  It was Joseph Pease who was able to persuade 
his cousins at Backhouse’s not to call in the loans, and either lent the money himself or stood 
security for the firm.
113
 
 
More generally, if contemporary accounts are to be believed, there was a mutually supportive 
relationship between the two ironmasters and Joseph Pease.  Jeans wrote in the characteristically 
flowery prose of the day that there was ‘reciprocity of feeling and of interest that made the one 
rely to a large extent on the other’, and ‘we have heard it said, too, that there were pecuniary 
transactions carried on that reflected equal credit on both – providing as it did the limitless 
confidence of the one [Bolckow], and the honour and integrity of the other [Pease].’114  That 
there was ‘reciprocity of feeling’ between the two sides, and particularly between the two 
financiers Pease and Bolckow, is shown by a note by Pease in his diary later in 1855.  He wrote 
that Bolckow ‘stuck up for me and my partners.’115 
 
One further  aspect of Bolckow and Vaughan’s early history that is worth noting is that in 1845 
the firm built its own blast furnace plant at Witton Park near Bishop Auckland to smelt the local 
clayband ore and to take advantages of coal supplied from the local collieries.
116
  The plan to 
supply the works at Middlesbrough with pig iron clearly benefitted from, and would be a source 
of revenue for, the S&DR, which provided the rail link to the Tees.  And for the firm, shipping 
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pig smelted at Witton Park to the processing plant was likely to be less costly than building blast 
furnaces at Middlesbrough and transporting all the materials – coal, iron ore and limestone –to 
Teesside.  On the surface therefore the plan seemed logical, and John Vaughan in particular 
expected to find substantial iron deposits in the local coal measures to make it worthwhile.  But 
this was not a view shared by all.  According to Hugh Bell, Lowthian Bell attempted to dissuade 
Vaughan from the investment, advising him that there was no ironstone in the south Durham 
coalfield.  Bell is supposed to have commented that ‘a more crack-brained enterprise was never 
undertaken.’117  As it turned out, Bell was absolutely right; the ironstone supplies were 
insufficient and Bolckow and Vaughan had to look elsewhere. As others firms had done in the 
past, it was to the nearest and most obvious source that they turned, Cleveland.  However, using 
the poor quality Cleveland ore raised costs substantially because of its low iron content and as it 
had to be transported in its raw and bulky state, notwithstanding the volume reducing effects of 
calcining, up to Witton Park for smelting and then as pig iron back to Middlesbrough for 
finishing.  It was this ore shortage that stimulated the search for the richer and thicker main 
seam of the ore deposit in the hills south of Middlesbrough, a quest that was eventually 
successful.   
 
In fact, the search for a commercially viable source of iron in Cleveland had been taking place 
since the early 1800s.
118
  Repeated trials and surveys led to an accumulation of knowledge about 
the properties and possible location of the main deposit of ironstone that would have been 
transmitted between the iron firms, surveyors and geologists involved in the north east iron 
industry.  Bolckow and Vaughan were part of this network, or set of interconnected networks, 
and were well aware of the potential offered by Cleveland.  Their discovery was far from a 
chance event; it was the culmination of a collective effort and a gradual homing-in on the most 
likely location of the iron.  It is possible therefore to provide an explanation for the initial 
‘event’ that started the expansion of the Cleveland iron industry that is also consistent with the 
operation of business networks.   
 
Edgar Gilkes and Isaac Wilson 
Edgar Gilkes and Isaac Wilson had both Quaker connections and interests in the S&DR.  Gilkes 
(1821-1894) was from a Quaker family in Nailsworth, Gloucestershire.
119
  He trained as an 
engineer in Berkshire before moving to Shildon, County Durham, to work at the S&DR’s 
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locomotive works in 1839.  By 1843 Gilkes had moved to Middlesbrough to manage an 
engineering works, the Tees Engine Works, mainly to repair rolling stock at the S&DR’s 
Middlesbrough terminus.  In the following year he and Isaac Wilson became partners, initially 
to lease, and subsequently to take over, the works as an independent business – Gilkes, Wilson 
and Co.
120
  Wilson (1822-99) himself was already in Middlesbrough, having arrived in 1841 to 
join the Middlesbrough Pottery.  It was one of the few manufacturing firms in the town at the 
time and was owned and run by Richard Otley, a former secretary to the S&DR.
121
  Wilson is 
described by Jeans as a protégé of Joseph Pease and in 1842 Wilson, when still only 20, was 
already a shareholder in the S&DR and on the management committee.  His move to 
Middlesbrough was encouraged by Pease, as perhaps were his later business ventures.
122
  Like 
Gilkes, he was from a Quaker family, and also related to the Peases: a great aunt (Dorothy 
Wilson) was married to John Whitwell, an uncle of Joseph Pease, and Whitwell’s sister Rachel 
was Joseph’s mother.  Wilson was also linked to the S&DR through his sister Mary, who was 
the second wife of John Harris, an engineer with the S&DR.
123
   
 
The Tees Engine Works (Gilkes, Wilson and Co) appears to have been the second iron and 
engineering plant in Middlesbrough, after Bolckow Vaughan.
124
  In addition to maintaining 
S&DR rolling stock, the works also manufactured steam engines for a variety of purposes 
including locomotives, stationary and marine engines, and agricultural engines.
125
  After the 
ironstone discovery in 1850, the firm continued as a specialist engineering business, but also 
branched out into blowing engines for blast furnaces and other blast furnace equipment as the 
new iron works were built along the Tees.  Later bridges were added to the product line.  It 
remained an independent operation until 1865 when the business amalgamated with an iron 
firm, Hopkins and Co (see below).   
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Gilkes and Wilson moved into pig iron production soon after 1850, setting up another firm to do 
this.  Taking on another partner, Charles Leatham, they formed Gilkes, Wilson, Leatham and Co 
(1852) and established the Tees Ironworks at Cargo Fleet on the riverside to the east of 
Middlesbrough.  Initially the works had two blast furnaces; this was increased to four by the 
early 1870s, and later puddling furnaces to produce cast iron railway products such as chairs and 
sleepers were added.
126
  This firm is one example of the tendency noted above for some 
Cleveland ironmasters to extend their business interests by establishing new firms rather than 
enlarging their existing one.  It is also one in which the close Quaker network connections were 
evident.  Charles Leatham, also a Quaker, was married to Joseph Pease’s daughter Rachel.  That 
the marriage (6 March 1851) pre-dates the formation of the partnership might be indicative of 
another possible reason for the Pease involvement in promoting new iron businesses.  It is that 
of finding a suitably secure, remunerative career, and one with the appropriate status, for close 
relatives and fellow Quakers, in this case a son-in-law.  Later, after Charles Leatham’s death in 
1859, his place was taken in the partnership by another member of the extended Pease family, 
Joseph Beaumont Pease, the son of Joseph Pease’s cousin John Beaumont Pease, and the firm 
became Gilkes, Wilson, Pease and Co.   
 
It is not known whether Leatham or J.B. Pease brought any capital into the firm, but it is likely 
that the venture had Pease backing.  In fact the later history of the firm shows just how close it 
was to the Pease businesses.  On J.B. Pease’s death in 1873, Joseph Whitwell Pease, who 
replaced his father as the head of the Pease business interests, inherited the shares.  By the end 
of the 1870s, when the firm was in financial trouble, he supported the business, injecting over 
£28,000 between 1879 and 1881.  Continued failure to improve performance meant that the 
firm, renamed Wilson, Pease and Co after Gilkes’ retirement, had accumulated a bank overdraft 
of £151,698 by 1901.  This was debited to J.W. Pease’s own account at the Pease bank (by this 
time trading as J. and J.W. Pease and Co).
127
   
 
Thomas Snowden and W.R.I. Hopkins 
Snowden, Hopkins and Co, also had links with Pease interests, although it was with the railway 
rather than through the Quaker or family network.  Thomas Snowden was an engine driver and 
engineer who was employed by the S&DR from sometime in the early 1840s.
128
 Similarly, 
William (Randolph Innes) Hopkins was closely associated with the S&DR, though as an 
investor rather than an employee.  His father, John Castell Hopkins, was a shareholder in and a 
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member of the Railway’s management committee from 1841 or earlier, and along with other 
Committee members was one of the promoters of the Wear Valley railway in 1845.
129
  William 
Hopkins had joined the management of the S&DR by 1858.   
 
The Hopkins family was one of some means and William Hopkins was at first apprenticed to an 
architect (John Middleton).  After working at the Great Exhibition in London (1851) his 
interests turned to engineering and he was sent to Middlesbrough to manage the Worlicks Patent 
Fuel Works in which his father had invested.
130
  He was thus well placed and connected to take 
advantage of the new iron trade as soon as its potential became apparent.  He quickly abandoned 
the unprofitable fuel works and set up as an ironmaster with Snowden as Snowden, Hopkins and 
Co.  His younger brother James Innes Hopkins and Robert Lloyd were the other partners.
 131
  
This business set up the Tees-side Ironworks (1853) with plant that included puddling furnaces 
and rolling mills for producing bar and angle iron.  It was therefore an early instance of 
diversification in the local economy as the firm initially concentrated on processing pig iron 
supplied by other firms on Teesside.  A few years later the firm integrated backwards into iron 
smelting, building two blast furnaces between 1857 and 1859.  By 1871 there were four blast 
furnaces in operation and puddling had expanded to 102 furnaces.
132
 
 
The early history of this company is an illustration not only of how the iron firms were linked 
into a network of interests and the chain production, but also provides another example of how 
investors kept their businesses interests in separate, but linked, organisations.  Thus, in 1865 
when Hopkins and Co (the name changed after Snowden’s retirement in 1861) merged with 
Gilkes, Wilson and Co’s Tees Engine Works to form Hopkins, Gilkes and Co, no steps were 
taken to amalgamate the plants, and nor were there any moves to combine the other companies 
in which the partners were involved.  Gilkes, Wilson, Pease and Co remained a separate entity 
despite Gilkes and Wilson being partners in the new firm and the potential benefits from 
coordinating production between the different sites.
133
  For his part, Hopkins also retained 
separate interests in another pig iron producer Lloyd and Co (see below) and also had 
investments in ironstone mining and collieries in south Durham as well as the railways.
134
  Isaac 
Wilson too maintained a wide range of business and interests in the iron industry as a partner in 
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several other firms including Lloyds and Co (Linthorpe Ironworks, see below) and Stevenson 
Jacques (Acklam Ironworks). He was also a director of the North Eastern Railway.
135
  
 
William and Thomas Whitwell 
Another firm with close Quaker and family associations with the Peases was W. Whitwell and 
Co, established in South Stockton (Thornaby) in 1859 by William Whitwell and his younger 
brother Thomas.  Like Isaac Wilson, the Whitwell brothers were from a Quaker family from 
Kendal and the links with the Peases, Darlington and Teesside in general were numerous and 
close.  William and Thomas’s father was the cousin of Joseph Pease, and there is a family link 
at an earlier generation between the Whitwell family and that of Isaac Wilson as well as other 
family connections through an uncle and an aunt.
136
  The Whitwells were also connected to 
Teesside as both William and Thomas were born in the area at a time when their father was 
working in the district.
137
  
 
It is not surprising therefore that in the early 1850s the Whitwell brothers were sent to 
Darlington to acquire a profession in the newly expanding and prosperous area and where they 
could be looked after by the Peases.
138
  William Whitwell was initially employed in the Peases 
business in Darlington, and Thomas, who became a gifted engineer, also received his training 
through Quaker connections.  First he was apprenticed to Alfred Kitching, an engineer and 
locomotive builder in Darlington – also a Quaker, and then continued his training as an engineer 
at Robert Stephenson and Co’s Forth Street Works in Newcastle.  Both these firms had close 
connections with the Peases and the S&DR.
139
  Thomas returned to the Cleveland area in 1859 
to set up the Thornaby Ironworks in partnership with his brother.  Thomlinson notes in his 
biographical sketch that there were others in the partnership;  he is not explicit as to who they 
were but it is possible that some of the initial financial backing came from the Peases or their 
associates and also from the Whitwell family textile manufacturing business in Kendal.  Once 
again, Pease and Quaker influence was in evidence in the selection and training of potential 
ironmasters to run a business that was closely tied into existing business interests. 
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Theodore Fox and Jeremiah Head 
The examples so far are all of early entrants to Cleveland.  But even though the Quaker 
connection became less prominent after the first decade, the working of the network continued 
to encourage new firms into the district.  A feature of new firms in the 1860s was the entry of 
more specialist and downstream producers.  One example is Fox, Head and Co, started by 
Theodore Fox (b. 1831) and Jeremiah Head (1835-99) in partnership with a local landowner, 
Charles Newcomen of Kirkleatham Hall.  Set up in 1863, this firm built and operated the 
Newport Rolling Mills to produce semi-finished and finished iron products from 40 puddling 
furnaces, 14 other furnaces and rolling mills.  By 1871 the range of products was fairly 
extensive, including plates for boilers, ships and bridges, wire billets, puddle bars and non-
conducting material for boilers and steam pumps.
140
   
 
Both Fox and Head were from Quaker families, and Fox, from Falmouth, was also closely 
related to the Peases – two of his sisters were married to Peases.141  It is not certain what enticed 
Theodore Fox to Middlesbrough, nor what capital he brought to the firm, but it is likely that he 
was attracted, or encouraged, to move to a district that offered both opportunities in an industry 
in which he had experience (the south Wales iron industry) and way in through his family 
connections.  A move to Cleveland when an opening arose was a logical step.  This was 
provided by Jeremiah Head in 1862.  Head, who already had connections with Teesside and the 
Peases, approached Joseph Pease with a scheme for a rolling mill to produce boiler and ship 
plate at Middlesbrough, a plan that he believed would be ‘lucrative’ as few ship plates were 
produced in the area at the time.
142
  Through Pease, who had by this time had more or less 
withdrawn from active business life, Head was put in touch with his son J.W. Pease and finally 
Fox.
 143
   
 
Once again, the workings of the Pease-Quaker networks can be seen, and it is useful to trace 
back Jeremiah Head’s career to illustrate how the connections worked to provide openings and 
to nurture a career.  Head was from an Ipswich Quaker family, and after formal education at 
Friend’s schools in the town, he became an engineering apprentice at Robert Stephenson and Co 
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in Newcastle.
144
  It is through his work with Stephenson that he was first connected with the 
Peases: he designed a pair of condensing steam engines for the Priestgate Mills (Darlington) of 
Henry Pease and Co.
145
  Also through the Peases, Head met the Leeds agricultural machinery 
manufacturer John Fowler (Fowler was married to J.W. Pease’s sister Elizabeth) and together 
they worked at Stephenson’s Forth Road plant producing steam ploughs.146  A proposal to 
establish a separate Newcastle-based company by Head and Fowler to concentrate on 
manufacturing agricultural machinery was abandoned following Robert Stephenson’s death in 
1858, but revived when Hewitson from Leeds agreed to put up the funds.
147
  Head subsequently 
moved to Leeds to manage the new firm in 1859, but by 1860 he appears to have suffered 
something of a physical, or perhaps mental, breakdown.  He took time away from the Leeds 
business, becoming Fowler’s sales representative in Swindon.  A year later, following his 
recovery he returned north, this time to form Fox, Head and Co.  Head was also connected to 
the Stockton engineering firm of Head, Ashby and Co, which later became Head, Wrightson.  
His brother Charles was one of the founding partners, and Jeremiah himself was married to 
Rebecca Wrightson, sister of the other main partner, Thomas Wrightson.
148
 
 
Lloyd and Co 
If Fox, Head and Co represents a step up the value-added ladder from basic iron production 
towards the processing end of the industry, then the formation of Lloyd and Co in 1864 and the 
building of their Linthorpe Ironworks was more of a horizontal expansion.  This should not 
necessarily be seen as a retrogressive step, however; although it did not help with the 
diversification of the local economy, it did add another six blast furnaces to pig iron producing 
capacity at a time when raw materials were plentiful and iron prices, and hence demand was 
buoyant.  At least it was at the time when the investment decision was made.  It also illustrates 
how differing combinations of investors in existing firms set up a new one.  Thus Lloyd and 
Co’s partners included Robert Lloyd, William Hopkins and Isaac Wilson. All had other interests 
in the industry, and shortly after Lloyd’s formation were to acquire interests in Hopkins, Gilkes 
and Co (see above).  Interestingly, although the Linthorpe plant was adjacent to the Tees-side 
Ironworks of Hopkins, Gilkes and Co, the two were not merged either as one company or as a 
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single works.  However, that is not to say that in practice they may have been operated as a joint 
plant.
149
 
 
Crewdson, Hardy and Co  
A business that combined the features of the diversification of ownership and diversification 
into specialised, higher value products and which also had Quaker family and finance 
connections was the Yorkshire Tube Works of Crewdson, Hardy and Co.  It was established in 
1873, rather later than the others already considered, to specialise in pipes and tubes.  It was 
thus another example of a user plant for the output of the smelting and processing firms.   
 
Originally, the firm was set up as a partnership between seven investors, six of whom had 
existing interests on Teesside, and three of these had Quaker family connections to other 
ironmasters already in the district.
150
  The leading partner was Edward D. Crewdson, a Quaker 
from a Kendal banking family that set up Crewdson and Co, known as The Kendal Bank, and 
which became Wakefield, Crewdson and Co.
151
  He was already a partner in Jones, Dunning 
and Co (Normanby Ironworks), and through the bank was, in 1874, to become the mortgagor of 
the Loftus Iron Co, and later Skinningrove Iron Co.
152
  Crewdson had close religious-cum-
family connections with Isaac Wilson, the Whitwells and other Quaker businesses based in 
Kendal and Darlington. Another Quaker partner was J.F. Wilson, a nephew of Isaac Wilson, 
who was also involved with several other Cleveland iron firms, most notably Gilkes, Wilson 
Pease and Co where he became the managing partner.  The third Quaker was William Jones, a 
close family friend of the Peases.  He had numerous connections with other aspects of Teesside 
industry as a partner in a Teesside chemical works and as a former employee of the Darlington 
Gas and Water Company and the Stockton and Middlesbrough Water Company.
153
  The other 
local investors were William and Thomas Gill, ironmasters who owned another Cleveland firm 
(Jackson, Gill and Co, Imperial Ironworks), John Livingstone, a plumber and owner of a brass 
and copper works, Edward Crowe, an engineer at Teesside Ironworks and James Taylor, a 
Middlesbrough ship owner.  The only non-Teesside partner was W.H. Hardy, who at the time of 
moving to Middlesbrough was manager of a tube and pipe works in Wednesbury.  Looking at 
the terms of the partnership offered to Hardy, it is apparent that the Cleveland investors were 
keen to import specialist skills from outside the area.  Hardy was paid a salary (£300, rising to 
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£400 after five years) and he was not required to put up any capital; rather, as the firm made 
profits, his share was retained within the firm and hence his financial interests were gradually 
built up.  By the 1890s Hardy became the principal shareholder, with ownership of the company 
vested in family members. 
 
It is clear from these brief outlines that all the firms were either initially supported by, or grew 
out of the Quaker family and business community.  For some, the new industry offered 
employees and others already connected with local business, the opportunity to start up their 
own ventures, as in the case of Gilkes, Snowden, Lloyd and Hopkins.  For Wilson and the 
Whitwells it is possible to see their introduction to the iron industry as a way of finding a 
suitable occupation for talented young men who, as members of a non-conformist sect, had few 
other outlets for their ambitions.  But on another level, setting them up, or at least providing 
them with the means to set up, in the industry was a way of increasing the demand for the goods 
and services in which the Peases and Backhouses had already invested heavily; it offered the 
prospect of extending their business interests by furthering the district’s industrial development.  
As well as becoming a leading member of Middlesbrough’s business community, Wilson was 
deeply embedded in the Quaker network and his business activities played an important part in 
the first stage of the iron industry’s development.154  He also contributed to later phases through 
his involvement in extending his businesses and helping to establish other iron enterprises, such 
as Lloyd and Co.’s Linthorpe works.  This works was initially set up to increase the supply of 
pig iron to the neighbouring and related business of Hopkins, Gilkes and Co (Tees-side 
Ironworks), a firm that specialised in rolling rails and bar and angle iron for shipbuilding.  
Rather than buy on the open market, the firm wanted secure supplies from a closely allied 
supplier.  The relationship between the firms, however, was more than one of supplier and 
customer: three of four partners in the new firm were also partners in Hopkins, Gilkes. 
 
The Whitwells’ firm was part of the second phase of the expansion of the district in the late 
1850s and early 1860s.  In contrast to Wilson, William and Thomas Whitwell concentrated on 
building up their own business and were far less involved in extending their interests by the 
creation of other firms.  But once again the firm’s formation is an example of how use was 
made of the infrastructure and other resources under the control of the Quaker business 
community.  The investment in blast furnaces at the Thornaby works was an addition to the 
district’s existing smelting capacity, and was thus part of the duplication process in the 
development of an industrial cluster, rather than part of its diversification.  The same is the case 
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with Lloyd’s and both firms enhanced Cleveland’s advantage as a specialist pig iron producer.  
As part of this process of specialisation, Thomas Whitwell also made an important contribution 
to the advances in blast furnace design and practice, most notably with his development of the 
Whitwell hot blast stove.  These stoves were produced at the Thornaby plant and sold to other 
smelting firms.
155
  As with many other firms, Whitwell’s facilities later expanded beyond pig 
iron production to rolling mills, forges and bar iron, thus also adding to the diversification 
process. 
 
Crewdson, Hardy presents a rather different case.  As a producer of pipes it was a much more 
specialist business and contributed to the downstream expansion and diversification of the 
cluster, adding capacity to the user end of iron production chain.  At the time of its formation 
there was only one other pipe and tube business in Cleveland (Cochrane, Grove).
156
  Crewdson 
Hardy was also a supplier of components to blast furnace and iron processing firms – a 
speciality was the production of tuyérè coils for furnaces – and thus added to the development 
of specialist industry suppliers.
157
  The involvement of existing investors and ironmasters in the 
venture indicates a readiness to exploit the opportunities of a growing market, in this case the 
expansion of gas and water distribution and sewage systems in Victorian cities and the growing 
demand inside the cluster for components.  It also shows a high degree of willingness among 
investors from different firms to cooperate in the expansion of the industry.  Establishing a new 
firm would not only make use of existing resources, but would contribute to extending the 
activities and interests of the industry into new areas.  The business network in this final case 
was rather wider than in the other two, encompassing not just the existing Quaker business 
community, but also extending to other ironmasters and entrepreneurs in the district, and in the 
case of the recruitment of William Hardy, into a national network of professional iron works 
managers and engineers. 
 
While the main focus of these examples has been Quaker-connected firms, there were many 
others that entered the Cleveland industry that had no direct link to the Pease or Backhouse 
businesses, at least before setting up on Teesside.  Data on entrepreneurs and investors’ origins 
shows that there were three other routes through which firms were drawn to the district.  First, 
there were the existing iron firms in the north east and others connected with the coal industry, 
mainly from Tyneside or County Durham.  Amongst these were Bell Brothers and the Carlton 
Iron Company.  Second, there were those ironmasters, ironworks managers and engineers who 
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were drawn from a greater distance.  Among these existing businesses and entrepreneurs, who 
were already in the same or closely related sector, were Bernhard Samuelson, an engineer who 
ran an agricultural machinery manufacturers in Banbury and Charles Cochrane, from a well-
established iron firm in Dudley.  In this category could be included the Swedish engineer John 
Gjers.  At first working for Cochrane’s, he later designed blast furnaces for other firms before 
setting up his own plant, the Ayresome Ironworks (Gjers, Mills and Co) in 1870.
158
   Third, as 
the industry developed, there was a growing business community in Cleveland, the members of 
which encouraged the entry of new firms.  Examples include Ralph Ward Jackson (see below) 
and Joseph Dodds, a Stockton solicitor and MP, both of whom played leading roles.  In the mid- 
1870s Dodds was connected with at least five businesses.
159
 
 
Bell Brothers 
Bell Brothers was one of the earliest entrants to Cleveland, building its first blast three furnaces 
on Teesside in 1853.  As the firm’s partners were deeply embedded in the industrial and 
business community in north-east England and already part of the region’s iron and chemical 
industries, they provide a useful example of the way in which regional connections also played 
a part in Cleveland’s development.  The firm is significant for two other reasons.  First, it had 
experience of smelting Cleveland ore in its furnaces prior to 1850 and was thus familiar with the 
ore’s properties.  Moreover, the Bells, notably John Bell, a geologist, were instrumental in the 
search for commercially viable ore deposits in Cleveland.
160
  Second, Bell Brothers entry to 
Cleveland was linked to a local rival to the Pease-Backhouse-S&DR network – Ralph Ward 
Jackson. 
 
The Bell Brothers firm was formed as a partnership between Isaac Lowthian (1816-1904), 
Thomas and John Bell in 1844 to take over the management and eventually the ownership of the 
Walker Ironworks.  This works was set up in 1827 by Losh, Wilson and Bell, the main partner 
of which was William Losh, a notable Newcastle merchant and businessman who also owned a 
chemical plant (Walker Alkali Company).
161
  Losh had taken on one of his employees, Thomas 
Bell, the father of the Bell brothers, as a partner (1808).  Thomas Bell initially managed the 
works, which rolled bar iron and rails to meet the rising local demand for manufactured iron, 
especially from collieries for iron rails.  It had a capacity of 80 to 100 tons per week, which was 
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sizeable plant for the time, and drew its supplies from scrap iron and Welsh bars that were cut 
up and re-rolled. Inputs were supplemented by pig iron from the near-by Lemington blast 
furnaces.
162
 
 
Lowthian Bell started work at Walker ‘sometime before 1840’ and soon became the works 
manager.
163
  In was then that Bell began to experiment with Cleveland ore, building a furnace in 
1842 to produce forge pig iron from a mix of mill and furnace cinders (high in iron content) and 
ironstone imported up the coast from the Whitby Stone Company.  This is an early example of 
Bell’s ingenuity in finding cost cutting ways of producing iron and may have been a direct 
response to the limited supplies of local ore and the rising pig iron prices.  A second furnace 
was erected in 1844.  The importance of these two furnaces lies not just in their use of 
Cleveland ironstone, as other firms were doing the same, but also from two other factors.  
Firstly, they were the first blast furnaces to be specifically designed to smelt the Cleveland ore.  
Secondly, it indicates that the Bells, and Lowthian Bell in particular, had a good knowledge of 
the existence and properties of the ironstone well before the 1850 main seam discovery and their 
entry to Teesside.  Their knowledge would have been reinforced by the fact that in 1844 the 
Bells, on the founding of their firm, also took on the lease of the Wylam Ironworks, where 
supplies Cleveland ore had been, and continued to be used. 
 
There was, however, considerable concern about the quality of the ironstone supplied from 
Whitby.  Using data from the Birtley Ironworks, Lowthian Bell maintained that with ironstone 
costs of 30 to 34 shillings per ton of pig, iron was cheaper on the Glasgow market than it cost to 
produce in five out of the 11 years between 1840 and 1850.
164
  Moreover, the average Glasgow 
price over the whole period was within 6d of the Birtley cost.  To remain profitable therefore an 
ironworks needed a far cheaper source for their iron inputs, either from lower extraction and 
transport costs or from a much higher iron yield from the ore.  The effect on the Tyneside 
ironmasters at Birtley, Walker, Wylam and Lemington was that they brought in blackband ore 
from west Scotland and also started to import the iron-rich hematite from Cumberland.
165
  Bell 
Brothers even investigated the possibility of acquiring their own blackband royalties in 
Scotland.  John Bell went to survey Fifeshire in the hope that the East Coast coalfield would 
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provide ores similar to those found in the coal measures of the west.  Needless to say his trip 
was unsuccessful.
166
   
 
At this time, the mid-1840s, Cleveland did not provide the solution to the shortage of iron ore in 
the north east. However, it is clear that Bell Brothers was ready to take advantage of any 
significant improvement in the supply conditions as soon as they occurred, which they were 
able to do in 1850 with the discovery of the main seam.  Bell Brothers quickly acquired a lease 
for mining ironstone on the Normanby estate, to the south east of Middlesbrough, from the 
royalty owner, George Ward Jackson, and more or less simultaneously, as a site for the blast 
furnace plant, bought 30 acres of waste ground, much of it marsh, from the Hartlepool West 
Dock and Railway Company on the north bank of the Tees at Port Clarence.  This was directly 
opposite Middlesbrough.
167
 
 
The prime mover behind the railway company was Ralph Ward Jackson, the younger brother of 
the owner of the Normanby royalty, and Bell Brothers’ association with Ralph Ward Jackson 
was significant.
 168
    It enabled the firm immediately to plug into an established railway network 
on the north side of the Tees that linked up Port Clarence with the south Durham coalfield and 
Weardale limestone quarries.  As the main architect of the system Ward Jackson must have seen 
the potential for a symbiotic relationship between the Bell and Ward Jackson interests both to 
the north of the Tees – the railway – and the south side – the ironstone mines at Normanby. 
There is no evidence of direct financial backing by Ward Jackson for the Port Clarence works, 
but there is a suggestion that he was able to induce the Bells to locate furnaces north of the 
river, unlike most other new works that were on the south bank, by offering the lease of the 
Normanby ironstone as a quid pro quo.  Given the growing interest in, and rising cost of, leases 
at the time (1851-52), it would have been a good bargaining chip.  Of particular benefit to Ward 
Jackson was the additional coal traffic the ironworks would bring to the Clarence section of his 
railway system.  The line, which had been built in the early 1830s (opened in 1833), ran from 
collieries at Ferryhill, Coxhoe and Byers Green to Port Clarence.  It had originally been 
promoted by Stockton businessmen to challenge the dominance of the S&DR and 
Middlesbrough in the area’s coal trade, especially after the building of the Middlesbrough 
extension.  Navigation problems on the Tees led to the construction of the Stockton and 
Hartlepool Railway to link the Clarence Railway with Hartlepool where there were better deep 
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water harbour facilities.  It was promoted initially by Christopher Tennent and after his death in 
1839 by Ralph Ward Jackson.  Although Hartlepool proved to be a much more satisfactory port 
than Middlesbrough, by the early 1850s Ward Jackson’s West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway 
Company, formed from the merger of the Clarence and Stockton and Hartlepool Railways, 
faced intense competition for the coal trade from two rivals.  In the south there was the old 
adversary, the S&DR, with  its port facilities at Middlesbrough.  To the north there was a newer 
rival in the form of the Hartlepool Dock and Harbour Company, which also owned and 
controlled the main harbour facilities (Victoria Dock) at Hartlepool that were used by Ward 
Jackson’s company.  Ward Jackson responded by building a new harbour at West Hartlepool.  
In this intensely competitive environment, the siting of the Bell Brothers’ plant on the north 
bank of the Tees made good use of the increasingly under-utilised section of the railway from 
Billingham to Port Clarence, generating additional revenues from the carriage of minerals and 
finished products. 
 
The mutuality of interests between Bell and Ward Jackson continued into the 1860s with the 
promotion and eventual construction of the Cleveland Railway.  This line linked the ironstone 
mines at Skelton (1861) and ultimately Skinningrove (1865) with a jetty at Normanby on the 
south bank of the Tees.  For Ward Jackson it meant that he was able to break into the 
increasingly profitable ironstone transport business on the south side of the river that was 
dominated by the S&DR.  For Bell Brothers it enabled the firm to open new ironstone mines in 
the Cleveland Hills to the south-east of the original mines.  As the demand for ore from the 
Clarence furnaces increased – by 1858 there were four operating – the new mines provided an 
additional source of ironstone under the control of the company. The railway also offered a 
cheaper and more efficient transport system as the ironstone was brought to the Normanby Jetty 
directly opposite the ironworks and sent across the river in barges.  Not only did this avoid 
shipping the ore up the coast ore by the circuitous rail route inland, it also meant that Bells did 
not have pay dues to the river authority (Tees Conservancy Commission), as these were levied 
on movements along but not across the river.  The line could also help drive down carriage costs 
since it challenged the S&DR monopoly.
169
  For Bell Brothers the outcome was highly 
satisfactory, even if for Ward Jackson, whose company collapsed in 1865 and was taken over by 
the NER, the result was less than happy.
170
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3.4 Networks and Performance 
 
The preponderance of Quaker-linked firms in the early stages of Cleveland’s iron industry 
provides an opportunity to test whether business networks do produce a beneficial effect on an 
industry’s growth.   It is not possible, however, to measure the network contribution directly as 
there is no way of determining the nature or form Cleveland’s development would have taken in 
their absence.  The approach used in this study was to assess network contribution indirectly by 
comparing the business performance of Quaker-connected and non-Quaker-connected firms.  
The basic hypothesis is that firms connected to the network perform better than those that were 
not connected, and may be seen as a partial test of the model proposed in Figure 2.3 (p.36). 
 
The underlying logic can be briefly stated: in a world of imperfect information, the selection of 
business partners or, for a bank or other investors, the choice of business ventures and 
borrowers to finance poses substantial difficulties.  In essence it is an asymmetric information 
problem; that it is impossible distinguishing between a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ borrower or partner 
without facing significant, if not insuperable, transactions costs.  The selection of members of a 
network as appropriate business partners reduces these costs and consequently makes the 
identification of those most likely to be successful entrepreneurs easier.  There are several 
possible reasons for this.  One is that there is likely to be a greater degree of trust within a 
network, greater knowledge of members’ attributes, or it may be that there are more effective 
constraints on members.  It is not only easier to monitor, observe and discipline those members 
who transgress unwritten rules, the effect of the loss of status if expectations are not met acts as 
a disciplining mechanism.  In short there are two potential effects.  One is that the quality of 
entrepreneurship is higher, and the second that resources, especially financial, are more 
forthcoming, thus providing conditions more conducive to growth and development of an 
enterprise. 
 
Data limitations meant that the usual measures of performance – profits, turnover, output, 
employment – were not available.  For this reason survival is used as a proxy, with the 
underlying assumption that the longer a firm survives, the greater the contribution it makes to 
growth and development.  Defining survival as a binary variable, where 1 indicates survival and 
0 failure, it is possible to estimate a logistical regression model that relates the log odds of the 
probability of survival to the characteristics of firms: 
 
Ln    Si      = b0 + b1Xi1 + b2Xi2 +.....+ bnXin    (A1) 
      1 - Si 
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Si is the probability of survival of firm i, the Xs are the independent variables representing the 
characteristics of the firm, and the coefficients b1 to bn which relate a firm’s characteristics to 
the probability of survival.
171
   
 
To test the hypothesis that being a member of the Quaker network contributed to the success of 
a firm, the independent variables include a measure of each firm’s connection with the network 
(the variable ‘Quaker’).  Network membership is defined as where at least one owner-investor 
or partner in the firm was a Quaker, from a Quaker family or closely related to one, either by 
descent or marriage.  
 
The likelihood of the survival was not solely determined by membership of the Quaker network, 
however; it was the outcome of many other influences.  These are captured in the other 
variables in the model, and summarised in Table 3.9.  Previous experience in the iron industry 
can be expected to have a significant positive influence on success, perhaps as a result of a 
knowledge of the market environment or the possession of technical expertise in production for 
example.  This is captured in the variable ‘Experience’.  Experience is defined as a situation in 
which one partner in a firm had experience in the same sector as the sector in which the 
Cleveland firm operated.  For example, if an investor in a Cleveland pig iron producing firm 
had previous experience in iron smelting, this is defined as previous experience, but if the 
investor had a background in engineering or colliery management, then this is not counted as 
experience. 
 
 The date the firm was established is included to test for any systematic beneficial effects that 
may arise from being an early entrant into the industry.  It may be, for instance, that firms set up 
in the 1850s and early 1860s benefited from first mover advantages such as developing a 
reputation in the market, establishing links in the industry or by gaining preferential access to 
resources – buying land cheaply or acquiring ironstone royalties at lower cost before the inward 
rush of firms as expansion took off. 
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Table 3.9: Model Variables 
 
Variable 
  
Measure 
Expected 
effect 
 
Dependent variable 
   
Survival Firm survival measured as 5, 10 or 15 
years or after 1880. 
Binary  
 
Independent 
variables 
   
Quaker At least one partner was a member of the 
Quaker network. 
 
Binary + 
Experience Previous experience in the industry sector 
before establishing a firm in Cleveland. 
 
Binary + 
Date Date established in Cleveland. 
 
Continuous - 
Other At least one investor in the firm had 
interests in another Cleveland firm in the 
iron and related sector. 
 
Binary + 
Size Large firms are distinguished from all 
others according to the number of blast 
furnaces, puddling furnaces, rolling mills. 
Binary + 
Sector dummies 
Wrought 
 
 
Engineering 
 
 
 
Diversified 
 
 
Miscellaneous 
 
Base group – pig 
iron 
 
Specialists in the wrought or malleable 
iron sector, or in rolling. 
 
Specialist in the engineering sector, e.g. 
steam engines, pipes and tubes, blast 
furnace plant, railway engineering 
products. 
 
Firms operating in more than one sector 
of the iron industry, e.g. pig iron and 
wrought iron. 
 
Other firms in related sectors, e.g. non-
ferrous metal, shipbuilding. 
 
All binary  
- 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
? 
 
 
It might also be expected that a firm whose investors had interests in other firms in the 
Cleveland area also improved the chances of survival (variable ‘Other’).  While this is not 
necessarily an unambiguous benefit, having interests in and control over other businesses may 
be a way of linking firms at different stages of the production process, thus reducing 
(transactions) costs and making supplies or sales more secure and predictable.  Spreading risks 
and the potential for cross subsidising operations is another possible advantage. As indicated 
above, some investors did establish or have interests in firms at different stages of the 
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production process.  There is also the possibility that a single investor with interests in different 
firms could add to their vulnerability: problems with one firm, which places the investor in 
financial difficulty, may be transmitted to his other investments.   
 
Firm size (variable ‘Size’) is expected to reduce the risk of failure.  This may be because a large 
business has more resources on which to draw, either to invest in profitable ventures or to 
sustain itself though difficult periods, and because it has a stronger market position.  The latter 
may put a firm in a position to negotiate better terms with suppliers, with banks or with 
customers.  Again, however, the effect of size is not unambiguous since these firms may be less 
adaptable to sudden market shifts.  Nevertheless, hypothesis here is that size has a positive 
impact on the probability of survival.  The size variable is measured very simply by 
distinguishing between large firms and the rest, with a large firm defined in terms of the 
production plant owned and operated.  Thus a firm with six or more blast furnaces, 100 or more 
puddling furnaces or operating two or more plants is classified as a large firm.
172
  
 
Finally, dummy variables are included in order to pick up sector specific changes within the 
iron and closely allied industries.  One of the most important is the decline in the demand for 
wrought iron products after 1873, especially iron rails as railway companies switched to steel.  
The dummy variables distinguish between: wrought (or malleable) iron firms; engineering 
firms; diversified firms operating in more than one sector; and a miscellaneous category that 
includes non-ferrous metals and shipbuilding.  The expected effects of these sector dummies on 
survival are measured in relation to specialist pig iron producers (the base).  It is anticipated that 
diversified and engineering firms will have a greater probability of survival because of a 
reduced vulnerability to market swings over the economic cycle compared to that faced by pig 
iron producers.  Moreover, these sectors, especially engineering, may have had higher long-run 
growth prospects as the economy developed and the demand for more technical, higher value 
added products rose. On the other hand, firms in the wrought iron sector are expected to have a 
reduced chance of survival given their exposure to the major structural shifts in demand.  The 
miscellaneous variable has no anticipated sign. 
 
The full model can be summarised as: 
 
Ln    Si      = b0 + b1Quaker + b2Experience + b3Date + b4Other + b5Size               
      1 - Si 
         + b6Wrought + b7Engineering + b8Diversified + b9Miscellaneous  (A2) 
 
 
                                            
172
 As with other variables, data limitations, especially a lack of reliable data on capital employed, meant 
that a simple definition of size was used. 
84 
 
Data 
The model was estimated using observations on 103 firms.
173
  Data problems meant that not all 
of the 130 Cleveland firms could be included and to increase the sample size ten observations 
from Darlington-based firms were added.  This can be justified by geographical proximity to the 
Cleveland industry and on the grounds that they were established and grew (or failed) at the 
same time as the iron industry developed in Cleveland.  They were also similar types of firm, 
depended on the same resources and markets and also connected to the same networks.   
 
Before examining the results it is useful to consider some of the data problems and thus the 
inaccuracies that may distort the estimates of the model.  First there is the difficulty of 
identifying which firms survived and which did not.  Failure is straightforward to identify for 
firms that closed and were liquidated.  For others, however, a name or ownership change, or 
even the replacement of some owners and investors by others, does not necessarily signify 
failure.  It may be that a new partner was added or ownership transferred, with the business sold 
as a going concern as the original owners retired.  On the other hand ownership and name 
changes may follow financial difficulties from which the firm was rescued by a new owner, 
floated as a limited company, or even liquidated, restructured and reopened.  In these cases the 
original firm is defined as a failed business, but because it has not always been possible to trace 
a firm’s precise history, there is the possibility of misclassification. 
 
Inaccuracies are also likely in the some of the other variables, especially in identifying those 
firms in which there were Quaker-related investors or where the partners were also partners in 
other Cleveland iron businesses.  In many cases the partnership deeds are not available and 
reliance has been placed on secondary data such as directories, press reports and previously 
published sources.  The ‘Quaker’ variable is defined as a binary variable indicating the presence 
or absence of an investor with Quaker links. A scaled variable measuring the strength of linkage 
to the network would have enabled an assessment of the association between the probability of 
survival and the degree of connection to the network.  The measurement of firm size also 
presented problems as data limitations prevented the use of the usual measures of turnover, 
capital employed or numbers employed.  These would have provided a continuous scale, 
enabling a finer distinction to be made between small, medium and large firms.  A more 
fundamental problem with assessing firm size is finding a single measure that was appropriate 
for the thirty year period of the study.  Over that time firms’ sizes changed and consequently, 
the distinction between large and other firms that has been used should be regarded as only a 
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very crude approximation.  Finally, it is likely that there are some influences on the chances of 
survival that have been excluded from the model.  These are discussed in more detail below.   
 
Results 
The full model (equation A2 above) performed poorly, with few of the coefficients statistically 
significant.  There was evidence of a high degree of correlation between some of the 
explanatory variables and for the number of observations, there are too many regressors.  
Elimination of the least significant and most highly correlated variables and the estimation of a 
reduced version of the model, however, yielded statistically significant and economically 
meaningful results.  A selection of these is shown in Table 3.10.  All the reported results refer to 
survival for a period of ten years.  Results for survival for five years, fifteen years and after 
1880 are generally insignificant, and some possible reasons are discussed below. 
 
All specifications show that being a member of the Quaker network had marked and statistically 
significant effects, increasing the odds of survival; this was also the case for Quaker-financed 
and for larger firms.  Having interests in other firms reduced survival odds. Taking equation 4 
as an example, other things equal, the odds of survival were five times higher for Quaker firms, 
four times higher for Quaker-financed firms, five times higher for large businesses, and 70 per 
cent greater for firms whose investors did not have interests in other businesses (Table 3.11).  
The relatively poor statistical performance of the model, however, means that the results should 
be seen as suggestive rather than as precise measures of the effect of network membership on 
survival.  Nevertheless, on the assumption that longer-lived firms make a greater contribution 
growth, there is sufficient consistency to conclude that the results are indicative of the 
importance of the Quaker network. 
 
In drawing these conclusions, however, a number of important provisos have to be borne in 
mind.  One is that firms may survive because they were able to draw on the resources of the 
network in order to keep afloat rather than because the network gave rise to the selection of 
better entrepreneurs or encouraged the development of better businesses.   In other words 
network-related businesses, insulated from the demands of the market, were able to survive but 
would under other circumstances, and without the support of the network, collapse.  The model 
is unable to distinguish between these two possibilities and there is some evidence that unsound 
firms may have remained in business longer than market pressures would normally allow.  
Statistically, the failure to find a longer-run relationship (i.e. beyond 10 years) may reflect this.  
Anecdotally, one example is the repeated support given to Gilkes, Wilson, Pease and Co (see 
above).  Another possible reason for the poor performance of model for survival beyond 10 
years, or after 1880, is that by the 1870s there were major changes in the iron sector that 
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affected the viability of all firms in Cleveland.  Especially important were the technological 
advances in steelmaking and the decline in the demand for wrought iron.   
 
Table 3.10: Coefficients for Logistical Regression Models 
Dependent variable: 10 year survival.  Sample size:103 
      
Independent 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Quaker  
 
1.816** 1.551** 1.697** 1.619** 2.129*** 
Quaker 
Finance 
 
1.839** 1.411* 1.401* 1.430*  
Other interests 
 
-1.313* -1.157** -1.287** -1.25** -1.011* 
Size 
 
2.388** 1.348 1.647* 1.630* 1.44* 
Experience 
 
-0.020  0.317   
Time
+
  
 
-0.004     
Wrought 
 
0.092 -0.600    
Diversified 
 
-1.344     
Engineering 
 
20.709     
Constant -24.217*** -3.526*** -4.208*** -4.096*** -3.347*** 
 
-2 LL 
 
84.905 99.316 100.394 100.683 104.743 
R
2 
Nagelkerke  
 
0.407 0.249 0.360 0.232 0.183 
H-L Chi
2
 8.366 3.032 5.197 1.214 2.236 
(df/sig) (8/0.399) (7/0.882) (7/0.636) (5/0.944) 4/0.692 
(p values:*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. 
+ 
Time = Date firm established - 1840) 
 
Table 3.11: Survival Odds (Model 4) 
 Odds 
Quaker 5.050 
Quaker Finance 4.179 
Other interests 0.286 
Size (large firm) 5.105 
(Note: odds = e
b
, where b is the coefficient from Table 3.10)  
 
As regards the inability of the model to predict survival over the shorter period of five years, 
one explanation is that the industry was expanding at an increasing rate under buoyant market 
conditions.  The Quaker network may have drawn firms in to the industry, but this did not 
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necessarily increase the chances of survival above that of others.  In fact, up to 1874 most firms 
survived, thus there were too few observations that were failures to derive meaningful results.  
Similarly, the fact that most firms had at least one investor with experience in the sector (Table 
3.8) also meant that there were too few observations for the effects of the ‘Experience’ variable 
to be detected.    
 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
The close links between the investors and firms involved in the development of the Cleveland 
iron and related industries suggest that whether or not the geographical factors made the growth 
of an iron industry inevitable, the actual process owed much to the network of investors.  There 
were effectively four interconnected business networks relevant to the development of 
Cleveland. 
 
One was of existing iron firms on the Tyne near Newcastle and in County Durham.  They had 
developed some expertise in blast furnace practice and in the production of puddled and rolled 
iron and therefore provided a pool of north east based ironmasters on which the new Cleveland 
industry could draw once its potential had been realised.  There was also a well-developed 
mining industry in the region, based primarily on coal, but also iron ore.  As with iron 
production, mining skills and capital could be quickly transferred into Cleveland and thus bring 
about the rapid exploitation of the newly discovered ironstone.  This network was not just 
important once the main Cleveland ironstone deposit had been discovered; it was instrumental 
in bringing about its discovery.  Secondly, there appears to have been something of a national 
network of ironmasters some of whom quickly responded to the 1850 discovery.  Businesses 
were set up in Middlesbrough by ironmasters from Staffordshire (Cochrane) and Oxfordshire 
(Samuelson), and technical expertise drawn from South Wales and Sweden.  For example, 
Bolckow and Vaughan appointed works managers from Wales, and John Gjers, the Swedish 
engineer, was first employed by Cochrane’s before establishing his own firm. Thirdly, there was 
a growing business community on Teesside.  This was closely linked to the wider business 
community, and not just the Quaker one, in the already established towns of Stockton and 
Darlington in the lower Tees valley, and Hartlepool.  Ward Jackson and Joseph Dodds are two 
examples.   
 
Finally, the one on which most emphasis has been placed in this chapter was the Quaker 
business and banking network centred on Darlington.  This included Backhouse’s bank and, 
most importantly, the Pease family, with their interests in the S&DR, the Middlesbrough estate 
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and port, collieries and the coal trade, ironstone mines.   The network, based on membership of 
the same religious denomination and, what often amounted to the same, extended family 
connections also went wider than Darlington and Cleveland to include financial interests from 
bankers based elsewhere in England, including London and Kendal. Some evidence was 
presented to show that being part of this Quaker network improved the chances of survival in 
the Cleveland iron industry, either as a result of the more efficient selection of owner-investors, 
or because the network was able to support firms in difficulty for longer.  Both interpretations 
are consistent with the network making a contribution to growth.  The results, however, are 
subject to numerous qualifications and should be regarded as tentative.   
 
Nonetheless, the importance of networks to the development of Cleveland’s iron industry 
should not be underestimated.  The networks provided a conduit for information which enabled 
the marshalling of resources that were essential to the growth of a previously unexploited 
region.  Moreover, they contributed to the clustering process in the district, increasing both the 
scale and diversity of production.  But the process was more than sending out information in a 
neutral way.  The networks acted as routes through which incentives to set up new firms and 
extend existing ones could be channelled.  More precisely there were powerful incentives for 
the owners of the infrastructure (railways, port, coal and ironstone mines) and the early entrants 
to the industry to encourage the setting up of iron processing and using firms and other ancillary 
and supporting business.  This development of downstream activities provided a market for the 
basic iron products, and the supporting activities and upstream industries increased the 
efficiency and reduced external dependence of the district.  From point of view of new investors 
and the firms, the incentives were not just that this was a new source of an important raw 
material.  Cleveland offered opportunities to develop new activities out of the existing ones; as 
the cluster of firms expanded and the infrastructure improved, then so too did the profitable 
opportunities, creating incentives for existing business owners to make further investments in 
railways, port facilities and improving  river navigation.  This this was not always done 
cooperatively; as the case of Ward Jackson and the Cleveland railway demonstrates, there was 
rivalry between competing networks.   
 
Important as physical assets are to a sector such as iron, the availability of other key inputs such 
as finance, technical expertise and marketing are crucial.  They make up the institutional 
infrastructure of an industrial district.   Although not discussed in this chapter, the institutions 
that developed in conjunction with the industry added to the business networks, extending their 
scope, and intensified the ties and interdependencies between the firms.  The effect, at least in 
the early development of the cluster was to improve firms’ efficiency, by helping coordination 
in the industry, the dissemination of technical advances and in some cases by facilitating further 
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entry and thus expansion of the cluster.  Particularly relevant to this aspect of the district’s 
growth were, among others, the employer’s organisation, the Cleveland Iron Masters 
Association (1866), the Cleveland Scientific Institution, the Cleveland Institution of Engineers 
(1864) and the creation of a secondary market in iron.
174
  The last is marked by the substantial 
growth in the number of iron merchants based mainly in Middlesbrough and the building in 
1868 of the Middlesbrough Exchange with a weekly iron market.  A measure of its importance 
is shown by the twenty-four iron merchant firms operating in Middlesbrough by 1871 and that 
between 1869 and 1880 the membership of the Exchange rose from 166 to 591; it included 
merchants, ironmasters and other representatives of iron firms.
175
   
 
Together these factors created a more profitable and diversified industry that in turn drew in 
new investors, firms and technical experts, leading to cumulative growth.  The evidence 
therefore lends support to the influence of networks on the process by which of an industrial 
cluster develops as indicated in Figure 2.3 (p. 36).  Cleveland’s expansion, however, was 
development within a fairly narrow, specialist range of iron-based activities.  This resulted in 
considerable vulnerability to shifts in market and technological conditions, and ultimately 
questions over the district’s sustainability by late 1870s. 
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Part 2: Transition 
 
Chapter 4: Iron and Steel in Transition – An Outline of the Issues 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In some respects the 1870s can be seen as a watershed for the Cleveland iron and steel industry, 
or what more accurately at that time was almost exclusively an iron industry.  The decade began 
with the continued expansion of output at an increasing rate and an explosion of new firms in 
the iron processing sector.  By the end, pig iron production was barely above its mid-decade 
level and a wave of bankruptcies hit the industry as it was caught between a cyclical downturn 
in the economy and a shift in demand away from iron towards steel.  This challenge from steel 
threatened the very basis of the prosperity of the iron cluster.  It could have resulted in a rapid 
transition from the expansion stage of the life cycle to the decline with barely a pause for the 
industry or the district to mature.  Indeed, some writers have seen the zenith of the industry, if 
not the district as falling ‘in the latter half of the 1860s and 1870s.’176 
 
At round the same time, major changes were taking place in the wider business environment 
and in the Victorian economy and society.  Four principal ones are especially relevant to 
Cleveland’s iron and steel industry.  Firstly, there were major developments in the nature and 
ownership of business organisations following the reform of corporate regulations that made 
joint stock company status with limited liability freely availability.  Secondly, there were the 
related changes in the financial markets, including both the capital markets and the banking 
sector that affected the ability and the way in which firms could raise finance.  Thirdly, there 
were changes, or at least supposed changes, in attitudes towards business and enterprise as the 
ownership of established firms passed to the second or later generations.  The new wealthy 
industrial-aristocrats, it is argued, sought other outlets for their energies and developed interests 
away from the original source of their wealth – in politics, or managing their estates and the 
like.
177
  Fourthly, there was growing international competition, especially from the US and 
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Germany.  Britain’s international leadership in a number of sectors, including iron and steel, 
was challenged and then lost in both technological and market terms as rival producers adopted 
newer technologies more readily and pursued more strategically orientated approaches to 
business. 
 
All these affected Cleveland’s iron and steel industry.  The aim of the second part of this thesis 
is to examine how firms in the district responded to the changes and the effects on the firms’ 
and the industry’s performance.  Specifically, three aspects will be covered.  Chapter 5 
investigates the impact of the changes in corporate legislation on business organisation and 
finance.  This is followed in Chapter 6 by an examination of the response to the shifts in 
technology, concentrating especially on the development of the basic open hearth steel process.  
In Chapter 7 several aspects are drawn together in a case study that explores the strategy of 
Dorman Long.  This firm was one of the new entrants into the industry in the 1870s that by 
1914 had become one of the largest businesses on Teesside and in Britain. 
 
Together these chapters demonstrate that the adjustment of Cleveland’s iron and steel firms 
brought about a revival in the growth of the industry cluster.  After all, iron and steel making, 
and the Teesside economy as a whole, did not collapse; a number of companies made the 
transformation to steel production successfully, and with development of other related 
industries, the district maintained its position as a major centre of heavy manufacturing.  It is 
suggested that life cycles of industries and industrial districts do not necessarily fit the simple 
model of maturity followed by decline, with decline necessarily built into past conditions.  
Whether the life cycle is extended and a district renewed depends on how businesses respond to 
shifts in the external factors, especially the ways in which the opportunities open to them are 
exploited.  In Cleveland, out of the integrated and interrelated network of iron and steel firms, at 
times interdependent and at others competing, came the development of closely related 
engineering and shipbuilding industries.  Ultimately, the district produced a new growth centre 
based on chemicals, which, along with the other manufacturing activities in the area, also 
developed from the iron and steel sector.   
 
Naturally, the external changes noted in the second paragraph above did not just affect 
Cleveland.  The whole of the British iron and steel industry faced similar pressures and 
challenges beginning in the mid-1870s and running through to the First World War and beyond.  
There has been widespread and long-standing interest in the industry’s difficulties and it was an 
issue that attracted much contemporary comment.  Iron and steel was one of the four industries 
selected for special investigation by the 1886 Royal Commission into the Depression of Trade 
and Industry; later a Board of Trade Committee in 1916 reviewed the industry’s past difficulties 
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and its prospects for the post-war period.
178
  And ever since Duncan Burn’s damning indictment 
of the industry originally published in 1940, there has been a steady stream of research and 
analysis into performance both at the sector level and of individual firms.
179
  For many, the 
failure of the industry to respond effectively contributed to the slippage in Britain’s dominance 
in iron and steel.  It is also taken as an indicative of a deeper malaise in the British economy – 
the loss of entrepreneurial vitality in manufacturing as a whole.
180
   
 
The purpose of the rest of this chapter is to review some the arguments that seek to explain the 
decline in the industry as they provide not only a useful background to the later discussion of 
Cleveland’s firms, but also because some of the criticisms that have been levelled at the 
industry are of direct relevance to the district.  These are covered in Sections 3 and 4.  Before 
that Section 2 presents an outline of the basic statistics on the comparative size of the British, 
US and German iron and steel industries and brief assessment of Britain’s trade performance.  
The data suggest that not all of the disparaging comments about the sector are entirely justified. 
 
 
4.2 Trends in Output and Trade in Iron and Steel 
 
There is little doubt that Britain lost its position as the world’s dominant producer of iron and 
steel in the final decades of the nineteenth century (Tables 4.1 to 4.3).  It was a relative decline 
rather than an absolute one for total output continued to rise, apart from a temporary drop in pig 
iron output in the early 1890s.  By the beginning of World War I iron production was double, 
and steel had risen to 16 times, the 1870 level.  The deterioration in the relative position, 
however, was rapid as Britain’s share of world output was overtaken by the US in the 1880s, 
1886 to be precise, and Germany in the 1890s (1893).  As a proportion of world production, 
Britain’ share fell from almost half in the early 1870s to 15 per cent for iron; for steel the 
reduction was from over 40 per cent to 15 per cent in 1913.  On the on the eve of war the 
German steel industry was two and a half times, and the American steel industry four times, the 
size of that in Britain.
181
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Table 4.1: British Iron and Steel Output (million tons, annual average) 
 Pig Iron % World Steel % World 
1860-64 4.15 - 0.11* - 
1870-74 6.38 47.6 0.43 43.9 
1880-84 8.16 40.8 1.79 32.7 
1890-94 7.28 28.5 3.14 24.6 
1900-04 8.64 20.2 4.97 15.1 
1910-14 9.50 14.9 7.2 10.8 
*Data for 1868.  Source: S. Pollard, Britain’s Prime and Britain’s Decline: The British Economy 1870-
1914 (London, 1989), p. 77; Mitchell, Historical Statistics, pp. 281-3. 
 
Table 4.2: Pig Iron Output in Britain, Germany and the USA, 1870-1913 
 Metric tons, million Per cent of world output 
 Britain Germany US Britain Germany US 
1870 6.1 1.4 1.7 49 11 14 
1880 7.9 2.7 3.9 43 15 21 
1890 8 4.6 9.4 29 17 34 
1900 9.1 8.5 14 22 21 34 
1910 10.2 14.8 27.7 15 22 42 
1913 10.4 19.3 31.5 13 24 39 
Source: W.S. Woytinsky and E.S. Woytinsky, World Population and Production: Trends and Outlook 
(New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), p. 1117. 
 
Table 4.3: Steel Output in Britain, Germany and the USA, 1870-1913 
 Tons, million Per cent of world output 
 Britain Germany US Britain Germany US 
1870 0.22 0.13 0.04 43 25 8 
1880 1.29 0.69 1.25 31 17 30 
1890 3.58 2.10 4.28 29 17 28 
1900 4.90 6.36 10.19 18 23 37 
1910 6.37 12.89 26.09 11 22 44 
1913 7.66 17.32 31.30 10 23 42 
Source: P.E. Paskoff, ‘The growth of the American steel industry, 1865-1914: technological change, 
capital investment, and trade policy’, in E. Abe and Y. Suzuki (eds.), Changing Patterns of International 
Rivalry: Some Lessons from the Steel Industry (Tokyo: 1991), p. 78. 
 
In terms of world trade, the situation was similar, if less dramatic (Table 4.4); and, as with 
production, the decline was relative rather than absolute.  Exports were higher in terms of both 
value and volume in the 1910 to 1914 period than in the 1870s, but the fall in the share of world 
exports was striking, declining from over 80 per cent to 32 per cent. Imports rose steeply from a 
negligible amount in the 1870s to 40 per cent of exports in volume and 26 per cent in value by 
the end of the period.  The extent of this reversal in fortunes can be illustrated by the ratio of 
exports to imports: this fell from 26:1 to 2.5:1 in volume, and in value from 12:1 to 4:1.  As 
Table 4.5 shows, not only did this represent a major shift in imports and exports, but it also 
marks a rising degree of import penetration. As a total of pig iron output, imports increased 
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from 2.5 per cent to 21.6 per cent between 1870 and 1913 as overseas producers captured more 
of the British market.
182
   
 
The trade position can also be illustrated by considering the unit value of exports and imports. 
There was a downward trend in the value of imports per ton from £12.52 to £6.50, while at the 
same time the unit value of exports rose from £7.10 to £10.50 (Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1).  This 
may be partly explained by changes in relative prices of imports and exports, as production 
costs fell faster abroad than in Britain or from lower import prices as a result of dumping of 
output by foreign producers.
183
  But it seems unlikely that prices and costs account for the entire 
shift in relative unit values; part was due to the change in the composition of trade, with a 
movement to higher quality-higher value exports compared to imports.
184
  
 
Table 4.4: British Iron and Steel Exports and Imports (annual average) 
 Imports Exports  
Exports % of 
world exports 
  
Tons (m) 
 
£m 
 
Tons (m) 
 
£m 
1870-74 0.19 2.38 2.95 30.5 80+ 
1880-84 0.35 4.15 3.90 27.6 70+ 
1890-94 0.36 4.14 3.01 23.5 60+ 
1900-04 1.09 7.93 3.31 28.8 44 
1910-14 1.79 11.99 4.42 46.5 32 
Source: Pollard, Britain’s Prime, p. 27. 
 
Table 4.5: Iron and Steel Output, Imports and Import Penetration (thousand tons) 
                                                        Output                                     
Iron and steel 
imports 
 
Import % 
output 
  
Pig iron 
Steel ingots 
and castings 
 
Total 
1870 5,963 240 6,203 150 2.4 
1880 7,749 1,295 9,044 348 3.8 
1890 7,904 3,579 11,483 386 3.7 
1900 8,960 4,901 13,861 800 5.8 
1910 10,012 3,674 16,386 1,367 8.3 
1914 10,260 7,664 17,924 2,220 12.4 
Source: Mitchell, Historical Statistics, Chapter 5, Tables 2, 4, 7, pp. 281-3, 289-90, 294-5. 
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Figure 4.1: Unit Value of Exports and Imports (£ per ton), 1870-1913 
 
Source: The data series for this graph are derived from various years of the Board of Trade, Annual 
statement of the trade of the United Kingdom with foreign countries and British possessions, as follows: 
1869-73: Board of Trade, 1874, C.1029; 
1874-78: Board of Trade, 1878-9, C.2371; 
1878-82: Board of Trade, 1883, C.3637; 
1883-87: Board of Trade, 1888, C.5451; 
1888-91: Board of Trade, 1892, C.6676; 
1892-95: Board of Trade, 1896, C.8097; 
1896-1900: Board of Trade, 1901, Cd.549, Cd.664; 
1901-04: 1905, Board of Trade, Cd.2497, Cd.2626; 
1905-07: 1908, Board of Trade, Cd.4100, Cd.4150; 
1907-11: 1912-3, Cd.6216, Cd. 6336, Cd.6491; 
1911-13: 1914-16, Cd.7968, Cd.8069. 
 
A similar pattern is evident at the level of individual products, or at least for groups of products 
(Table 4.6).  In 1913 the unit value of exports of iron and steel sheets was 28% higher than for 
imports, and for steel bars and angles the figure for exports was over twice that for imports.  
Further, a comparison of the balance of trade in these products indicates that the deterioration in 
trade performance may not have been as serious as has often been suggested.  There was indeed 
a significant increase in imports in tonnage terms and only a slow rise in exports between 1910 
and 1913 (Table 4.7).  Overall the net exports of these products halved (231,744 tons to 
116,804), and there was even net imports of sheets and plates.  In value terms, on the other 
hand, the trade balance held up well despite the rising import volumes; it declined by just 
£125,000 (1910-13), with much of this accounted for by a collapse in exports to, and a surge in 
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imports from, Germany between 1912 and 1913.
185
  Once again, one probable explanation of the 
better performance in trade values than volumes is that exports were of an increasingly higher 
quality in comparison to the more basic imports. 
 
Table 4.6: Unit Value of Exports and Imports of Plates and Bars, 1913 (£ per ton) 
 Exports Imports Ratio 
Iron and steel ship, bridge,, boiler 
and other plates  
(not under 1/8
th
 inch thick) 
 
9.2 
 
7.2 
 
1.28 
 
Steel bars, angles and shapes 
 
 
14.2 
 
6.8 
 
2.09 
Source: Board of Trade Iron and Steel Industries Committee, North East Steelmakers Association: 
Statistics and Documents, (Board of Trade, 1916), pp. 4-7. 
 
Table 4.7: Exports and Imports of Plates and Bars, 1910-1913 
 Volumes (tons) Values (£) 
1910 Exports Imports 
Trade 
Balance Exports Imports 
Trade 
Balance 
Plates and sheets 121,131 57,765 63,366 933,607 438,794 949,813 
Bars and angles 227,202 58,794 168,408 2,952,970 401,750 2,551,220 
Totals   231,744   3,046,033 
 
 
1913 Exports Imports 
Trade 
Balance Exports Imports 
Trade 
Balance 
Plates and sheets 113,949 134,612 -663 1,232,998 973,086 259,912 
Bars and angles 251,059 133,592 117,467 3,571,478 910,540 2,660,938 
Totals   116,804   2,920,850 
Source: Board of Trade Iron and Steel Industries Committee, North East Steelmakers Association: 
Statistics and Documents, (Board of Trade, 1916), pp. 4-7. 
 
The general picture indicated by this brief assessment of the statistics is one of slowing growth, 
as might be expected with the maturing of the industry and economy.  It was overtaken is size 
by both the US and Germany by the end of the nineteenth century.  There was also a loss of 
ground in international markets as export growth slowed and imports, especially from Germany, 
rose.  In some products Britain even became a net importer in volume terms by 1913.  
Nevertheless, the state of the industry was not as bleak, and the rate of relative decline not as 
rapid, as is often presented.  The most startling signs of decline are the result of measuring the 
size of the sector and its trade performance in volume terms, i.e. as tons of iron and steel.  This 
is partly because it is easier to obtain the data, but also partly because of an obsession with 
quantities and the sheer physical size of the industry.  But because the products are not 
homogeneous, figures in tons of iron and steel are not necessarily good measures of the 
economic value of output since they ignore the range and quality of products.  When this is 
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taken into account, there is some indication that, at least in trade terms, the decline in the 
competitive condition of the sector was not as serious as some commentators have suggested. 
 
This is most clearly demonstrated by the balance of trade (Figures 4.2 and4. 3).   In volume 
terms, by 1913 the trade balance was barely above the level of 1869 as imports expanded at a 
rate that far outstripped the growth in exports.  From 1887 the compound growth rate of imports 
was 8.6 per cent per year whilst export tonnage grew at 1.5 per cent.  By contrast, although 
imports grew faster than exports in value, the discrepancy was not so marked, with annual 
(compound) growth rates for exports and imports over the same period of 3 per cent and 5 per 
cent respectively.  This had the result that by 1913, the trade balance in Britain’s favour was 
£18.5 million wider than it had been in 1869.  Taking five year averages, by 1909-13 Britain 
was importing 129,000 tons more than it had been in 1869-73, but the trade surplus had 
widened by £6.3 million. 
 
Figure 4.2: Exports, Imports and the Balance of Trade by Volume, 1869-1913 (tons) 
 
Source: Board of Trade, Annual statement of trade, 1874-1916 (see Figure 4.1 for full references). 
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Figure 4.3: Exports, Imports and the Balance of Trade by Value, 1869-1913 (£) 
 Source: Board of Trade, Annual statement of trade, 1874-1916 (see Figure 4.1 for full references). 
 
 
4.3 Explanations: Entrepreneurial Failures and Institutional Constraints 
 
In many respects it is rather surprising that economic and business historians have spent so 
much time and energy investigating the relative decline of the British iron and steel industry.  
The history of industrial development is littered with cases of firms and industries that have 
suffered as a result of shifts in comparative and competitive advantage.  The explanation, of 
course, lies in the totemic nature of the industry; it is often considered an indicator of a 
country’s economic strength and a symbol of national and regional pride.  As the supplier of one 
of the basic products of an industrial economy, it is an early sector to develop and thus is at 
forefront of the industrial growth process, viz. the recent rapid rates of industrialisation in 
China, India and Brazil in the early twenty-first century, with China alone producing 626 
million tons of crude steel in 2010, 44 per cent of the world’s output.186  And as an early 
contributor to industrialisation, it is also likely to be an early casualty of maturity as demand and 
                                            
186
 World Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook 2011, (Brussels, 2011), Table 1, pp. 3-5. 
0
10000000
20000000
30000000
40000000
50000000
60000000
1869 1873 1877 1881 1885 1889 1893 1897 1901 1905 1909 1913
Exports
Imports
Balance of Trade
99 
 
production move away from basic products as real incomes rise and the infrastructure of initial 
development – railways, bridges and so forth – is completed.187  
 
It was probably inevitable that Britain would lose her pre-eminent position as an iron and steel 
producer.  In the face of rapid industrialisation in the larger countries of the US and Germany, 
the potential for bigger home markets and a later start presented American and German 
steelmasters with a reasonably straightforward strategy for success: produce high volumes to 
meet rapidly expanding market demand by increasing capacity, usually in newly built plants 
using the latest technology.  For their British counterparts, with slower growing demand and 
established sites, the decisions were more complex.  Whether they failed to make the 
appropriate adjustments and investments cannot be judged solely by a comparison of the size of 
the industries in 1913, but by answering the question of whether Britain’s industry grew more 
slowly and lost more of its export market, and home market to imports, than might reasonably 
be expected.  In some ways, this is an almost impossible question to answer as the standard 
against which to assess performance is difficult if not impossible to predict.  One way of 
determining the counterfactual is to consider what the output of the UK iron and steel sector 
would have been had the share of exports to neutral markets, i.e. where the US and Germany did 
not have the particular advantage of geographical proximity and national preference, and the 
degree of import penetration been maintained. 
188
  Temin suggests that steel output would have 
been approximately 2.4 million tons higher, making the annual average growth rate from 1890 
to 1913 4.6 per cent instead of 3.4 per cent.  Growth in the German steel industry was 9 per cent 
per year, and as Table 4.3 shows, an additional 2.4 million tons of British output and 2.4 million 
tons lower German output would still have left German production 50 per cent higher in 1913.  
This result offers support for the view that irrespective of other developments in the industry, 
Britain was unlikely to have been able to keep its leading position.  Other researchers, however, 
have adopted a more critical, and often more indirect, approach.  By looking at the 
characteristics of the industry, they have drawn inferences about the causes of the growth 
slowdown, and concluded that the loss of markets was avoidable. 
 
In general, a declining market share is the manifestation of deeper problems in two possible 
areas.  The first is a loss of cost competitiveness as a result of a relatively low level of 
productivity, or a slowing in its rate of growth, compared to producers in other countries.  The 
other is a concentration on the wrong markets, either in terms of products or geographical area.  
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Both of these can be regarded as the result of underlying inefficiencies and the outcome of 
deeper problems and structural weaknesses in the industry that resulted in a failure to adapt to 
changing circumstances.  Explanations of the shortcomings of Britain’s iron and steel industry 
along these lines fall broadly into two groups: the entrepreneurial failure hypothesis and the 
institutional constraints hypothesis.  According to the entrepreneurial failure explanation, the 
decline was due principally to the inability of the entrepreneurs in the late Victorian and 
Edwardian period to take the necessary decisions to modernise the industry.  It was a want of 
vision and an unwillingness to take risks that was in stark contrast to the boldness of the early 
ironmasters.  At root, the argument is an indictment of individual business behaviour of the 
owners and decision takers, who had become more conservative, and possibly complacent in 
their attitudes.  By contrast, the institutional constraints hypothesis suggests that decision 
making was constrained by the rigidities in, and fragmentation of, the industry’s structure.  It 
was the collective impact of these constraints that prevented British iron and steel firms from 
adopting the latest technologies and modernising their organisations, rather than a failure of 
leadership.  While the structural conditions are seen as the underlying cause of the restrictions, it 
is possible to view both hypotheses as complementary: it was a lack of vision on the part of the 
iron- and steelmasters that explains why they were unable to break free from the difficulties 
they faced.   
 
By contrast, not all commentators have seen the problems of the industry as the result of 
institutional or behavioural characteristics.  The market and resource constraints hypotheses 
ascribe the difficulties to factors that were rather more fundamental.  Specifically, these 
stemmed from restricted access to growing markets and to the difficulty of obtaining the 
appropriate raw materials.  Moreover, they were binding constraints from which the industry 
was unable to break free however adventurous or far-sighted its entrepreneurs.  These 
explanations are now examined in more detail. 
 
Entrepreneurial Failure 
It is, perhaps, ironic that three of the four major technological advances in steel making in the 
third quarter of the nineteenth century were developed in Britain, and yet it was the large scale 
adoption of these processes that undermined Britain’s lead in production.  The main advances 
began in 1856 when Henry Bessemer announced the development of his converter (the 
Bessemer converter) that for the first time enabled steel to be mass produced at low cost.
189
  At 
about the same time, William Siemens and his brother Frederick developed the regenerative 
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furnace that was in the 1860s to be applied to steel production by the French metallurgist Emile 
Martin as the open hearth furnace or Siemens-Martin process.
190
  Apart from the size of furnace, 
with the open hearth eventually becoming substantially larger, the two methods differ 
principally in the time taken for the conversion of pig iron into steel.  For the Bessemer 
converter it is 15 to 20 minutes but it takes several hours for the open hearth method.  The 
rapidity of the Bessemer conversion makes the chemical reactions in the converter more 
difficult to control and thus the quality of the steel less reliable; higher grade steels are more 
easily produced by the open hearth method.  
 
The spread of both techniques initiated a rapid rise in the demand for, and consequently 
production of, steel.  In the early stages, the demand for rails was strong as the more durable, 
lighter and ductile product was substituted for iron.  The switch from iron to steel, however, 
took some to complete time; the production techniques needed to be improved before the 
quality of the products could be assured, and steel prices needed to fall.
191
  But ultimately steel 
would undermine the prosperity of specialist iron producers unless they made the transition to 
the new material.  At first, the application of the new techniques was limited mainly to the 
production of acid steel using low phosphorus iron ore, hematite.  High phosphorus ore was 
unsuitable because of the large amounts of slag and difficulties in eliminating the impurities 
made the resulting steel brittle and of poor quality.  The problem was eventually solved for the 
Bessemer process by Sidney Thomas and Percy Gilchrist, who discovered that by using a 
chemically ‘basic’ lining such as dolomite (or other limestones) in the converter, pig iron made 
from ore with high phosphorus and sulphur content could be used to make steel of a useable 
quality.  Known variously as the Thomas or basic Bessemer process, and the product as Thomas 
or basic steel, this method was mainly employed to produce steel that was suitable for rails.  For 
many years it was not deemed of sufficiently good quality in Britain for widespread use; until 
1890 the Admiralty and Lloyds would not permit basic steel in shipbuilding.
192
 The basic 
process was later applied to the open hearth method, but rather than using ore with high 
phosphorus content (basic Bessemer needed ore with greater than 2 per cent), the basic open 
hearth process required low phosphorus ore (less than 0.5 per cent).  This was a condition that 
caused particular difficulties for British producers. The problem with high phosphorus (and high 
sulphur) ores in the basic open hearth process is that a heavy slag is formed during refining, 
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impeding the oxidisation of the impurities and causing the phosphorus to return to the molten 
metal.  Consequently, the steel is brittle and of poor quality. 
193
 
 
The tardiness of the British iron and steel producers in adopting these technical advances in 
steel making on a large scale, along with a number of other technological improvements, lies at 
the heart of the entrepreneurial failure hypothesis.  Set out originally by Burn and re-iterated and 
developed by Aldcroft, Landes, Allen and Abé, the failure was one of a lack of vision, poor 
technical ability and a reluctance to take risks that together led steelmasters to make the wrong 
investment decisions, or when they did, to make them too late by which time they had ceded 
ground to US and German producers.
194
  Unlike the German producers, who built their 
expansion on the basic Bessemer method, British firms adopted the acid open hearth process 
using hematite from Cumberland and imported low phosphorus ores, mainly from northern 
Spain.  Given the problems with the basic process, the availability of suitable ore and the quality 
demands of the British market, especially from shipbuilders, the decision may initially have 
been rational; it was certainly profitable.  Similarly, German industry’s specialisation in basic 
Bessemer steel made good economic sense as they had access to substantial deposits of high 
phosphorus iron ore (Minette ores) from Lorraine from the early 1870s.  Over time, however, as 
the low phosphorus ore became scarcer and prices increased, acid steel became increasingly 
uncompetitive and susceptible to undercutting both in the home and export markets. 
 
Burn and others have argued that these problems could have been anticipated and overcome had 
British producers adopted the basic process earlier by making use of alternative ore supplies.
195
  
Cleveland ironstone was found to be unsuitable, being of intermediate phosphorus content 
(1.5per cent), but there were other sources in Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire which could 
have been exploited from the 1890s.  This view was challenged by McCloskey on the grounds 
that when transport to Cleveland for smelting and refining was taken into account, the cost 
advantages of using these East Midlands ores disappeared.
196
  More significantly, Tolliday has 
pointed out that real problem was not transport, since new works could have been built in 
Northamptonshire, but technical difficulties in the production process, which would not be 
remedied until 1930s.
197
  Abé on the other hand maintains that there were other options and that 
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both the basic Bessemer and basic open hearth processes could have been more widely 
adopted.
198
  Producers could have mixed local ores with scrap or with imported ores from 
Sweden and Spain to reduce the phosphorus content, and dealt with other processing problems 
such as the high sulphur and silicon content of local ores by using existing techniques, such as 
mixers.  That they did not is seen as evidence of entrepreneurial failure.   
In addition to choosing the wrong processes, another line of criticism is that British producers 
did not utilise the latest technologies and techniques of production.
199
  This included a failure to 
integrate the production process and thus save costs from having to reheat pig iron to produce 
steel, and maintaining old, small and inefficient production plants that were costly to run.  
Instead of building large scale plants on new sites with the most advanced equipment, such as 
mechanical and electrical materials handling and continuous rolling mills, and using advanced 
techniques like hard-driving, i.e. operating large blast furnaces at high temperatures and 
pressures, the British firms relied on ad hoc improvements to their original plants on the same, 
often confined sites.  This limited the ability to realise scale economies of the sort achieved by 
Carnegie Steel at the Edgar Thompson Works in Pittsburgh.  Completed in 1879, this was a 
steel rail-mill, fully integrated from blast furnace to rolling mill on one site.
200
 
 
Underlying these errors were deeper problems of management.  These included a shortage of 
trained professional managers with an appropriate technical background who were capable of 
making the crucial decisions.  This reflected a general weakness in Britain’s educational system 
that in contrast to Germany was not geared to producing technical experts in sufficient numbers.  
It went hand in hand with and was compounded by the continued domination of company 
boards by family members or descendants of the firms’ founders. 201  They often lacked the 
skills or interest to pursue a more adventurous strategy.  And even when the ageing iron or 
steelmasters remained in control, they were too conservative, cautious or wedded to traditional 
methods to tackle the challenges posed by new technology and the growing German and 
American businesses. 
 
The outcome was that British firms specialised in the wrong products – acid rather than basic 
steel – and productivity growth lagged so that with higher costs their lead in the industry was 
quickly overhauled.  Allen for example suggests that by 1907-8 labour productivity across the 
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steel industry was 50 per cent higher in Germany and 85 per cent higher in the US.  For total 
factor productivity the lead was 15 per cent in both countries.
202
 
 
Institutional Constraints 
An obvious objection to the entrepreneurial failure hypothesis is that it does not explain why 
there was a general deficiency in the quality of entrepreneurship.  In competitive market 
economies it would normally be expected that a new generation of entrepreneurs would replace 
the old, and that if this did not happen within a firm, then it would occur through the growth of 
new, more efficient businesses.  In the same way that new businesses, industries and districts 
had overtaken the old ones at an earlier stage of the iron and steel industry, with Cleveland in 
the mid-nineteenth century being a notable example of a new centre of production, the 
opportunities for expansion and profits at the expense of inefficient incumbents ought to have 
occurred in the late Victorian and Edwardian period as well.  For Elbaum and Lazonick, the 
problem with the entrepreneurial failure explanation is that it concentrated on the behaviour of 
individual entrepreneurs rather than identifying ‘systematic sources of variation in enterprise 
performance’.  In their view iron and steel was just one example of an industry in which 
‘modern technological and organizational innovations (were) impeded by inherited 
socioeconomic constraints’.203  The underlying causes were the entrenched and rigid economic 
and social structures which reinforced conservative business attitudes.  The problems stretched 
right across economic life from the nature of industrial organisation and labour relations to the 
financial system and trade.   For steel it was not just that the broader economic and social 
institutions were faulty; it was the very structure of the industry that determined the dynamics of 
development.  Specifically, the highly fragmented and competitive nature of the sector produced 
a dynamic that resulted in relative, and ultimately absolute, decline rather than growth. 
 
The source of the difficulties lay in the highly competitive market, described by Elbaum as the 
most atomistically competitive of the major iron and steel producing countries, and its 
implications for investment decisions,.
204
  The adoption of the latest technology required heavy 
investment but yielded considerable cost advantages as a result of economies of scale.  The 
realisation of the benefits, however, was conditional on high levels of capacity utilisation and 
depended either on increasing market share or a rapidly expanding market.  With many small 
businesses competing vigorously in a slowly growing market that was frequently disrupted by 
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cyclical fluctuations, firms faced considerable instability in demand.  Scrapping existing plant 
and replacing it with modern, large scale facilities was a high risk strategy; there was no 
guaranteed return unless a firm could ensure market dominance.  Indeed, in the absence of 
sustained high levels of output, unit costs would rise and even the most advanced and largest 
producers could be undercut by firms with lower capacity works and older technology, 
inflicting heavy losses.  As each firm in the industry faced similar conditions, an optimal 
strategy was to delay large investments in up-to-date technology that required wholesale 
rebuilding and adopt the lower cost and less risky option of making piecemeal improvements.  
The problem can be seen as a form of prisoner’s dilemma game: the optimal strategy for each 
firm making its decisions independently was not optimal for the industry as a whole. 
International competitiveness of the sector would have been maintained had all firms cooperated 
and invested, but given the likely reaction of others, no individual business was prepared to take 
the risk.
205
 
 
The problems were exacerbated by two factors.  First, there was slow growth in the domestic 
market.  Where markets were expanding rapidly, then the risks of high cost investments in 
large-scale plant were significantly lower since firms were not reliant on taking market share 
from their rivals.  In the slow growing British market, however, this, apart from exports, was the 
only way in which a firm could expand.  Even where a firm expected eventually to capture a 
significant share from its competitors, the slow growing demand extended the payback period 
and left the expanding firm vulnerable to defensive cost-reducing investments by existing firms 
attempting to shore up their own competitive position.  And even though this investment may be 
in older technology, it could be sufficient to deter large scale expansions.
206
  As other have, 
Elbaum points to the lack of investment in the production of basic Bessemer steel by British 
firms as a prime example of the failure of the industry to adapt and a major cause of its loss of 
competitiveness and the dominance of German producers for the product.
207
 
 
The second factor stemmed from the nature of wage setting and work organisation.
208
  Wages in 
the steel sector were set by collective agreements according to a two part formula.  There was a 
base level, negotiated locally, that related wages to plant output (tonnage), plus a variable 
element under which wages were adjusted to steel prices according to a sliding scale.  Although 
this produced a relatively strike free industry and imparted some wage flexibility in cyclical 
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downturns, the tonnage rates tended to penalise high-output, high-productivity plants.  The 
effect was to enable older, lower productivity firms to survive through lower labour costs and 
deterred large scale investment in high capacity facilities since the wage bill would rise.  Added 
to the high dependence on worker control over work organisation and manning levels, an 
inheritance from the contracting system employed by earlier ironmasters, the overall effect was 
to raise the cost and reduce the benefits of large scale investment and plant reorganisation. 
 
Much the same argument about the exacerbating effects of a slow growing market is advanced 
by Chandler.
209
    His assessment, however, is that it was more than just investment in large 
scale plant and the latest technology that determined the success of US and German 
manufacturers.  It was part of a strategic, longer-term approach to business by the owners and 
senior managers that in parallel with investment new high-capacity plant saw two other major 
investments.  These were in the organisational aspects of business rather than in productive 
equipment.  One was the development of large scale business organisations controlled and 
administered by professionally trained managers; and the second was establishing large sales 
organisations dedicated to maintaining high volumes of sales and thus output – or throughput to 
use Chandler’s term.  In this way the reduced unit costs of operating large scale plants could be 
achieved by ensuring high levels of capacity utilisation.  
 
For British industry the relative backwardness stemmed from the failure to build business 
organisations of sufficient size and professionalism; instead they relied not only on traditional 
production methods, but also on long-established organisational structures, employment 
methods and the marketing of products through agents rather than sales departments.  It is, 
however, not always clear which way causality runs.  The vast and massively expanding US 
market needed investment on a huge scale, but that in turn required large administrations to run 
the huge production units efficiently, as well as committed sales staff to maintain the flow of 
orders to justify the output levels.  Although in retrospect all three elements appear as a strategic 
plan, the organisational changes may also be regarded as a response to the creation of the great 
enterprises which, once established, were able to cement their initial competitive advantage by 
further strategic investments, both in productive and organisational capacity.  In Britain the 
apparent neglect of these three complementary investments – production, management and sales 
– may not simply reflect an attachment to traditional methods.  It may have been partly the 
result of the greater efficiency of existing arrangements for producers whose output was more 
specialised and less standardised.  Ultimately it was the result of a slower expansion in market 
demand that deterred the British iron and steel masters from following the American example.  
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As Chandler comments: ‘Only a courageous and somewhat irrational set of British steelmakers 
and financiers would have made the investment required to build and integrate works in Britain 
large enough to compete with those of Pittsburgh and the Ruhr in order to regain those distant 
markets.  By not doing so, however, the British lost markets forever.’ 210  
 
Slow home market growth and the institutional constraints of a fragmented sector, however, do 
not necessarily absolve British industry from the charge of entrepreneurial failure.  Abé 
maintains that while there were some difficulties that the industry’s leaders could not have 
overcome, there were others they could reasonably have been expected to confront.
211
  In 
particular, the limitations of the British market might have been surmounted by consolidating 
and reorganising the industry through mergers and takeovers followed by investment in new 
large scale, technologically advanced plant.  To some extent restructuring did occur but the 
practice in Britain is often criticised on the grounds that whilst ownership was consolidated, it 
rarely resulted in the necessary rationalisation and integration of business operations or 
production units, of the stripping out of the old plant and its replacement with the new.
212
  Too 
often a merger or acquisition left the acquired company as a semi-independent, wholly owned 
subsidiary, still run by the original owners, or more likely their second or third generation 
descendants.   In other cases, the reorganisation was too slow and mismanaged that even when 
the most advanced plant was built, the benefits that could have resulted were incapable of being 
realised.  Boyce’s study of the linked South Durham Steel and Cargo Fleet Iron Company 
reorganisation by Furness is a case in point.
213
  In short, it may be argued that while the way the 
industrial structure had evolved may have placed constraints on the main decision makers, it 
was not beyond the ability of a visionary and risk-taking entrepreneur to break free of the 
constraints in order to challenge other British firms and the growing US and German industrial 
leadership.  That they did not may signify that there were deeper social and institutional 
constraints that were manifest in business attitudes and practices and these ultimately placed 
limitations on both aspirations and business decisions.
214
  At this point the institutional 
constraints and entrepreneurial failure explanations begin to merge, or at least complement each 
other. 
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4.4 Market and Resource Constraints 
 
Britain’s fall in the rankings of iron and steel producers has not been seen by all as an indication 
of weakness of enterprise.  Famously, McCloskey argued that Britain’s firms faced binding 
constraints on their decisions and made the best possible choices in the circumstances.
215
  Three 
constraint stand out: the nature of the market; the availability of suitable iron ore resources; and 
access to export markets.   
 
Apart from the overall size and rate of growth of the market, a number of other features of the 
nature of demand for iron and steel in Britain may explain the apparent backwardness of home 
producers in adapting to the technological and other changes.  They mark out the British market 
as distinct from those in the US and Germany at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  One prominent aspect is that the major source of early expansion, the demand for 
relatively simple products such as rails, had come to an end as the railway system neared 
completion.  Added to this was the slowdown in replacement demand as longer-lasting steel 
rails were substituted for iron and thus needed replacing less frequently.
216
  The flattening in rail 
demand was replaced by rising demand for higher quality steels for engineering and 
shipbuilding as well as for more specialist products such as tinplate and galvanised sheets. 
Many of Britain’s producers also specialised in orders for products with non-standardised 
specifications that had short production runs both for the home and export markets.  This 
specialisation meant that there was less scope for new technology or for achieving economies of 
scale, which by definition requires standardisation.  It enabled smaller firms to meet the demand 
competitively and profitably with less modern technology and production methods, often by 
relying on a highly skilled workforce.
 217
 
 
While these developments are particularly relevant to small scale, specialist iron and steel 
producers, they can also be seen as applicable to bulk steel production.  The decline in the rail 
market and the rise in shipbuilding shifted the demand towards a higher grade of steel that could 
not be produced using the Bessemer process.  It needed the slower, more controllable open 
hearth method that gave a more reliably high-quality product.  Resource availability partly 
dictated that it was in acid open hearth steel that Britain’s producers specialised, using low 
phosphorus hematite ores from Cumberland or imported from northern Spain where a number 
of British firms had mining interests.  For some this was a highly successful strategy, as is 
shown by the performance of the Consett Iron Company, a highly profitable acid steel producer 
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that specialised in ship plate.
218
  The alternative was to produce basic open hearth steel, which 
was later to become the dominant process in the industry.  As we have seen, Britain’s producers 
have been accused of being slow to adopt the process (Burn, and Burnham and Hoskins), but 
until the 1890s basic open hearth steel was not really an option for British producers, at least 
using local ores.  The problem, as Tolliday and Wengenroth have discussed in detail, arose from 
the requirement of the basic open hearth process for relatively low phosphorous ores, less than 
0.5 per cent.
219
  One option was to use the East Midlands ores of Northamptonshire and 
Lincolnshire.  However, due to the high silica content a heavy slag was produced in the 
smelting process and therefore the blast furnaces had to be operated at higher than normal 
temperatures.  As a result the production of basic pig iron suitable for the open hearth furnace 
was prohibitively costly.  Another option was to mix the ore with other imported ores, but again 
this raised costs.  In either case, not only would the steel have been uncompetitive, it was also of 
questionable quality because of the silica.  Indeed, it was not until proper scientific research 
work was undertaken in the 1920s that the difficulties of using the East Midlands ore for steel 
production were overcome.  Pig iron quality and blast furnace efficiency were found to be 
highly sensitive to temperature and it was only through careful control of the smelting process 
that iron of an acceptable quality could be produced.  Even then its use was for basic Bessemer 
steel rather than in the open hearth, and suspicion about quality persisted because of the its 
sulphur content. 
 
A further possibility was to use the extensive Cleveland ore deposits.  The problem with this ore 
was that with an intermediate phosphorus content of 1.5 per cent, it was suitable neither for the 
basic open hearth steel nor for basic Bessemer production.  There were early attempts to adapt 
the smelting of Cleveland pig to both basic processes.  By adding puddler’s tap to the blast 
furnace, a waste product from the wrought iron industry, the phosphorus content could be raised 
in smelting and the resulting pig iron used in the basic Bessemer converter.  It was a method 
adopted by the North Eastern Steel Company in Middlesbrough.  Alternatively, the phosphorus 
could be reduced by adding hematite ores to the blast to produce pig iron that was suitable for 
the basic open hearth furnace.  However, both were costly compared to the production of acid 
steel and the quality uncertain, not least because pig from the Cleveland ore also produced a 
heavy slag in the steel making furnace, compromising the conversion process.  Solutions to the 
difficulties came in the 1890s through advances in the steel making process rather than 
changing the phosphorus in the pig iron.  At first mixers were used as an intermediate process 
between the blast furnace and the open hearth furnace to improve the quality of the iron.  From 
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1906 they were replaced by the tilting furnace devised by Benjamin Talbot of the Cargo Fleet 
Iron Company.  It involved the periodic tilting of the open hearth furnace to remove the excess 
slag and regular partial emptying and recharging to maintain the phosphorus at the appropriate 
levels.
220
 
 
Once a solution had been found there was major investment in basic open hearth capacity and a 
rapid expansion in output.  Production rose to almost 3 million tons by 1914, 37 per cent of the 
total output of steel, from an almost negligible amount 25 years earlier (Table 4.8).  This hardly 
suggests a sluggish response either in terms of technology or entrepreneurship.   
 
 
Table 4.8: Steel Output by Process, 1889-1914 (selected years) 
 Percentage of total output  
Total output 
(tons) 
 Open hearth 
basic 
Open hearth 
acid 
Bessemer 
basic  
Bessemer 
acid  
1889 2.0 38.0 11.8 48.2 3,570,669 
1894 3.3 47.3 12.7 36.7 3,107,682 
1899 6.1 56.3 10.7 26.9 4,853,325 
1904 16.4 64.2 16.2 3.2 5,026,879 
1909 23.5 47.0 10.6 18.9 5,884,628 
1914 36.7 47.0 6.2 10.2 7,835,113 
Source: ICTR 17 May, 1912, p. 799 and NFISM Statistical Report 1918 (July 1919), p. 5. 
 
Whatever the delays there may have been in developing basic open hearth technology or the 
constraints on iron ore availability in Britain, these factors do not explain why British 
manufacturers did not expand their basic Bessemer capacity.  Using cheaper imported high 
phosphorus ores they might have challenged US and especially German producers in their home 
or neutral export markets.  Leaving aside the question of ore availability, there was, however, a 
further hurdle facing British firms: it was the protection of home markets by both the US and 
Germany.
221
  The effects of protection are uncertain and often disputed since on the one hand it 
permits the expansion of output behind the protective wall, but on the other can reduce the level 
of productivity and slow its growth by reducing competition and thus the incentive for 
efficiency raising investment.
222
  There are also differential effects on the protected sector 
depending on the nature industry and the structure of the tariff.  In the case of the iron and steel 
industry, however, it does appear that trade policy had beneficial effects for the industries in the 
protecting countries and a deleterious one on Britain’s. 
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For the US the protective barriers were raised to significant levels after 1873, with ad valorem 
rates in the 1883-90 period of 40-48 per cent for pig iron, 61-79 per cent for steel rails and 89-
98 per cent for shapes.
223
  This high degree of protection did decline progressively up to 1914 
with successive Tariff Acts easing the duty, but the tariffs remained a major barrier to imports 
from Britain when added to the geographical protection provided by transport costs.  The impact 
on cost competitiveness can be gauged by comparing the dollar prices of British and US pig 
iron and steel rails in 1883 after adding the duty and freight charges (Table 4.9).   
 
Table 4.9: British and US Prices after Duty and Freight Charges (per ton), 1883  
 Pig iron Steel rails 
British price (£ s d) 
 
£1 19s 5d £5 7s 5d 
British price in £ 
 
1.9708 5.6042 
x $4.8665 ($ per £) 
 
9.5909 27.2728 
Duty in $ 
 
6.72 20.16 
Transatlantic freight ($) 
 
0.9733 0.9733 
Rail freight in US ($) 
 
2.50 2.50 
British price in $ 
 
19.78 50.9 
US price ($) 
 
22.67 37.75 
UK:US % 
 
87.3% 135% 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from I.L. Bell, ‘Evidence’, p. 352; Paskoff, ‘American steel’, p. 
90. 
 
The data reveal that the tariffs provided a significant advantage for American producers in steel 
rails and reduced the cost benefits of British pig to only the narrowest of margins, and these 
were highly susceptible to relatively small fluctuations in British prices.  Thus a 12 shilling (30 
per cent) rise in Cleveland pig, well within the price fluctuations of the previous 10 years, 
would have rendered it uncompetitive, and for higher priced hematite pig the British cost 
advantage was even more vulnerable.  Added to a preference for home produced goods, the 
tariffs could effectively shut out the British exports, and this indeed is what seemed to happen.  
The effect on imports into the US market was very marked (Table 4.10). Imports of iron and 
steel rails, which came almost exclusively from Britain, fell from two-thirds of US output in the 
early 1870s to virtually nothing by the end of the decade and into the 1880s. That this occurred 
at the same time US rail production doubled not only indicates the benefits to the American 
producers, who were able to take advantage of the expansion of demand as the railway system 
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grew, but also of the adverse effect on British exports and output.  And if Paskoff’s assessment 
is correct that the American industry needed protection before 1880 and perhaps as late as 1890, 
it gave US firms the not only the opportunity to expand output, but also to invest in efficiency-
raising plant.  The effect was that by the lasts decade of the century cost reductions from the 
scale and technological advance of US firms rendered the tariff unnecessary, although 
protection continued.
224
  
 
Table 4.10: US Output and Imports of Rails, 1870-1884 (thousand tons) 
  
US Output 
 
US Imports 
Imports % of 
output 
1870 554 356 64.3 
1871 693 505 72.9 
1872 893 474 53.1 
1873 795 231 29.1 
1874 651 96 14.7 
1875 708 16 2.3 
1876 785 0 0.0 
1877 683 0 0.0 
1878 788 0 0.0 
1879 994 39 3.9 
1880 1,305 259 19.8 
1881 1,647 346 21.0 
1882 1,508 200 13.3 
1883 1,215 35 2.9 
1884 1,021 28 2.7 
Source: Bell, ‘Evidence’, p. 142, Table LXVII. 
 
For Germany it has been suggested that the benefits of protection were rather more complex, 
involving an interaction between tariffs, cartelised domestic production, especially strong 
among the bulk iron and steel firms, and pricing strategy in export markets.  From the 
introduction of tariffs in 1879 the level of protection was considerable, ranging from about 25 
per cent for pig iron to several hundred per cent for bar iron (Table 4.11).  The level of duty 
remained the same for the period up to the First War, although the ad valorem rate varied with 
prices.  For steel, it remained in the 15-25 per cent range.
225
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Table 4.11: German Tariffs on Iron and Steel, 1879 (per ton) 
  
Duty in shillings 
British price 
(shillings) 
 
Rate % 
Pig iron: Cleveland 10s 37.33 28.6 
Pig iron: hematite 10s 59.33 16.9 
Bar iron: Cleveland 25s 5.6 446 
Bar iron: Staffs 25s 7.8 321 
Ingot steel 15s -- -- 
Iron rails 25s 111.6 22.4 
Steel rails 25s 88 28.4 
Iron and steel plates 30s -- -- 
Source: Bell, ‘Evidence’, p. 29, Table VIII; p. 115, Table XLVI. 
 
Webb’s study of the effective rate of protection in German iron and steel shows that the degree 
of protection varied across the industry.  This resulted partly from the structure of the tariffs, but 
also from the industry’s composition, in particular whether a firm produced final or intermediate 
products and whether or not it was vertically integrated.  For some non-integrated firms 
producing end products (e.g. cast iron) protection was effectively negative because the impact 
of duties raised the prices of intermediate inputs.  The most protected were the heavily 
cartelised, vertically integrated mass producers of iron and steel.  Effective protection on all 
steel goods averaged about 12 per cent between 1883 and 1913, peaking at 37 per cent in 1900-
02.  For pig iron and heavy rolled steel this was significantly higher, averaging 51 and 23 per 
cent respectively, and again peaking in 1900-02 at 70 and 42 per cent for each product group.
226
  
These figures demonstrate just how heavily protected the large German steel producers were, 
and is significant both in that it was greatest at the time the industry grew rapidly and for the 
products in which it specialised.  This helped the development of large scale, technically 
advanced production methods that ultimately gave it a competitive advantage over Britain. 
 
The effect was more than simply expanding behind a protective tariff wall, however.  The tariff 
gave rise to an incentive to integrate production vertically to avoid paying duties on inputs and 
this in turn increased the scope for adopting and further developing the latest technology in bulk 
steel production.  The relevance of vertical integration is that many of the advances in 
production techniques came from vertically linked processes and, given the heavy capital 
expenditure needed, this required high levels of output if it was to be economical.  Cartelisation 
in a secure home market meant that high domestic prices could be maintained, thus profitability 
could be ensured even during periods of low demand.  It also enabled heavy discounting in 
export markets, with firms able to sell at or below cost.  The effect was to stabilise the 
combined demand from home and export markets at high levels this enabled firms to achieve 
low unit costs by operating plant close to capacity, with overseas losses subsidised by the high 
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margins on home sales.  Overall, this reduced the risks of investing in large scale production 
facilities and it was the resulting increased investment rate in a more stable environment that 
ultimately raised German productivity and eventually led to output levels overtaking those in 
Britain.
227
  According to Webb’s estimates the effect raised German productivity in steel by 10 
per cent above British levels by 1912-13 and this accounts for one-third to one-half of the 
output differential, somewhere in the region of 3.6 to 5.5 million tons or 46 per cent to 71 per 
cent of British output of steel. 
228
  
 
Wengenroth has similarly argued that German expansion was ‘at the expense of the British’ and 
points to ‘the industry’s collective behaviour and to national economic policy, especially 
customs policies, as dominant factors.’229  Interestingly, this analysis of Germany’s industry was 
at least partially recognised at the time, notably by Lowthian Bell, although, understandably, he 
did not foresee the implications it would have for the relative strengths of the British and 
German industries. Thus in Bell’s evidence in 1885 to the Royal Commission on Depression of 
Trade and Industry, when asked about steel imports and the relative costs in Britain and 
Germany, he replied: 
 
I do not think it is possible that the German makers can deliver steel at a cheaper rate 
than it can be produced at home.  That a certain quantity is sent into this country I do 
not dispute and, as is well known, Germany competes with us in neutral markets, but 
this they have done at times when the cost must, I think, have been more than the price 
they received.  The explanation of this I take to be as follows: Some years ago the home 
demand in Germany was so great that large importations, chiefly from the United 
Kingdom, were made to meet it.  During several of these years the iron trade must have 
been a very profitable one to the iron makers on or near to the Rhine, because, in 
addition to their natural advantages, they enjoyed protection against British iron masters 
in the form of transport and protective duties.  Stimulated by profits thus artificially 
raised, the German works were extended to a point which, when home demand fell off, 
left about one third of the entire make of the empire in the hands of the manufacturers.  
The choice now lay between stopping the works to this extent and seeking an export 
trade equal to the surplus power of their furnaces and mills, even when no profit or even 
a loss attended the latter policy.  By its adoption the works are kept fully employed, 
which is more economical than when only at partial work, and men are kept together 
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ready for any improvement in the trade when the time arrives.  The freight and duty on 
steel imported into Germany are such that the manufacturers by getting rid of the excess 
of their produce in the way described are able to obtain about 40s per ton more for 
articles required at home than they can for what is exported. Suppose, then, that  upon 
the latter no profit or say a loss of even 10s per ton was realised, the effect would be 
that instead of receiving 40s on the whole output they are content with something 
between 23s 4d and 26s 8d per ton with the advantage, whatever it may be worth, of 
having their establishments fully employed.
230
 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide some background to the later analysis of 
Cleveland’s iron and steel sector by identifying the main trends in the industry in Britain and the 
various explanations that have been put forward to explain its performance.  It is well 
established that iron and steel output grew more slowly than in the US, Germany, and a number 
of other European countries.  As technology spread and other economies industrialised, the 
demand for, and the production of, this most fundamental of industrial products grew rapidly.  
Britain’s relative decline therefore was inevitable; but this was not an absolute decline.  In 1913 
pig iron output was 14 per cent above the turn of the century level and steel 57 per cent higher.  
In terms of world output in the same year, Britain produced 13 per cent of the world’s pig iron 
and 10 per cent of the steel.
231
  Trade was marked by sharply rising imports, but the quantity 
measure (i.e. tons) tends to overstate the problems as Britain shifted to higher quality exports 
and lower value imports.  As a result the balance of trade in value terms improved, especially 
after the trough in 1891-4 when exports fell by 13 per cent in two years.  These statistics and the 
analysis in this chapter show it is not altogether clear that entrepreneurial failure and 
institutional constraints were evident or entirely to blame for the relative decline.  The industry 
was beset by other difficulties, not least among which were the protectionist policies of the 
largest potential markets, the US and Germany.
232
  Coupled with the slower growth and the 
highly cyclical nature of the industry, expansion was more difficult in Britain than elsewhere.  
In Cleveland, the technical limitations on the use of the local ore, which had been so important 
in the early growth of the industry, held back some of the adjustment to steel.  But as Chapter 6 
will demonstrate, British firms were not dilatory first in finding ways around and later in 
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solving this problem.  Moreover, as will be explored in Chapter 7 there were still entrepreneurs 
in the industry with the drive to create large organisations.  First, however, the effect of the mid-
nineteenth century changes in corporate legislation, often thought to be a crucial factor that 
enabled the growth of large companies, will be examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: The Effects of Changes in Corporate Legislation on the Iron and Steel 
Industry in Cleveland 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
It is well documented that the Joint Stock Company Acts of 1855 and 1856, and consolidated in 
1862, led to a sharp rise in the promotion of joint stock companies, and that iron and steel was 
one of the first sectors to take advantage of the benefits of incorporation and limited liability.
233
  
As Watson has shown, by 1881 there were 46 iron and steel companies quoted in Burdett’s 
Official Intelligence, with a market capitalisation of £23.5 million, and this had risen to 106 
(market capitalisation of £86.5 million) by 1910.
234
  Between 1881 and 1900 the proportion of 
blast furnaces operated by publicly quoted companies had increased from 23.5 to 65 per cent.
235
  
These changes had a marked impact on firms in the Cleveland iron and steel and related 
engineering industries and it is the aim of this chapter is to investigate the effects.  In particular, 
it will look at the way in which firms made use of the changes in corporate legislation of the 
1850s and 1860s, the effects on financing business and the ownership structure of firms.   
 
The traditional view on the significance of the new corporate legislation, exemplified by 
Shannon, Todd, Jefferys and Hunt, is that the free availability of incorporation and limited 
liability was not only inevitable, but also a natural and logical concomitant of economic 
development.
236
  The growth of large scale enterprises with substantial capital requirements 
meant that businesses needed access to a wider source of funds.  This could be achieved only 
though incorporation, the protection of investors by limited liability and meeting investors’ 
preferences for liquidity by the free transfer of ownership rights, i.e. a secondary market in 
shares.  Indeed, in some interpretations the failure of the legal developments to keep pace with 
the business ones held back economic development.  Consequently, the corporate reforms were 
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a necessary legal catching up with the economic imperatives.
237
  For brevity, this will be called 
the ‘growth view’. 
 
There is some indication that following the legislative changes, iron and steel companies did 
seek finance from the equity market.  Watson notes that although many firms did not rely on 
market funds, there was a tendency for companies to approach the market for additional capital 
when the industry was in the ‘upper half’ of the cycle.238  Newton’s paper on Sheffield capital 
networks examines the activities of three company promoters floating iron and steel companies 
in the district.
239
  Their promotions primarily tapped into local sources of funds but also brought 
in some extra-regional capital.  This not only financed the expansion of the Sheffield iron and 
steel industry but also helped to develop a domestic industrial capital market ‘...educating a 
solid core of investors into the act of investment’.240  This had the effect of spreading limited 
liability, raising funds, encouraging the adoption of new technology, increasing the scale of 
enterprises and helping firms survive the cyclical downturns.
241
 
 
Similarly supportive views of the benefits of the joint stock form of organisation in the iron and 
steel sector are expressed by Allen.
242
  He suggests that it was the larger, public limited 
companies with broadly-based shareholding that were likely to be the most advanced, 
productive and willing to invest in the latest technology.  Those that remained partnerships or 
were private companies whose shareholders were confined to family members, often 
descendants of the original founders, were likely to be more conservative  They stuck with out-
dated technology, obsolete plant and old fashioned production and management methods.  
Widespread share ownership and directors with more varied backgrounds aided the 
professionalisation of company management, resulting in a greater emphasis on corporate 
growth and a more realistic attitude to risk taking.  Furthermore, the public holding of shares 
provided a stronger incentive for directors to monitor company behaviour, and although there 
was no market for corporate control in the modern sense, shareholder pressure, including that 
from non-family directors, for profits and a steady flow of dividends may have been enough to 
improve performance. 
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Not all researchers have seen incorporation as a logical and necessarily beneficial development 
in business organisation, or at least have been so sanguine about the way it was fashioned in the 
mid-nineteenth century.  Armstrong for example presents evidence of the often questionable, 
and frequently fraudulent, practices of company promoters.  He maintains that such activities, 
especially notable in the 1850s to 1860s, restricted the benefits of incorporation: investors were 
‘turned off home industrials’ and some sound firms shied away from going public because of 
the adverse publicity that surrounded the promotion of new companies.  The effect was that 
British firms remained small, family ownership dominated, and the resulting lack of capital 
meant that they were unable to compete with the large-scale, professionally managed firms that 
were developing abroad, especially in the US and Germany.
243
  This is a position that is 
particularly relevant to the iron and steel industry. 
 
There is also an alternative explanation of the roots of the 1850s relaxation of company law that 
directly contradicts the ‘inevitable and logical’ interpretation.  This will be termed the ‘socio-
political view’.  Taylor has shown, convincingly, than an important source of the political 
pressure behind the 1855 and 1856 Joint Stock Company Acts was a desire by the authorities to 
eradicate the anomalies and discretionary decision making in the process of granting of 
corporate status.
244
  Described by Taylor as a ‘troublesome responsibility’, it was a system that 
was open to abuse and the justified criticism that it was opaque and seemingly arbitrary. Of 
wider significance, perhaps, is Taylor’s contention that the apparent shift in policy was in many 
respects a continuation of the government’s ultimate objective of maintaining financial stability, 
but by the almost counter-intuitive method of liberalising regulations rather than tightening 
them.   
 
Specifically, by granting firms free access to the protection of limited liability, creditors would 
be discouraged from the reckless lending to companies that occurred after the 1844 Act as 
shareholders’ liability for the debts would be limited and thus so too would be creditors’ claims.  
And for investors, because lifting the restrictions made incorporation and limited liability 
virtually automatic, subject only to minimal requirements, as shareholders they would have 
would have to exercise greater responsibility in their choice of investments.  They would no 
longer feel they had the protection of a business that had been regulated by the state, and in the 
same way that creditors were forced to become more prudent, it was the duty of investors to 
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ensure that companies in which they invested were sound.  Thus it was a way of shifting the 
burden of responsibility for regulation of incorporated businesses from the state to investors and 
creditors.
245
  
 
According to this view, the legislative relaxation was motivated by a desire to protect investors 
and the financial system from the speculative excesses of the late 1840s.  It was a means of 
reducing the moral hazard effects of state regulation: less regulation meant more self-regulation 
and therefore greater stability. Investors and creditors were forced to become more circumspect 
and behave with greater responsibility.  That the legislation resulted in limited liability 
companies becoming the dominant form of business enterprise was an unintended consequence 
of the change rather than a reflection of a wholesale conversion to ‘the ideology of growth’.  As 
Taylor emphasises, at the time of the 1850s legislation there was no evidence that companies 
had finally managed to shake off the ‘prejudices’ and ‘misconceptions’ that had dogged their 
earlier existence.
246
 
 
The main purpose chapter is to investigate the impact of incorporation on business behaviour, 
and how firms in Cleveland made use of limited liability status.  As part of this, it is possible to 
make an assessment of the relative merits of ‘growth view’ and the ‘socio-political view’ of the 
emergence of joint stock companies.  In particular, some of the evidence can be used to test 
indirectly the first hypothesis, i.e. the joint stock form was an economic necessity in a growing 
economy.  Whatever the motivations of the legislators might appear to be, the underlying forces 
that drive change may often be hidden and become apparent only later.  Thus if limited liability 
is associated with higher investment, growth and expansion, then it could be that the legislative 
changes of the mid-nineteenth century were responding to the needs of the business community 
as capital requirements increased and the expanding size of firms demanded different 
organisational forms.  In part, this is a test of a view that institutions and organisations adapt to 
requirements and to solve problems in an optimal way. The alternative hypothesis is that 
organisational development proceeds by a series of adaptations to immediate problems and is 
guided, or influenced, by the balance of social, political and economic forces.  This latter 
approach fits most closely with Taylor’s interpretation.  A look at the practical implications of 
the joint stock legislation therefore offers an indirect, if partial, way of assessing the two 
hypotheses.   
 
The following sections investigate these issues first by considering the trends in, and the overall 
pattern of, company registration as the Cleveland iron and steel industry developed from the 
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1850s.  Second, the extent to which conversion to joint stock status was linked to the demand 
for external funds to finance capital investment is examined by considering in detail the 
flotation of  Bolckow Vaughan in 1864-5 (Section 3) and then the post-flotation capital 
structure and sources of long-term funds of Bolckow Vaughan and Dorman Long (Section 4).  
Section 5 offers some conclusions.   
 
5.2 Trends in Company Registration in Cleveland 
 
It was perhaps because of the relative newness of the Cleveland iron industry, which made it 
unattractive to investors, that following the 1850s reform of corporate legislation there was no 
headlong rush in the district towards the formation of joint stock companies.  Nationally, 
between mid-1856 and mid-1864 Todd estimates that over 3,500 companies had been 
registered, which after adjustments for failures and abortive flotations, left 2,000 in existence in 
June 1864.
247
  In Cleveland at that time just seven had been registered.  Nevertheless, from 1860 
onwards there was a steady flow of registrations; measured decade by decade, this increased 
from 14 in the 1860s to a peak of 22 in the 1890s (Table 5.1).
248
  There was, however, a 
considerable degree of variation from year to year, with peaks in 1864-65, 1872-74, the late 
1880s, the mid-1890s and in 1900, and troughs particularly in the late 1860s and mid-1870s 
(Figure 5.1).  In the early days of the industry these fluctuations were associated with the usual 
cyclical measures of activity (i.e. prices and output) in the sector, which was also the case for 
variations at the national level.  For public flotations at least, this can be easily explained: 
profits in the immediate past were taken as an indicator of the prospect of future profits and 
dividends, making the shares in newly floated companies an attractive proposition for investors 
and company promoters.  After the mid-1880s, as the industry matured, the year to year 
variation in Cleveland was less closely correlated with changes in the economic cycle.
 249
   New 
entry, which tended to be pro-cyclical, declined and in any event most existing larger business 
had already converted.
250
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Table 5.1: Joint Stock Company Registration in the Cleveland Iron and Steel Industry, 
1860-1900 
 Total 
New 
businesses
a 
New 
businesses 
reconstructed 
from existing 
firms
b 
Conversions
c 
Not Known 
1860-69 14   9 -  5 - 
1870-79 17 12 -  5 - 
1880-89 21 10  5  5 - 
1890-99 22   9  4  8 1 
1900-09 17   7  3  5 2 
Total 91 47 11 29 3 
Notes: 
a: new businesses established as joint stock companies. 
b: new joint-stock companies formed from failed partnerships or liquidated joint stock companies. 
c: conversion unincorporated firms, usually partnerships, into joint stock companies. 
Source: Appendix 1. 
 
Figure 5.1: Incorporation of Cleveland Iron, Steel and Related Engineering Companies, 
1860-1912 
 
Note: the data refer to the total annual registrations of iron, steel and engineering companies as new 
businesses, reconstructions of failed businesses or conversions to from partnerships to joint stock 
companies. 
Source: Appendix 1 
 
The data reveals some interesting features of company formation.  Throughout the period the 
establishment of new businesses formed a significant proportion of the total number of joint 
stock companies registered, approximately two-thirds of all companies for the whole period 
(1860-1909).  As might be expected, proportionately this was at its highest during the rapid 
expansion of the industry in the 1860s and early 1870s, although as a proportion of all new 
businesses, including partnerships, joint stock firms were still in a minority.  By the 1880s and 
1890s the proportion of joint stock companies that were new businesses had fallen, despite the 
overall total rising, partly reflecting a slowing in the growth of the district and a restructuring in 
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the ownership of existing firms.  The other principal category of company registration is the 
conversion of existing businesses into limited companies.  By the end of the nineteenth century 
the joint stock company had become the accepted form of business organisation and many of 
the established firms that were still partnerships took advantage of the protection of limited 
liability.  Indeed, by the turn of the century all of the big names of the Cleveland iron industry 
and many of the smaller ones had become incorporated, with long-lived partnerships converting 
to limited companies, e.g. Weardale Iron and Steel (1863), Bolckow Vaughan (1864-65), Bell 
Brothers (1873), Samuelson (1887), Dorman, Long (1889), and Head, Wrightson (1890).  
Smaller firms that survived also converted, such as Pickerings Lifts (1887), Cochrane and 
Grove (1889) and Crewdson, Hardy (1899).  By the early twentieth century virtually all sizeable 
business in the industry had become incorporated, although most were ‘private’ companies.251 
 
Figure 5.2: Business Failures in Cleveland Iron and Steel, 1850-99 
 
Note: failed firms include failed sole proprietors, partnerships and liquidated joint stock companies. 
Source: Appendix 1. 
 
In many respects the picture is much more complicated than a simple division of companies into 
new entrants and the conversion of survivors.  There was a considerable degree of business 
failure (Figure 5.2), resulting in part from the highly cyclical nature of the industry in 
conjunction with a tendency for excessive optimism in the upswing that produced periodic over-
investment and over-production.  This is most notable in the 1870s, the first half of which 
produced an enormous expansion in iron producing and processing capacity, the employment of 
which could not be sustained following the downturn in 1874.  North Yorkshire pig iron 
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production was virtually static between 1873 and 1874 at 1.16 million tons, and nationally 
output fell by 9 per cent.
252
  The succession of failures that followed the recessions often left not 
only collapsed firms and bankrupt ironmasters (e.g. Thomas Vaughan, Richard Jaques, George 
Swan and many others), but also valuable plant and equipment, and even a pig iron brand name, 
idle.  And even when the closed iron and engineering works were obsolete, the site could prove 
attractive to new investors in the industry.  There was therefore considerable scope for business 
reconstruction, and in many, if not most, of the cases this was achieved through the flotation of 
a new company. 
 
Broadly speaking, reconstructions took three main forms. 
1. The reconstruction of an existing partnership as a limited company, under the same or a new 
name, and usually with some or all of the existing partners. 
2. The revival and reconstruction of a limited company that had been dissolved. Again this 
was often under the same name with the existing directors 
3. The formation of a completely new company.  This was often with help from the main 
creditors or other interested parties of investors, some of whom were already involved in the 
iron industry, who had bought up the site and equipment in order to float a new business. 
  
As far as Table 5.1 is concerned, the first two are classified under the ‘New Businesses 
reconstructed from existing firms’ category, while a firm in the third is regarded as a completely 
new business.
253
  
 
A classic case of a partnership that failed and was revived by the same partners as a limited 
company is Cargo Fleet Iron.  The original firm was established as Swan, Coates and Co in 
1864 and by 1866 was smelting pig iron in four blast furnaces.  In 1876-77 the firm failed in 
iron recession, leaving debts of £280,000 and the partners – J.G. Swan, George Newcomen and 
John Legal – were declared bankrupt.254  Following their discharge from bankruptcy, the 
ironworks at Cargo Fleet was reopened as a limited company, now named Cargo Fleet Iron Co 
Ltd, with Swan as managing director.  The business prospered for a number of years, expanding 
to five blast furnaces and acquiring ironstone mines at Liverton, Normanby and Ormesby until it 
went out of business in the 1890s.  Despite its obsolete plant, the firm was then bought up by Sir 
Christopher Furness for its large riverside site.
255
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Moor Steel and Iron Company provides another example of a collapsed partnership that was re-
floated as a limited company.  Established in Stockton, originally by Shaw, Johnson and Reay 
in 1872, the firm specialised in iron puddling and rolling, particularly ship plate.  It also had 
coal mining interests.  The business collapsed in May 1882 with debts of around £164,000 and 
the assets were seized by creditors.  The two principal mortgage holders took the main property:  
Lambton’s, a Newcastle bank, gained control of the collieries at Whitworth and Castle Eden, in 
County Durham; and Backhouse’s, the Darlington bank, took possession of the ironworks.  By 
1885 the creditors and two of the partners had re-launched the iron business as a limited 
company, and with new investment in open hearth acid steel furnaces, switched to producing 
steel plate.  It remained an independent company until 1896 when it was taken over by 
Weardale Steel and Coal, again as part of the expansion of Furness’s business interests.256 
 
In the same way that failed partnerships were rebuilt as limited companies, so too were 
liquidated joint stock companies.  The formation of Skinningrove Iron Company in 1880 
presents a relatively typical case.  The ironworks were first set up by the Loftus Iron Co, a new 
limited company formed specifically to take advantage of the early 1870s iron boom.  It owned 
and operated ironstone mines at Carlin How and blast furnaces at Loftus.  Like numerous others 
in this industry, the firm ran into difficulties during the mid-1870s, probably in late 1876 or 
early 1877.  The furnaces were blown out by mid-1877 and the managing director, John 
Westray, faced bankruptcy proceedings.  Following the firm’s winding-up its assets were 
offered for auction in Middlesbrough (at the Royal Exchange) and bought up by W.D. (William 
Dillworth) Crewdson for £50,000 on behalf of the ‘first mortgagees’. The plant was then sold to 
a newly formed company, Skinningrove, also for £50,000.
257
   
 
There are a number of interesting features of the Loftus-Skinningrove case.  One is that the 
chairman of the new company, T.C. Hutchinson was also one of the liquidators of the Loftus 
Iron Co, and of the other shareholders at least two out of the six were already connected with 
the Cleveland iron trade.  John Rogerson was general manager at the Weardale Iron and Steel 
Company and ran his own iron merchant business from the Middlesbrough Exchange.  Edwin 
K. Fox was also an iron merchant at the Middlesbrough Exchange and related to one of the 
partners (Theodore Fox) in another Middlesbrough iron firm – Fox, Head and Co.  Secondly, 
the new company was partially financed by a mortgage with W. D. Crewdson, a partner in the 
private Kendal-based bank of Wakefield, Crewdson and Co and previously a creditor of the 
Loftus Iron Co.  Although neither Crewdson nor the other partners of the bank took shares in 
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the new firm, Wakefield, Crewdson continued to provide finance for Skinningrove, even after 
the bank was taken over by the Bank of Liverpool (1893).  For example, a £34,000 mortgage 
was arranged in June 1894.
258
 
 
A more involved example is that of Teesside Iron and Engineering Works Co, a business that 
had a rather chequered, and at times troubled, history.  This firm went through a number of 
reorganisations between 1879 and 1896, during which it demonstrated at least two of the three 
ways in which the joint stock company form was used to revive a business in difficulties.  The 
original company (Hopkins, Gilkes and Co) was an early instance of a public joint stock 
company in the Cleveland iron industry, formed from the merger of two existing partnerships 
when the engineering business of Gilkes, Wilson and Co (Tees Engine Works) amalgamated 
with the iron smelting firm of Hopkins and Co (Teesside Ironworks) in 1865.  The resulting 
firm produced a wide range of iron products from pig iron to steam engines and bridge design 
and construction.  As with Bolckow, Vaughan (see below), it was promoted in, and attracted a 
significant number of investors from, Manchester.
259
  Following the downturn in the demand for 
iron in the second half of the 1870s the company experienced financial difficulties and its fate 
was sealed after the Tay bridge disaster, for which the firm had been a major contractor.
260
  
After the disaster, Edgar Gilkes resigned and the company was liquidated in 1880.   
 
When iron prices revived in the early 1880s, the firm’s idle and potentially profitable plant, 
however, provided the principal remaining shareholders, among them Isaac Wilson and 
members of the Pease family, sufficient incentive to reopen the business.  Wilson, Pease and 
Co, a partnership that ran the Tees Ironworks and which had included Gilkes before his 
departure, bought the business and re-floated the firm as Teesside Iron and Engineering Works 
Co in early in 1880, with a total nominal share capital of £324,000, £99,000 in £3 preference 
shares (probably held by Wilson and the Pease family) and £225,000 in £5 ordinary shares.
261
  
Even with new management, a tarnished reputation and a highly competitive market meant that 
the company experienced great difficulty in obtaining orders and struggled to survive, let alone 
to make profit.  By 1889 the firm had once again collapsed and been liquidated, but it was soon 
revived with a further injection of Pease money.  The new company, registered in 1890, 
struggled on for a few years with limited success, this time dogged by poor management and 
obsolete equipment.  Both the firm’s plants were eventually shut in 1894 and remained 
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redundant until the liquidation the following year.  The works were then were bought up by Sir 
Christopher Furness in 1896 as another part of his expansion plans.
262
   
 
Furness’ purchase of Teesside Iron and Engineering appears to have been something of a new 
pattern of business reconstruction in Cleveland that started in the 1890s: that of buying up firms 
that were either in difficulties or closed and then reorganising their assets into a number of 
different companies.  These were then floated as public companies or retained as wholly owned 
subsidiaries as private companies.  Furness tended to follow the former path.  In the case of 
Teesside Iron and Engineering, the engineering side of the business was re-floated as Teesside 
Bridge and Engineering Co, which as its name indicates, specialised in bridge construction.  
After a poor start, the company eventually built a sound business.  The blast furnace plant was 
rather less successful.  This part of the business was re-launched as Tees Furnace Co in 1896, 
but lasted only a few years before being closed.  The out of date furnaces were pulled down and 
the site sold to the expanding marine engineering company, Richardson, Westgarth, another of 
Furness’ companies and a product of his amalgamations and reconstructions.263 
 
A similar pattern of reinvigorating defunct businesses is shown in the case of Bowesfield Steel 
Company, and though the pattern is similar to Tees Bridge and Engineering, there are some 
interesting variations in the details.  The Bowesfield works was principally a rolling mill 
specialising mainly in iron and also steel plate for shipbuilding.  The original firm, Bowesfield 
Iron Co, shut down operations in September 1890, another victim of the shift away from iron 
and the periodic recessions in the industry.  Liquidation proceedings to wind-up the company 
were quickly instituted at the behest of the creditors, with C.A. Head of Head, Wrightson among 
the principal ones, and W.B. Peat, an accountant and a well-known figure in the Middlesbrough 
iron trade, appointed as liquidator.
264
  Initial attempts to re-float the business were abortive, and 
the works lay idle for some years.
265
  Improving prospects in the industry by the mid-1890s, 
however, encouraged a number of local investors to form a group, the Bowesfield Syndicate, to 
buy up the deserted works and sell them to a new company (for £18,000) set up to re-equip and 
modernise the firm.  The new Bowesfield Steel Company was floated in July 1896 with shares 
allotted to the syndicate members in payment for the works, inclusive of a £10,000 mortgage, 
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and 30,000 £1 shares (10 shillings paid) offered to the public to raise capital for new equipment 
and to inject working capital.
266
   
 
This flotation illustrates a well-established way in which promoters and directors were able to 
minimise their exposure to risk.  The shares issued to the vendors were fully paid-up, in contrast 
to the subscribers whose investment was only 50 per cent paid, and consequently exposed to 
significant financial losses in the event of a company failure.  The flotation was also a way in 
which the creditors were able to obtain some reimbursement for the losses incurred resulting 
from the failure of the earlier version of the company.  In Bowesfield’s case the syndicate 
members numbered at least two creditors, Charles Head and Thomas Wrightson, and there may 
have been others.
267
  Such promotions are not necessarily entirely cynical, however; the 
promoters were after all establishing a new company, which, with good management and some 
luck, would become profitable and produce dividends.  Bowesfield did seem to be a genuine 
attempt to renew the business and break into new markets.  The directors planned to branch out 
from iron, to rolling thin steel sheets for galvanising and corrugating.  At that time these 
products were mostly produced in the West Midlands and South Wales, and not at all on 
Teesside.  Alfred Baldwin, whose companies had steel works in Wales and the Midlands and 
which were already producing for this market, was brought in as a director, with a nominal 
investment, presumably to provide expertise and contacts in the sector.
268
   
 
These examples show a varying use and experience of joint stock status by companies in 
Cleveland.  The practice was rather more complex than establishing a completely new business 
or converting a well-established partnership.  Past research has tended to overlook the role of 
incorporation in facilitating the reconstruction of businesses; it helped produce a more rapid 
response to changing economic circumstances and enabled firms to take advantage of 
potentially profitable opportunities.  The explanations are relatively straightforward.  First, 
limited liability meant that the failure of a business did not necessarily result in drawn-out and 
involved bankruptcy proceedings that could leave productive and profitable property 
unemployed.  Second, new investors were not deterred by the possibility of future claims on a 
business that could arise many years later and which left the ownership of the property in 
dispute or tied up the business in long-lasting law suits.
269
  By emphasising the financing and 
speculative aspects of company promotion, historians have neglected an important result of the 
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legal changes.  That is, by codifying and standardising the procedures for winding-up a 
company and determining the claims of its creditors, the reform of corporate legislation made it 
easier and therefore more likely that the assets of defunct companies would be re-employed.  In 
short, by making it easier to exit, the legislation made entry more likely, and therefore 
encouraged greater entrepreneurial activity.  As to whether joint stock company formation 
resulted in greater capital investment, one way to assess this from the data on company 
registration is to compare the proportion of new firms that were set up with the conversion of 
existing firms.  That there were a significant number of new firm registrations, about half 
according to Table 5.1, could be interpreted as confirming the ‘growth view’.  That is, the 
advent of free access to incorporation encouraged the influx of funds to finance capital 
formation.  However, there are two qualifications to this interpretation.  First, it is not surprising 
that in a rapidly growing industry in which new business formation was fairly high as was the 
case in Cleveland in the 1860s and 1870s, some entrepreneurs took advantage of the protection 
offered by incorporation.  Second, by the end of the nineteenth century, as noted above, the joint 
stock company had become the principal form of business organisation, at least for larger firms 
in established industries.  While it is difficult to predict the counter-factual, i.e. what business 
formation would have been in the absence of the reform of company legislation, it is likely that 
in Cleveland this would have been high and therefore the joint stock form may have had little 
net effect on overall investment or even business formation. 
 
Company conversions pose similar problems of interpretation.  Generally, it might be expected 
that turning a partnership into a limited company would not necessarily increase investment, but 
this depends on the nature and the details of the conversion.  For private companies, any 
increase in funds would be unlikely since ownership of the business would usually be 
distributed between the partners and family members.  Bringing in a new investor, however, 
was always a possibility, and there were a number of instances where this occurred in 
Cleveland; for example in the formation of Ashmore,, Benson and Pease and Co, which had 
previously been the partnership Ashmore, White.
270
  For public flotations, on the other hand, in 
which shares were offered for sale to a widespread investing public, it might be expected that 
the new funds drawn in to the business would be used at least in part for expansion and 
modernisation.  This is the justification for the joint stock reforms that underlies the ‘growth 
view’.  But here again the picture is complicated.  There is no logical reason why funds 
generated from the public flotation of an existing partnership or private company should 
necessarily raise investment.  In many instances it is just as likely that funds raised were used to 
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pay the vendors and promoters of the company, as in the example of Bolckow Vaughan 
investigated in Section 5.3. 
 
The other form of incorporation identified in Table 5.1, that of company or business 
reconstruction, also presents problems when trying to draw inferences about the contribution of 
incorporation to financing investment.  In general it might be expected that a reconstruction is 
associated both with modernisation and greater investment as in the examples of Bowesfield, 
Skinningrove and Cargo Fleet (the 1906 reconstruction).  An alternative is that the directors’ 
plans were simply to return the plant to production with minimal extra capital expenditure on 
the firm beyond the injection of basic working capital to finance operations.   
 
One final complication is worth mentioning.  It is that public flotations provided entrepreneurs 
not only with a means of exploiting unwary and ill-informed investors, but also with a method 
of securing rapid returns on their investments.  Thus it may be that entrepreneurs’ willingness to 
invest privately in businesses was increased by the knowledge that a quick return could be 
obtained from a future public flotation.  One possible example of this is the Britannia Iron 
Works Company.  This was a sizeable puddling and rolling mill business established by 
Bernhard Samuelson in 1870 on a site close to his large smelting plant at Newport, 
Middlesbrough.  The business was floated as a public company in 1872, with the  prospectus 
stating that Samuelson was selling the business because of his decision ‘to retire ... from all 
business engagements requiring his personal attention’.  It is an explanation that was at odds 
with his continued involvement in the Newport ironworks and his agricultural engineering 
business in Banbury.  Whatever the real reason behind Samuelson’s decision to float the 
Britannia works as a limited company, the point here is that his original decision to build the 
rolling mills and to take on a £82,500 mortgage at 6 per cent may well have been influenced by 
the knowledge that the business could be sold by establishing a limited company.  Samuelson 
could thus earn a quick return on the investment.  The details of Samuelson’s earnings from the 
flotation are not known, but they are likely to have been considerable as the company was 
launched at the height of the early 1870s expansion and the works were sold with the mortgage.  
Unusually, Samuelson did not become a director of the company, as was normally the case in 
the conversion of privately owned businesses.
271
  In this way the joint stock company provided 
an indirect incentive to investment and thus a stimulus to growth, and the effect applies equally 
to new ventures as it does to the reconstruction of defunct or failing companies.  In a sense, it is 
akin to the practice adopted by some of today’s private equity funds and venture capitalists.  But 
as with modern experience, without detailed case by case analysis it is often difficult to 
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determine whether the potential returns from a future flotation acts as an incentive to invest and 
improve the management of the assets or whether it is simply a matter of asset stripping. 
 
Overall, the data show the importance of the joint stock company form to the Cleveland iron 
and steel industry.  Unsurprisingly, it grew to become the dominant form of business 
organisation in the district, just as it did elsewhere in the country.  The discussion has shown 
how diverse in nature and circumstance the formation of joint stock companies was and thus 
how difficult it is to draw inferences about the contribution of the liberalisation of corporate 
legislation to the growth of industry.  The fact that most surviving firms of any size had become 
incorporated by 1900 suggests that at the very least the protection offered by limited liability 
was an important consideration, especially in an industry that was notorious for the volatility of 
its market conditions and the risk of business failure.  Nevertheless, joint stock status was 
adopted for many different reasons and had a variety of effects depending on the position of the 
business and the objectives of the owners.  This is examined in more detail in the following 
sections by looking in depth at how two large firms made use of the opportunities offered by the 
changes in corporate legislation and especially the extent to which they were able to draw on 
capital markets for long term funds. 
 
 
5.3 Bolckow Vaughan: the first five years of incorporation 
 
In the 1860s Bolckow, Vaughan was the largest of the publicly floated iron companies in 
Cleveland and also one of the most widely known.  By the end of the decade its shares were 
quoted on the stock markets of London, Manchester and Newcastle.  Its conversion from a 
partnership makes an interesting study as it was sizeable, with the company valued at just less 
under £1 million, and, through its promoter, David Chadwick, brought in substantial investment 
funds to Cleveland from outside the district.  As Table 5.2 shows, and as noted by a number of 
historians, a majority of the investors were Manchester or north west businessmen, many 
involved in the cotton trade, and also associated with David Chadwick from the Manchester-
based accounting and auditing firm of Chadwick, Adamson.
272
  Some of these north west 
associates of Chadwick were major shareholders and became directors of the company, 
including H.D. Pochin and Benjamin Whitworth.  A number of the shareholders were also 
directors or shareholders in other iron and steel companies promoted by Chadwick; for example 
Henry Pochin and Charles Cammell both had interests in Sheffield iron and steel businesses.
273
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Table 5.2: Regional Distribution of Bolckow Vaughan Shareholders 
Region No of shares 
No of 
shareholders 
Per cent of 
shares 
Per cent of 
shareholders 
Average  
shareholding 
North West 11,603 288 68.3 60.6 40 
London 1,100 23 6.5 4.8 48 
North East 1,038 35 6.1 7.4 30 
Yorkshire 805 38 4.7 8.0 21 
Cleveland 611 37 3.6 7.8 17 
East Midlands 535 9 3.1 1.9 59 
Ireland 448 27 2.6 5.7 17 
West Midlands 340 8 2.0 1.7 43 
South 160 5 0.9 1.1 32 
Scotland 135 4 0.8 0.8 34 
South West 75 1 0.4 0.2 75 
Others 150 8 0.9 1.7 19 
Total 17000 475 100 100 36 
Note: BVDM records the address or town of residence of each shareholder.  Allocation of shareholders to 
a region uses standard UK regions. 
Source: BVDM Vol. 1, 3 Dec 1864, pp. 45-59. 
 
The public issue produced a substantial inflow of funds to the firm, totalling £510,000 between 
1865 and 1869.  This was raised from an initial share price of £17 10s, with two later calls 
taking the paid up value to £30 per share out of a nominal value of £100.  To some writers this 
was a clear case of raising finance to increase investment.  Birch for example suggests that 
Bolckow Vaughan illustrates one of the three ‘legitimate’ reasons identified by Jefferys for 
forming a joint stock company, namely the ‘desire to extend the sources of capital’.274  And 
despite the involvement of Chadwick as a promoter, who was connected with both failed and a 
fraudulent flotations, Birch suggests that the partners, Henry Bolckow and John Vaughan, had 
no ‘fraudulent intentions’.275 
 
As evidence of the honourable motives behind the flotation, both Birch and Cottrell have cited a 
self-denying ordinance in the terms of sale agreement and the articles of association of the new 
company.  This stated that Bolckow and Vaughan would forego dividends on their vendors’ 
shares until an average dividend of 10 per cent had been paid on ordinary shares for the first five 
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years of the company.
276
  A closer examination of the flotation, however, suggests that the 
guarantee was little more than cosmetic, and that the raising of funds had little to do with 
financing extra capital investment.  Jefferys’ and Birch’s ‘desire for external sources of capital’ 
was the way in which Bolckow and Vaughan could liquidate part of their investment in the 
business by selling it to external buyers at the best possible price.   
 
In addition to presenting a case that sheds light on the question of whether the move towards 
incorporation was motivated by the need to raise funds for capital investment externally, or for 
other reasons, Bolckow Vaughan is also an interesting example of the way in which the interests 
of different groups of shareholders might clash, especially in the early years of incorporation.  
Specifically, this conflict was between the vendors on the one side and the new directors 
defending their own and the other external shareholders’ interests on the other.  The original 
partners, particularly Henry Bolckow, were not only able to maintain their control over the 
business, or at least its finances, but also to maximise their personal return from the sale.  And 
this, of course, provides pointers to the real reason for the flotation of the company. 
 
To demonstrate this it is useful to consider the detail of the sale and financing of the firm in 
some depth.  Table 5.3 sets out the specifics of the sale agreement and Bolckow and Vaughan’s 
receipts.   
 
At flotation the business was valued at £955,000 (but see below), with Bolckow and Vaughan 
receiving £400,000 in shares and the remainder in cash – initially £250,000 and the rest in 
instalments over five years with 5 per cent interest paid on the outstanding balance.  It is 
difficult to estimate the total cash paid to Bolckow and Vaughan as a dispute over the precise 
valuation of the company meant that not all the instalments were paid on time.  Moreover, the 
actual interest payments to the two partners were published in only the first two annual 
reports.
277
  Making the assumption that the instalments were paid on time, and using the average 
annual interest rate (APR) approximation, the interest payments can be estimated to have been a 
minimum of £41,935 10s.  In total therefore, Bolckow and Vaughan received around £1 million 
for the business, £600,000 in cash and £400,000 in shares.  This probably rather underestimates 
the full amount because of the additional interest that had to be paid as a result of delayed 
payments.
278
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Table 5.3: Flotation of Bolckow Vaughan in 1864-5 
Nominal capital 
 
£2.5 million 25,000 £100 shares 
Authorised capital 
 
£400,000 £8,000 vendors’ shares, £50 paid 
 
 
£297,000 17,000 ordinary shares, £17 10s paid 
Total Authorised 
 
£69,750  
   
Payments to Bolckow and Vaughan, January 1865 
Shares 
 
£400,000 8,000 vendors’ shares, £50 paid 
Cash 
 
£20,000 Deposit, 31 Dec. 1864 
Cash 
 
£230,000 First payment, 2 Jan. 1865 
Balance to be paid £305,000 Equal instalments to be paid six 
monthly over five years 
Company valuation 
 
£955,000  
Bolckow and Vaughan’s cash receipts over five years 
 
Cash deposit 
 
£20,000  
First instalment 
 
£230,000  
Balance 
 
£305,000  
Estimated interest paid on the 
outstanding balance 
 
£41,935 10s  
Total £596, 93510s  
Source: BVDM vol. 1; BVAR 1865-1869, vol. 1. 
 
 
The delays in the instalment payments were the result of a dispute between Bolckow and 
Vaughan and the other directors over the valuation of the company.  When the valuation, 
conducted by William Armstrong, a notable and pioneering accountant in the north east, and 
John Mackenzie (from Glasgow), was reported to the directors’ meeting in April 1865, Bolckow 
and Vaughan expressed their disappointment.
279
  The minutes of the meeting state that ‘… in 
their opinion the valuation had been conducted on a principle different to that specified in the 
(sale) agreement...and they declined to accept it’.280  The value of the firm was put at £808,146, 
lower than originally agreed with the vendors.  There followed what appears to be a rather 
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acrimonious dispute with both sides seeking outside legal opinion. Joseph Dodds, a Stockton 
solicitor and also ironmaster and later MP, acted for the partners and sought advice from the 
Attorney General and ‘other eminent counsel’ in London.  This supported Bolckow and 
Vaughan’s objections, and on presentation of the advice at the next directors’ meeting (20th 
May), the board agreed to hold a special meeting to resolve the matter.  The directors’ meeting 
the following month (21
st
 June), however, was unable to make any progress as the company 
solicitor, Shipman, had also sought legal advice, this time in Manchester.  Even though other 
matters were dealt with, the atmosphere at the meeting must have been difficult.  First, Bolckow 
and Vaughan were offered a cheque for the purchase money due on 1
st
 July (£22,314 12s plus 
interest of £3,913 13s). They declined the offer, and when it was put to a vote, the board split.  
The external directors (George Wood, James Holden and Henry Pochin) all voted in favour of 
the offer, while Bolckow and Vaughan, supported by Carl Bolckow and Thomas Vaughan, 
newly appointed to the board, voted against.
281
  Second, the board also agreed to send the 
company secretary, James Jennings, to visit the Ashby Iron Company in Manchester ‘to see the 
way in which (the company) lay their form of business before their board.’282 
 
The conflict finally came to a head at a ‘special meeting’ at the Station Hotel in York on 29th 
June where it was finally resolved.  The meeting lasted for over four hours, and although there 
is no direct evidence in the minutes of animosity, they do suggest that it was a confrontational 
and possibly ill-tempered meeting.  The Manchester-based directors Whitworth, Holden and 
Pochin had accompanied the company’s solicitor, Shipman, to the Manchester lawyers, and the 
advice they received was in line with that obtained by Dodds in London: the valuation was not 
in accordance with the original sale agreement and that ‘the duty of the valuers remained to be 
performed’.  The Manchester directors then renewed their offer of an interim payment to 
Bolckow and Vaughan, this time for £25,000 ‘without prejudice to the substance to the conduct 
or any other questions between the parties’, but also tied this payment to a resolution that 
accepted the valuation was not in line with the sale agreement.  This attempt to link the payment 
with a statement on the valuation caused havoc.  On the advice of Dodds, Bolckow and 
Vaughan rejected the payment, presumably because by accepting money they were in some 
(legal) way signifying agreement with the Armstrong-Mackenzie valuation.  Dodds pressed the 
board to pass a separate resolution accepting that the valuation was inaccurate.  The minutes 
note that there followed ‘a lengthy discussion on the point’ with the Manchester contingent 
continuing to press for their original resolution and Bolckow wanting it to be withdrawn.  
Eventually, it seems, the meeting must have come to a stalemate. Bolckow and Vaughan 
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threatened to cancel the sale; Bolckow ‘then vacated the chair and left the meeting’, 
accompanied by John and Thomas Vaughan and Carl Bolckow. 
 
This action seriously undermined the future of the company.  But while Bolckow’s 
brinksmanship, had it not worked, would have meant the partners foregoing an enormous rise in 
their wealth, they were already exceedingly wealthy men with substantial property and would 
still have been left with a highly profitable business had the flotation collapsed.  The 
Manchester directors were in a much weaker position.  The collapse of the company would have 
been hugely costly for them, both financially and in terms of the loss in reputation.   They also 
had legal advice from two different sources against them. Interestingly, Chadwick’s name does 
not appear in the minutes, but his reputation would also have suffered as a promoter and as an 
accountant and auditor of many of the newly floated companies.  It seems likely that he would 
have pressed for a compromise. With the partners out of the room, Cheetham took the chair and 
the remaining board members capitulated to Bolckow and Vaughan’s demands.  Armstrong and 
Mackenzie were to revalue the business, but with professional legal guidance, and by a separate 
resolution, Bolckow and Vaughan were offered the £25,000 ‘on account and without 
prejudice.’283 
 
Whether it was the result of deft legal and financial preparation, or tough bargaining by 
Bolckow and Dodds, the valuation disagreement demonstrates the difficulties the directors 
faced in protecting the interests of shareholders. That skilful vendors could outmanoeuvre or 
manipulate the company into paying an excessive price for the business is also shown by the 
minimum dividend guarantee referred to above.  Simply stated, it ostensibly protected investors 
by preventing dividend payments to holders of vendor shares until the ordinary shareholders had 
received a minimum return of 10 per cent a year on average over the first five years of the 
company.  In addition, the vendors would have to repay the company an amount equal to the 
difference between the actual dividend and 10 per cent if the 10 per cent minimum was not met.  
A closer examination of the conditions of this guarantee, however, shows that there were 
numerous exceptions and qualifications.  The terms of the guarantee and the imprecise 
definition of the way in which the minimum average return was to be calculated, therefore, not 
only failed to protect the shareholders, it also proved to be another lucrative source of company, 
and thus shareholder, funds for the vendors.
284
 
 
The vagueness of the guarantee can be seen in the terms of the vendors’ shares.  These were 
discussed at a directors’ meeting on 3rd December 1864, where it was agreed to issue two 
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classes of these shares.  Both were deemed to be £50 paid up, but only Class 2 shares had the 
minimum dividend condition attached.  There were, however, a number of qualifications to the 
dividend restriction.  First, if it was possible to declare a 10 per cent dividend on the whole of 
the shares of the company within the first five years, then the holders of the vendors’ shares 
were entitled to a dividend of the same amount ‘without waiting five years to ascertain such 
average’.  Second, any dividend repayments to the company in the event of the average falling 
below a threshold would apply only if the average fell below 5 per cent and not 10 per cent. 
Third, the vendors were to be paid interest on the difference between the amount paid up on the 
vendors’ shares (£50) and that called-up on the ordinary shares, initially £17 10s, later rising to 
£30.
285
 
 
A number of comments are warranted here.  Firstly, as there are no details available on the 
proportion of Class 1 and Class 2 shares issued, it is difficult to judge how much of a protection 
the clause offered to shareholders.  Secondly, the risk of Bolckow and Vaughan having to 
compensate shareholders was minimised as the average return on ordinary shares that triggered 
a repayment was set at half the level of the guaranteed minimum.  Thirdly, Bolckow and 
Vaughan had effectively devised something of a sophisticated hedge, or at least a scheme 
which, by combining the dividend guarantee with the interest payments on the difference in the 
amount paid on the different types of shares, gave at an insurance against a downside loss but 
maximised the upside gain, to use modern financial parlance.  In the event of dividends being 
low, the interest payments could be used to make compensation payments, and if profits and 
dividends were high, these would augment the interest.  Finally, as it turned out, the dividend 
payments in each year were deemed to be above the 10 per cent level, leaving Bolckow and 
Vaughan with substantial additional earnings from their share ownership.  However, as 
indicated in Table 5.4, it is not certain exactly how the dividends were calculated to be 10 per 
cent without some rather arbitrary accounting practice.  For example, in 1866 the dividend as a 
percentage of the paid up capital is only 5.7 per cent, but the announced rate was 10 per cent.  
One way of raising the percentage would have been to value all the shares at £17 10s, the 
amount paid up on the ordinary shares, giving a 10.4 per cent return; another would have been 
to exclude the vendor’s shares from the definition of capital (11.9 per cent return).  As Table 5.4 
shows, not only did the company not meet the 10 per cent condition for paying dividends to the 
vendors in three out of the first five years, but the average for the period fell short of the 
guaranteed minimum, though not short of the 5 per cent threshold for compensation. 
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Table 5.4: Bolckow, Vaughan Dividend Payments, 1865-69 
Year 
Total 
dividend (£) 
Announced 
dividend 
Percentage dividend 
announced 
Actual dividend 
% on paid-up 
capital
* 
1865 75,000 £3 per share on 
25,000 shares 
10.75 10.75 
1866 
 
45,394 Not stated 10.00 5.70 
1867 
 
70,625 £2 16s 6d A little in excess of 
10% 
7.70 
1868 
 
75,000 10% 10.00 8.24 
1869 100,000 £3 per share plus a 
bonus of £1 per 
share on 25,000 
shares 
Not stated 11.00 
1865-9 
 
366,019   Average: 8.68% 
*Author’s calculations based on total dividends paid and paid-up capital recorded in the published annual 
reports and accounts . 
Source: BVAR, 1865-69; BVDM, 1865-70. 
 
In brief, the apparently reassuring self-limitation offered by the vendors to the investors that 
they would not pay themselves dividends at the expense of the ordinary shareholders was not 
only totally ineffective, but can be seen as little more than a marketing strategy to ensure 
demand for the shares at flotation.  In part it reflects the naiveté of the investors, and this 
possibly extends to earlier researchers, on the one side, and the financial dexterity, or perhaps 
duplicity of the company promoters on the other that would almost certainly include Bolckow 
and perhaps Chadwick too.  As Cottrell notes, ‘this form of vendors’ guarantee on dividend 
distributions was used again by Chadwick in the 1870s’.286  It was a successful and lucrative 
ruse. 
 
Taking the dividend payments and the interest on difference between the paid-up capital on the 
vendors’ and ordinary shares into account, Bolckow and Vaughan benefitted financially to an 
even greater extent than the estimates above.  Table 5.5 sets out these payments and compares 
them to the dividends paid to other shareholders.  For the division of the total dividends, it has 
been assumed that the vendors and the ordinary shareholders were paid in proportion to the 
number of shares held, 32 per cent and 68 per cent respectively.  Adding these payments to the 
cash and shares paid for the business suggests that in the first five years of the company 
Bolckow and Vaughan received over £1.2 million, with £800,000 of that in cash.  These 
enormous sums indicate that far from being motivated to find ‘external sources of finance’ to 
expand their business, the primary incentive behind the flotation was to liquidate some of their 
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assets tied up in the firm in a way that maximised their yield and at the same time protected 
their remaining interest in, and control over, a highly profitable enterprise.  Having floated the 
company, however, the firm did, in subsequent years, make use of the capital market that 
incorporation had facilitated in order to raise funds for capital investment.  This is considered in 
the next section in which comparisons are drawn with another large public flotation, that of 
Dorman Long, that took place almost twenty five years later. 
 
Table 5.5: Dividends to Shareholders and Interest Payments to Vendors (£)* 
Year Total dividend 
Dividends to 
ordinary 
shareholders 
Dividends on 
vendors’ 
shares 
Interest 
payments at 
5% 
Total 
payments to 
vendors 
1865 75,000 51,000 24,000 27,625 51,625 
1866 45,394 30,868 14,526 27,625 42,151 
1867 70,625 48,025 22,600 23,375 45,975 
1868 75,000 51,000 24,000 17,000 41,000 
1869 100,000 68,000 32,000 17,000 49,000 
Total 366,019 248,893 117,126 112,625 229,751 
*It has been assumed that total dividends were paid to ordinary shareholders and vendors in the same 
ratio as the number of shares held, i.e. 68:32 (see Table 5.3).  Total payments to vendors comprise 
dividends and interest payments. 
Source: BVAR, 1865-69; BVDM vol.1, 1864-70. 
 
 
5.4 Long-term Finance and Capital Expenditure: A comparison between Bolckow 
Vaughan and Dorman Long 
 
Bolckow Vaughan 
Bolckow Vaughan’s 1865 flotation and two cash calls (1866 and 1867) did not and were not 
intended to raise sufficient funds to cover the cash payment to the two partners for the business.  
This fact alone indicates that the initial incorporation of the business was not primarily 
concerned with financing capital expenditure in any direct way.  Nevertheless, the phasing of 
payments to Bolckow and Vaughan meant that there were some funds in the business to support 
investment in fixed assets, although it was not enough for the whole of the first five years.  The 
accounts show that between 1865 and 1869 capital expenditure amounted to more than 
£240,000 and as a result the firm had to find alternative sources of funds.
287
  This was done 
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partly by paying for the Byers Green Colliery, bought in 1865 for £50,000, in instalments over 
ten years and by an increase in short-term credits – the amount owing on Bills and to short-term 
creditors more than doubled from £101,474 in 1865 to £230,486 in 1868.
288
  Interest payments 
and dividend policy also ensured that retained profits played little role in generating funds; over 
the first five years cumulative retained profits (£59,167) amounted to barely one quarter of 
capital spending, although some caution should be exercised in interpreting the profit figures 
given the common habit of charging some expenditure on fixed assets to the revenue account.
289
  
By 1868 the firm was in need of additional long-term funds and a two-year loan for £100,000 
from Bolckow and Vaughan had to be arranged.
290
   
 
But while the original flotation of the company may have had little to do with financing capital 
investment, it would be wrong to conclude that the capital market was not important to, or used 
by, the company.  The prospect of heavy investment in (Bessemer) steel production, the 
associated development of hematite mining interests in Spain in the early 1870s and the 
generous dividend payments, which averaged 90 per cent and ranged from 78 to 105 per cent of 
net profits (1865-70), meant that further funds were needed to maintain the firm’s expansion.  
Table 5.6 shows that for the first half of the 1870s retained profits covered just fifteen per cent 
of capital spending and the firm went to the capital market for the bulk of its long-term finance.  
From 1870 to 1876 it raised over £450,000 from ordinary shareholders and £½ million in 
debentures, thirty-three and fifty-five per cent of gross funds respectively.  Over the longer 
period, up to 1887, shareholders contributed £1¼ million, forty-four per cent of gross funds, 
with most of this coming in the form of cash calls on the partially-paid, high denomination 
(£100) shares that were issued at incorporation.
291
  It was a method of raising finance that gave 
considerable flexibility to the company as they were able to rely on shareholders for additional 
funds at short notice and without the inconvenience of calling an Extraordinary General 
Meeting (EGM), although it added to shareholder risks. 
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Table 5.6: Sources of Funds – Bolckow Vaughan, 1870-1914 (Totals)a  
                    1870-6                         1870-87                 1888-1914 
  
£ 
%  gross 
funds 
 
£ 
%  gross 
funds 
 
£ 
% gross 
funds 
Ordinary shares:  -- -- - -- -- 
New issues 
 
-- -- 240,660 8.6 -- -- 
Cash calls 
 
375,000 33.1 1,005,640 35.8 -- -- 
Preference shares 80,440 
 
7.1 312,080 11.1 -- -- 
Debentures 499,181 
 
44.0 698,267 24.9 934,920 29.0 
Retained profits 179,904 
 
15.9 545,952 19.7 2,263,297 71.0 
Gross funds raised  1,134,525  2,802,599  3,198,217  
less  
Loan/debenture 
repayments 
 
111,000 
  
352,175 
  
684,775 
 
Net funds 998,362  2,450,424  2,513,442  
 
Capital expenditure 
 
 
1,211,400 
  
- 
  
3,548,017 
 
Retained profits % 
capital expenditure 
15.0    63.8
b 
 
Notes; 
a: the figures refer to the totals, i.e. cumulative amounts, for the period shown. 
b: 1896-1914.   
Sources: BVAR 1870-1914 and BVDM, 1870-1914.   
 
More attractive for the risk averse were the preference shares that the company offered to 
general investors from 1876.  In addition to the guaranteed dividend of 5 per cent, these shares 
were of a lower denomination (£20) and fully paid.  They were originally introduced as part of 
the capital restructuring on the expiration of the vendors’ shares issued to Bolckow and 
Vaughan.
292
  At two EGMs in February and April the nominal preference share capital was 
raised by £240,000 to £400,000, after which circulars were sent to existing shareholders inviting 
applications.  The directors’ minutes and annual accounts show a steady flow of applicants until 
the limit was reached in 1880.  Later, in 1882, the limit was raised by an additional £100,000, 
although this was not fully taken up until 1887.  Overall, these preference share issues raised 
over £300,000 between 1870 and 1887, making a small but significant contribution to the 
inflow of funds to the firm (11%).  After 1887 there were no further issues, and although there 
are no indications as to why, one possibility is that alternative forms of finance became cheaper.  
By the 1890s debentures offering an interest rate of 4 to 4 ½ per cent were less costly, and with 
fixed terms, the potential to refinance at market interest rates, which may fall, and the 
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opportunity for early redemption, they offered firms greater control over their liabilities and 
interest payments.
293
   
 
Debentures were considered by Bolckow Vaughan’s directors as early as 1868, but blocked by 
Henry Bolckow, who argued that as he was attempting to raise a mortgage at the time, thought it 
would be ‘injurious to his interests’.294  The first issue was in 1871 following a board discussion 
on how to finance a substantial increase in planned capital spending of £261,000 for the second 
half of 1871 and 1872.
295
  It proved a highly successful source of funds.  The initial agreement 
was to raise was £100,000 at five per cent (or less) for terms of three, five and seven years and 
this was soon increased to a maximum of £200,000.  The funds were raised by the end of 1873, 
but heavy expenditure on Bessemer steel plant and increasing blast furnace capacity at this time 
meant that there was a steady need for funds and in March 1874 the firm sought and obtained 
permission from existing debenture holders to increase the total issue to £500,000.  The 
additional £300,000 was raised through five, seven and some ten year bonds paying 5 per cent, 
though this had fallen to 4½-¾ per cent in 1876.  At first the issues were offered to existing 
shareholders, and applications, which were directly to the firm, came from individual investors. 
There were, however, early indications of institutional investment, with an application in June 
1871 for £50,000 of five year bonds from the United Kingdom Temperance and General 
Provident Institution.
296
  
 
From the last two decades of the nineteenth century companies relied increasingly on loan 
capital.  For a sample of brewing companies Watson found that the proportion of subscribed 
capital in the form of debentures had risen from nine per cent in 1885 to 38 per cent in 1895 and 
to 43 per cent by 1910.  In her sample of iron and steel companies the dependence on 
debentures was less marked but still rising: the equivalent figures are 13 per cent in 1885 and 19 
per cent in 1910.
297
  Bolckow Vaughan’s debenture issues were part of this trend and broadly in 
line with the industry average.  Their issues can be divided into two main phases.  The first 
phase, from the first issues in 1871, saw debt rise to peak at 22 per cent in 1875 and 
subsequently decline for the next 25 years as redemptions exceeded renewals.  Over the three 
decades from 1871-99 the average debt level was 12 per cent.  By 1900 all the debentures had 
been repaid and the firm relied on retained profits and short-term bank borrowing for funds.  
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However, falling profits and unchanged dividend payments meant that by 1905 the firm’s 
financial position had become precarious, with bank overdrafts reaching £ ½ million by the end 
of 1904.  At the February board meeting the company secretary (W.W. Storr) reported a total 
overdraft of almost £600,000 with three banks (National Provincial, London, City and Midland, 
and Williams Deacons).  To ease the pressure on the company he had already negotiated with 
the Middlesbrough manager of the National Provincial a deal that would allow the company to 
increase its overdraft above the arranged level ‘without for the moment specifying a limit.’  
Clearly this would not have been an open commitment from the bank; the condition may well 
have been that the company should seek longer-term finance through another debenture issue as 
the minutes of the same board meeting record that the company secretary was ‘authorized to 
inform all the Company’s Bankers of the intention of the Board to issue Mortgage Debentures’. 
The proposal was to issue up to £1 million 4% Debentures and to offer these to current 
shareholders and ‘the clients of Brokers dealing in the Company’s shares’.  By April a circular 
had been sent out to shareholders inviting applications and explaining that the funds were 
needed to repay the firm’s bankers and to finance capital spending. 298 
 
This second phase of debenture issues was highly successful and crucial in helping the firm 
through a difficult period.  In the six years up to 1911 over £850,000 was raised, but most 
importantly it brought an immediate easing of the short-term cash problem.  By December 1905 
the overdraft had fallen from its March peak of £709,000 to £403,000, and less than £200,000 in 
August the following year.  The combination of the inflow of long-term borrowing (£587,500 
by mid-1907) and a significant recovery in profits meant the firm was able simultaneously to 
reduce the overdraft (under £100,000 by February 1907), maintain capital expenditure and 
increase dividend payments.  In 1912 repayment of long-term debt had started, and as a 
proportion of total shareholder capital it began to fall from twenty-one per cent to seventeen per 
cent in 1914.  The firm therefore entered the War without an excessive debt problem unlike the 
one it would have to face in the 1920s, and which would bring about its eventual demise in 
1929.  However, it was the firm’s good fortune that profits were buoyant.  As Tolliday has 
pointed out, and contrary to Pitts’s view, this pattern of reliance on short-term bank finance that 
was corrected from time to time by the issue of longer-term debt was established well before 
1914.
299
  Indeed from the early days of incorporation Bolckow Vaughan repeatedly renewed its 
bank borrowing, as the few examples in Table 5.7 show.  It was a risky policy, but one that 
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could be managed when there was confidence that cyclical reductions in profits would recover, 
as they did in the pre-War years; however, it was one that could not be sustained when the 
industry remained depressed over prolonged periods.   
 
Table 5.7: Examples of Bolckow Vaughan Bank Borrowing 
 Details Source  
(All BVDM) 
1873 £75,000 from National Provincial Bank.  5%, repayable in 
three monthly instalments. 
£50,000 from Glyn Mills. Bank rate plus ½%, repayable in 
three monthly instalments. 
 
vol. 3, 26 Sept. 
1873, p. 318 
1877 Renewal of £100,000 loan from Glyn Mills for a further two 
months at the Bank Rate plus ½% (with a minimum of 3½%). 
 
vol. 5, 19 Jul. 
1977p. 35 
1883 £50,000 from Glyn Mills.  Four months at 4%, with 5% 
preference shares as security. 
 
vol. 6, 3 April 
1883, p. 274 
1894 Renewal of £50,000 loan from National Provincial for a 
further six months at Bank Rate plus ½% (minimum 4%). 
 
vol. 9, 7 Jul. 1894, 
p.317 
 
Dorman Long 
The details of the conversion of Dorman Long into a limited company in 1889 are similar to 
Bolckow Vaughan and many other firms whose ordinary shares were offered to the general 
investor.  That is, it was primarily a means of liquidating the owners’ capital, but in a way that 
control over the business was retained by the original partners.  There are, however, a number of 
differences from the Bolckow Vaughan experience that indicate some of the developments in 
the capital market and the practice of floating and financing companies that had taken place in 
the intervening twenty-five years.  
 
At Dorman Long’s flotation, £520,000 was raised through the issue of £350,000 ordinary shares 
and £170,000 debentures.  As payment for the business, which was valued at £467,000, the 
partners Arthur Dorman and Albert Long received one-third of the share capital and took 
£90,900 in debentures, taking the balance of £261,000 in cash.  This left just £53,000 injected 
into the firm as a result of its incorporation (Table 5.8).  While modest, these additional funds 
are in contrast to Bolckow Vaughan where there was a net outflow over the five years after 
incorporation.
300
  There are also a number of other noteworthy contrasts between the firms.  
First, the shares were issued at a lower denomination of £5 rather than £100 of the earlier 
flotation, and were fully paid-up (by instalments within weeks of issue) rather than being left 
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with a substantial unpaid portion that exposed investors to future calls.  These two details are 
significant as both increased the attractiveness of the shares to investors: they facilitated 
secondary market trading and reduced the risk of future of claims against shareholders.  For the 
firm, however, it meant that additional funds could not be called on automatically.  Second, 
debentures were issued at the formation of the company, and these were for a longer term of ten 
years rather than the three, to seven years for Bolckow Vaughan’s first issue.  Moreover, paying 
the vendors in part by debentures meant that the company was not burdened with a special debt 
to the former owners that had to be paid before other creditors.  Dorman Long also made no use 
of other types of shares with special privileges, e.g. preference shares, although one of its 
subsidiaries, Bell Brothers, did (see below). 
 
Table 5.8: Sources of Funds – Dorman Long, 1889-1914 (Totals)a 
 1889-98 1899-1914 
 £ % gross 
funds 
£ % gross 
funds 
New share issues 
 
235,000
b 
51.5 425,000 17.9 
Calls 
 
-- -- -- -- 
Debentures (gross) 
 
79,100
c 
17.3 1,150,000 48.5 
Retained profits 
 
142,499 31.2 796,997 33.6 
Gross funds raised 456,599 100 2,371,997 100 
less 
Repayments/debenture 
redemptions 
 
 
261,000
+ 
  
428,500 
 
Net funds 
 
195,599  1,943,497  
Capital expenditure 
 
162,521  643,143  
Acquisitions (cash payments) 
 
  457,709  
Retained profits % capital 
expenditure 
73%  123.9%  
a: the figures refer to the totals, i.e. cumulative amounts, for the period shown. 
b: Share and debentures in 1889 are net of the allocations to Arthur Dorman and Albert Long at 
incorporation. 
c: 1889 repayments comprise the cash payments to Dorman and Long for the business. 
Sources: DLAR 1889-1914 and DLDM, 1889-1914. 
 
Unlike Bolckow Vaughan, Dorman Long therefore needed to make no further use of the capital 
market for the first ten years of incorporation.  Capital expenditure, at 73 per cent of retained 
profits, was more than adequately financed from internal sources (and short-term borrowings).  
It was a position helped by adopting a far less generous distribution policy than its larger rival.  
Total dividend payments between 1890 and 1898 were 54 per cent of net profits; the equivalent 
146 
 
figure for Bolckow Vaughan in its first five years was 91%.  A marked change, however, came 
in 1899-1900 at the time Dorman Long embarked on a major expansion through heavy 
investment in the basic open hearth steel process, extension of facilities at its Britannia plant 
and a series of acquisition (see Table 5.9 and Chapter 7 below).  Financing this scale of growth 
for a relatively small company whose profit after interest payments averaged around £40,000 
per year was feasible only through additional long-term funds, and these were raised in the 
conventional ways from the capital market by two new share issues and a series of debenture 
issues.   
 
Table 5.9: Dorman Long Expenditure on Acquisitions, 1898-1914 (£) 
  Form of Payment  
  DL shares 
issued 
Cash Total 
Ayrton Sheet Works 1898 -- 75,000 75,000 
Cleveland Wire 
Works 
1900 -- 75,000 75,000 
Bell Brothers 1899-1902* 225,000 195,000 420,000 
NESCo 1903 259,640 19,909 259,604 
Wade and Dorman Co 
Ltd 
1911 -- 25,000 25,000 
Bowesfield Steel 1912 -- 20,300 20,300 
Channel Collieries 1913-4 -- 47,500 47,500 
 
Total 
  
484,604 
 
457,709 
 
942,313 
*This figure includes calls made on Bell Brothers shares in 1902, 1905, 1905 and 1913.   
Sources: DLAR 1889-1914 and DLDM, 1889-1914. 
 
The first increase in share capital came at the time the company bought up a sheet works, a wire 
works and first took a financial interest in Bell Brothers.  Arthur Dorman’s (the chairman’s) 
explanation to shareholders was that new capital was needed to pay for, extend and improve the 
sheet works; but there was clearly a more general financial strategy being planned for the firm’s 
expansion.  And this included not just taking a stake in Bell Brothers, but also making a bid for 
Bolckow Vaughan (see Chapter 7).  At the 1898 September board meeting that involved the 
firm’s auditor W.B. Peat, there was an important discussion on the company’s financial position 
and how to raise the necessary funds.  It was decided that the ordinary share capital should be 
increased by £210,000 (sixty per cent), though this was scaled back to £175,000 at a later board 
meeting, and the final plan was agreed by shareholders at the EGM in December.  The shares 
were offered to existing shareholders in the ratio of one new for two existing shares, effectively 
a rights issue, with Arthur Dorman underwriting the issue by taking up the unallocated shares.
301
  
This was soon followed by a second share issue in 1902.  It was made at the time of the full 
takeover of Bell Brothers when Dorman Long acquired the second half of the share capital 
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(£300,000 nominal, £210,000 paid up) from the Bell family.  The EGM of September 1902 
authorised an increase in the firm’s nominal ordinary share capital by £475,000 to £1 million, 
£225,000 of which was to be used to exchange for the remaining Bell Brothers shares.  The rest 
raised cash of £250,000, with half of the shares allocated to existing shareholders (one new 
share for three existing shares) and the remainder taken by Arthur Dorman (90,000 shares) and 
Hugh Bell (35,000).
302
  There were no further share issues in this period except on the takeover 
of NESCo the following year when additional Dorman Long shares were created to exchange 
for those in NESCo.  The terms of the deal were that following an increase in authorised capital 
to £1.5 million, Dorman Long offered three of their own shares for each one of NESCo’s (with 
cash paid for fractions of shares), and by the time the acquisition had been completed 258,541 
£1 Dorman Long shares had been exchanged for 78,554 shares (£3 paid up) in NESCo plus cash 
payments of £19,909.
303
 
 
Of over £900,000 of new shares issued after flotation, just under half generated additional cash 
for the firm, and the rest were used to pay for acquisitions.  The additional cash amounted to 
only eighteen per cent of the gross long-term funds raised between 1898 and 1914.  As Table 
5.8 indicates, the principal source of funds was not from the share issues but from retained 
profits and, most significantly, from the capital market in the form of debentures.  Up to 1914 
there were three debenture issues raising over £1 million (net £722,500), in 1900, 1904-5 and 
1914, that is nearly half the long-term finance for the business.  In this increasing dependence 
on debentures Dorman Long was much like other companies of the period, including Bolckow 
Vaughan, as was indicated above.  What marks out Dorman Long is its far greater reliance on 
debentures, with the effect the company operated with a much higher level of gearing.  At an 
average 32% (1890-1914) this was considerably above the industry averages of the time 
estimated by Watson, although it is not excessive by modern standards.  Perhaps even more 
striking is that when the Dorman Long group of companies is examined, the dependence on 
debt finance is shown to have been even greater (Table 5.10).  There were no group accounts 
presented at the time, but combining the separate accounts of the two major wholly owned 
subsidiaries, Bell Brothers and NESCo, it is possible to provide an indication of the group’s 
gearing.  As Table 5.10 shows, both subsidiaries were highly geared, and this contributed to an 
overall group gearing of 50 to 60 per cent, depending on the way in which Bell Brothers’ 
preference shares are classified. 
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Table 5.10: Dorman Long Companies’ Gearing (%) 
 
Dorman 
Long 
Bell 
Brothers A* 
Bell 
Brothers B*
 
NESCo 
Dorman 
Long 
Group A* 
Dorman 
Long 
Group B* 
1904 
 
32.8 39.1 78.2 49.9 54.4 61.3 
1909 
 
32.8 34.2 73.9 46.2 50.3 57.5 
1914 
 
37.9 28.2 66.0 43.7 49.1 55.7 
*Gearing is defined as: Long term debt/ (Long term debt + Shareholders’ funds). 
Bell Brothers and DL Group gearing is calculated in two ways.  ‘A’ does not include preference shares as 
debt; ‘B’ includes preference shares as debt. 
Sources: calculations from DLAR, BBAR, NESAR, 1904, 1909, 1914. 
 
These high and, from 1900, rising rates of corporate borrowing suggest that there was a 
receptive market for the debt of industrial companies.  But, as would be expected, the cost and 
ease of raising funds varied with both general economic conditions and company performance.  
Dorman Long’s 1900 debenture issue, despite being offered at an interest rate lower than the 
retiring debt (four as opposed to five per cent) was oversubscribed by almost 70 per cent and 
had to be scaled back so that only about half of the applications from the public were accepted.  
Of the other applicants, that is, the existing debenture holders and the shareholders, only the 
latters’ allocation was reduced.304  A year earlier the Bell Brothers debenture and preference 
share issue was even more oversubscribed.  For the £333,600 of debentures offered for public 
subscription, applications (£2,466,542) exceeded the amount available by a factor of 6.7.  And 
for the 33,340 preference shares (£10) the oversubscription was even more dramatic, with 
demand greater than availability by a factor of 15.5.  As Hugh Bell reported to the board, the 
subscription list was closed by noon of the day of opening (26
th
 January 1899) and had been 
advertised only on the two preceding days.
305
  Dorman Long’s issue in 1914 was not so 
spectacular, but was again sufficiently well subscribed that the list had to be closed on the 
opening day at 11.30 a.m.
306
 
 
Debenture issues did not always run so smoothly, however.  In 1904 Dorman Long found it 
rather more difficult to raise £250,000 from investors.  It was at a time when the company was 
barely profitable, had paid no dividends for two years and it also followed shortly after a 
£250,000 share issue in 1902.  Despite an interest rate of 6 per cent, applications from the public 
were just £36,650 and the firm had to rely on the underwriters (Edinger and Asch) to place 
£111, 350 of the £150,000 that they had agreed to underwrite with the 16 sub-underwriters.  The 
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balance, £100,000, was taken up by Hugh and Charles Bell (£50,000) and other directors or 
their relatives and friends.
307
 
 
The fact that the directors acted as underwriters – and Dorman Long’s were not alone in this – 
means that the total amount of debt issued by companies tends to overstate firms’ reliance on, 
and the importance of, the wider securities market.  But companies resorted to this form of 
underwriting only in difficult periods and there was always the likelihood that the debentures 
could be sold on to other investors in the secondary market as conditions improved.  A more 
important reason for caution in using the total debenture issues as a measure of dependence on 
external debt, and as a way of assessing the size of the debt securities market, is that debentures 
and preference shares were often used to pay for the business at incorporation.  This was the 
case with Dorman Long (see above) and also Bell Brothers in 1899.  For Bell Brothers, of the 
£900,000 price paid to the Bell family for the original (private) company, one third was paid in 
debentures or preference shares, £133,400 and £166,600 respectively.  Thus out of the £1 
million apparently raised from the creation of these two types of security (£500,000 of each), 
the total debt issue overstates the funds from the market by approximately 40 per cent.
308
  The 
Stockton iron and engineering company Head Wrightson provides another example.  On its 
incorporation in 1890, £150,000 debentures were created, of which £120,000 were allocated to 
the former partners, Charles Head and Thomas Wrightson, as partial payment for the firm.  In 
this case therefore only one-fifth of the debentures were sold directly to the public, and this 
generated just £30,000 in cash.
309
  A related practice that was used by some nominally private 
limited companies was to issue debentures to the directors in return for loans to the company.  
In 1874 Bell Brothers borrowed £150,000 by issuing debentures to the three principal 
shareholders – £75,000 to Lowthian Bell, £35,000 to Thomas Bell, and £40,000 to John Bell.310  
Another iron firm, Samuelson’s, also borrowed from its principal shareholder (and also 
chairman and managing director) Bernhard Samuelson in the same way.
311
   
 
In each of these cases, using the total value of debentures issued has the same effect of 
overstating the significance of these securities as a means of obtaining finance from the open 
capital market.  But even with this qualification in mind, it is clear that debentures grew in 
importance from the end of the nineteenth century, and from the evidence of two large 
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Cleveland iron and steel companies looked at in this section, they became the principal source 
of long-term external finance.  This is not surprising as debentures gave firms access to funds 
without the problem of diluting control over the company, and for investors, they offered a safer 
asset than equities with a more assured return.  For the companies they also proved to be a 
highly flexible financial tool.  As Capie and Collins have demonstrated, banks were increasingly 
willing to hold debentures as security for loans and overdrafts.  Their study found that between 
1880-4 and 1910-4 the proportion of loans secured in this way rose from just 1.1 per cent to 15 
per cent.
312
  Debentures also provided firms with a method of converting short-term bank debt 
into longer-term securities, as Bolckow Vaughan was able to do in 1905.  Dorman Long’s issue 
in 1904 was probably made under similar, if less dramatic, circumstances: shortly before the 
decision to issue the debentures (May), Arthur Dorman had agreed a six month overdraft of up 
to £100,000 with Barclays.
313
  A more direct process of securitisation occurred when debentures 
were issued to creditors, as Bell Brothers did in 1877 by issuing debentures to a Mr Lightfoot 
‘for the amount standing to his credit’.314  And finally, in some cases where a firm’s directors 
were required to provide personal guarantees for bank borrowing, the guarantors would be 
indemnified by the firm through the issue of debentures. NESCo for example offered its 
bankers, Backhouse’s, a guarantee of £8,500 on the bank account from five of its directors and 
set aside £7,500 of its debentures to be issued to the guarantors in the event that any claims were 
made.
315
 
 
 
 5.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has shown that in Cleveland’s iron and steel industry there was a variety of reasons 
why firms sought joint-stock status.  These ranged from the formation of brand new enterprises 
or the straightforward conversion of profitable partnerships on the one hand, to the re-floating of 
failed firms or the formation of new ones to buy up the idle plant of defunct businesses on the 
other.  Amongst the examples, it is possible to find cases that cover all of Jefferys’ four reasons, 
viz. financing investment in new capital, extending the sources of capital, the retirement of the 
owners, and the disreputable and ‘semi-fraudulent’ avoidance of bankruptcy.316  However, a 
detailed examination of the industry does not support the ‘growth view’, i.e. that the changes 
needed to happen to accommodate the growing scale of capital investment, or at least not in a 
direct way.  The fairly high proportion of private companies suggest that the protection of 
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limited liability was an important motive, contrary to Jefferys’ assertion, as does the detailed 
investigation of the flotation of two large Teesside firms, Bolckow Vaughan and Dorman Long.  
For these, especially the former, the principal motivation, or at least the immediate concern, of 
the partners appears to be the liquidation of the partners’ capital and not the generation of funds 
for capital investment.  Together, these two points show that it is necessary to separate the 
implications of the changes in corporate legislation, that is, the decision to incorporate from the 
public flotation of a company.  Whilst incorporation is necessary for flotation, it is not 
sufficient; and the decision to float publicly depended on numerous factors, not least was the 
access it gave to the means by which vendors could capitalise their past entrepreneurial 
efforts.
317
 
 
Although the intentions behind the mid-century changes in corporate legislation were not 
specifically to help industry raise funds, but to find a more effective form of regulating the 
financial market – the ‘socio-political view’ – it does not mean that in practice the Joint Stock 
Acts did not have this effect, amongst others.  What the experience of some of the Cleveland 
iron and steel firms has shown is that the companies used the legislation flexibly and in different 
ways.  It opened up opportunities for the exploitation of the capital markets and gave access to 
investors’ wealth which firms could tap according to their objectives or requirements.  At times 
this was indeed to raise capital for a new company or for the development of a new process, as 
in the case of NESCo and the development of basic Bessemer steel in the early 1880s.  After 
being floated, companies were able to go to the market for additional funds.  In the early years 
this was through cash calls on the high denomination shares that had been issued at 
incorporation.  Once this avenue had been exhausted or was foregone because it risked upsetting 
shareholders, there were opportunities for new issues of ordinary shares, or even preference 
shares – more costly but safer for investors.  Later, there was increasing reliance on the debt 
securities market as debentures became the favoured instrument.
 318
  Debentures, along with 
retained profits, provided most of the funds for capital investment, and where excessive short 
term debts, usually in the form of bank overdrafts, had been built up, they gave a means of 
converting the debt into longer term, more manageable liabilities.  The growth of the securities 
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market, especially for debt, also meant that even in difficult times funds could be raised by 
issuing debentures (and sometimes additional ordinary shares) to the directors and their families 
in the knowledge that as market conditions improved the securities could be sold on to other 
investors.
319
 The banks too were willing to lend, at least temporarily, on the security of 
debentures.  And to make the debentures more attractive, there is even an instance of a 
Cleveland company that attached an ‘equity kicker’, i.e. a right to buy shares on maturity.320 
 
Another important feature facilitated by incorporation and the expansion of the securities 
markets was the development of the takeover process.  This is shown by Dorman Long’s 
acquisition of Bell Brothers and NESCo, and its attempted takeover of Bolckow Vaughan.  
Similar developments were evident in the formation of two other inter-related iron and steel 
companies on Teesside – South Durham Steel and Cargo Fleet Iron.321  Exchanging shares 
enabled the reorganisation and change in ownership of businesses without the need to make 
substantial cash payments.  It made possible improvements in the efficiency in the use of real 
assets, although there is some dispute over whether, in these early days of takeovers and 
amalgamations, the required restructuring and new investment were forthcoming.
322
   
 
All in all, it is too simplistic to consider the advent of widespread incorporation and the parallel 
developments in financial markets as solely geared towards the financing of larger scale 
enterprises  In reality there was a complex interaction between business and financial markets, 
and raising funds for capital investment was important, but not exclusively so.  There were other 
reasons why firms sought finance from the investing public and institutions, and other ways in 
which the legal institution of corporate status and the ownership rights embodied in shares were 
used.  A further effect was that for some firms the relationship with the financial markets 
became an increasingly important part of their business operations.  They were keen that their 
shares and debentures were registered to be traded on the country’s stock exchanges and there is 
evidence that there was a growing interest in the market performance of their securities.  From 
1902 Dorman Long monitored the volume and price of shares and debentures traded on stock 
exchanges and the data was reported at the monthly directors’ meetings.323  Whether this marks 
an early instance of the British form of short-termism in which the financial aspects of running a 
business began to dominate the productive side is not clear.  Nor is it certain whether the 
financial sector denied funds for capital investment.  The experience of the two large companies 
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investigated in this chapter suggests that there does not seem to have been a shortage of funds 
available – finance could be readily raised by issuing shares and debentures when industry 
prospects looked bright.  Nevertheless, there was still criticism from the industry, as when 
Arthur Dorman complained to shareholders that attempts to invest in improvements were 
‘fettered by the difficulty of getting capital’.324  He went on: 
 
British Capital...is largely being invested abroad.  Our home industries are not attracting 
it, yet I cannot help thinking there is an excellent prospect for its profitable employment 
in our own country.  If capitalists should be persuaded of this, and give their aid to the 
development of British industries so as to enable us to reduce the cost of manufacture 
by the judicious extension and improvement of existing plant, I think they would not 
have cause to regret it. 
 
In this study there is not sufficient evidence to make a conclusive judgement on whether British 
firms’ investment decisions were constrained by the capital markets.  What is clear, however, is 
that on incorporation the vendors were often paid, or paid themselves, too high a price for the 
business and in subsequent years there was a tendency in some firms, exemplified by Bolckow 
Vaughan, to distribute excessive dividends, leaving the firm short of funds or dependent on 
external sources.   
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Chapter 6: Technology and Products  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
I am very glad to find the important question of the basic process, as carried on in the 
open-hearth furnace, taken up by the Cleveland Engineers… To Cleveland it is a 
question of the utmost, indeed of vital importance.  We first lost our rail trade, then the 
plate trade, and other branches of our manufacturing may also disappear by steel taking 
the place of ordinary malleable iron.
325
 
 
This statement by Lowthian Bell, the éminence grise of British iron and steel, captures 
succinctly the repeated adaptations Cleveland’s iron and steel industry had to make to maintain 
its prosperity through the last quarter of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth 
centuries.  It was an industry built on iron, but after demand peaked first in the 1870s and then 
in the early 1880s, and was afterwards undermined by the shift to steel, the Cleveland 
ironmasters felt that their very existence was threatened.  This chapter considers the process of 
adjustment to the new material – steel – examining in particular how Cleveland firms took steps 
to meet the technological challenges.   
 
It is possible to identify a number phases in the way in which the district adapted and sought to 
re-establish itself as Britain’s principal producing centre, though this time for steel rather than 
iron.  The first phase was the adoption of Bessemer steel converters in the 1870s, notably by 
Bolckow Vaughan.  This firm employed the acid process using imported hematite ore mainly 
from Spain, substituting it for the unsuitable, high phosphorus, Cleveland iron that was smelted 
from local ironstone.  The second followed Thomas and Gilchrist’s development of the basic 
process in 1878-9.  This seemed to unlock the potential for using the lower quality local iron 
and gave rise to an expansion in basic Bessemer production, again involving Bolckow Vaughan, 
along with a newly established firm, North Eastern Steel.  Problems with the acceptability of 
basic Bessemer, or Thomas, steel, especially concerns about its quality among plate and girder 
makers and users, resulted in the third phase, the investment in acid open-hearth (Siemens-
Martin) furnaces from the mid-1880s.  Finally, and most successfully, there was the eventual 
adoption of the basic open-hearth process, which after a long gestation period, dominated steel 
production from the early 1900s on Teesside, and later worldwide. 
 
The emphasis of the chapter is on the development of basic-open-hearth production and its 
application on Teesside; the advent of the process seemed to settle thirty years of turbulence and 
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uncertainty in the district’s industry, during which time attempts to meet the technological 
challenges were never entirely satisfactory.  Its importance to Cleveland is that it ensured the 
survival of mass steel production and a return to prosperity for the area’s firms in the years 
before the First World War.  This aspect of the area’s industrial history appears to be 
understated in other histories. 
 
The chapter is divided into four main sections.  The first outlines principal trends in iron and 
steel production between the late 1870s and 1914, drawing particularly on data from the British 
Iron Trade Association and the Iron and Coal Trades Review.  The second section reviews the 
principal shifts in production and technology from the 1870s to the early 1890s, covering early 
Bessemer production, the introduction of basic Bessemer steel and the acid open-hearth process.  
The third section discusses the development of the basic open-hearth process and its eventual 
adoption by Cleveland’s steel firms.  It is demonstrated that far from being backward, insular 
and not open to the adoption of new production methods and ideas, they responded to technical 
advances outside the district and were active in applying those techniques in Cleveland.  It took 
time, however, as the steel producers faced severe technical difficulties.  The changeover, when 
it came, was also a response to economic signals both from the supply and the demand side.  On 
the supply side there was pressure to react to changing input costs, notably the relative costs of 
overseas and local ore, and on the demand side there was the eventual acceptance of basic open-
hearth steel as a product of equal, if not superior, quality to acid steel. The chapter also suggests 
that throughout the period of the development of the open-hearth process, there was 
considerable interest in the technical developments.  These were shared through the networks of 
steelworks managers, engineers, scientists and metallurgists, often at meetings of the industry 
and professional associations.  There was also a movement of staff between firms.  Moreover, 
information that was exchanged in these ways occurred both within Britain and between Britain, 
the US and Continental Europe.  Incorporation and maturity in the industry may have reduced 
the extent of “collective invention” so characteristic of the earlier phases of the Cleveland 
industry, but it still remained to some extent at the national level.
326
 
 
 
6.2: Trends from 1880 
 
The early 1880s marked the peak for the iron industry in Cleveland.  The growth in pig iron 
production had paused during the 1870s recession before resuming its upward path, but it was 
the specialisation in manufactured, or malleable, iron that left the district vulnerable to 
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technological change and shifts in market demand towards steel.  At the beginning of the 1870s 
production reached over 750,000 tons per year, driven largely by the demand for rails.  Rails 
made up over half of the total output of manufactured iron, with plates accounting for the next 
largest source of demand at thirty per cent (Table 6.1).  The demand for iron, and iron rails in 
particular, collapsed as the industry was caught between the slowing of railway expansion in 
Britain, the increasing difficulties in penetrating protected overseas markets, and the switch to 
Bessemer steel rails.  In 1884, at 3,500 tons, rail production was barely one hundredth of the 
level in 1872-3, and accounted for less than one per cent of total manufactured iron output.  This 
might have spelt the end of much iron processing on the Tees, and did result in the collapse of 
numerous firms (see Chapter 5).  From the end of the 1870s, however, the slack was taken up by 
the production of ship plate for the growing iron shipbuilding industry.  As Lowthian Bell’s 
report for the Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade and Industry shows, the gross 
tonnage of British built shipping doubled between 1878 and 1883 from 522,160 tons to 1.1 
million, with the vast majority (85 per cent) being of iron.
327
  Responding to this shift, 
Cleveland’s iron manufacturers rapidly adapted their mills and changed over to plates, with 
manufactured iron production rising sharply from a trough in 1878 to peak at over 850,000 tons 
in 1882. Plates accounted for over two-thirds of output.
328
 
 
Table 6.1: Manufactured Iron in Cleveland, 1872-1884 (per cent of output) 
 Rails Bars Plates Angles 
1872 49.0 12.3 29.2 9.5 
1873 52.9 12.9 27.1 7.2 
1874 45.4 15.6 30.5 8.6 
1875 43.9 18.0 30.8 7.3 
1876 25.7 20.9 40.9 12.6 
1878 9.4 19.5 54.2 17.0 
1879 5.2 18.5 55.5 20.9 
1880 2.4 21.0 59.8 16.8 
1881 5.3 14.0 62.4 18.3 
1882 2.7 11.7 65.4 20.2 
1883 0.9 10.0 68.5 20.6 
1884 0.5 12.3 66.9 20.4 
Source: Bell, ‘Evidence’, p. 323. 
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Figure 6.1: Manufactured Iron Output in Cleveland, 1872-1900 
 
* Source: Source: ICTR, 21 June, 1901; 1872-1881 calculated from Bell, ‘Evidence’, p. 323. 
 
This was, however, to be the highpoint of Cleveland’s manufactured iron industry, both in terms 
of total production and as a share of total UK output (30 per cent).  As Figure 6.1 indicates, the 
subsequent decline was precipitous.  Production collapsed by half in three years, and by half 
again in the early 1890s.  At the turn of the century, production had stabilised at 23 per cent of 
the level in 1882 and at a 17 per cent national share.  It was a decline that mirrored the national 
trend in manufactured iron, although as Table 6.2 shows, it was both faster and settled at a 
lower level sooner.  On the surface, the contraction appears indicate a disastrous period for 
Teesside’s iron producers, and indeed there were firms that faced severe difficulties, as had 
occurred ten years earlier with the collapse of the iron rail trade.  What the raw data conceals, 
however, is that just as iron rail makers moved into plates, and some to steel rails, the iron plate 
makers also switched over, this time to steel plates.  The decline does not therefore suggest a 
failure of the iron industry so much as demonstrate the success of Cleveland producers in 
adjusting to new production processes and market demand, i.e. for steel. 
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Table 6.2: Finished Iron (puddled/bar iron), 1881-1900 (thousand tons) 
  
South 
Staffs 
 
North 
Staffs 
 
Cleve-
land 
 
 
Scotland 
 
Lanca-
shire 
South 
&West 
Yorks. 
 
 
Other* 
 
UK 
Total 
1881 
 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,681 
1882 
 
660 195 852 210 277 265 381 2,841 
1883 
 
606 185 795 244 236 252 413 2,731 
1884 
 
656 185 508 197 239 166 287 2,238 
1885 
 
585 171 394 182 208 129 241 1,911 
1886 
 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,617 
1887 
 
486 157 447 181 204 151 76 1,701 
1888 
 
646 181 388 239 197 197 183 2,031 
1889 
 
699 186 485 258 219 232 174 2,254 
1890 
 
534 170 420 251 217 162 169 1,923 
1891 
 
503 170 354 217 213 143 134 1,734 
1892 
 
478 159 240 217 214 131 122 1,561 
1893 
 
438 124 227 202 174 106 593 1,864 
1894 
 
389 187 233 196 145 122 66 1,339 
1895 
 
240 116 186 236 147 120 102 1,148 
1896 
 
258 126 212 258 172 120 69 1,214 
1897 
 
270 148 227 247 162 134 100 1,288 
1898 
 
239 131 185 228 186 110 37 1,116 
1899 
 
247 125 222 228 154 139 87 1,202 
1900 
 
265 114 198 206 149 137 93 1,163 
* ‘Other’ includes Derbyshire, Wales, Shropshire and Cumberland.  The accompanying notes to the table 
in the ICTR indicate that puddled bar output in Wales fell from 213,179 tons in 1882 to virtually nothing 
in 1900.   North Staffordshire output for 1896 includes an estimate of 30,000 tons for one firm that did 
not submit returns 
Source: ICTR, 21 June, 1901. 
 
Although it was rapid when it came, the changeover to steel in Cleveland did to some extent lag 
behind other districts, especially South Wales and Scotland.  This arose partly because Teesside 
firms had particular advantages in iron manufacturing, resulting from heavy investment in plant 
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and the availability of skilled labour.  The reasons are examined in more detail in the next 
section; for the present it is useful to identify the main trends in the data on steel production.  
Even in 1880 when total steel output in Britain exceeded 1 million tons, Cleveland’s was just 
short of 11 per cent of the total (150,000 tons), and virtually all (98 per cent) was Bessemer 
steel.  By contrast, production expanded much more rapidly in South Wales, which accounted 
for one third of Britain’s steel output at that time using both Bessemer and open-hearth 
processes, and Sheffield (22 per cent) which produced mainly Bessemer steel.  In Scotland, like 
Cleveland, steel production had barely taken hold in 1880, but soon switched over almost 
exclusively to the acid open-hearth method.   
 
The national picture in 1880 therefore was one of an expanding steel industry dominated by the 
Bessemer process, but still with a large, if no longer unchallenged, iron manufacturing sector.  
In 1881 out of a total production of manufactured (puddled) iron and steel ingots of 4.45 million 
tons, 60 per cent was accounted for by iron, 32 per cent Bessemer steel and only 8 per cent 
open-hearth steel.  In Cleveland, the bias was still heavily towards iron, with the respective 
figures being 73 per cent iron, 26 per cent Bessemer and 0.5 per cent open-hearth.  The growth 
in steel, however, posed significant problems for the district as the iron from Cleveland ore, and 
on which the industry had been built, was unsuitable for the steel processes available at the 
time.  It was for this reason that the initial steel production on Teesside was based on imported 
hematite ore from Cumberland, but principally from northern Spain, and the converters installed 
by Bolckow Vaughan in the 1870s, the main steel producer in the area, were for the acid 
process.  It was only with the development of the basic process by Thomas and Gilchrist in the 
late 1870s that pig iron from locally mined ironstone could be used for steel and steel 
production up to the mid-1880s was dominated by these two variants of Bessemer’s method.  In 
1883, the peak of Cleveland’s Bessemer steel production, output reached 485,000 tons, 
approximately 23 per cent of total Bessemer output in Britain (2 million tons) and 15 per cent of 
the total in Britain.  In fact at this time over sixty-six per cent of British steel was produced by 
the basic Bessemer method. 
 
For Cleveland, and Britain as a whole, however, basic Bessemer was only a partial and 
temporary solution to the falling away of the demand for iron.  Problems with the quality of 
Bessemer steel meant that it was no substitute for iron in the production of ship plates or 
girders, where ductility and tensile strength were important qualities.  It was primarily for rail 
production that it was most suited.  In 1880, of the one million tons of the Bessemer steel 
produced, almost three-quarters (732,000) went for rail rolling, and even after improvements 
that raised the quality of steel and increased the efficiency of production, by 1900 of the 1.8 
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million tons of rails produced, Bessemer rail output remained at much the same level as 20 
years earlier (760,000 tons) and captured only 42 per cent of the market.   
 
For makers of ship plate and other steel products where quality was important, the answer lay in 
the open-hearth process using acid-lined furnaces.  This method had first gained acceptance 
with South Wales and Scottish firms, being pioneered especially by the Steel Company of 
Scotland in the late 1870s and early 1880s.
329
  Expansion in the use of the acid open-hearth 
method came in the early 1880s following the resolution of cost and production problems and 
after the acceptance by Lloyd’s Register that open-hearth plates were acceptable for 
shipbuilding (1877).
330
  Scottish output expanded rapidly from 84,500 tons in 1880 to 240,000 
tons by 1885 and 481,668 in 1890.  In Wales the steel from acid open hearth producers was 
favoured by the tinplate industry, with production rising to almost 173,000 tons by mid-
decade.
331
  Cleveland’s adoption of the process was slow, being delayed until 1885.  But once 
Cleveland producers had committed to the process, production expanded rapidly, so that by 
1890, at 460,115 tons, the district’s output was about one third of the total UK acid open-hearth 
steel (1.46 million tons) and second only to Scotland.
332
  In terms of the relative outputs of 
Bessemer and open-hearth steel, these developments led to production by the open-heath 
process overtaking the Bessemer process in 1894 (Figure 6.2).  For Cleveland the position is 
summarised in Figure 6.3.  The advent of the acid open-hearth process demonstrates how the 
Cleveland iron producers were able to turn round a seemingly disastrous slump in manufactured 
iron to one in which the district once again became, along with Scotland, the largest producer.  
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Figure 6.2: British Steel Output, 1889-1918 (tons) 
Source: ICTR 17 May, 1912, p. 799; National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers, Statistical 
Report 1918 (July 1919), p. 5. 
 
Figure 6.3: Bessemer and Open Hearth Steel Output in Cleveland, 1889-1900 (thousand 
tons) 
 
Source: ICTR 12 April, 1901, p. 770; ICTR 21 June, 1901, p. 1302. 
 
As with basic Bessemer, the acid process in its turn was an unsatisfactory long-term answer to 
the problems of supplying high quality steel since it meant that Cleveland’s firms were 
dependent on imported hematite ore.  It also left the still substantial local ironstone resources 
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under-utilised.  At the time, except for its use in the basic Bessemer process, which was shut out 
of many of the important steel markets, the only outlet for Cleveland pig iron was for forge and 
foundry iron and the shrinking remnants of the puddled iron sector.  Only with advances in the 
development of the basic open-hearth method that permitted the use of poorer quality ores could 
Cleveland’s full steelmaking potential be unlocked.  However, it was not until the 1890s and 
early 1900s that sufficient progress was made in the techniques of manufacturing in the basic 
open-hearth furnace.  This was initially in north east Wales (Brymbo Steelworks, Wrexham) 
and in Staffordshire (see below).  In 1890 Cleveland’s basic open-hearth production was, at 
9,823 tons, negligible and even by 1900 just 25,000 tons were being made.  This was barely 9 
per cent of the UK, the total of which was less than 30,000, and just 6 per cent of UK steel 
production.  But as with the changeover from iron to acid open hearth steel, the expansion of 
basic open hearth production was extremely rapid once the technical problems had been 
surmounted.  Cleveland was not the only district whose firms adopted the method – basic open-
hearth furnaces were installed across Britain’s steelmaking areas – but it was in Cleveland that 
the most dramatic expansion occurred.  By 1907, even though basic open hearth steel still 
accounted for only 6 per cent of national steel output, total production had expanded four-fold 
since 1900 and Cleveland’s production had expanded almost sixteen-fold to over 400,000 tons, 
35 per cent of the country’s total.  By 1918 output exceeded 1.1 million tons, 75 per cent of the 
district’s total steel, 40 per cent of all basic open-hearth output and almost 11 per cent of all 
types of steel produced in Britain.  Nationally, the acid open hearth process continued to provide 
the largest proportion of Britain’s steel, and it was not until 1918 that basic overtook acid open 
hearth production.  Nevertheless, basic open hearth steel was the most important contributor to 
the growth in total output. The magnitude of this shift can be illustrated by using a simplified 
shift-share calculation.  Between 1906 and 1914, of the 1,699,000 ton increase in basic open 
hearth output (144 per cent) just 234,000 tons (20 per cent) can be attributed to the overall 
growth in steel production.  The rest, 1,465,000 tons (124 per cent), was the result of a decisive 
move away from the other steel processes to the basic open hearth, and Cleveland’s industry 
was at the centre of this transformation.   
 
 
6.3: From Iron to Steel 
 
It had become evident by the end of the 1860s that iron, Cleveland’s speciality, was under threat 
from the new product, steel, which for the first time could be manufactured in bulk at a 
competitive cost.
333
  And while many Cleveland producers stuck to iron through the 1870s and 
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into the 1880s, if they survived, some firms in the district did take early steps into the steel 
market, experimenting with the new processes.  This section provides a brief outline of the 
adoption of three of the four steel processes – acid Bessemer, basic Bessemer and acid open 
hearth – as a background to the investigation of the later shift into basic open hearth steel.  It 
also aims to show that throughout the period there was a process of continuous adaptation by 
the iron and steel firms of the area. 
 
It was established fairly soon after its invention that Henry Bessemer’s pneumatic process 
needed a low phosphorus iron to produce steel of a reliable quality, and that the end product was 
best suited to rails.
334
  Early production was dominated by Sheffield firms, and later some 
railway companies installed Bessemer converters (e.g. the London and North Western Railway 
at it works in Crewe).  But even though demand grew, the expansion in output was limited by 
shortages of low phosphorus ore.
335
  The ore constraint was eventually released by the 
development of the Cumberland and North West Lancashire hematite industry and by imports 
from Spain.  Both these had the effect of shifting the focus of the industry away from Sheffield 
to the north west and to coastal districts, notably south Wales and the north east. 
 
The first north east firm to show an interest in the Bessemer process was Weardale Iron and 
Steel, under the direction of Charles Attwood.  This was a short-lived venture that started in 
1861 but abandoned by 1864.
336
  The main north east entrant into the Bessemer rail market was 
Cleveland’s largest iron producer and Britain’s largest iron rail manufacturer, Bolckow 
Vaughan.  Aware of the growing inroads into the rail market being made by steel as the relative 
price fell and domestic rail companies increasingly looked to the longer-lasting material for 
replacement rails, the firm was especially vulnerable to shifting market demand.  The company 
announced in 1870 that it would be erecting a Bessemer plant to produce 500 tons of rails per 
week, with the option of doubling capacity.  Since Bolckow Vaughan was keen to enter the 
market as soon as possible, as a temporary measure they bought up a small existing plant in 
Manchester, the Gorton Steelworks, from the liquidated Lancashire Steel Company.
337
  The 
shortage of suitable ore for a Bessemer works, or equivalently the high price of British-mined 
hematite, also prompted Bolckow Vaughan to look to Spain for their supplies of low-
phosphorus iron.  In conjunction with John Brown, the Sheffield steel firm, they acquired 
mining rights near Bilbao, a strategy followed by numerous other firms at the time, including 
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Consett, Dowlais and, in Germany, Krupp’s.338  It was, however, some time before the plant was 
built, the plans being hampered by the downturn in the rail market after 1873 (although this did 
not affect steel as much as iron rails), the attempts to make the Gorton works profitable and the 
disruption to the development of the Spanish ore supplies caused by the Third Carlist War.
339
  
Production at Gorton was eventually abandoned (1874), as was the plan to move the plant to 
Cleveland, and by 1875 Bolckow Vaughan had begun to build new works at Eston, a short 
distance to the east of Middlesbrough.  These were eventually completed and in operation in 
1877, with three new blast furnaces supplying four 8 ton converters.  Incorporating many of the 
improvements to Bessemer plant design made in the US in the 1870s, it had a capacity of 1,000 
tons of rails per week, approximately 50,000 tons per year, and was reputed to be one of the 
lowest cost producers in Europe.
340
  The 1878 annual report stated that the plant was in ‘full 
operation for the whole year’ and that the results (i.e. profits) were ‘fairly satisfactory’.  This not 
particularly enthusiastic tone belies the importance of the move into Bessemer for Bolckow 
Vaughan.  It was at a time when the demand for steel rails remained buoyant while the iron rail 
market collapsed; the company’s two iron rail mills at Middlesbrough and Witton Park had been 
idle from 1876.  Moreover, unlike its Durham rival, Consett, Bolckow Vaughan had not moved 
the focus of its manufactured iron production into ship plate at this stage.
341
 
 
The other advantage to Bolckow Vaughan of being a relatively early entrant into Bessemer 
production is that fortuitously it had plant available and experience with Bessemer’s method, 
and was thus ready to move into basic Bessemer steel as and when the process was developed.  
Indeed, this next advance in steel technology came just eighteen months or so after the new 
works were completed, and the company was at the forefront of the new process’s commercial 
application. 
 
Wengenroth makes the interesting case that the contrast between Bolckow Vaughan and Consett 
was that the latter’s strength was partly based on its access to high quality local coal reserves 
and that it was unencumbered by Cleveland ironstone interests.  Consett therefore was not tied 
to using its own ore in the production of iron.  Consequently, the switch to steel using bought-
in, imported hematite could be made more easily.  Bolckow Vaughan on the other hand had 
extensive ironstone mines and so there was every incentive to use the output from these.  When 
Windsor Richards, the firm’s general manager, learned at the Paris Meeting of the ISI in 1878 of 
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Thomas and Gilchrist’s breakthrough in producing good quality steel from high phosphorus iron 
in a basic-lined Bessemer converter, he was quick to persuade Bolckow Vaughan directors to 
offer Thomas and Gilchrist the opportunity to develop their process commercially.  Thomas and 
Gilchrist’s advance seemed to provide an ideal solution to the difficulty of using of Cleveland’s 
moderately high phosphorus iron in steel making, and with it came the prospect of not just 
making steel with what was claimed to be the cheapest iron in the world, but to transfer the 
district’s dominance in the one metal to the other.342  In late 1878 Bolckow Vaughan attracted 
the two inventors away from south Wales where Gilchrist had been conducting experiments 
under Thomas’ direction at Blaenavon and Dowlais, providing experimental facilities at 
Middlesbrough and Eston and offering terms for licensing their patents.
343
  Despite some initial 
difficulties in making the process technically and commercially viable, by the end of 1879 
Bolckow Vaughan had decided to build a new two converter plant at Eston to produce steel 
using the new basic Bessemer process.
344
  It is a measure of their optimism that over the next 
two years these plans were extended to include three new blast furnaces and four more 15 ton 
basic converters.
345
  As the directors’ annual report for 1880 stated: ‘during the past year the 
perfecting of [the] process has absorbed a large portion of the time and ability of Mr Richards, 
your Works General Manager, and it is largely due to him that the invention can now be 
declared an entire success.’346 
 
The buoyant mood, no doubt partly a result of announcements by Bolckow Vaughan of the 
progress of the trials, was reflected in the national press.  The Times for example in a lengthy 
article describing recent advances in steel production, stated: 
 
The last remnants of doubt concerning the entire success of the Thomas-Gilchrist 
process should now be dispelled by the confidence with which it is being applied by 
practical iron and steel manufacturers all over Europe…Altogether, indeed, there are 
now working on the process a dozen to twenty Bessemer converters, and it is probable 
that many more will be got to work within the next few months.  Few innovations have 
enjoyed such a ready application; few have involved so few difficulties in their 
adoption; few have been of more general or more extensive use; few have been attended 
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with such important results; and few have given the promise of yielding their authors 
such a rich reward.
347
 
 
In Cleveland the early enthusiasm for and success in using local iron in the steel production 
along with the ever-present and growing threat to the manufactured iron industry prompted, in 
1881, the formation of a new firm specifically to produce steel by the basic Bessemer method.  
This was the North-Eastern Steel Company (NESCo).  The original directors included a 
selection of Teesside industrialists: an ironmaster (A.J. Dorman of Dorman Long), an engineer 
(Thomas Wrightson of Head Wrightson) and a ship owner (R.C. Denton), along with two 
metallurgists who had been at the forefront of the process’s development, Sidney Thomas, the 
originator, and Edward Riley.  Thomas’s co-developer, Percy Gilchrist, joined the Company’s 
board a short while later. It is clear that most of the original promoters had a considerable 
interest in the success of the new process, either as patent holders or because the new steel 
offered either a challenge to their business – Dorman Long operated a large puddling plant – or 
for the opportunities to supply equipment – Head Wrightson built part of the plant.348  Under the 
guidance of Arthur Cooper as general manager, who had already had experimented with basic 
Bessemer production at Brown, Bayley and Dixon in Sheffield, the firm built its new works in 
the centre of the Cleveland ironmasters’ district close to blast furnaces to supply Cleveland pig 
iron and to rolling mills to process the output.  The plant itself was laid out along American 
lines and comprised four 10 ton converters with a capacity of 100,000 tons of steel a year and 
included mills for rolling blooms, rails and angles.  There was also an expectation that the steel 
could be rolled into ship plate and find a market with north east shipbuilders; as the Prospectus 
notes: ‘The close neighbourhood of the Middlesbro’, Hartlepool, and Sunderland shipyards 
gives additional value to the position, having reference to the increasing use of steel for 
shipbuilding.’349  Delays in construction, however, meant that the plant was not in operation 
until mid-1883.
350
 
 
Basic Bessemer in Cleveland failed to fulfil its early promise and after NESCo no further works 
were built on Teesside.  Of the three other converter plants that were initially intended for basic 
operation, Erimus Steelworks (sited between Middlesbrough and Stockton), Darlington Iron 
Company and the Cleveland Iron and Steel Company at Guisborough, only the first two were 
built, but were worked as acid converters.
351
  Bolckow Vaughan and NESCo continued basic 
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Bessemer production well beyond the turn of the century, accounting between them for up to as 
much as 80 per cent of Britain’s output when working at full capacity.352  But both firms 
encountered technical problems and considerable difficulties in marketing their output as widely 
as they had wished.  And for neither firm was the process as profitable as first anticipated.  Thus 
NESCo, admittedly in its prospectus, suggested that a 17s 6d per ton difference in the cost of 
hematite pig compared to the cheaper Cleveland pig would give a cost advantage to the basic 
over the acid process of 10s a ton.  These projections, however, were based on prices for 
Cumberland hematite rather than the costs of hematite pig available from Cleveland producers, 
which over the 1880s became considerably cheaper as ore imports from Spain and hematite pig 
production expanded.
353
  Interestingly, this outcome had been predicted in an early assessment 
of the prospects for the basic Bessemer process by Transenster.  He suggested that the principal 
factor determining the districts in which it would be a success depended of the hematite-basic 
pig iron price differential; he concluded that because of Cleveland’s coastal site and the access 
to high quality, low phosphorus Spanish ore, the process was unlikely to be profitable in the 
district.
354
  Nevertheless, NESCo was a profitable firm, although not especially so.  Bolckow 
Vaughan’s directors at various times expressed disappointment and looked at alternative steel 
production methods (see below), although the company persisted with the process until 1911. 
 
It was not just the price difference between hematite and Cleveland (or basic) pig that hampered 
the basic Bessemer producers.  Much of the problem lay in the technical difficulties of 
producing a satisfactory quality of steel.  Despite the expectations, basic Bessemer never 
penetrated the ship plate market.  The product was too brittle to be acceptable for shipbuilding, 
and even methods to reduce the phosphorus and sulphur contents were unsuccessful in 
manufacturing a suitably mild metal.  It was later discovered that the brittleness was due to 
nitrogen in the steel introduced during blowing, something that affected both Bessemer 
processes.  The presence of high levels of silicon in Cleveland iron also made the steel hard, 
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acting like carbon.  These factors meant that the product’s markets were limited, and for British 
firms largely confined to the production of rails.
355
   
 
There was, however, a more fundamental problem facing the basic Bessemer process in 
Cleveland; it was that of providing a suitable pig iron for the converter, and it was a difficulty 
that was never fully solved.
 356
  The problem can be stated in the following way: heat was 
needed in the converter to keep the metal liquid and this was produced by the oxidation of the 
impurities during the blowing process.  For acid Bessemer converters the heat came mainly 
from silicon in the iron, and conveniently the low phosphorus pig used in acid converters tended 
to have a high silicon content.  The silicon was also compatible with the acid lining of the 
converter.  In the basic process, however, the silicon destroyed the basic lining, and since 
adding more basic material (lime) as slag to the converter to offset the silicon increased the 
quantity of slag and cooled the iron, a low silicon (and low sulphur) iron was required.  In a 
basic converter, the alternative to the silicon for the production of heat was to use a high 
phosphorus iron (2 to 2.5 per cent), which oxidises at the end of the conversion process just at 
the point when the heat is most required. The problem for the Cleveland producers was that 
Cleveland iron had an intermediate phosphorus content (1.4 to 1.6 per cent), as well as a high 
level of sulphur, and to produce a satisfactory steel required expensive adaptations to the 
process.  These included the addition of manganese in the blast furnace to produce basic pig, or 
the use of the duplex process, which involved the treatment of the metal first in an acid 
converter followed by finishing in a basic one.
 357
  
  
In other words, using Cleveland iron in the basic Bessemer method proved more costly and the 
product less marketable than first anticipated, and despite improvements in the process by using 
mixers, adding high phosphorus puddler’s tap to produce basic pig and the contribution made to 
revenues by selling the high phosphorus slag by-product as a fertiliser, the spread of the 
technique in Britain was limited.  Indeed, given the technical difficulties and the boom in the 
demand for iron ship plate, it is unsurprising that there was only a limited take-up of the process 
in Cleveland in the early 1880s.  Moreover, it is not generally the case that the response of 
Cleveland’s firms was determined by their local ore interests, as Wengenroth maintained (see 
above).  In fact it was only Bolckow Vaughan that fitted this pattern; NESCo had no mineral 
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interests or pig iron producing capacity at the time.
358
  For other firms, product and process 
choices were very much market-led, at least in the years up to the turn of the century.  The home 
market rail production, for which Bessemer was most suited, offered little opportunity for 
expansion, and the main engine of growth of demand, and therefore output came from 
shipbuilding.  Thus, following the success principally of the Scottish steel producers in 
supplying the ship plate market with steel from the acid open hearth process, a number of 
manufactured iron firms on Teesside changed over to this slower, but more reliable method for 
manufacturing mild steel, albeit rather later their Scottish counterparts.
359
  
 
Apart from small scale open hearth production at Weardale Iron and Steel in the late 1860s, the 
first post-1880 changeover in north east was at Consett in 1883 where two acid open hearth 
furnaces working on pig produced from low phosphorus Spanish ore were installed to 
manufacture ship plate.  Initially introduced as a stop-gap while the firm considered building a 
Bessemer plant, the success of this temporary measure led to further expansions in capacity so 
that by 1890 Consett was the largest open hearth manufacturer in the region, producing 160,000 
tons, 11 per cent of the national total.
360
  For Cleveland’s producers the tipping point seemed to 
be when the ratio of the price of steel to iron plates fell below 1.2; at this point the market for 
iron plates evaporated as quickly as that for iron rails had in the 1870s as shipbuilders changed 
over to steel.
361
  Dorman Long scrapped its huge 120-furnace puddling plant at the Britannia 
Works in 1886 and replaced it with seven acid open hearth furnaces.  Two years previously 
Bolckow Vaughan decided to add acid open hearth plant in order to be able to supply ship 
plates.  Capacity was quickly expanded so that by 1890 it was operating seven furnaces of 
between 10 and 25 tons.
362
 Once underway, the transition from iron to acid open hearth steel 
was rapid and by the early 1890s there were at least five works in Cleveland operating the 
process, including Moor Iron Company and Stockton Malleable Iron Company in Stockton and 
the West Hartlepool Steel and Iron Company.  There were also a number of foundries with 
small Siemens-Martin furnaces (e.g. the Cast Steel Works in Middlesbrough).  It is difficult to 
determine precisely the output of acid steel in Cleveland at this time, but in the north east as a 
whole by 1890 acid open hearth production was 460,000 tons, accounting for about one-third of 
the British total. Along with Scotland, it was the largest producing region.  After taking into 
account Consett’s output of 167,000 tons and production at works on the Tyne and Wear (e.g. 
Palmers Shipbuilding at South Shields), it seems likely that the production in Cleveland 
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amounted to up to one-half of the north east total, about 230,000 tons (or 16 per cent of 
Britain’s production).363 
 
The importance of the acid open hearth steel process to Cleveland is also indicated by the effect 
on pig iron production.  As Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show, the production of Cleveland and basic pig 
iron stagnated for much of the last two decades of the century, rising only seven per cent 
between 1883 and 1903; it was only the growth in hematite (and ‘other kinds of pig’) that 
maintained the overall growth in output. Hematite production grew by 24 per cent over the same 
period, and by 1892 accounted for about 40 per cent of total pig production. This is best shown 
by the 4-year moving averages in the Figure 6.4.  The impact of hematite is also reflected in the 
working of the blast furnaces on the different ores.  According to Hawdon, in 1883 eighty-four 
of the 117 furnaces in blast, almost three-quarters, were producing Cleveland pig or basic iron 
with most of the rest producing hematite.  By 1893 the ratio had changed to approximately half 
working on Cleveland pig (43 blast furnaces) and half on other ores, again mainly hematite 
(41furnaces).
364
  The effect also meant stagnation in Cleveland ore mining while imports 
boomed, as shown in Figure 6.6.  The implications of these trends are considered in more detail 
below in the discussion of the pressure for the development of the basic open heath process.   
 
Figure 6.4: Cleveland and Hematite Pig Iron Production, (1883-1907, thousand tons) 
 
Source: W. Hawdon, ‘President’s address’, CIE, (1890-3); Hawdon, ‘Iron and steel industries’.  
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Figure 6.5: Cleveland Hematite Pig Iron Production, 1883-1907 (per cent of total output) 
 
Source: W. Hawdon, ‘President’s address’, CIE, (1890-3); Hawdon, ‘Iron and steel industries’.  
 
 
Figure 6.6: Cleveland Ore Production and UK Ore Imports, 1870-1913 (thousand tons) 
 
Source: W. Hawdon, ‘President’s address’, CIE, (1890-3); Hawdon, ‘Iron and steel industries’.  
 
Although acid open hearth continued to expand nationally up to the end of the First War, and in 
the north east until 1905, the process left the district’s producers dependent on imported ore and 
thus vulnerable to adverse shifts in the relative cost of hematite and Cleveland pig.  What is 
more, the use of the acid process did not solve the problem of the under-utilisation of local ore.  
As Hawdon pointed out in his Presidential Address to the Cleveland Institute of Engineers in 
1892, if, in 1890 Cleveland pig had been substituted for hematite, then at the prevailing output 
this would have required an additional 2.7 million tons of Cleveland ironstone and would have 
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employed an extra 2,500 men, increases of 64 per cent and 46 per cent respectively.  The other 
benefits he noted were the additional railway employment and the extra 120,000 tons of 
phosphoric slag produced that could have been sold as fertiliser.  Clearly, the answer to the 
problem was to expand basic steel output, but given the well-known drawbacks of basic 
Bessemer steel, this would have to wait until the basic process could be adapted for use in the 
open hearth furnace.  Hawdon commented thus: ‘This revolution is not likely wholly to come 
about, but in part, why should it not do so?’365  As discussed in the next section, this did come 
about, but it was more of an evolution than a revolution, though one that produced a thorough-
going change. 
 
 
6.4: The Development of the Basic Open-Hearth Process 
 
Although Cleveland’s iron and steel firms were unable to take complete advantage of Thomas 
and Gilchrist’s basic process immediately, the importance of their invention over the long-term 
should not be understated.  As Wengenroth notes, the modest level of basic Bessemer output in 
Britain disguises the profound impact it was to have on steel production throughout the world.
366
  
This became evident from the 1890s in the US and from 1900 in Britain.  But like so many 
technical developments, it took time before its full benefits could be realised and required not 
only a series of supporting technological innovations but also changes in economic 
circumstances in the steel market.
367
  
 
Attempts to produce open hearth steel in Cleveland using pig iron from local ore pre-dates the 
basic process by some 10 years.  There were early experiments using Siemens furnaces at 
Richardson, Johnson and Co.’s Stockton Ironworks in 1868, with investment in the venture 
from a number of local ironmasters.  Prominent among these was Bernhard Samuelson whose 
Newport Ironworks was, at the time, one of the newest and largest plants on Teesside.  The 
failure to produce steel of an acceptable quality led to the rapid termination of the project and 
resulted in significant losses for some of the principal investors.  Samuelson is reputed to have 
lost £30,000.
368
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The problems arose from the impurities in Cleveland pig and the ore from which it was made, 
with the three troublesome elements being phosphorus, sulphur and silicon.  Thomas and 
Gilchrist’s breakthrough of applying a basic lining to the Bessemer converter so that steel could 
be produced from high phosphorus iron rapidly stimulated interest in extending basic linings to 
open-hearth furnaces.  It took almost 25 years, however, to solve the problems that would 
enable open-hearth steel to be made from Cleveland iron of a quality and on a scale that was 
commercially viable.  There were several barriers to basic open-hearth development that had to 
be surmounted.  First, there was a need to understand the process by which the impurities could 
be eliminated and sound steel produced.  This would enable steel with comparable properties to 
acid steel to be manufactured, properties that included tensile strength, elongation, ductility, 
ease of welding, absence of cracking when riveting among others.  Second, the steel had to gain 
acceptance from users, the civil and mechanical engineers, naval architects and shipbuilders 
who ordered the steel from the makers.  Ultimately, this depended on the bodies that set down 
the required minimum standards, including the Admiralty, the Board of Trade and Lloyd’s.  As 
a relatively new material, at least in the mass manufactured form rather than as a specialist 
metal for instruments and tools that was made by the crucible method, this took some years.  
Third, the basic open-hearth process had to be adapted to the specific conditions of production 
in each area.  Only then could it be produced with the available inputs and in a way that costs 
were low enough and the volume of production sufficiently high for it to challenge the 
dominance of acid open-hearth steel.  As will be explained, this required further technological 
advances and adjustments to the process of manufacture. 
 
The early developers of the basic open hearth method in Britain were all outside Cleveland.  
The district’s producers were heavily committed to iron, and later to acid steel, and the 
experience of the late 1860s had made them cautious of using local pig in the basic open hearth.  
In any case, there was already, in the late 1870s and early 1880s, heavy investment and 
considerable optimism in the potential for basic Bessemer converters.  It was therefore left to 
iron and steel masters in other district, where there were high phosphorus iron ores, or where the 
costs of transporting hematite pig from north west England or a suitable port were too high to 
make acid steel a viable proposition.  These works were mainly in the west midlands or south 
Wales.  The first British use of a basic open-hearth seems to have been at the Farnley Iron 
Company, near Leeds, in 1882.
369
  At this works, Thomas Gillott was already producing acid 
steel with hematite pig in open-hearth furnaces, but had been unsuccessful when he attempted to 
combine the hematite pig with high phosphorus (of 0.2% or more) wrought iron scrap.  
Explaining that he was ‘instructed to apply…the process which Messrs Thomas and Gilchrist 
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had at that time just succeeded with in the Bessemer converter’, Gillott re-lined the furnace with 
a basic material.
370
  This enabled him to use low silicon and sulphur but high phosphorus 
Farnley pig (P = 0.601%) and scrap iron (P = 0.2%) to produce ‘soft steel of great purity’ with 
maximum ductility when cold. As he noted in his report, the product was good enough for 
specialist use such as for boiler plates requiring difficult flanging.  While Gillott maintained that 
the basic open hearth was suitable for steel of ‘exceptional qualities’, production was on a very 
small scale; the furnaces he used were of just 2 to 2¾ tons and the charge was no greater than 
2½ tons.  Moreover, it was an expensive process, principally because of the high cost of the 
preparation and the regular repairs that needed to be made to the furnace lining.
371
 
 
Gillott’s work was significant in demonstrating the potential of the basic open-hearth process, 
but suggested that it had limited application, to the production of the highest quality steels only.  
As J.W. Wailes (of the Patent Shaft and Axletree Company) noted at an Iron and Steel Institute 
meeting in 1889, he could make ‘a very beautiful material [but] ...doubted it as a commercial 
enterprise.’372  Production at Farnley was also based on the combination of pig and scrap, a 
process more widely used in continental Europe where scrap was more abundant and 
consequently available at a lower price.
373
  The preferred basic open-hearth approach that 
developed in Britain was the pig and ore method that was pioneered by J.H. Darby at the 
Brymbo Steelworks near Wrexham. 
 
Trials at Brymbo stared in 1883.
374
  Darby’s firm were prompted by the problem of producing a 
low phosphorus pig iron using local (north Wales) coal.  The coal’s high phosphorus content 
made it unsuitable for producing hematite pig and hence ruled out the acid process.  Moreover, 
as Darby remarks in his paper to the Iron and Steel Institute, he wanted to determine whether the 
success of the basic open-hearth process in Germany could be repeated in Britain, but modified 
to use pig and ore instead of scrap in the charge.
375
  The initial experiments on a 5 ton Batho 
furnace proved successful; a good soft (i.e. mild) steel could be produced from a high 
phosphorus pig (P = 0.3%), and this was despite problems with the operation and maintenance 
of the furnace, which needed frequent, expensive repairs.  On the strength of the quality of the 
steel, capacity was expanded considerably to six basic-lined furnaces, four of 12 tons and two of 
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20 tons, with the works producing about 180 to 200 tons of ingots per week, approximately 
10,000 tons per year by the late 1880s.  In his paper, Darby reported that they were also able to 
manufacture mild steel that ‘works and welds freely with a small addition of manganese’.  But 
he added that ‘a suitable pig is as necessary in the basic as in the acid process.’376  As at Farnley, 
de-phosphorising high phosphorus iron had been successful only when the pig contained low 
levels of sulphur and silicon.  At Brymbo the sulphur content was 0.04 per cent and the silicon 
content 0.4 per cent; at Farnley the equivalent figures were 0.013 per cent and 1.245 per cent 
respectively.  It was clear that at this early stage that the basic open hearth process was more 
problematic when used with iron that had high sulphur and silicon content as this made the 
elimination of the phosphorus considerably trickier.  And it was precisely this difficulty that 
faced those interested in using Cleveland pig in steel production in the basic open hearth.  The 
ironstone from which Cleveland pig was made contained 1.13 per cent phosphorus, 0.9 per cent 
sulphur and 11.87 per cent silicon.
377
   The equivalent for the hematite ‘Rubio’ ore from Spain 
was 0.1 per cent, 0.03 per cent and 10 per cent respectively.
378
 It became clear that the methods 
developed at Farnley and other plants especially Brymbo, would not be directly transferable to 
the Teesside producers without further technological advance or understanding of the process. 
 
Farnley and Brymbo are just two of the earliest examples of the application of the basic open 
hearth process in Britain, but they are not the only ones.  By 1890 there were about fifteen to 
seventeen plants where the process was in operation or had been tried (Table 6.3). Although 
production was on a small scale, often experimental, and high cost, with an emphasis on high 
quality, mild steel, the spread of the technique does indicate that there was not only considerable 
interest in the new technique, but also a willingness to experiment and to perfect it.  It was not, 
as has been suggested by some authors, that the process was neglected.
379
  Indeed, the low total 
output figures belie the development work that was going on.  This is also shown by the number 
of papers on the topic presented at the Iron and Steel Institute and other technical organisations 
in England, including engineering institutes in Staffordshire and Cleveland.  For the period 
1883-1893 Dawson lists thirteen principal papers on the subject, and there were many more as 
is indicated in the abstracts of technical papers in the JISI.
380
  The published records of these 
papers show that there was a lively interest in basic open hearth steel, with good attendance at 
the meetings and detailed discussions following the papers during which experience and ideas 
were exchanged and examined.  For example, at Darby’s paper in London in 1889 there were 
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contributions from seventeen named contributors, all but one of whom worked for or owned an 
iron and steel firm and had had experience of the basic process.
381
 
 
In spite of these early investigations, the development of the basic open hearth steel production 
was slower in Britain than in the US and in continental Europe.  In Europe interest was 
stimulated mainly by easy access to high phosphorus ores and a shortage of hematite that made 
the acid process uncompetitive.
382
  Even though the emphasis was on basic Bessemer, which 
accounted for 63.6 per cent of German steel production in 1900, almost 31 per cent was basic 
open hearth, and only 5.7 per cent was acid steel (Table 6.4).
383
  The abundance of scrap metal 
also meant that most firms employed the scrap and pig method, a very different situation to that 
in Britain where the shortage of scrap posed, according to Gilchrist, ‘particular problems’ and 
meant the pig and ore process ‘alone was applicable’.384  Gilchrist produced details of a 
representative German plant, Hoerde, where in 1890 there were nine furnaces in operation, two 
of 7½ tons and seven of 15 tons.  The charge was 70 to75 per cent scrap and the rest ore, and 
with these proportions the basic open hearth process could produce steel for plates and angles 
with a phosphorus content of 0.025 per cent using a high phosphorus pig of 2.5 per cent.
385
  At 
around this time there were also some significant pioneering practices introduced at other 
continental plants.  These included the use of molten pig fed directly from the blast furnaces to 
open hearth furnaces, as at Witkowitz (in Moravia); and the introduction of the combined 
Bessemer and open hearth, or Duplex method, where the metal is first treated in a Bessemer 
converter before the final refining in an open hearth furnace.  This approach was used at Ruhrort 
in the late 1880s and also at Witkowitz.
386
  Third, there was the invention of the Bertrand-Thiel 
two-stage process at the Kladno plant, near Prague, that was later improved at the Hoesch works 
in Germany, where it became something of a feature.
387
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Table 6.3: Firms using or Experimenting with Basic Open-Hearth Production up to the 
mid-1890s 
 
Date Works/Firm Engineer/ 
Manager 
Comment Source 
1882 Farnley Iron Co, Leeds 
 
Thomas Gillott Small scale.  1 
1883 Brymbo, Wrexham, 
North Wales 
 
J.H. Darby First to use the pig and ore method. 2 
By 
1884 
Weardale Steel, Tow 
Law and Tudhoe, Co 
Durham 
 
C.J. Bagley Discussed steel furnace size and steel quality. 
 
3 
c1884 Patent Shaft and 
Axletree Co, 
Wednesbury 
J.W. Wailes Wailes stated in 1889 that he had been developing 
the basic open-hearth process “for about five 
years”.  Wailes was later (1891) at Calderbank 
steelworks Scotland. 
 
4 
1888 Parkgate Iron and 
Steel, Rotherham 
J. Davis and 
Stoddart 
Operated two basic open-hearth furnaces, 
producing 145-175 ingots per week, approx. 7,000 
per year. 
 
5 
1888 Round Oak Works, 
Brierley Hill, 
Staffordshire 
 
R. Casson Smith  6 
1888 The Patent Shaft and 
Axletree Co, 
Wednesbury. 
 
G.A. Millward  7 
1888 Frodingham, Nr 
Scunthorpe 
Maximilian 
Mannaberg 
Gilchrist advised the firm on the use of the basic 
process. 
 
8 
1888-9 Benjamin Talbot and 
Sons, Castle Works, 
Wellington, 
Shropshire. 
 
Benjamin 
Talbot 
Talbot presented his results to the South 
Staffordshire Institute of Iron and Steel Works’ 
Managers. 
9 
Before 
1889 
Eston Steelworks, 
Bolckow Vaughan, 
near Middlesbrough 
 
E. Windsor 
Richards 
Described trials with different shaped furnaces. 
 
10 
Before 
1889 
 
Chesterfield, probably 
Staveley Ironworks 
 
William 
Galbraith 
Reported on suitable iron and furnace linings. 
 
11 
Before 
1889 
 
Dowlais, South Wales E.P. Martin Used hematite pig in basic-lined furnace. 
 
12 
By 
1889 
 
Firm not identified F.W. Paul Contrasted experience of basic Bessemer and open-
hearth. 
 
13 
By 
1889 
 
Firm not identified Joseph Cooper Discussed type of iron and furnace linings used. 
 
14 
1889 Clarence Ironworks, 
Bell Brothers, 
Middlesbrough 
 
 
I.L. Bell and 
others 
See text, pp. 173-6. 15 
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By 
1890 
Possibly Lilleshall 
Ironworks, Shropshire 
Bernard 
Dawson 
Dawson was an experienced furnace designer as 
indicated by his comment on the basic open hearth 
process at the discussion of Davis’ 1890 CIE paper 
and his own CIE paper in 1894. 
 
16 
By 
1890 
Staffordshire Steel Co Not identified, 
possibly 
Thomas Turner 
Submitted steel samples to Gilchrist for testing 
1890.  The firm produced basic Bessemer, but may 
have experimented with open-hearth. 
 
17 
By 
1894 
Dorman Long, 
Middlesbrough 
W.H. Panton Reported having been making steel for “a few 
weeks”. 
18 
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Table 6.4 Steel Output by Process, 1900 and 1910 (per cent of total national output) 
 Basic Bessemer Basic open 
hearth 
Acid open 
hearth 
Acid Bessemer 
1900 
 
Britain 10.0 6.0 58.4 25.6 
US -- 25.2 8.5 66.3 
Germany 63.6 30.7 2.3 3.4 
1910 
 
Britain 10.7 26.3 44.1 18.9 
US -- 59.0 4.7 36.3 
Germany 60.3 37.3 1.1 1.3 
Source ICTR, 9 Feb. 1912.     
 
In the US, as in the UK, there was greater interest in the acid process, with little development in 
basic open hearth practice until the latter part of the 1880s.  Samuel T. Wellman, after a visit to 
Europe in 1885 set up a small experimental basic open hearth furnace at the Otis Steelworks in 
Pittsburgh the following year.  This operated in secret for about four months, successfully 
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supplying good quality steel, but was discontinued because of the slowness of the process 
compared to acid production and, to quote Wellman, the ‘pressure brought by the selling 
department for more steel.’388  The first successful commercial production was in 1889 at 
Carnegie and Phipps’ Homestead Works, near Pittsburgh, and by 1890 there were five plants in 
operation, three in Pennsylvania (Homestead, Steelton and Pottstown), and two in the South 
(Chattanooga, and Henderson Steel and Manufacturing Co, Birmingham, Alabama) but annual 
production had reached only 90,000 tons, barely 5.7 per cent of total open hearth output.
389
  
Subsequent expansion was rapid, however, with basic soon displacing the acid open hearth 
process and eclipsing acid Bessemer production.  In 1900 basic open hearth steel accounted for 
25 per cent of US output and 59 per cent in 1910.
390
   
 
This was a phenomenal rate of expansion, the more so given the overall growth rate of the 
industry, and was achieved not only by the extension of the process to existing plants and the 
building of new ones, but also by an enormous increase in the capacity of the furnaces.  As 
Wellman points out, in 1901 the average size of a furnace was 40 to 50 tons, but 100 ton 
furnaces were under construction and there were plans for some of 200 ton capacity.
391
  In 
addition to the size of furnaces, the growth was made possible by advances several areas.  These 
included; a greater understanding of the de-phosphorisation process; and improvements in the 
design of furnaces, the layout of works and in operating equipment.  Chief among the latter 
were the use of mechanical chargers for the furnaces and feeders for the gas producers, and in 
the development of the tilting furnace.  Tilting, or rolling, furnaces were first developed by H.H. 
Campbell at the Steelton Works, Pittsburgh in 1889 and taken up by Wellman at the Illinois 
steelworks, Chicago (1895).  They allowed the slag to be removed intermittently during refining 
and this permitted more effective heating.  It also enabled more efficient mechanical tapping 
(teeming), as the furnace could be tilted by about 25 degrees from the horizontal.  It was this 
last advance that led to Benjamin Talbot’s innovative continuous steel process that he first 
introduced at the Pencoyd Steelworks in 1898 and which was to become a major feature of 
basic open hearth practice in Cleveland at a number of works, most notably at Cargo Fleet.
392
  In 
passing it is useful to note that in an important respect the early US conditions for producing 
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basic open hearth steel differed somewhat from those in Britain.  As Darby points out, the 
original basic open hearth furnaces at Homestead used low phosphorus pig iron. In Britain it 
was coping with high phosphorus and the other impurities that was the problem.  The benefit of 
using a low phosphorus iron in a basic-lined furnace was that even more of the phosphorus 
could be removed than in the acid process and a very high quality of steel assured.  The steel, 
according to Darby, was ‘acknowledged to be the best steel for plates and other purposes made 
in America.’393 
 
The position on the basic open hearth steel in Cleveland, while not reflecting precisely the 
experience of other steel districts in Britain, was very similar. There was a keen interest shown 
in the developments elsewhere and recognition of its potential benefits for Teesside, but there 
do not seem to have been any steps taken in the district in the early 1880s to investigate the 
extension of the idea of a basic lining to the open hearth.  Interestingly, and perhaps this is a 
sign of the attitude on Teesside, there was no explicit discussion of the process in Lowthian 
Bell’s 1884 Principles of the Manufacture of Iron and Steel, although he does discuss the 
methods of de-phosphorising high phosphorus iron as well as the acid open hearth process at 
some length.
394
  This initial lack of urgency to develop the basic open hearth process arose for 
three main reasons.  First, there was a buoyant iron plate trade that was only just peaking 
(Figure 6.1).  Second, the iron and steel firms had ready access to imported hematite and were 
thus able to follow the trend in Scotland to invest in acid open hearth capacity.  And third, much 
of the early effort to use Cleveland iron went towards developing the basic Bessemer process, as 
noted in section 6.2. 
 
Nevertheless, by the late 1880s there is clear evidence that Cleveland’s firms began to 
experiment with the basic open hearth furnaces, notably at Bolckow Vaughan and Bell Brothers.  
Trials appear to have begun at Bolckow Vaughan sometime before 1889, with the general 
manager of the time, E. Windsor Richards, directing the experiments first with a circular and 
then an elliptical furnace, probably of the Batho type.  This interest was stimulated after 
Richards had attended a lecture given by J.W. Wailes of the Patent Shaft and Axletree Co. at 
Owen’s College in Manchester.  Both furnaces proved to be expensive failures, with Richards 
commenting: ‘if [I] had not heard that paper read by Mr Wailes, it would have saved a good 
deal of money and considerable vexation of spirit.’395  Richards then reverted to using a 
traditional rectangular Siemens furnace and with a charge of Cleveland ironstone, pig and scrap, 
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and adding ferro-manganese to raise the carbon content to 0.12 per cent, was able to produce 
steel of high enough quality to meet Lloyd’s requirements for tensile strength, i.e., a minimum 
of 24 to 25 tons per square inch.  Gilchrist also reported on tests he had carried out on Bolckow 
Vaughan’s basic open hearth steel plates and rivets, and again indicated that that the tensile 
strength was in the range 22.4 to 30.5 tons, mostly in the upper range.
396
  Despite these 
favourable results, Bolckow Vaughan must have abandoned the experiments as the comments in 
1891 from Le Neve Foster, an engineer from the firm, strongly suggest that they were no longer 
using the process.
397
  He gave no indication of why Bolckow Vaughan stopped its trials, 
although it is likely that it was either on cost grounds or because of limited demand, and it was 
not until almost ten years later that they were resumed, this time using the American Monell 
method.
398
 
 
Even though Bell seems to have overlooked the application of the basic process to the open 
hearth furnace in his Principles book, he was only too aware of its possibilities.  While not 
explicitly distinguishing basic Bessemer from basic open hearth, he wrote in his evidence to the 
Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade that ‘the basic process … relieves us from all 
difficulty [of dealing with phosphoric pig]…the world need not fear that its demand for steel 
runs any danger of being limited by the want of the necessary raw material.’399  In reply to a 
question from the Committee on whether the UK steel industry was entirely dependent on 
hematite ore, he replied: 
 
No, and I would go further than that, for admitting some difference in the quality, I do 
not despair of science and practice in this country being able to obtain steel by the basic 
process fit for all purposes for which steel is made by the acid process can be or is used 
at present.
400
 
 
Bell’s early research into the use of Cleveland iron in the production of steel was primarily 
aimed at the removal of phosphorus and other impurities (at the time referred to as metalloids) 
from the pig before refining, either in the blast furnace or before transfer to the steel furnace.  
He was not therefore specifically concerned with the basic open hearth method. These processes 
included ‘washing’ the iron to remove the silicon, a process that was also developed 
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independently by Krupp in Germany at the same time.
401
  However, by the late 1880s his firm, 
Bell Brothers, turned its attention to basic open hearth production and started experiments with 
two basic furnaces in January 1889.  This was probably prompted by the lack of success in his 
other methods of purifying pig iron; but also, as he commented in a discussion at the Cleveland 
Institution of Engineers, he was responding to the decline in the malleable iron trade, something 
that seriously affected Bell Brothers as a large pig iron producer.
402
    
 
The Bell Brothers cost accounts show records for two six month periods during which the trials 
took place – October 1890 to March 1891 and April to September 1891 (Tables 6.5 and 6.6).  
The experiments reveal two interesting features. First, rather than lining the furnace with 
dolomite, the usual basic material, Bell used chrome (a neutral material), an approach that had 
been practised at the Alexandroski steelworks near St Petersburg.
403
   Second and possibly 
related to the first given his extensive European experience, the firm employed Alexandre 
Pourcel, the famous French metallurgist who had been involved in the early refinements of the 
Siemens-Martin open hearth furnace at the Terre Noire works at St Etienne.
404
  It appears that 
Lowthian Bell and his son Hugh, who was the firm’s managing director, were using their 
connections in the iron and steel industry to tap into expertise that had been developing outside 
Britain, especially in Europe where the basic open hearth method had been more extensively 
investigated and developed than elsewhere. 
 
Stead presented some results for the composition for steel from a typical cast.  These show that 
on purely technical grounds the firm had some success in making a product of acceptable 
quality.  The steel, with 0.08 per cent carbon, contained low levels of phosphorus (0.02 per 
cent), sulphur (0.03 per cent) and no silicon.  These were, much the same as the results obtained 
by Davis at Park Gate, Rotherham (Table 6.3) some years before, but from a charge that 
contained a far higher proportion of phosphoric pig (64 per cent) and less scrap – iron and steel 
scrap were 20 and 16 per cent respectively.
405
  In fact it seems that the firm experimented with 
different proportions of pig, ore and scrap in the charge (Table 6.5) and also from the details in a 
paper reporting on the trials at the Metallurgical Congress in Paris in 1889.
406
  But while the 
quality of the steel may have been satisfactory, at least in its chemical composition, there is no 
analysis of its physical properties.  Also the cost data clearly show that the experiments were not 
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economically viable.  Production cost were, in the first six months period, 39.2 shillings per ton 
above the average selling price, a loss of almost 50 per cent.  And even when production 
switched to using higher yielding hematite and less impure pig and scrap in the second six 
months, the losses were still substantial – 27.9 shillings – with costs 28 per cent above prices.  
Over the 1890 to 1891 period for which there are records, the cumulative loss amounted to 
£6,783 on an output of just over 4,000 tons.  It is hardly surprising that the trials were 
abandoned for the time being, especially as Bell Brothers was also making heavy losses on its 
pig iron trade. 
 
Table 6.5: Bell Brothers Basic Open-Hearth Steel Experiments (1889-91) – Average 
Charge Composition  
 October to March 1891 April to September 1891 
Input per ton of steel cwt. % cwt. % 
Clarence pig 13.75 
 
52.60 5.05 23.10 
Hematite pig and other 
metal 
0.22 0.01 4.50 20.59 
Scrap iron and steel 9.26 
 
35.42 9.31 42.59 
Ferro- and Spiegel 
 
0.34 0.01 0.43 0.20 
Oxide 2.03 
 
0.08 2.47 0.11 
Chrome ore 0.54 
 
0.02 0.10 < 0.01 
Total 26.14  21.86  
Source: Bell Brothers Profit and Loss Accounts, Balance Sheets, Auditors Reports and Cost Accounts 
No.5 (BBA vol. 5), p. 503. 
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Table 6.6: Bell Brothers Basic Open Hearth Steel Experiments (1889-91) – Costs, 
Revenues and Output 
 October to March 1891 April to September 1891 
Costs and revenues per ton Shillings Shillings 
Charge   
Clarence pig iron 28.89 10.55 
Hematite pig & old metal 0.71 9.58 
Scrap iron and steel 25.42 27.72 
Ferro and spiegel 3.01 3.43 
Oxide 1.42 1.73 
Chrome ore 1.74 0.40 
 
Other costs 
  
Fuel: Coal/ Coke 11.79 9.13 
Limestone 0.87 1.40 
Wages and Salaries 22.53 15.40 
Other* 13.61 6.48 
Depreciation of steelworks 4.72 13.51 
Cost per ton 114.64 99.38 
   
Average price per ton 75.32 71.47 
   
Profit or loss per ton (-) 39.32 (-) 27.91 
   
Revenue from scrap per ton 3.52 2.27 
 
Totals
+
 
 
£   
 
£ 
Sales Revenue 11,728 4,174 
Cost of manufacture 17,058 5,625 
Profit or loss (-) 5,329 (-) 1,452 
   
Steel ingots made (tons) 2,976  1,132 
Notes 
*Other costs include: stores, royalty, rents, rates and taxes. 
 
+
 Totals are given in £ and may not add up due to rounding. 
Source: BBCA vol. 5, p. 503. 
 
The commercial failure at Bell’s Clarence works, however, did not dampen the interest in basic 
open hearth methods in Cleveland.  Judging from the papers and discussions at the Cleveland 
Institution of Engineers meetings as well as attempts at other plants on Teesside, it seems that 
there was a growing sense of urgency in the need to overcome the problems with the process.  
This is clearly indicated by the presentation of a number of papers and the subsequent follow-up 
discussions at the Cleveland Institution.  In 1890, Davis, from the Park Gate Ironworks in 
Rotherham, set out his experience of producing basic open hearth steel and at the same meeting 
Edward Saniter elaborated on his desulphurising process that he had developed at Wigan, and 
already presented to the ISI’s autumn meeting.407  Later, in 1894, Bernard Dawson read a long 
and detailed assessment of the nature and operation of different types of open hearth furnaces.  
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Dawson is described by some of the discussants at the meeting as a ‘master of furnace 
engineering, who had extensive knowledge of steelmaking in Britain, the US and on the 
Continent.
408
  He also had a connection with Middlesbrough, where he grew up and trained as 
an engineer.
409
  Furthermore, both Hawdon (1892-3) and Stead (1894-5), in their president’s 
addresses to the CIE made direct reference to the basic open hearth process, with Hawdon 
particularly emphasising the potential for using it in Cleveland and how important it was ‘to 
make up our minds that the basic process is to be the steel refining process of the future in this 
district.’410  Stead, as might be expected given his technical expertise as a chemist, stressed the 
way in which Saniter’s new process helped in the reduction of the impurities in iron before final 
refining in the open hearth furnace.  In each of these cases the speakers expressed the view that 
it was now possible, or at least soon would be, as well as highly beneficial, for Cleveland’s steel 
producers to adopt the basic open hearth process.  Thus Davis wrote: 
 
‘…any firm who are (sic) not using up native pig for steel and desirous of making basic 
steel from Cleveland or other native ores, may do so very easily by flowing out the acid 
bottom and ramming in the basic lining, and making basic additions [to the charge]’.411 
 
Similarly, while acknowledging the current cost differences between acid and basic open hearth 
methods, Dawson urged steel producers to be prepared to switch to basic open hearth if 
circumstances changed.
412
  Indeed, the view that the process would be imminently adopted in 
the district was voiced by a number of others, including Saniter, who noted the importance of 
his process for Cleveland, as did Stead and Dawson.
413
  Another president of the CIE, C.J. 
Bagley, also emphasised that the future for Cleveland lay in the production of basic open hearth 
steel, remarking in his introduction to the discussion of Davis’s paper: 
 
Basic material must come for plates as surely as it came for rails.  I hope this discussion 
will remove all prejudice against it. It would be a great advantage to have plates made 
from Cleveland ore, even if they are not cheaper than those made from hematite ores.
414
 
 
Earlier, in a summing up after Davis’s paper, Bagley said that he hoped that the discussion 
would produce evidence as to ‘why the same [i.e. the use of the basic open hearth furnace] is not 
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done in this district as Mr Davis is doing in Rotherham’, adding that ‘we really ought to tackle 
this question in a business-like way.’415  Some years later, in 1903, C.H. Macmillan, an 
American engineer from British Westinghouse in Manchester, read another paper on the basic 
open hearth process for which he drew on his extensive experience in the US.
416
  It was, 
however, at a time when the switch to basic open hearth production had become a central part of 
the strategies of several steel producers in Cleveland, and so while it can be seen as yet another 
indication of the local interest in the process and part of the means by which information was 
transmitted, Macmillan’s influence in bringing about the change is probably limited. 
 
These papers and discussions which followed show that there were a number of concerns the 
iron and steel producers, metallurgists and engineers had in common and which led them to step 
up their interest in the process.  One was the reliance on imported hematite ore from Spain that 
was needed for the acid process.  Fears were expressed that this dependence left the district 
vulnerable to supply disruptions should an outbreak of war interfere with international trade.
417
  
A more widely held concern was the effect that the ore imports were having on the output of 
Cleveland’s ironstone mines and production of Cleveland pig.  Hawdon in particular 
emphasised the under-utilisation of local resources and the effect this had on the area and at a 
couple of meetings presented data to illustrate the effects.
418
  He even made a rather vague 
reference to the ‘economic advantage of the country’ of using domestic ores.419  Among others, 
Dawson was of a similar opinion about the failure to use local resources: ‘does it not appear a 
questionable practice to comparatively ignore the resources at our feet and seek them afar 
off?’420 
 
There are a number of ways of looking at these of concerns.  One is to view them as rather 
vague expressions of rudimentary mercantilist or even nationalistic attitudes.  Alternatively, 
they may simply reflect the interests of the Cleveland iron makers who not only produced the 
pig iron but also had extensive ironstone mining interests and were keen to find a new outlet for 
their product in the face of stagnating demand.  Hawdon, for example, worked for Samuelson’s 
which had a large blast furnace plant and owned ironstone interests at Slapeworth and Spa 
Wood. A number of other blast furnace firms, e.g. Bell Brothers, Cargo Fleet, Bolckow 
Vaughan, had similar interests.  Nevertheless, discussions at the Cleveland Institute reveal a 
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deep anxiety about the future of district’s iron and steel industry. These anxieties stemmed from 
the decline in the iron ship plate trade and the fact that the basic Bessemer process offered 
limited scope as a substitute because of concerns over the quality of Thomas steel.  The switch 
to acid open hearth, while successfully filling the gap for some firms still left acid producers 
exposed to rising hematite prices.  As Jeremiah Head commented in 1894 at a Cleveland 
Institution meeting, the iron and steel trade ‘is not in a particularly happy position at the 
moment’.421  This was exacerbated by the growing awareness of the competition from the 
German and Belgian basic open hearth producers whose steel had gained greater acceptability 
with the British regulatory authorities than that from home manufacturers.   
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that many in the Cleveland industry, along with industry experts 
such as Head, saw the exploitation of the local ores as the best way of restoring prosperity.
422
  
But it was widely recognised that a successful shift to basic open hearth depended on demand, 
and this in turn was dependent on two factors.  The first was to reduce the relative production 
costs of basic open-hearth compared to acid steel, and this relied on finding a commercially 
viable solution to the technical problems of making steel with Cleveland iron.  The second was 
to gain acceptability for the product among consumers – the mechanical and civil engineers and 
the shipbuilders.   
 
The question of the quality of basic steel was one that dogged the industry for a number of 
years, and judging from many ISI and CIE discussions, caused some resentment among the steel 
firms as there was an earlier acceptance of basic open hearth steel from continental producers.  
It is difficult to estimate the extent to which the slow rate of recognition of basic open hearth 
steel in Britain delayed its development, but it is likely to have something of a disincentive, at 
least up to the mid-1890s.  Most important was the large ship plate market that from the 1880s 
was dominated by acid open hearth steel, which had replaced iron as the preferred metal.  To 
open up this crucial market the producers needed to convince users of the quality of basic steel 
and in particular to obtain the official recognition from the insurers (Lloyd’s Register), the 
Board of Trade and one of the largest commissioners of ships, the Admiralty.  As Head stated in 
1889, ‘he was glad to hear… that there was a prospect of getting steel made by the basic 
Siemens process of quality to fulfil Lloyd’s and the board of Trade tests; because until that was 
done a large market … would be closed.’423 
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Lloyds’ first introduced minimum specifications for steel used in shipbuilding in 1877.424  The 
standards mainly referred to tensile strength, elongation and the minimum thickness of plates, 
and initially there was no distinction between or restrictions on the process by which the steel 
was made (Table 6.7).
425
  This last came in 1900 when Lloyd’s Registry Rules were made 
explicit: ‘steel for shipbuilding should be made from the Open Hearth process, acid or basic.’426  
Until 1900, therefore, the acceptability of steel for plates was dependent on the ability of the 
product to withstand the tests, which were applied firm by firm, and was not restricted by a 
general ruling from Lloyd’s against the basic process of either type.  This left the market 
potentially open to competition between different processes, and as McCloskey and 
Wengenroth have shown, once Martell, the Chief Surveyor at Lloyd’s, concluded that steel 
ships were as cheap to build and operate as those of iron, the rate at which the shift to steel 
occurred depended ultimately on the relative price of iron and steel plates.
427
  But in the case of 
basic open hearth steel, the acceptance was not as straightforward as it was for its acid 
equivalent. 
 
Table 6.7: Official British Minimum Standards for Steel Plates, c1896 
  Tensile strength, tons 
per square inch 
Elongation, per cent 
in 8 inches* 
Lloyd’s Registry Ship 28 to 32 20   
Boiler 26 to 30 20 
Admiralty Ship 26 to 30 20 
Boiler shells 26 to 30 20 
Boiler fireboxes 24 to 26 26 
Board of Trade Boiler shells 27 to 32 20 
Boiler fireboxes 26 to 30 20 
* In 10 inches for Board of Trade standards. Source: Head, ‘Steel plates’, p. 155. 
 
At first in the 1870s acid and basic Bessemer producers had high expectations of the ship plate 
market as an outlet for their mild steel and there were some early users in Scotland and in the 
north east.
428
  By 1884 both the Cleveland basic Bessemer specialists, Bolckow Vaughan and 
NESCo, were supplying plates but this was to be a short-lived market for them.  Lloyd’s tests on 
NESCo plates in January 1884 indicated an unacceptable variability in quality, with at least one 
of the samples failing to meet the standards required.  Worse was to come when Lloyd’s also 
tested plates at a north east shipyard and found that the product was of ‘catastrophically poor 
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quality’.  The reports in Britain did not name the firms, but they were identified in Stahl und 
Eisen, and one was Bolckow Vaughan.
429
  This led Lloyd’s to rule in December 1885 that they 
would not accept ships of basic steel for registration ‘until exhaustive tests from a large number 
of charges that a reliable and uniformly ductile material could be made.’430  The problem was 
one of brittleness in the steel caused not by phosphorus, most of which had been removed in the 
Bessemer converter, but by nitrogen.
431
  The damaged reputation of basic steel received a 
further blow in 1888 when Martell identified fractures in German produced plates destined for 
shipbuilders.
432
   
 
Although most of these tests, and all of the failures, applied to basic Bessemer steel, Lloyd’s did 
not at first, distinguish between the two the basic processes.  Consequently, the adverse 
publicity was a major setback for the basic open hearth process and occurring at such an early 
stage of its development enabled the acid process to secure its leading position in the plate 
market.  Indeed, it was only from the mid-1880s that basic open hearth producers began to 
apply to Lloyds and the Admiralty for their product to be tested.   For the Admiralty, William H. 
White, the Director of Naval Construction, reported that extensive tests had been conducted in 
1886 on both basic Bessemer and basic open hearth steel after representations from a number of 
firms.
433
  The results were set out in a paper read to the Institution of Naval Architects at their 
Sunderland meeting in 1887.
434
  The Admiralty’s position was much the same as Lloyd’s: they 
were willing to accept steel by any mode of manufacture ‘as long as it met the required 
standards after proper experiments’.  A wholesale acceptance, however, was not forthcoming. 
This was partly because the testing of basic open hearth steel had not been complete; in 
particular, although the tests for tensile strength and ductility were ‘quite successful’, there had 
been no inclusion of rivet samples, and past experience had shown that even when the other 
tests had been passed, those for riveting had not.  By 1891 the Admiralty had accepted some 
basic steel, mainly open heath, for shipbuilding, but White emphasised that its current status 
was equivalent to that of acid Bessemer steel. It could be used, but not for ‘the most important 
parts of the structure of ships’.435  Two years later at an Institute for Mechanical Engineers 
meeting, White referred to later Admiralty tests and voiced greater support for basic open hearth 
steel.  He explained that the Admiralty would use it if ‘they could get such a material they could 
trust’.436  And although he attempted to offer support for basic open hearth steel, saying ‘in the 
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Admiralty service there had been a continuous endeavour to encourage the basic process of 
steelmaking from native ore.  Admiralty officers had done their best to test the matter on the 
side of its possibilities’, his comments reveal a deep-seated feeling against basic steel of both 
kinds.  He announced that basic Bessemer was not to be used in ships for any purposes and 
basic open hearth was not to be used for boilers.  In fact, he stated explicitly an Admiralty 
preference for acid open hearth steel as it was both cheaper and had all the right qualities. 
 
The situation for basic open hearth steel was also not helped by some inconsistency between the 
authorities, and even by the Admiralty itself.  Thus at a Cleveland Institution meeting in January 
1891 Percy Gilchrist reported that following enquiries to the Board of Trade about the use of the 
steel, the department had replied that it was not prohibited for use in the boilers of passenger 
steamships ‘if it is found suitable’.  This was, quite clearly, a case of two government 
departments sending out confusing signals and was hardly conducive to encouraging a market 
for basic open hearth steel.  Gilchrist, however, made no mention of the Board of Trade’s 
attitude to ship plates.
437
 Gilchrist also revealed that as well as sanctioning some German basic 
open hearth steel plates, the Admiralty had accepted boiler plates from Belgium and Russia and 
ship plates from France.  He did, however, did point out that the tests on the materials were 
extensive and of the same standards as applied in Britain.
438
  In fact it is difficult to determine 
Gilchrist’s intentions from the report of the discussion; his comments can be read either as a 
complaint about preferential treatment for European competitors or as an encouragement to 
British producers to emulate their continental counterparts. 
 
To some extent Lloyd’s appear to have been more supportive of, or at least conciliatory 
towards, basic open hearth producers, perhaps because of mounting pressure from the firms who 
had adopted the process or who were potential producers.  Martell, at the Iron and Steel Institute 
meeting discussing Darby’s 1889 paper, indicated that they had had a ‘very large number of 
inquiries’ and felt obliged to explain to the meeting the conditions for the acceptance of the 
material.  The report of his contribution to the discussion noted: ‘this [the conditions for 
acceptance] was what he particularly wished to bring before the meeting, because they might 
not know so well as he did matters of that kind, which came officially under his knowledge’.439  
Perhaps Martell also felt under pressure as there was concern among British firms that Lloyd’s 
had accepted basic open hearth steel for shipbuilding from continental producers – eight to ten 
German firms in 1889.    At the same meeting he also indicated that basic plates of up to ½ inch 
thickness produced by the Glasgow Iron Company were regarded as acceptable, although he 
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failed to say whether they were of open hearth or Bessemer steel.  Later, at the January 1891 
Cleveland Institution meeting J.J. Milton, Martell’s successor, was also defensive of Lloyd’s 
policy.  He rejected criticism that Lloyd’s did not accept basic steel, stating that for the past 
three years plates and boilers had been accepted from a number of British works.  He also 
pointed out that there was a considerable difference between the basic open hearth steel 
produced in Britain and Germany since the German metal made at Hoerde for example was 
made with purer raw materials – 75 per cent scrap, 25 per cent non-phosphoric pig and no rail 
iron, which tended to be high in phosphorus.  This gave the German producers an advantage 
over their British rivals who used high phosphorus pig. He did on the other hand reiterate the 
position that if the steel made in Britain met the necessary tests, then the ‘…the Committee of 
Lloyd’s Register will be very pleased to pass it equally with acid steel.’440 
 
Despite some variation in official attitudes, and some misunderstanding by those in the industry, 
by the mid-1890s the position on basic open hearth finally appears to have been settled; it was 
acceptable as long as it met the necessary standards.  Indeed, in the discussion of Dawson’s 
paper at the Cleveland Institution in 1894 there was no mention of Lloyd’s or the Admiralty, 
and unlike earlier meetings, no representatives appear to have attended, or at least if they did, 
they made no contribution to the discussion.
441
  This left two remaining impediments to the 
widespread adoption of the process.  One was the attitude of the users and the other was the 
costs of production. 
 
The unwillingness of shipbuilders to use basic open hearth steel for ship and boiler plates can be 
explained partly by the poor reputation of basic Bessemer steel.  As Burn states, to north east 
shipbuilders basic Bessemer was ‘like a red rag to a bull’.442  But why the shortcomings of 
Bessemer steel should have extended to open hearth steel is not clear.  For some it may have 
been pure prejudice, the result of ignorance of the differences in the metals and the 
manufacturing processes.  This was the opinion of a number of steel producers, including 
Arthur W. Richards the steelworks manager at Bolckow Vaughan.
443
  Macmillan similarly 
attributes the reluctance to use the steel to ignorance of the metallurgical properties of the metal, 
noting comments such as that it was believed to be ‘too dry’ and ‘washed out’, and some users 
thought that there was a ‘mysterious something about acid steel that made it better’.444   
Interestingly, Burn inadvertently identifies a surprising source of such misunderstanding and 
confusion between the two basic processes – the famous civil engineer, Sir Benjamin Baker.  
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Burn cites Baker as an example of one of the ‘consulting engineers [who] regarded it unsuitable 
for bridges, etc.,’.445  He quotes Baker’s comment at an Institution of Civil Engineers meeting: 
‘[I] had more trouble and anxiety over the use of basic–steel plates for about six months than [I] 
had in twenty year’s use of acid steel.’446  However, as Jeremiah Head noted in his response to 
Baker, the ICE president was referring to basic Bessemer ‘which had come from the Continent, 
especially Germany’, and not to open hearth plates.447  Gilchrist offered a different explanation: 
he attributed the reluctance of ship owners and builders to use basic open hearth as a 
misunderstanding of the Admiralty and Lloyd’s attitudes and guidance rather than ignorance of 
the steel’s properties.448 
 
Although resistance by users on the grounds of prejudice, a lack of knowledge or a 
misunderstanding of the official position are all possible, none is entirely convincing.  As has 
been pointed out, over time the Admiralty, Lloyd’s and the Board of Trade accepted basic open 
hearth steel, and made it known that they did.  It is unlikely that users would have remained 
ignorant for long, especially given the basic open hearth producers’ promotion of the steel with 
the authorities, and they are unlikely to have overlooked a product that offered the same 
qualities as acid open hearth steel.  Some of the explanation must therefore lie with the steel 
producers themselves.  As William White explained in 1896, ‘there was nothing to prevent any 
maker from tendering for open hearth steel instead of open hearth acid…[but]… the invitation 
had not been responded to’.449  He went on to say: 
 
The Admiralty, as a large purchaser, had allowed the use of basic steel by the open-
hearth process, and the manufacturers had not availed themselves of the opportunity.  
[I] presume the only conclusion to be arrived at was that under existing conditions, and 
with existing plant it had been commercially preferable to continue the acid process.
450
 
 
To some extent this is supported by Head’s own assessment of the situation in 1896.  The 
hesitation on the part of steelmakers to commit to the basic open hearth process can be 
explained by risk aversion.  That is, having committed to the acid process ‘the steelmakers were 
reluctant to run the risk of trying new experiments and so had followed suit one after another in 
employing the acid process.’451 
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Given the rather confusing picture of users’, the authorities’ and the producers’ attitudes, it is 
almost impossible to disentangle the root cause of the slow adoption of basic open hearth steel 
in Britain, putting technical difficulties aside.  Whether it was the result of the shipbuilders’ or 
the steel producers’ preferences is unclear; in reality, it was probably an interaction of the two 
that gave rise to a self-reinforcing effect.  The initial poor quality of basic Bessemer plates 
damaged the reputation of the basic process, even if basic open hearth steel was implicated only 
by association, and the availability of a high quality acid open hearth product coupled with an 
official preference for the acid process produced a strong bias in its favour among consumers.  
This in turn encouraged steel makers to invest heavily in acid open hearth furnaces, and even 
though the authorities came to stress their neutrality between the two open hearth methods, as 
long as the steel passed the appropriate tests, the commitment to acid steel made producers wary 
of risking a new and, in Britain, largely untried process.  Such risk-averse behaviour is 
understandable given the recent loss of the iron plate trade; former iron masters who had 
switched over to acid open hearth were unlikely to forego the benefits of a rapidly expanding 
market from the highly successful successor to iron.  To have shifted again to a new process that 
they could not be certain their customers would accept was too much of a gamble.  And on the 
consumers’ part, the continued preference for acid open hearth steel would last as long as they 
were assured of a supply of a product of the appropriate quality at a competitive price.  Being 
offered an alternative, basic open hearth steel, but in very limited quantities and at a higher cost 
was unlikely to encourage them to experiment. 
 
Ultimately, what had to change to switch demand towards basic open hearth steel, and induce 
the makers in Cleveland to supply more, was a shift in the relative costs of acid and basic steel.  
This depended on two factors: the costs of imported hematite ore from Spain and solving the 
technical problems of using Cleveland iron in the open hearth. As John Gjers, a Cleveland 
ironmaster but not a steel manufacturer, astutely remarked in 1889, because of transport costs 
hematite pig was 12 shillings per ton less in Cleveland than in Staffordshire, and as a result the 
price difference between acid open hearth and basic open hearth steel in Cleveland was so small 
that there was no incentive to develop the basic version of the process in the district.  By 
contrast, such a price differential was an important inducement for West Midland’s steel firms 
to develop basic open hearth steel using local phosphoric pig, as was done at Brymbo and 
Round Oak (Dudley).  It could be expected, therefore, that once hematite ore and pig prices 
began to rise in Cleveland, the scales would begin to tip in favour of basic steel.  Yet, as Table 
6.8 shows, while the price of imported ore did rise from the mid-1890s, relative to Cleveland 
ore prices there was no discernible trend.  In fact, by 1890, relative import prices actually fell 
and continued to do so until 1900.  Consequently at the time there seem to be no major supply-
side signals to producers to speed up the development of the basic process, unless there was an 
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anticipation of future price rises.  Although ore price increases never materialised before 1914, 
there were upward pressures on hematite pig production costs and therefore prices as a result of 
declining ore quality.
452
  It is perhaps not surprising therefore that in the mid-1890s experiments 
in Cleveland using the local iron were resumed. 
 
Table 6.8: Iron Ore Prices, 1870 – 1913 (shillings per ton) 
 
Cleveland 
West Coast 
Hematite 
Imports 
(average) 
Imports/Cleve
-land price 
ratio 
1870 4.00 12.50 -- -- 
1875 4.00 15.50 25.42 6.4 
1880 3.50 14.58 21.16 6.0 
1885 3.25 9.58 13.83 4.3 
1890 3.83 11.16 16.08 4.2 
1895 3.25 10.00 13.42 4.1 
1900 4.83 16.16 17.83 3.7 
1905 3.83 13.50 16.33 4.3 
1910 4.33 16.16 17.42 4.0 
1913 5.08 17.83 18.83 3.7 
1920 15.83 59.25 50.00 3.2 
Source: Burnham and Hoskins, Iron and Steel, p. 110. 
 
The firm involved this time was Dorman Long, an acid open hearth steel producer that 
specialised in girders and some ship plate. It is not clear where the initiative came from, but at 
the February 1894 director’s meeting, the Chairman and joint managing director Arthur 
Dorman, is recorded as introducing a discussion about experimenting with the Siemens basic 
process.  It was agreed that trials should begin by converting one acid lined furnace to a basic 
lining once it had been ‘ascertained that Lloyd’s are favourable.’453  There are no further 
references in the directors’ minutes to this trial, but it appears to have been technically 
successful.  W.H. Panton, the general manager, reported at a Cleveland Institution meeting in 
1894 that year that the company had been making steel from Cleveland white iron in an acid 
furnace with a basic dolomite lining ‘for a few weeks’, and that the product was of a reliable 
quality.  At the same meeting, Charles Bagley (Weardale Iron and Steel) added that his 
company had used the steel and found it ‘very satisfactory’; being more regular, softer and 
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having better elongation, it gave better results than acid steel when rolled into thin plates.
454
  
Later that year, Stead, in his president’s address at the Cleveland Institution made a point of 
referring to the Dorman Long experiments, and noted that the iron had been treated by the 
Saniter desulphurisation process.
455
  This use of the Saniter process perhaps offers a clue as to 
why Dorman Long should have resumed basic open hearth experiments at a stage when there 
seemed to be no major price pressures to move to Cleveland rather than hematite iron and the 
firm itself had no incentive to use Cleveland’s ironstone resources as at the time the company 
had no ironstone mines of its own.  Saniter had recently presented papers on his process at the 
Iron and Steel Institute and at the Cleveland Institution of Engineers in November 1890 and 
perhaps the firm was influenced by the favourable results or even persuaded to experiment.
456
  
The use of white iron, however, indicates that while the quality problems may have been 
overcome, the technical difficulties of removing the impurities to make commercially viable 
steel remained.  White iron is a superior quality iron, low in carbon, and especially silicon, that 
is usually used in the puddling process (i.e. to produce malleable iron).  Costs were therefore 
likely to have been greater than if ordinary Cleveland iron had been used, and consequently the 
potential profitability of the basic steel much lower.  It is possibly for this reason that the 
experiments ceased – or at least there is no further record of the process in Cleveland – for the 
next three years. 
 
It was in February 1897 that Dorman Long resumed their work on basic steel, this time at the 
Cast Steel Foundry (Roseberry Foundry), a small works they rented from R.P Dorman and Co, a 
partnership between Arthur Dorman and his brother (see Chapter 7).  The trials continued 
through the year but without much success as the furnaces being used were too small.
457
  As 
Dorman and Panton explained to the board, however, they were convinced of the importance of 
the process to the future of the firm especially given Dorman’s expansionary ambitions.  1897 
had been a better year for Dorman Long, and the industry as a whole, after a lean period from 
1894; profits rose sharply and in his optimistic Annual Statement to Shareholders Arthur 
Dorman set out the necessity of future investment ‘to keep abreast of the times’ and to be able 
to meet competition from America and Germany.  He explained to shareholders, though was not 
precise about the details, that ‘a considerable extension of the works was being planned’ if it 
was justified by further investigations.  This last point may be read as a reference to the Board’s 
plans, agreed at a directors’ meeting immediately preceding the AGM, that arrangements should 
be made with Bell Brothers to use their two basic open hearth furnaces at the Clarence Works to 
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continue the experiments.
458
  This time the venture was a success and by the following 
November (1899) Dorman Long proposed a further agreement will Bell Brothers to build new 
furnaces at Port Clarence that Dorman Long would lease, initially for two years.   It was a 
significant investment, comprising two 45 ton basic Siemens furnaces and a 300 ton mixer.
459
  
In passing it is interesting to note that at this time Dorman Long was still hedging its bets 
between the two processes as they had already planned a new acid open hearth furnace at the 
Britannia Works, although this was subsequently cancelled as the commitment to the basic open 
hearth method deepened.
460
   On the other hand, the link-up with Bell Brothers can be seen as 
part of Arthur Dorman’s expansion strategy: as well as supervising the building of the Clarence 
steel furnaces and then leasing from Bell’s, Dorman Long agreed to take a fifty per cent stake in 
the firm.  It was the first stage of a full takeover that was completed in 1902 and a sure sign that 
the company believed the future lay in basic open hearth steel.
461
  The acquisition of a firm that 
had one of Cleveland’s premier blast furnace plants and sizeable ironstone and coal royalties 
was a central part of this growth (Chapter 7). 
 
At the same time as tapping in to Bell Brothers’ expertise, experience and equipment, Dorman 
Long maintained a tight control over production at the Clarence Steelworks.  Panton was 
brought in as superintending engineer, as well as keeping his position as general manager at the 
Britannia plant, and Dorman Long, not Bell Brothers, hired Ernest Saniter to implement his 
desulphurising process.  Some indication of the results of the tests can be found in Bell Brothers 
cost and production records, but only those for the first two years have survived; they are 
summarised in Table 6.9.  In comparison with the earlier cost accounts, they show a 
considerable improvement on the 1890-1 experiments, and although profitability was marginal, 
and highly sensitive both to scale, prices and the composition of iron inputs (Tables 6.9 and 
6.10) the results demonstrate that ordinary Cleveland forge or foundry iron could be used to 
produce good quality mild steel.  According to Stead, this was the first time it had been 
achieved.
462
  The improvement was largely due to the Saniter process and the use of a mixer as 
an intermediate step between the blast furnace and the open hearth steel furnace.  Mixers had 
been originally developed in the 1890s for use in the basic Bessemer process to mix iron from 
different blast furnaces before it was fed to the converters.  This was to ensure uniformity in the 
quality of the iron as different blast furnaces tended to produce iron with different 
characteristics, and to provide a reservoir of molten iron that could be fed continuously to the 
converters.  These so-called inactive mixers were adapted for the basic open hearth process as 
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active mixers in which preliminary treatment of the iron could take place.  In the mixer the 
sulphur and silicon content could be reduced and this permitted a more effective removal of the 
remaining impurities, especially phosphorus, in the open hearth furnace.
463
  It was at this 
intermediate stage that the Saniter process was used, with the silicon level reduced from 2.2 per 
cent to 1.2 per cent.  As Stead notes, this did away with the need either to use the higher quality, 
low silicon white iron or having to add expensive manganese.  The plant worked on No. 4 Forge 
and Foundry iron, with molten iron being fed directly to the mixer from the blast furnaces.
464
    
 
Table 6.9: Clarence Steelworks Basic Open Hearth Production - Costs, Revenues and 
Output (shillings), 1901-02 
 1899 1900 1901 1902 
Output (tons) 8,181 
 
16,063 42,733 32,761 
Cost per ton (s) 89.11 
 
106.18 76.23 76.20 
Receipts per ton (s)     
Steel 82.46 
 
107.42 76.15 74.12 
Basic slag 1.10 
 
0.44 0.68 0.73 
Ingot ends -- 
 
-- -- 1.22 
Total receipts per ton (s) 83.56 
 
107.86 76.73 76.07 
Profit(loss) per ton (s) 
 
-5.55 1.68 0.5  -0.13 
Total profit or loss* (£) 
 
- 2,270 1,349 1,068 -212 
* Totals may not add up due to rounding. Source: BBA, vol. 6, p. 502 
 
 
Table 6.10: Clarence Steelworks Basic Open Hearth Charge Composition, 1899-1902 (cwt. 
per ton of steel) 
 1899 1900 1901 1902 
Clarence pig 13.86 13.57 10.75 2.04 
Mixed metal -- -- 5.88 16.77 
Sundry pig and scrap 2.60 4.08 3.00 0.46 
Ingots and blooms 3.89 3.38 0.03 - 
Total 
 
20.35 21.03 19.66 19.27 
Clarence pig % 68.11 64.53 54.68 10.59 
Source: BBA, vol. 6, p. 502. 
 
In February 1900 the decision was taken to convert the furnaces at the Britannia Works ‘at 
once’, and later that year it was reported that two furnaces – G and H – were working 
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satisfactorily on Cleveland iron.
465
  In addition, some of the basic steel from the Clarence 
Works, about 50,000 tons per year, was sent for rolling to the mills at Britannia.  This was a 
clear indication that the market had shifted decisively in favour of basic-open hearth steel and of 
Dorman Long’s commitment to the new process.  The degree to which the company had now 
staked its future on the basic open-hearth process is demonstrated by the fact that over the 
following five years the firm persisted with the changeover, and this was despite the difficulties 
of transition and the higher than expected investment costs.  Reported (gross) profits fell from a 
healthy £163,000 in 1900 to barely £11,000 in 1905, and although this can be explained in part 
by the cyclical downswing in the iron and steel market, some of the deterioration was due to 
repeated interruptions in production. There were, for example, major problems at the Clarence 
Steel works and it was not until 1905 that the new furnaces and rolling mill were fully 
operational. There had difficulties with new rolling mill equipment, but there was also a delay 
as a result of experimentation with different approaches to the open hearth process.
466
  Once 
these had been resolved, however, the completed works had a capacity of 100,000 tons of 
finished steel and had cost approximately £300,000.
467
  
 
At the Britannia works, although some existing furnaces were working on the basic open hearth 
process in 1900, the complete switchover from acid to basic was similarly delayed.  This was 
partly due to disputes (in 1901) with steelmelters over wages for working with Cleveland iron, a 
long, drawn out stoppage at the rolling mill (in 1905), which closed the whole works for several 
months, and, as at Clarence, technical problems with new rolling mill.  It was therefore not until 
the end of 1905 that the teething problems were completely settled and the plant was in full 
production.  By then it had been entirely ‘remodelled’, with the old acid furnaces replaced by 
basic ones as well as the installation of new, modern material handling and rolling plant.  The 
changes at the Britannia may not have been as extensive as the rebuilding of the Cargo Fleet 
works (see below), often regarded as the only new large scale works on Teesside at that time, 
but it was a thoroughgoing modernisation of the plant and a major investment by Dorman Long.   
 
Apart from the operational problems, the other main reason for the delays, both at Clarence and 
Britannia was that the company took some time to decide on which of the alternative basic open 
hearth processes to opt for.  By 1900 there were five options and it was not obvious at the time 
which would be the best investment for the conditions facing Cleveland steel producers.  The 
alternatives were: first, the cold pig approach using furnaces that were charged with cold pig 
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iron, usually manually; second, the direct method of feeding the steel furnaces with molten iron 
from the blast furnaces, though usually through a mixer; third, the Talbot continuous steel 
process; fourth, the Bertrand-Thiel two-stage process; and finally, the Monell method.  Dorman 
Long spent time investigating the alternatives, consulting industry experts and visiting other 
plants using the different processes in Europe and the US.  This was in addition to continuing 
with their experiments. 
 
In 1902 the company’ managing directors – of which there were now two, W.H. Panton and 
Charles Dorman – and the chairman (Arthur Dorman), consulted Benjamin Talbot, the British 
metallurgist and engineer, who was later to be part of the related Cargo Fleet and South Durham 
Steel companies (see below).  Talbot had returned from the US in 1900 where he had developed 
his continuous steel process at the Pencoyd Works of A&P Roberts (later one of the constituent 
companies of US Steel).  Talbot’s process involved feeding molten iron directly into a large 
titling furnace (sometimes involving the use of a mixer as an intermediate stage), with the 
refined steel being periodically tapped by pouring off approximately one-third of the refined 
metal.  Tilting also enabled the removal of excess slag.  The process was continuous in the sense 
that the refining furnace was never fully emptied, and when refilled the molten iron was poured 
through the basic slag lying on top of the remaining bath of metal, a procedure that restarted the 
chemical reactions needed for refining.  Talbot had set out his ideas at an Iron and Steel Institute 
meeting in May 1900, and subsequently they had been published in the Institute’s journal.468  In 
the same year he established a new company, The Talbot Continuous Steel Process Limited, to 
promote his newly developed process and manage the licences associated with the patents.  
Also, he had already been engaged by Frodingham Iron, Scunthorpe, to build a new steel plant 
with a 100 ton tilting furnace, which was in operation by 1902.
469
  It was after consulting with 
Talbot several times in 1902 that Dorman Long decided to remodel the Britannia works and to 
build new basic open hearth furnaces rather than simply convert the existing ones.
470
  As Arthur 
Dorman explained in reporting on the meetings with Talbot to the February board meeting, the 
aim of the changes were to ‘bring the plant up to the state of efficiency to meet present day 
competition’, and that the cost would be approximately £100,000.  However, a decision on the 
actual process was not reached, being deferred for ‘further investigation as to the various 
systems of steelmaking which are being tried at some important works in this country.’471  
Discussions continued and there was further conferral with Talbot on the different processes, 
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but it is not clear from the directors’ minutes whether or not a decision was reached at that time.  
Panton put forward proposals that were considered at a meeting in March 1902 and £80,000 was 
voted for the improvements, but there is no indication of whether the company had settled on 
Talbot’s process, another process, or whether the decision had been deferred again.  Whatever 
the outcome of that particular meeting, one matter was confirmed;  this was to use of hot metal 
to supply the steel furnaces rather than using the traditional cold pig approach, a far more time 
consuming and energy and cost inefficient system.
472
  The obvious source of the molten iron 
was the blast furnaces of the neighbouring Samuelson’s Newport ironworks. Negotiations 
started with Samuelson’s in May 1902, but it seems that a final agreement was not concluded 
until after October 1903.
473
  Other possibilities were also investigated, including shipping hot 
metal across the river in barges from the Clarence Ironworks – a suggestion that does not appear 
to have been pursued, for obvious reasons.
474
 
 
Whether or not Dorman Long’s directors and managers considered Talbot’s process, and given 
their contact with him it see more than likely that they will have, at the May 1902 directors’ 
meeting the company finally settled on the Bertrand-Thiel process, or so it appears from the 
directors’ minutes.  This followed a visit by two board members, Charles Dorman and Charles 
Lowthian Bell, to the Kladno works (near Prague), where the method had been developed.  It 
was a two stage process that involved a primary furnace, operating at a lower temperature, that 
was used for eliminating most of the phosphorus and silicon and from which the metal was 
tipped to a secondary furnace.  This worked at a higher temperature that was needed to remove 
the last of the phosphorus and complete the refining.  As Macmillan explained in his 1903 
Cleveland Institution paper, it was more costly than the direct method but was suitable for iron 
with high levels of impurities.
475
  Why Dorman Long chose Bertrand-Thiel over Talbot is not 
made clear, but it should be noted that at the time the issue of which was the best process for 
Britain had not been settled.  The Bertrand-Thiel process was already in use at Brymbo, where 
Darby, in conjunction with the Round Oak Works, had bought the British licences, so there was 
already some British experience.
476
  Talbot’s process required larger furnaces, usually a 
minimum of 100 tons as opposed to the 40 to 50 tons of the other methods.  Thus it needed a 
higher initial capital outlay, and being more ‘lumpy’, was a less flexible or adaptable system.  It 
is also possible that Talbot asked for too high a royalty, as was the case in his negotiations 
Bolckow Vaughan where the process was seriously considered but rejected (see below).  
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Moreover, although Talbot’s ideas had been well received in some quarters, being described by 
one eminent metallurgist as ‘the greatest advance that has been made in the manufacture of steel 
for some years’, it had also been unfavourably compared to the Bertrand-Thiel method in an 
ICTR leading article.
477
  One other factor is that the site at Britannia, being something of a 
wedge shape, may not have been ideal for the Talbot designs.  The optimum shape for the 
continuous process was a long narrow site.   
 
Approval to proceed with the Bertrand-Thiel process and making the appropriate adjustments to 
the plant was given at the May 1902 board meeting, but it seems that the company still kept an 
open mind on which process should be eventually adopted.  It was agreed that the changes to 
the plant were to be ‘subject to any modifications consequent on experiments in progress at 
Clarence works’.478  These must have been significant as by April 1905 the licences agreed with 
Darby for the use of the process had been revoked. In the end Dorman Long opted for the direct 
method of production as at Clarence, using an active 300 ton mixer to feed a series of fixed (as 
opposed to tilting) furnaces, with the molten iron being supplied from the Newport ironworks.  
Most of the remodelling of the works seems to have been finished by mid-1904 at a cost of 
almost £200,000, double the original estimate, although full production was delayed until the 
following year by the labour disputes and rolling mill engine problems already mentioned.
479
  
By 1905 Dorman Long’s basic open hearth steel capacity had reached around 250,000 tons per 
year, 150,000 at Britannia and 100,000 at Clarence.  In the following year actual output was 
234,000 tons for the two plants, approximately two-thirds of basic open hearth steel in the North 
East coast region and 20 per cent of the whole of Britain.
480
 
 
That Dorman Long successfully switched from an acid to a basic open hearth producer and 
subsequently expanded capacity not only marked a full acceptance by user industries of the 
steel, it also underlines the importance of the firm’s decision for the future of steel production in 
Cleveland.  It demonstrated that firms no longer needed to be dependent on supplies of imported 
hematite and thus subject to cost pressures that were difficult to control and that could quickly 
undermine competitiveness.  Further, it was a clear indication that steel producers in Britain 
could manufacture steel competitively and on a large scale using a more flexible process that 
tolerated iron ore and pig iron of a far wider range of qualities.  At Dorman Long a second stage 
of expansion followed  between 1906 and 1908 shortly after the initial changeover as the firm 
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found that ingot production was unable to keep up pace with the rolling mills.  As Arthur 
Dorman commented in his 1907 annual statement, ‘the mills are idle for want of steel’.481  
Additional, larger furnaces and mixers were added at both works and annual capacity was 
increased by another 100,000 tons or more.  In 1908 the Clarence Steelworks comprised a 400 
ton mixer and eight open hearth furnaces, all supplied from the Clarence blast furnaces.  The 
works concentrated on producing specialist steels ranging from soft (mild) steels with low 
carbon content (0.08 per cent) suitable for locomotive pipes and high-conductivity wire, to high 
carbon (1.5 per cent) hard steels for tools and wire rope.  On the Britannia site there were 11 
open hearth furnaces – two of 80 tons, three of 50 and the rest of 40 – supplied by two mixers, 
the original of 300 tons and a new one of 400 tons.  According to a JISI report on a visit to the 
works, these and the ancillary equipment (e.g. charging machines) were of the ‘the most modern 
and up-to-date practice’.482  Annual output had risen to 362,000 by 1910 and capacity continued 
to be expanded, though at a slower rate, right up to 1914.  The 1913 annual report gives Dorman 
Long’s production for 1912-13 from its three steel plants as 651,768 tons, approximately 10 per 
cent of British output.  Assuming an output level at the NESCo basic Bessemer works of 
240,000 tons, production of basic open hearth steel at Britannia and Clarence amounted to about 
400,000 tons, almost 20 per cent of the country’s total for this type of steel.483 
 
In some respects Dorman Long-Bell Brothers can be regarded as the pioneers of the basic open 
hearth in Cleveland, but it was not the only firm to adopt the process.  There were three others 
and they took rather different routes.  These were: Cargo Fleet Iron Company and its sister, later 
parent, company, South Durham Steel and Iron; Skinningrove Iron Company; and Bolckow 
Vaughan.  The first and last have been analysed in some detail in earlier studies and it is 
sufficient here to provide a brief outline of their experience. 
 
Cargo Fleet is often regarded as the prime example of how the British steel industry, could have 
regained its competitive position against the American and German producers.
484
  It was the 
only completely new, fully integrated, single site plant built on Teesside in the decade and a half 
before the First War.  And it was one that demonstrated the greatest influence of an American 
approach to investment in the industry; that is, the tendency to reconstruct plants fully as 
technology changed.  The company was acquired in 1900 by Sir (later Lord) Christopher 
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Furness, who had built up a sizeable shipping and shipbuilding business (Furness Withy and 
Co) based in Hartlepool.  From 1899 he had begun to expand into iron and steel to secure 
supplies of ship plate through investments in Weardale Steel and South Durham Steel (see 
Chapter 5).
485
  Cargo Fleet in 1900 was a defunct blast furnace works, but offered an ideal site 
on which to build a new steel works, with its riverside position close to the Tees estuary, just 
two miles east of Middlesbrough, and of a shape that would permit the construction of a linearly 
organised plant.  There was the additional attraction: along with the old works the firm acquired 
the Liverton ironstone mine, a source of Cleveland ore that was an essential input into the basic 
process.  The plan was to build a plant with an annual capacity of 125,000 tons using the Talbot 
continuous process, and initially two 175 ton Talbot tilting furnaces were installed, supplied 
directly by two new blast furnaces.  Talbot himself at first acted as a consultant and, after 
problems at the works, joined Furness’ Expert Committee in 1903 to advise on their solution.  
He later became a board member of both Cargo Fleet and South Durham (1904) and eventually 
Cargo Fleet’s managing director in 1907.  
 
Talbot did much to sort out the technical and managerial difficulties that plagued the plant, but 
they meant that it did not begin operations until 1906, and was not fully productive until 1909.  
By that time capacity had been increased to four 175 ton Talbot furnaces.  The problems meant 
that costs were higher than anticipated and profits poorer than expected: the firm never made 
more than £100,000 per year gross profit less interest up to 1914 and paid no dividends from 
1907 to 1914.  As Burn noted, ‘its full earnings power and competitive strength were not fully 
demonstrated before the war.’486  The poor performance, however, did not arise from Talbot’s 
technology but from other areas, and the works demonstrated the potential superiority of the 
basic open hearth process in general and of Talbot’s invention in particular.  The other steel 
company in the Furness group, South Durham Steel, also considered changing over from acid to 
basic open hearth production using the Talbot process at two of its three plants.  But before 
1914 it was only at the West Hartlepool site that a Talbot furnace was installed as a convenient 
supply of molten iron could be obtained from the adjacent blast furnaces of the Seaton Carew 
ironworks – a company the South Durham eventually took over in 1919.  The other plant, the 
Stockton Malleable Works, was hampered by a lack of blast furnace capacity close by, and 
although South Durham twice considered building tilting furnaces at the works, the proposals 
were rejected. In 1912 for example the estimated cost, including new blast furnaces, was 
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£700,000.  Given the profitability of the business at the time and that it was using acid open 
hearth furnaces very effectively, it would have been a costly and risky venture.
487
    
 
Another Cleveland firm that decided to adopt the basic open hearth process in the 1900s was 
Skinningrove, a much smaller enterprise than Dorman Long, Cargo Fleet or South Durham.  It 
was a specialist Cleveland pig iron producer that decided to expand into steel partly, according 
to Boyce, because it feared being squeezed out of the iron market.  The threat arose from the 
integration of iron and steel plants, particularly with the advent of the basic open hearth process 
where the use of molten iron was essential if benefits of the continuous process were to be 
realised.
488
 The company drew up plans for a 250 ton Talbot tilting furnace with an output 
capacity of 1,600 to1,700 tons of steel per week, approximately 80,000 tons per year, to be 
supplied with iron from its five existing blast furnaces.  In the event, the plant was not 
completed and operational until 1911 and then the furnace was slightly smaller – 240 tons – and 
production lower than originally planned, 1,100 to 1,200 tons per week (60,000) per year.  
Improvements in the plant up to 1913 saw the large furnace converted into a mixer and two 
smaller Talbot furnaces (120 tons each) installed.  This helped to raise efficiency and enabled 
the production of higher quality steel.
489
 
 
The third firm to consider is Bolckow Vaughan.  Of all the iron and steel companies on 
Teesside at this time, it is Bolckow Vaughan’s whose decisions are most difficult to understand.  
It was the slowest of the large firms to change to the basic open hearth process to any great 
extent and because of this Abé, for example, identifies it as a classic case of late Victorian 
entrepreneurial failure.
490
  Thus, although it was one of the largest pig iron producers in Britain 
from both Cleveland and hematite ores – Abé estimates output was 800,000 tons in 1905 – and 
had access to one of the richest sources of Cleveland ironstone, it was not until 1913 that it 
became fully a basic open hearth producer.
 491
  Indeed, it could be argued that the firm was in an 
ideal position to take advantage of the basic open hearth process and that the relatively small 
scale of its steel output compared to the size of the firm – output was about 200,000 tons from 
all four processes – and its narrow specialisation in rails represented a major missed 
opportunity.  This was in stark contrast to its earlier history when Bolckow Vaughan quickly 
adopted the Bessemer and basic Bessemer processes (see above, section 6.2). 
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Abé maintains that Bolckow Vaughan did not consider the basic open hearth steel until the turn 
of the century after E. Windsor Richards, a director and former managing director, had visited 
Carnegie’s Homestead Works where he had observed large scale furnaces in operation.  In fact, 
the firm had investigated the process a decade earlier, and as general manager, Richards had 
visited other steel plants that were being developed.  These included the Alexandroski 
steelworks near St Petersburg, on which he reported the details of the process used there to an 
Iron and Steel Institute meeting.
492
  Although Bolckow and Vaughan’s early trials had been 
discontinued in the late 1880s, by 1901 concern over competition led the company to reconsider 
the process.  At board meetings in 1901 and 1902 there were discussions over the relative merits 
of the Talbot and Monell processes, with the final decision in favour of the Monell approach 
that had been developed at Homestead.  This was despite support for Talbot by two highly 
knowledgeable and experienced directors, Windsor Richards and Arthur Keen, chairman of 
Guest, Keen.  The rest of the board regarded Talbot’s royalty as too high, and although he was 
bargained down from one shilling per ton to ninepence, he was undercut by an offer from 
Carnegie, owners of the Monell patent.
493
   The firm subsequently converted five acid open 
hearth furnaces to basic and the steelworks manager of the time, Arthur W. Richards (E.W. 
Richards’ son) reported that the firm had been able to make good quality steel from Cleveland 
pig at a lower cost than the acid process.  Unlike at Dorman Long, however, there was not a full 
commitment to the new process, and at a Cleveland Institution meeting in 1903 Arthur Richards 
stated that the firm had stopped using it as the process was ‘only an auxiliary to our Bessemer 
department for using our scrap.’494  It is not clear why, in 1903, Richards said the process did 
‘not suit us at present’, or how long the process remained unused, but it must have been in 
operation from time to time.  In 1908 the firm was reported to be operating all four steel 
processes and of the seven open hearth furnaces, five were basic – two of 25 tons and three of 
60 tons.  In a way this can be seen as a rather half-hearted attempt to introduce the basic open 
hearth processes and the lack of commitment to, or possibly disappointment with, the Monell 
process is shown in 1905 when the firm decided to improve its basic Bessemer production by 
introducing advances developed in Germany by Massenez.  Once again the results were 
disappointing, mainly because the high levels of silicon in Cleveland iron made the process 
unsuitable; basic Bessemer production was abandoned altogether in 1911.  It was only then that 
Bolckow Vaughan finally made the decision to changeover completely to the basic open hearth 
process, investing approximately £300,000 to convert the plant, eventually installing two mixers 
and fifteen fixed furnaces.
495
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Abé ascribes the failure of Bolckow Vaughan to make the change to basic open hearth steel as 
due mainly to a lack of technological expertise and the result of a conservative product policy 
that relied excessively on rails and pig iron production.  The lack of technical understanding can 
perhaps been seen in the two successive mistakes in the choice of technology, the continued 
emphasis on basic Bessemer production and the wrong choice of basic open hearth process – 
Monell – that like the Massenez method, needed low silicon iron and was therefore also not 
suited to the local ore.  However, it is difficult to see how the failures can be attributed wholly 
to a lack of technical knowledge.   As will be argued below, understanding of the basic process 
was widespread and growing, and expertise could always have been brought in, as other firms 
had done.  Rather, it seems that the board made misjudgements, first by taking the cheaper 
Monell option over Talbot and second by attempting to follow the German advances rather than 
American success with basic open hearth.  While the second error is probably inexcusable, the 
result of inept management as Abé put it, given the history of disappointments with the basic 
Bessemer converters in Britain, the former is more understandable.
496
  In 1901-02 the best basic 
open hearth process for use with Cleveland pig had not been settled as the experience at Dorman 
Long and Cargo Fleet demonstrate.  Both companies had difficulties getting their new plant to 
operate efficiently, and at Britannia Dorman Long had not even made a final decision on which 
process to use.  That one company on Teesside made the wrong choice is not surprising.  As 
regards the firm’s emphasis on pig iron production, it is possibly explained less by a strategic 
decision to concentrate on this, the most elementary of iron products, but can be seen as one of 
necessity; it was the only way to compensate the poor performance on steel and thus to maintain 
profits.  Between 1905 and 1911 pig iron production was reasonably profitable, sometimes 
highly, if Bell Brothers data is at all representative.
497
 
 
 
6.5: Networks and the basic open hearth process in Cleveland 
 
A close inspection of the way in which Cleveland’s steel producers groped their way towards a 
solution to using Cleveland iron in the basic open hearth process reveals the importance of the 
links between those involved in steel production.  Whether these networks actually had an 
impact on the spread of information about the basic open hearth process and helped its 
development depend on four conditions being satisfied.  The first concerns the extent to which 
the different parts of the industry and the firms within it were actually connected.  The second is 
whether there were mechanisms for information to pass between the members of the networks.  
Third, firms needed to use the networks in an active way to acquire information and expertise.  
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And fourth, it has to be shown that firms acted on the intelligence they acquired.  These are 
examined in turn.   
 
There appear to be two important sets of linkages involved in the spread of information about 
the basic open hearth process.  One was between firms in common ownership, with the two 
most notable in Cleveland being the Dorman Long group and the South Durham Steel-Cargo 
Fleet combination.  For example, in the case of Dorman Long, developments at the Bell 
Brother’s Clarence plant were later adopted at the Britannia works; this is hardly a surprising 
result for a group of firms that, although nominally separate, were run as a single group of 
businesses, as will be argued in the next chapter. 
 
Second, and of greater significance, were the connections between members of the community 
of steelworks managers, chemists, metallurgists and engineers, that is the links between 
professionals below the level of the firms’ owners and directors.  These networks cut across 
firms’ boundaries and operated in the way that any professional association would; that is, 
through the reading of papers and the sharing of ideas at formal meetings and conferences, and 
the subsequent publication of papers with technical details in association journals, often with the 
minutes of the ensuing discussions.  There would, of course, be the more informal contact as a 
result of friendships, and conversations in which experiences were shared.  The main forums for 
this were the technical institutions, with the principal one at the national level being the Iron and 
Steel Institute, but also included the Institution of Civil Engineers and Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers.  Just as important were the regional bodies such as the Cleveland Institution of 
Engineers and the South Staffordshire Institute of Steel Works Managers, among many others.  
Indeed, all the iron districts had at least one such technical association.  The papers and 
discussions cited earlier in this chapter testify to the importance of these organisations.  The role 
of the industry’s main trade journal, the Iron and Coal Trades Review, also should not be 
underestimated.   Published weekly, it not only covered the business aspects of the industry, but 
also reported on technical matters including the proceedings of ISI conferences and reports on 
the developments published in American and European journals, e.g. Iron Age and Stahl und 
Eisen. 
 
Another aspect of the industry was the growing number of professional chemists, metallurgists 
and engineers who were employed as technical specialists within firms.  These were in addition 
to those who made careers as consultants, providing expertise to a number of companies.  As 
they moved from firm to firm they were able to take their knowledge and experience with them 
and thus they provided an important route through which details of the experiments and 
technological improvements in the basic open hearth process (as well as other developments) 
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could spread through the industry.  By the end of the nineteenth century there appear to be three 
routes through which information could be transmitted between firms in this way: the 
movement of specialist employees; the use of individual consultant, many of whom eventually 
settled at one firm; and the growth of firms of consulting engineers and chemists who remained 
independent and served many firms throughout their careers.  Ernest Saniter (1863-1934), the 
chemist and metallurgist, is an example of the first group of mobile employees, a relatively new 
phenomenon for the time.  Born originally in Middlesbrough and trained at the laboratories of 
John Stead, Saniter first worked as an assistant chemist at NESCo’s basic Bessemer plant. He 
later moved to Wigan Iron Works Company where he was recruited specifically to find a way of 
to reduce the sulphur content of iron, work which resulted in the development of his 
desulphurisation process.
498
  In 1898 he was attracted back to Middlesbrough by Dorman Long 
in order to apply his ideas to the basic open hearth process being developed at Bell’s Clarence 
steelworks.  Saniter’s JISI obituary credits him with ‘demonstrat[ing] the suitability of common 
Cleveland iron for making high-class open hearth steel’.  He then left Dorman Long, in 1904, to 
take up a post as chief metallurgist with Steel Peach and Tozer (later United Steel Company), 
again recruited for his expertise in the open hearth process.  Other examples of technical 
specialists who moved from firm to firm at this time include Edward Crowe (Davy Brothers, 
Sheffield and South Durham-Cargo Fleet), Arthur H. Cooper (NESCo, Dorman Long and later 
Partington Steel, Sheffield), and Walter Crooke (North Lincolnshire Iron, Frodingham, Cargo 
Fleet, J. Summers and Lillieshall).
499
 
 
The second group, that of consulting engineers who initially worked for a series of iron and 
steel firms but eventually either established their own or settled with one company after being 
offered a directorship, was a much more traditional pattern.  Benjamin Talbot, a highly 
influential figure in the spread of the basic open hearth process, fits this mould.
500
  After the 
collapse of his family iron firm in 1888-9, Talbot worked as a superintendent at several 
companies in America, developing his ideas on basic open hearth production.  This eventually 
resulted in Talbot’s continuous steel process using a tilting furnace that was first installed at 
Pencoyd Steelworks, Pennsylvania.  Returning to England in 1900 he set up a company, initially 
based in Leeds, and later Middlesbrough, through which he promoted his new process, and 
acted as a consultant to a number of firms, including, among others Frodingham, Scunthorpe, 
the first British firm to install the Talbot process, and also Dorman Long.  It was his connection 
with South Durham and Cargo Fleet, however, which provided his main opening and a settled 
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managerial position, first joining Christopher Furness’ specialist advisory committee and later 
becoming a director of both firms.  In some respects Talbot’s career is reminiscent of a number 
of the earlier Cleveland ironmasters.  For instance, in the 1860s and 1870s John Gjers, the 
Swedish blast furnace engineer, had worked for a number of companies in Cleveland before 
setting up his own (Gjers, Mills and Co)
501. A later example is Arthur Cooper, A.H. Cooper’s 
father.  He moved from Brown, Bagley and Dixon in Sheffield to manage, and later become a 
director of, NESCo in 1883.  Talbot’s importance, however, lies not just in the development of 
the continuous process, or because he brought his direct experience of American ideas and 
practices to Britain; he was also linked closely to the scientific community of metallurgists, 
chemists and engineers associated with the iron and steel industry.  Frank Harbord and Thomas 
Twynam, working as chemists at the Royal Indian Engineering College (Surrey) in 1900, acted 
as agents for Talbot’s new process, and it seems were long-standing friends or acquaintances.  
They had all travelled to the US in 1890 when Talbot went to work in Chattanooga.
502
  Harbord 
is likely to have known, or at least encountered, Talbot first in the late 1880s in Staffordshire 
when Talbot was conducting basic open hearth experiments at his family firm in Wellington 
(Shropshire) and at the Round Oak works in Brierley Hill (Staffordshire).  At the time Harbord 
worked for the Staffordshire Steel and Ingot Company, also in Dudley.  By 1900 Harbord had 
already become established as a distinguished metallurgical chemist and had undertaken 
numerous investigations into the basic process.  Twynam was also a chemist with an interest in 
metallurgy.  In his early career he had been an assistant first to Sidney Thomas and then Percy 
Gilchrist, the original developers of the basic process.  In 1900 Twynam joined Talbot’s 
company (The Continuous Steel Process Company Limited) and remained a director and its 
secretary until his retirement.  Earlier in his career Twynam had also briefly worked with 
Edward Riley, an engineer and chemist who had experience with the basic Bessemer process at 
Dowlais in the 1880s, but was also associated with NESCo and the South Staffordshire Steel 
and Ingot Company as a director.  Riley subsequently went into partnership with Harbord in 
1905 to form a firm of consultant chemists.
503
 
 
This brief outline of the careers of Talbot, Harbord and Twynam illustrates just how 
interconnected the world individual consultants and the firms they advised, was.  Added to this, 
there were a growing number of consultant firms, of which Harbord and Riley was just one 
rather late example.  Consulting firms were already well established in various branches of 
British engineering, especially in civil engineering, and a number connected to the iron and steel 
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industry had begun to appear from the late nineteenth century to support the sector.  The 
Middlesbrough firm of analytical chemists, Pattinson and Stead, formed in 1876 by John 
Pattinson and J.E. Stead was an early example.  It specialised in metallurgical chemistry.  As a 
young man Stead had worked for and trained with Pattinson in Newcastle before taking a post at 
Bolckow Vaughan.  He later re-joined his former employer in the partnership.  Stead’s strength 
lay in his combination of practical industrial experience and pioneering chemistry, and he 
became highly influential in the iron and steel industry.  For example, he is credited with 
discovering the ‘afterblow’ in the basic Bessemer process and contributed numerous technical 
papers in the JISI.
504
  Given his knowledge of the industry and the fact that his work covered not 
just Cleveland firms, but spanned the industry nationally, he and his firm were likely channels 
through which developments in the industry were transmitted.  His laboratory also trained other 
chemists who went to work for other iron and steel firms, and some also set up consultancies of 
their own.  One such was Charles Ridsdale, who after spells with Bolckow Vaughan and 
NESCo formed Ridsdale and Co, another firm of analytical chemists.   
 
On the engineering side of the industry there were similar developments, with Jeremiah Head 
and Son one of the more prominent firms.  This was set up in the early 1880s by the 
Middlesbrough-based engineer and ironmaster Jeremiah Head (1835-99) after the closure of the 
iron rolling company in which he had been a former partner (Fox, Head and Co, Newport 
Rolling Mills).  Initially as an individual consultant, and later through his firm, Head designed 
and installed plant for a number of iron and steel works, and through his membership of the Iron 
and Steel Institute,  Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Civil Engineers and the Cleveland 
Institution, he presented numerous papers reporting on the developments in the industry both in 
Britain and abroad.  Of particular significance were his links to the US where he made ten trips 
and from where he is reported to have brought back ‘many back many valuable suggestions for 
practical improvements in engineering industries in this country.’505  In the US he was a 
consulting engineer to the Otis Steel Company in Cleveland, Ohio, a company that was 
described as an ‘English’ firm and the first plant in America to be built specifically to produce 
open hearth steel (1876).  In 1886, under the direction of S.T. Wellman, it was also the first to 
produce basic open hearth steel.
506
  It is through his Otis connection that Head will have had 
contact with Wellman, one of the pioneers on basic open hearth steel in America, and possibly 
also A.L. Holley, one of basic open hearth steel’s great advocates.507  These connections with 
America were also evident in the career of Head’s son, Archibald Head (1866-1905).  He joined 
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the firm in Middlesbrough in the 1880s, became a partner when the business was moved to 
London in 1893 and the senior partner after his father’s death.  The younger Head had received 
practical training at Hawthorn, Leslie and Co. in Newcastle and later studied engineering at 
University College, London.  He had links with numerous companies, for which he designed 
steelworks, including NESCo (Middlesbrough) Vickers, Sons and Maxim (Sheffield), Round 
Oak (Brierley Hill) in Britain, and also in France and the US.  He acted as the European 
representative of Wellman’s company (Wellman-Seaver, Morgan) and worked as a consultant to 
Otis Steel where he later became the managing director.  He visited America twice a year to 
carry out his duties, a surprising arrangement for the time. These interests indicate that 
Archibald Head, like his father, would have had considerable knowledge of US developments 
across the iron and steel industry, both in general, and in particular of the rapidly expanding and 
increasingly dominant basic open hearth process. Indeed, Head demonstrated this knowledge by 
writing papers on the tilting furnace in 1899 and on the effect on the American iron and steel 
industry of the discovery of iron ore in the Lake Superior region.
508
 
 
The significance of this brief investigation into the links that existed between professional and 
technical experts in the iron and steel industry is that it indicates that there were ample 
opportunities for the transmission of intelligence about the industry and many pathways through 
which that intelligence could flow.  Meetings, publications, the movement of professional 
personnel between firms and the use of consultants all operated at the regional, national and 
international level.  Thus the first two conditions needed for the effectiveness and importance of 
networks for the development of the basic open hearth process set out at the beginning of this 
section were clearly satisfied, viz. the presence of linkages and the transmission of information 
through them.  As regards the other conditions, there is plenty of evidence that firms actively 
used their connections to acquire information and expertise, recruiting technical experts as 
employees and drawing on the services of consultants.  Members of the firms also took active 
roles in the meetings and discussions of the technical associations and visited other works in 
Britain and abroad.  The final condition, that of whether the firms used the information 
effectively is less easy to answer; it depends on making a judgement as to whether firms would 
have introduced the process sooner if they had relied solely on their own resources.  In a sense, 
this is almost a trivial question as almost any detail about what was going on in other firms is 
better than none, although it is conceivable that some of the negative attitudes towards the basic 
open hearth process, which delayed its introduction, were transmitted.  More important is that 
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an examination of the networks has shown how information could be communicated and that 
firms were aware of the advances across the industry.  There was not therefore a collective 
ignorance of the potential that basic steel offered; firms actively sought out the information and 
acted on it.  This is shown by the repeated attempts to produce steel in basic open heath furnaces 
both in Cleveland from the late 1880s and from earlier in the decade elsewhere in Britain.  It 
does not answer the question of whether the steel could have been mass-produced on a 
commercial scale sooner.  This is better answered by the investigation of the demand and supply 
conditions that prevailed in the industry, as has been done earlier in the chapter. 
 
Finally, there are some signs that the basic open hearth developments that led to its successful 
application in Cleveland were reminiscent of the earlier improvements in blast furnace practice 
that Allen called ‘collective invention’.509  Outwardly, there are some common features: the 
improvements were in small steps; details of experiments were made public through the 
professional networks; and the process had regional importance, that is it enhanced the 
competitiveness of Cleveland’s iron and steel makers relative to those elsewhere.  There are, 
however, differences in a number of critical areas.  First, the advances in technology were made 
on a national and international level, rather than being specifically regional.  Second, far greater 
use was made of patented ideas that were developed by individual inventors.  Knowledge was 
not therefore entirely collective in the Allen sense that it was un-patentable, nor was it 
collectively developed, although once patented techniques were adopted there were 
considerable adaptations and improvements made to meet local conditions.  Lastly, unlike the 
earlier period, when advances were essentially the by-product of the capital investment process, 
by the end of the nineteenth century firms were putting resources aside for experimentation.  
Thus although most iron and steel firms at the time did not have research and development 
(R&D) departments, they were undertaking experiments with the basic open hearth process, 
often on a small scale, alongside normal production.  Dorman Long began tests into the basic 
open hearth process with small furnaces and continued with experiments at the Clarence 
steelworks whilst at the same time maintaining acid steel production at the Britannia plant.  In 
other words, by this time investigation into new technologies was taking on something of a 
hybrid form that combined the traditional sole inventor along with the shared knowledge of 
collective invention as the patented processes were improved and adapted through repeated 
trials, and increasingly there were in-firm experiments that can be regarded as forerunners to 
R&D departments. 
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6.6: Conclusions 
 
An editorial in the ICTR in 1912 entitled ‘The Decay of the Bessemer Process’ commented that 
‘we are on the eve, if we have not already reached, practically the end of the Bessemer process 
as an important factor in the steel trade of this country’.510  This was prompted by recent 
announcements by Bolckow Vaughan and NESCo that they were either installing or planning to 
install open hearth plant, and it marks the complete changeover in Cleveland to the production 
of basic open hearth steel.  The process of transition from a specialist manufactured iron district 
to steel had taken place over a period of thirty years.  As this chapter has demonstrated, from the 
1870s Cleveland’s iron and steel firms responded to technological advances in steel 
manufacture in a timely manner, adapting their production facilities as and when new 
developments were available.  Thus Bolckow Vaughan was an early adopter of Bessemer 
converters, and two firms, Bolckow Vaughan and NESCo, were at the forefront of developing 
the basic Bessemer process.  Similarly, the switch to acid open hearth steel was rapid after the 
shift away from iron plate by the shipbuilding industry.  Most importantly, a detailed 
examination of the move into basic open hearth steel using Cleveland pig iron has shown that 
while this was slow compared to the US and continental Europe, there was active investigation 
of the process’s potential from an early stage – sometime in the latter half of the 1880s.  There 
were, however, both demand and supply reasons for the delay. On the demand side the market 
was constrained by the poor reputation of basic steel and the authorities’ tardy acceptance of the 
material as suitable for shipbuilding.  On the supply side the process remained uncompetitive 
compared to acid steel for two reasons.  One was the continued low cost of Cleveland hematite 
pig that gave producers little incentive to search for a replacement process.  The second 
stemmed from the particular difficulties that arose from the use of Cleveland iron, with its high 
silicon and sulphur and moderate phosphorus content, in the basic open hearth furnace.  It was 
only when these technical impediments had been surmounted that investment in open hearth 
plant began in earnest– even then it took some years to perfect – but which ultimately improved 
the performance not only of Cleveland’s largest steel producers, but of the district’s industry as 
a whole. 
 
The findings here, therefore, challenge some earlier studies and suggest that the basic open 
hearth process was not neglected, either in Cleveland or in Britain generally.  Conditions 
differed markedly from those in the US and continental Europe, and not only were British steel 
producers fully aware of basic steel’s significance, they also repeatedly experimented with the 
process.  Moreover, McCloskey is not entirely correct in stating that Talbot’s tilting furnace was 
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‘the particular innovation that appears to have been responsible for the shift in the relative 
advantage [to the basic open hearth process]’.511  The use of mixers with fixed furnaces, aided 
by the use of Saniter’s desulphurisation process, as at Dorman Long-Bell Brothers, also 
provided an effective answer that pre-dated the use of Talbot’s system on Teesside. 
 
The steps towards adopting basic open hearth steel production also reveal the industry’s 
interconnectedness, with many details of the process, equipment, experiments and results 
transmitted through professionals working in the industry.  Together this expanding knowledge 
contributed to overcoming the problems of using Cleveland iron in the basic open hearth in an 
incremental manner.  And while there do appear to be some aspects of the developments that 
meet the conditions for collective invention, and there certainly seems to be a sense of collective 
purpose amongst the professionals involved, the actual process was more of a hybrid, 
combining patented inventions that were adapted to specific local circumstances, in-firm 
research and knowledge spillovers.  
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Chapter 7:  Case Study of Dorman Long 
 
  
7.1 Introduction 
 
In 1876, Arthur Dorman in partnership with Alfred de Land Long took advantage of the deep 
slump in the iron industry to take over the redundant plant of the West Marsh Iron Co.  The 
acquisition of this small ironworks, which had been established in 1870 at the western end of 
the Middlesbrough Ironmasters’ district, and had briefly been managed by Arthur Dorman until 
its closure in 1875, marks the beginning of the Dorman Long enterprise.  The firm would 
become one of the largest iron and steel producers on Teesside, and survive until eventual 
nationalisation in 1967.  Unlike many of the other sizeable Teesside firms, which grew almost 
exclusively through internal expansion, Dorman Long’s growth was principally by means of 
takeover in conjunction with a judicious use of new investment, modernisation of ageing plant, 
and diversification.  At least, that was the pattern up to 1914.  By the early years of the 
twentieth century, Dorman Long’s acquisition of five other iron and steel firms meant that it had 
become one of the largest businesses in Britain – fifty-second as measured by capital employed 
(1905) and forty-first when measured by employment (1907).
512
 
 
This chapter looks at Dorman Long’s growth up to the First World War. It suggests, contrary to 
some widely-held views of the iron and steel industry of the period, that the firm’s expansion 
not only demonstrates a continuing vitality in entrepreneurship in Cleveland’s industry, but also 
reveals serious attempts to adapt to the changing market and technological conditions.  Close 
examination of the records of Dorman Long and its associated companies, especially directors’ 
minutes, shows evidence that challenges a number of typical characterisations of British 
industry, notably that firms were backward in taking on new technology and failed to adapt 
management and organisational structures to the demands of larger-scale businesses.
513
  In 
particular, it will be argued that there was a strategy underlying Dorman Long’s growth that 
encompassed technological advance, vertical integration, diversification and a product 
distribution policy.  Secondly, that despite not formally integrating the ownership of its 
constituent companies until 1923, there was an attempt to exert some common control and 
management over the business that was much greater than first appears.  It seems that far from 
the entrepreneurial spirit having deserted Cleveland’s iron and steel masters, it was still very 
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much present; the industry offered opportunities for those with the vision and organisational 
ability to build large and successful enterprises. 
 
 
7.2 The Growth of Dorman Long in Outline 
 
This section provides the main details of the firm’s expansion as a background to a more 
detailed discussion of the organisational, marketing and strategic aspects of the company’s 
growth in later parts of the chapter.  The chronology of expansion is indicated in Table 7.1.   
 
Table 7.1: The Expansion of Dorman Long’s Interests, 1876-1914 
1876 
 
West Marsh Ironworks leased by Dorman and Long partnership. 
1879 
 
Leased Britannia Mills. 
1889 
 
Dorman Long incorporated. 
1892 
 
London girder yard established. 
1898 Melbourne branch (office and stockyard) established. 
 Construction and bridge building departments opened. 
 
 
Clarence steelworks leased from Bell Brothers. 
1899 
 
Sheet works bought from R.P. Dorman and Co and wire works from C. Dorman 
and Co. 
 
1899-1902 
 
Takeover of Bell Brothers. 
1903 Takeover of North Eastern Steel Co Ltd. 
 
 
South African branch opened – office and stockyard in Cape Town 
1906 
 
South African business converted into a subsidiary company. 
1909 South African branch converted into a joint venture, Wade and Dorman Ltd. 
 
1911 Long-term supply contract agreement with Sir B. Samuelson and Co Ltd for the 
supply of molten iron. 
 
1912 Takeover of Bowesfield Steel Co Ltd. 
 
1913 Minority interest in The Channel Collieries Trust Ltd, stake increased in 1914. 
 
Sources: DLAR 1890-1914; DLDM 1889-1916; Dorman Long, Works. 
 
Dorman and Long’s first venture as a partnership at West Marsh was a relatively modest start.  
The works, which had been built by the combined interests of the Stockton ironmasters Smith 
and Thomson, and the Middlesbrough (and later Glasgow) metal brokers J.E. Swan and Bros., 
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consisted of twenty puddling furnaces and two rolling mills.
514
  By early 1873 the firm had run 
into difficulties and the furnaces were blown out, but it was re-launched as a limited company, 
the West Marsh Iron Co Ltd, later that year, with one of the original partners, T.J. Thomson, as 
chairman.  At the time the works was also extended to produce light rails.  The revival was 
short-lived, however, and hit by the recession, the plant was again closed in late 1875.
515
  The 
following year the newly formed Dorman and Long partnership leased the plant and restarted 
operations, specialising in the production of iron bars and angles for the growing shipbuilding 
industry, using puddled bars and old rails as inputs.  A 10-inch finishing mill was added to the 
existing puddled bar rolling mill and the 14 inch finishing mill.
516
  The works was later bought 
in 1889 when Dorman Long was floated as a limited company.
517
  As the firm expanded, the 
West Marsh plant was updated until the late 1890s, with the addition of steel rolling and 
finishing.  By 1898, however, the firm’s interests had switched to investing in other plants, and 
although there were modernisation plans, to replace the heating furnaces and boilers in the 
middle of that year, these were soon cancelled.  From that time there appear to have been no 
further improvements until the electrification of the rolling mills in 1907-8.
518
 
 
Despite the depressed condition of the iron market and the increasing shift to steel, Dorman and 
Long clearly took an optimistic view of the industry, leasing the neighbouring Britannia 
Ironworks just three years after taking over West Marsh.  This was a sizeable works of 120 
puddling furnaces, a blooming mill and a rail mill capable of producing 33,000 tons of iron rails 
per year. It had been built by Samuelson’s in 1868-70, opened in 1871 and floated as a limited 
company the following year, though Samuelson himself did not take any part in the new 
company.  From the outset, it seems to have been a troubled business having been opened on the 
eve of the collapse of the early 1870s iron boom and, as a large capacity iron rail plant, 
especially vulnerable to competition from steel rails.  Heavy losses were made in 1873-5 and 
the company was eventually liquidated in 1876, remaining idle until the takeover.
519
  Initially 
Dorman Long’s intention had been to use Britannia to produce puddled bars to supply the 
rolling mills at West Marsh, primarily to counter the effects of a shortage of old rails that had 
been used for angle production. Buoyant demand at the end of the 1870s and early 1880s meant 
that soon after reopening the puddling plant, the rolling mill was brought back into production, 
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specialising in larger-sized angles.  In 1881 and 1882 it was expanded further with investment 
in a new reversing engine and a second, larger, rolling mill.
520
  
 
In addition to the improved climate in the industry compared to the mid-1870s, there are two 
main reasons for this early success.  The first is the firm’s specialisation in products for the 
growing areas of the iron and steel market.  Largely keeping out of the crowded rail sector 
dominated on Teesside by the much bigger Bolckow Vaughan, Dorman Long was able to 
expand into a variety of product markets including ship plate, angles, engineering products, and 
especially into construction and building materials – joists and girders.  Girders were to become 
a particular speciality and at the turn of the century the company claimed to be the most 
extensive producer in the country.
521
  This choice was an important piece of market positioning 
for a British firm, since before Dorman Long began girder and joist production in 1883, most 
had been imported from Belgium and Germany.  There was clearly an opening for a domestic 
producer.  The second reason is that the company moved away from iron and into steel by the 
mid-1880s.  In 1886, sixty puddling furnaces at Britannia were scrapped and replaced by seven 
Siemens-Martin acid open hearth steel furnaces.  In operation by 1888, and with the rolling 
mills adapted for ship plate and constructional products, there was a significant improvement in 
profits in the eighteen months before incorporation.
522
  Overall, the firm’s results over the 1880s 
show that Dorman Long had made some astute decisions and as a result had been able to turn 
two moribund businesses into a profitable enterprise.  It was an early sign of the adaptability of 
the firm’s management and their ability to adjust to new technology (steel) and market demand 
(shipbuilding and construction).  By 1888 annual sales had reached almost £½ million and 
profits £65,000, a return on sales of 14 per cent, rising to 22 per cent in the first part of 1889.  
The return on capital employed is estimated to have been almost 14 per cent in 1888 and 
exceeded 24 per cent a year later, levels the company would not achieve again until the First 
World War (see Table 7.2 below). 
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Table 7.2: Sales and Profits, 1882-1889 
  
 
Profits (£) 
 
 
Sales (£) 
 
Profit % of sales 
Return on 
capital employed 
(%)* 
1882-87 
(annual average) 
22,765 -- -- -- 
1887 
 
27,040 313,628 8.6 -- 
1888 
 
64,651 468329 13.8 13.9 
1889  
(first 9 months) 
85,095 396,696 21.5 24.2 
1889 
(annualised) 
113,460 528,928 21.5 24.2 
*Capital employed is estimated from the purchase price of the company at incorporation - £467,000.  
Using the value of shares at incorporation (£350,000) would produce higher returns: 1888: 18.5%; 1889: 
32.4%.   
Sources: Prospectus, Northern Echo, 6 Nov. 1889; DLDM vol. 1, p. 3: Statement of profits prepared by 
R. MacKay and Co and pp. 5-8 (Prospectus).   
 
It is difficult to determine exactly how this initial expansion was financed.  Capital requirements 
were kept down at the start by leasing both West Marsh (a seven year lease) and Britannia (three 
years, with an option to buy).  By 1882 Dorman and Long must have been reasonably certain of 
success because instead of renewing the Britannia lease, they exercised the option to buy the 
works for £50,000 – £5,000 deposit plus 5 per cent interest on the outstanding balance.523  The 
£40,000 balance was paid to Samuelson in 1886, although this was quickly followed by a 
£12,000 mortgage also with Samuelson, probably to help finance the installation of the steel 
furnaces.  It is interesting that Samuelson was willing to help finance the upgrading of the plant; 
it provides another example of the operation of the network of iron and steel masters and the 
interdependence of firms in Cleveland’s industrial cluster.  There were of course benefits to 
Samuelson: an expanded Britannia works would offer an outlet for pig iron from Samuelson’s 
Newport blast furnaces that were located on an adjacent site.  Later, as discussed below, 
Dorman Long and Samuelson’s would develop an even closer supplier-customer relationship 
that eventually resulted in a take-over by Dorman Long in 1917. 
 
Although Dorman Long enjoyed a period of significant growth and prosperity during the 1880s, 
by the end of the decade it was still a moderately-sized business compared to the larger Teesside 
iron and steel firms.  With an annual output of 100,000 tons of manufactured iron and steel 
products, employing 1,300 men and just two plants specialising in finished goods, it was 
dwarfed by the integrated operations of Bolckow Vaughan.
524
  Nevertheless, rapid expansion 
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had enabled it to overtake some of the older, more established businesses such as Samuelson’s 
and Head Wrightson, and this provided the basis from which Dorman Long could launch a 
further period of more ambitious growth.  This next stage of expansion was to come in the latter 
part of the 1890s and early 1900s following its flotation as a limited company in 1889.  The 
nature and effects of this expansion on Dorman Long’s operations and the way in which it was 
managed are examined in the following sections.  For the present it is sufficient to indicate the 
broad directions in which its activities were extended. 
 
First, the capacity of the Britannia works was expanded with a series of modernisations, 
including investment in new plant (additional furnaces and rolling mill), the incorporation of 
new equipment for steel production and improvements through rebuilding existing plant.  
Initially this took the form of duplicating existing acid open hearth furnaces, but later these were 
replaced by basic open hearth furnaces.  The firm also moved into downstream activities, 
establishing construction and bridge building departments (1897).  This made use of one of its 
principal products, girders, and started the development of an expertise in an area for which the 
firm was later to become so famous – bridge building (e.g. the Tyne Bridge, Sydney Harbour 
Bridge, and Auckland Harbour Bridge).  Second, the distribution network was extended using 
not only the traditional method of selling through agents, but establishing its own branches and 
stockyards managed and staffed by Dorman Long employees.  The principal ones were on the 
Thames at Vauxhall in London (1892), Melbourne (1898) and Cape Town (1903).  Third, the 
company embarked on a series of acquisitions between 1898 and 1903, two of which were of 
companies of substantial size – Bell Brothers (1899) and North Eastern Steel Co (1903) – and 
three smaller, but still significant, businesses.  To some extent these acquisitions can be divided 
into the conventional categories of diversification, vertical integration and horizontal expansion, 
but there were some overlapping and other complicating elements.  In each case it is likely that 
there was more than one motivating factor. 
 
Diversification came in the form of buying the sheet works of R.P. Dorman and Co and the wire 
works of C. Dorman and Co in 1898-99.  This extended the firm’s product range from the basic 
output of ingots, angles, plates and girders to the finished goods of corrugated sheets and wire.  
It also provided a useful if small downstream use for Dorman Long’s own steel.  Interestingly, 
both these firms were already partly owned by Arthur Dorman, the former having been a 
partnership with his brother, Robert Page Dorman, which he took control of on Robert’s 
death.
525
   The other was a partnership with his eldest son, Arthur Charles Dorman (known as 
Charles).  The incorporation of these works into Dorman Long was therefore not solely about 
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diversification; the motivation was also organisational and financial as Arthur Dorman 
consolidated his business interests into the growing company.  Later, in 1912, Dorman Long 
bought the specialised galvanised sheet producer Bowesfield Steel in Stockton, a company that 
had been established in 1896 to meet the rising demand for thin galvanised steel sheets. 
 
The takeover of Bell Brothers between 1899 and 1902 has been seen as a classic case of vertical 
integration, and as one of the few in the iron and steel sector that did not involve merging with 
armaments companies.
526
  At the time it was the largest combination in the Cleveland industry.  
Bell Brothers was a pioneering, high volume pig iron producer located on the north bank of the 
Tees at Port Clarence.  Its works comprised twelve large blast furnaces producing over 300,000 
tons of pig iron a year (326,793 in 1898), which generated sale revenue of over £660,000.
527
  In 
addition to its smelting plant, the company had significant coal interests in south Durham, with 
collieries at Page Bank, South Brancepeth, Browney and Tursdale; and ironstone mines in 
Cleveland – Normanby, Skelton, Cliff, Carlin How and Lumpsey.  There was also a limestone 
quarry at Stanhope.  Much has been made of the desire to obtain a secure and reliable supply of 
raw materials as a motive for the link-up with Bell Brothers, and given the conditions in the coal 
market at the time (booming demand and rising prices) this can be regarded as one reason. But 
it is only one. The expectation of profit in the iron industry is another.  Pig iron, although highly 
cyclical, could also be highly profitable, as proved to be the case in 1889 and 1900 when Bell 
Brothers made profits of £190,690 and £136,974 respectively on its iron business.  However, 
the vagaries of the iron trade with its price fluctuations and the damaging effects on margins 
suggest that this was unlikely to be a major factor.  Bell Brothers had made losses at the 
Clarence works through much of the 1890s (1890-97) and returned to making a profit, albeit a 
small one, only in 1898 (£12,120).
528
  Certainly, an ironmaster as experienced and astute as 
Arthur Dorman would not have taken the temporary restoration of profitability as a signal for a 
takeover.  Much more important was the plan to develop the basic open hearth steel process in 
order to find a commercially viable way of making steel from Cleveland pig iron.  Bell Brothers 
had started trials in 1889 and the two firms had been cooperating on the development at least 
since 1897.
529
  With extensive ironstone reserves and iron producing capacity, as well as its own 
steel furnaces, the acquisition of Bell Brothers would not only ensure a supply of inputs, but 
also give Dorman Long access to the new technology, experience and expertise.  In its turn, Bell 
Brothers, which had accumulated large losses in iron making over the previous seven years, 
would have access to the finance to develop new plant and to the processing capacity. It would 
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also have an outlet for pig iron that was not entirely dependent on iron market.  As Arthur 
Dorman stated in his 1901 chairman’s statement at the shareholders’ annual meeting, the aims 
of the link up were “to combine with them (Bell Brothers) as first-class manufacturers of pig 
iron, having large reserves of coal and ironstone, for the establishment of works for the 
production of steel from Cleveland iron by the open-hearth process.”530 
 
The takeover of North Eastern Steel Co (NESCo) is less easy to account for.  The product and 
the technology – basic (Thomas) steel from basic Bessemer converters – was very different 
from that being developed at the Britannia works or at Bell’s Clarence works, i.e. open hearth.  
The company had been established in 1881specifically to produce steel from Cleveland iron 
using the basic Bessemer process, and its developers, Sidney Thomas and Percy Gilchrist were 
among the founding directors.  By the turn of the century NESCo was a sizeable business with 
an annual output of 150,000 tons of steel from four Bessemer converters; its main products were 
rails, finished steel billets and bars.
531
  Dorman Long had been interested in the business since at 
least 1901; the circular to NESCo shareholders from the board recommending the takeover 
states that negotiations had begun more than two years previously, but it is not obvious what the 
reasons for this interest were.
532
  To some extent it can be seen as a horizontal expansion, 
increasing Dorman Long’s steel capacity and position in the market. It can also be regarded as a 
way of diversifying the product range.  Dorman Long saw its future as a producer of basic steel 
rather than acid steel, and at the time NESCo was one of only two firms with basic capacity in 
Cleveland.  The other was Bolckow Vaughan.  As there were continuing problems with the 
production costs, quality and market acceptance of open hearth basic steel, the success of the 
new product could not be assured. The acquisition of NESCo may therefore be seen as a way in 
which Dorman Long could hedge its bets in basic steel production in the event that the 
developments in the open hearth process using Cleveland pig proved unsuccessful.  NESCo 
could then provide a way of emulating the German success with the basic Bessemer process.  
Perhaps Dorman believed that with the German dominance in Thomas steel, a growing 
acceptance of basic steel in general and the recent new capacity the NESCo plant to produce 
finished rather than just semi-finished sections, including tramway and electric rails, the firm 
was a useful addition to portfolio of businesses 
 
As for other possible explanations, short-term profitability was unlikely to have been a major 
motivation.  Although NESCo had been making profits up to 1900, they collapsed from £40,000 
in 1899 to £4,000 the following year.  In 1901 the position worsened: the company made loss of 
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£14,000 as it was caught between rising raw material costs, especially coal, which it had to buy 
in the open market, and falling product prices as a result of German protection and dumping on 
the world market.
533
 The immediate outlook therefore was poor; as Arthur Dorman noted in his 
chairman’s statements of 1903 and 1904, even at the time of the takeover ‘it is likely to be an 
unproductive investment for some time to come.’534  Finally, it may be simply an example of the 
desire for expansion, a way of increasing the size of the company. Although NESCo was not 
performing well, the works was located in a good position on the Tees adjacent to the Britannia 
works, and as the company was in a difficult financial position, it was cheaper for Dorman Long 
to expand by buying a business than acquiring land and building a new works.  Moreover, 
Arthur Dorman was, and had been since its inception, a major shareholder in NESCo, a member 
of its board and chairman until 1885.
535
  Therefore he would have been fully aware of the 
benefits and difficulties likely to be encountered in taking over the firm.  Buying NESCo may 
have been a way of consolidating his position and control over the company, and finding a 
means of co-ordinating the various branches of his iron and steel interests. It is interesting to 
note that ten years before the takeover NESCo had itself expanded, buying the Acklam 
ironworks of Stevenson, Jacques and Co in 1893.
536
  With its four blast furnaces, this works 
supplied the bulk of NESCo’s iron.  The NESCo acquisition therefore is an example both of the 
movement towards vertical integration and of the increasing concentration of the industry in the 
district, as one firm extended its control over a significant portion of the Cleveland industry. 
 
One final step Dorman Long took towards vertical integration in this period was to acquire an 
interest in the Channel Collieries Trust Limited. This was a company founded in 1910 to obtain 
rights to and explore the extent of the Kent coalfield.  Although this was recommended to the 
shareholders on the basis of the likely coal reserves – Dorman described the Channel Collieries 
as having some of the best royalties in the Kent coalfield – part of the motivation was the 
potential for discovering new iron ore deposits.  In his 1913 chairman’s statement Dorman, 
referring to a report by Edward Riley on the Kent coalfield, suggested that there may be a bed of 
ironstone ‘of a quality similar to the Cleveland stone’.  Initially the investment was small, just 
£15,000 (30,000 £1 shares, 10 shillings paid) but this was more than tripled to £47,500.  
Dorman regarded it as ‘of a somewhat speculative character’, which is what it turned out to be. 
Indeed, it was something of a costly failure since the coalfield’s development was delayed by 
the outbreak of war in 1914, and there proved to be no ironstone to exploit.
537
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7.3 Organisational and Management Developments 
 
By the eve of the First War Dorman Long had been built up into a business of significant size, 
with a commanding, though not dominant, position in both the Cleveland and British iron and 
steel industry.  The company had control over nine plants on Teesside under the ownership of 
four firms (depending on how they are counted), offices and stockyards in London and abroad, 
and a series of coal and ironstone mines. The combined output of the three steel plants was 
around 650,000 tons of ingots per year, much of which was processed into finished steel, 
ranging from rails, plates and angles to girders, joists and bridge construction.  Upstream, 
production figures were also substantial: annual coal and ironstone output each exceeded one 
million tons, limestone 250,000 tons and 600,000 tons of pig iron. Employment at the Dorman 
Long plants alone exceeded 10,000.
538
   
 
Such a growing and complex business required careful organisation and management in order to 
effect control and maintain efficiency. While the outward appearance is one of several disparate 
firms in which one, Dorman Long, held a controlling interest in two similar sized, but 
independent businesses – Bell Brothers and NESCo – this is deceptive.  In practice there was 
much closer integration of management; there is also clear evidence of coordination between the 
different interests, with strategic control exercised particularly through Dorman Long’s board. 
 
Prior to flotation there is little surviving evidence of the way in which the Dorman and Long 
partnership operated.  It appears that Arthur Dorman and Albert Long were joint managing 
partners, and in the early years after incorporation this arrangement continued, with the former 
partners working as joint managing directors.  From the beginning it seems that Dorman was the 
dominant half of the duo, taking on the position of chairman and acting as the driving force 
behind the growth of the company.  He was responsible most of the initiatives that are recorded 
in the board minutes and it was common for a board decision to leave matters in Arthur 
Dorman’s hands ‘to take action as he may consider desirable’.539  As far as Long’s position is 
concerned, he was very much in the background, taking the chair only in Dorman’s absence.  
Over the eleven years from 1889 to 1900, when Long resigned, there is just one recorded case 
where he presented a proposal to the board; this was in April 1890 when he submitted estimates 
for a new engineering shop at the Britannia works.
540
   
 
                                                                                                                                
to use ores from Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire.  This is another reason for rejecting Burn’s criticism 
of Britain’s steelmasters that they ignored indigenous iron ore supplies. 
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In the familiar pattern of a company following incorporation, a general manager was appointed 
to take charge of the operation of the works in early 1891.  This was W.H. Panton, an 
experienced engineer, who was ‘to take over most of the managerial tasks’ for a salary of 
£2,000 per year.
541
   There are various reasons why at conversion to a limited company firms 
took steps to appoint a professional manager.  These include: allowing time for the former 
partners to enjoy the wealth derived from the flotation; bringing in managerial and technical 
expertise that would guide the expansion of the firm; and giving the former owners, who usually 
kept control of the business as the largest shareholders, the time to concentrate on a more 
strategic role rather than getting caught up in the day to day operation of the company.  In this 
case it seems that the last two best explain the appointment of Panton.  Dorman and Long 
remained joint managing directors, but each accepted a salary reduction of £750 p.a. that was 
used to make up part of Panton’s.542  Immediately after his appointment, most of the proposals 
for capital investment and plant improvements came from Panton, and Dorman increasingly 
spent time developing the firm’s prospects by building up a distribution and marketing network. 
 
As might be expected, the two big amalgamations with Bell Brothers and NESCo, brought 
changes to the organisational and management structure.  There were a number of ways in 
which Dorman Long as the parent company was able to maintain control over its subsidiaries.  
First of all there was considerable degree of overlap in the membership of the three boards.  
This is a process that had begun well before the takeovers.  For example, three Dorman Long 
directors, Arthur Dorman, Alexander Hay and Frank Walters Bond, had all been directors of 
NESCo since its inception.  Following the takeover the first two remained on the board, with the 
addition of Hugh Bell, who by that time was also a director of Dorman Long.
543
  In the case of 
Bell Brothers, when Dorman Long acquired 50 per cent of the company, three directors were 
appointed to Bell Brothers – Arthur Dorman and Alexander Hay again, along with Charles 
Dorman, Arthur’s eldest son.544  Such appointments are hardly surprising as it would be 
expected that the parent company would want proper representation on, and control over, the 
boards of its subsidiaries.  Perhaps more telling is that the process was not all one way: in both 
cases directors of the newly acquired subsidiaries were appointed to the Dorman Long board.  
Thus in 1899 Hugh Bell joined the Dorman Long and following the full takeover in 1902, four 
additional Bell Brothers directors were appointed – Lowthian Bell, Walter Johnson, Charles 
Bell and Maurice Bell.
545
  For NESCo, three directors were appointed to the Dorman Long 
board – Richard Denton, the chairman, Arthur Cooper, the managing director, and J. Francis 
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Mason.
546
  As Table 7.3 shows, from the beginning there was considerable overlap between the 
boards of three main businesses of the Dorman Long group, and this was one way in which 
coordination and control could be facilitated.  Of course, membership of the Dorman Long 
board for members of the Bell family and some NESCo directors may well have been part of the 
takeover deals, but this does not negate the benefits of overlapping directorships. 
 
It has been commented that a number of the mergers of the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth resulted in excessively large boards. In 1905 for example, Imperial Tobacco had 
twenty-eight directors, and combinations in the textile industry resulted in even larger numbers: 
the Bleachers Association had fifty, Bradford Dyers forty-six and Fine Cotton Spinners’ and 
Doublers’ Association thirty.547  With fifteen, Dorman Long seems large in comparison with 
other steel companies (e.g. Bolckow Vaughan seven, John Brown seven), but this was barely 
above the average of twelve for the fifty-two largest companies identified by Payne, and 
certainly  nowhere near those of the unmanageably-sized textile companies.  In fact, fifteen was 
the maximum size the Dorman Long board reached and by 1910, with the death and retirement 
of older members, the board numbers fell to thirteen, much the same as in other amalgamated 
steel firms (e.g. Vickers, Sons and Maxim – fifteen; Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds – eleven).548   
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Table 7.3: Board Membership for Dorman Long, Bell Brothers and NESCo, 1903 
Dorman Long Bell Brothers NESCo 
Arthur Dorman** Arthur Dorman Arthur Dorman 
Alexander Hay Alexander Hay Alexander Hay 
Charles Dorman Charles Dorman  
Hugh Bell Hugh Bell Hugh Bell 
Sir I. Lowthian Bell* Sir I. Lowthian Bell*  
Charles Lowthian Bell Charles Lowthian Bell  
Maurice Lowthian Bell Maurice Lowthian Bell  
Walter Johnson Walter Johnson  
F. Waters Bond  F. Waters Bond 
Richard C. Denton  Richard C. Denton* 
Arthur Cooper  Arthur Cooper 
J. Francis Mason  J. Francis Mason 
Charles A. Head  Sir Thomas Wrightson 
Henry Echalaz  Hugh Ripley 
W.H. Panton  Edward Riley 
  The Hon. Henry Parker 
*Chairman. **Vice Chairman 
Sources: DLAR, BBAR and NESAR for 1903. 
 
As far as composition is concerned, there are several common features of the boards of 
companies in this period that are regarded as working against management control and effective 
decision making.  One is that on incorporation they often included well-known, but essentially 
token members, whose presence was designed primarily to attract investors to buy shares in the 
newly floated company.  These ‘ornamental’ directors, as Payne called them, would receive 
their directors’ fees but contribute little, if anything to the operation of the business.549  A 
second is that the boards of companies were often dominated by members of the founders’ 
families – sons, sons-in-law, nephews, grandsons and so on – irrespective of their suitability for 
a business career.  Third, in cases of amalgamation, the original directors, again often from the 
founding families, retained directorships, perhaps as part of the merger agreement, to look after 
family interests and investments that were still tied up in the company, or simply as a mark of 
respect for a business’s pioneers. 
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The appointment of Lowthian Bell, not only to the board and also as chairman at the advanced 
age of 86, is an obvious example of deference to the founding family; but in this case it is an 
understandable one.  Lowthian Bell was the grand old man of iron and steel, both in Cleveland 
and nationally, and one of only two survivors from the start of the industry in the district.
550
  His 
position as chairman was more than likely an honorary one, and although he did attend board 
meetings over the three and a half years of his membership until he died in December 1904, it 
was sporadic and he never presented the chairman’s statement at an AGM.551   
 
An interesting feature of the Dorman Long board, and those of its component firms, is that most 
directors seem to offer something to the company by way of connections, advice or performing 
some function or role, even if they did not have an executive position in the modern sense.  And 
this seems to be the case from the outset.  In addition to the two partners, the original directors 
(in 1890) were all connected with the sales and marketing side of the iron trade, reflecting an 
understanding by either Dorman or Long that having good outlets for finished products was 
essential.  Both Alexander Hay and F.W. Bond were metal merchants or brokers in London and, 
at the time of incorporation in 1889, were already on the NESCo board.
552
 Charles Head was the 
chairman of the Stockton engineering firm Head Wrightson, which both supplied Dorman Long 
with equipment and bought their iron and steel.  His partner, Thomas Wrightson was on the 
NESCo board.  Henry Echalaz, the sixth appointment to the board in 1891, was also an iron and 
steel merchant in Newcastle, with interests in the mineral broking business and general metal 
broking, as well as an agent for a life insurance company (The Economic).  He was also 
involved in the iron exchange in Middlesbrough from at least 1880 as is indicated by his 
inclusion on the subscription list to the Middlesbrough Royal Exchange. 
553
  Bond and Hay also 
handled some of the financial affairs of the company in London.  Thus in September 1891 Bond 
placed £25,000 on call in the London discount market and Hay similarly placed £10,000 on 
seven days’ notice the following June.554   
 
With the amalgamations and the expansion of the Dorman Long board, there was a strong 
representation from the Bell family.  However, while Bell Brothers was very much a family 
business, there was a considerable amount of expertise in the firm, both of technical nature and 
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especially in knowledge of the iron business.  Hugh Bell and his younger brother Charles had 
both had a technical education, Hugh studying chemistry at the Sorbonne and then in Germany 
under the famous chemist Friedrich Wohler.  He returned to Cleveland to work at the Clarence 
Ironworks in the 1860s, eventually taking charge as his father withdrew from active business 
involvement.
555
  Charles similarly studied first in France, at the Paris School of Mines and later 
in Germany, after which he returned to work at the Clarence works under the management of 
John Thompson.  He took over the management in 1885 on Thompson’s retirement.556  The 
other experienced addition to the Dorman Long board from Bell Brothers was Walter Johnson, a 
former career soldier.  After retiring in his thirties he became an iron merchant in 
Middlesbrough, joining Bells first as an employee, and later as a director.
557
  From NESCo, in 
addition to Bond the two directors who joined Dorman Long were Richard Denton and Arthur 
Cooper.  Denton was a ship owner from Stockton, at least before his involvement with NESCo; 
he was one of the original directors and had been chairman of the company from 1885.  He thus 
had considerable experience in running a steel business.  Arthur Cooper also brought 
considerable experience and technical knowledge to Dorman Long’s board, having been an 
engineer at a Bessemer steelworks in Sheffield (Brown, Bailey and Dixon) before taking up the 
position of general manager at NESCo with responsibility for building the works when the 
company was first set up.  He later joined NESCo’s board.558   
 
All in all, it seems that there was considerable expertise at director level in Dorman Long at this 
time.  But there were also two cases of the elevation to directorships of young, relatively 
inexperienced members of the founding families.  These are the appointments of Charles 
Dorman, Arthur Dorman’s son, and Maurice Bell, Hugh Bell’s son.  Each was very much part 
of a familiar pattern of bringing the eldest son into the business, providing training and 
experience as they acquired the technical and business skills.  Charles Dorman, only 23, joined 
the board in 1898 at the time the sheet and wire works were bought by the company.  He was 
already taking an active role in the business having had some responsibility at the two newly 
acquired works under their previous ownership by his father.  However, it is clear that his 
apprenticeship was far from over and he was very much under the guidance of Panton, the 
general manager, with whom he toured American iron and steel works in 1898, and also his 
father’s associates in the industry.  For example, he again toured American industry with 
Thomas Wrightson, of the Stockton iron and engineering company in 1901.
559
 Maurice Bell was 
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a little older and more experienced in the industry.  Like his father, uncle and grandfather he had 
been sent abroad after his British education (at Eton) to gain technical training, first to France 
and then to Germany.  He returned to work at the Clarence works in 1893, joined Bell Brothers 
board soon afterwards and on the amalgamation joined the Dorman Long board at the age of 33.  
In each of these cases, of course, it may well be that family preferment brought in directors with 
limited talent or aptitude for a role that required both technical understanding as well as 
business acumen.  However, it is not necessarily the case that the son and grandson of the 
founders lacked the desired skills and their inclusion on the board is not prima facie evidence 
for entrepreneurial failure.  In fact, both Charles Dorman and Maurice Bell played an active part 
in the business, both as directors and in more direct managerial positions, and Dorman was 
known not to be keen to make appointments purely because of family connections.
560
  
 
One final board member is worth mentioning although his directorship comes after the period 
covered in this study.  This is Walter L. Johnson, the son of Walter Johnson who was one of the 
directors who joined the Dorman Long board from Bell Brothers (see above).  Walter L. took 
his father’s seat on the board when his father died, but like the Dorman sons before him, he had 
also had an active career in the business.  By all accounts he was a talented engineer and was 
responsible for the management and operation of the Clarence steelworks from 1903.
561
 
 
Monitoring and decision making 
The size and composition of the board are important elements in accounting for a business’s 
success as they can be regarded as indicators of the potential effectiveness of decision making; 
but more crucial is the actual role the board plays in directing business operations and policy. 
This takes on a greater significance since the complexity of business operations increases as a 
firm grows and diversifies.  There is a greater need for effective mechanisms to monitor, control 
and coordinate the different parts of the organisation.  For Dorman Long various monitoring and 
control systems were developed and extended over time, and some impression of the way in 
which they evolved and operated can be traced from the firm’s records in the period following 
incorporation.   
 
Although Arthur Dorman and Albert Long retained their positions as managing directors after 
the 1889 flotation, much of the day to day operation of the plants was delegated to the new 
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general manager, WH. Panton.  From 1891 Panton attended the majority of the monthly board 
meetings and made regular reports on the state of the business.  Until 1900 these meetings were 
on average every two months, although each year the number and time between them varied 
according to the state of trade and the demands of the business.  At first the nature and details of 
the reports recorded in the minutes also varied before a consistent pattern and method of 
monitoring was established.  The early reports were primarily concerned with recommendations 
for improvements to the plant; for example major changes to the Britannia works in mid-1891. 
Panton put forward plans for new capital investment which the board then discussed, 
determined which of Panton’s proposals they should proceed with and how much should be 
‘voted’ for the investment. Considerable control was exercised by the board over expenditure 
since even modest investments were put to the directors.   Panton subsequently reported back to 
the board on the progress of the new investments.
562
   
 
As Dorman and Long were at this time, in the 1890s, joint managing directors and in regular 
contact with production at the plants, there was little need for detailed reporting on the 
performance of the works.  There were a few exceptions, such as a discussion on how and when 
to reduce workmen’s wages in November 1892. The board even became involved in settling a 
dispute with workmen from the Britannia works.
563
 But in general the board concentrated on 
two major areas: capital investment decisions and the control of capital spending; and the 
finances of the firm.  At one point in June 1893 the board stopped further expenditure on the 
‘plant account’ because it was so high.  This is a clear indication that control was exerted at 
board level and that it was willing to rein in what it thought was excessive expenditure, perhaps 
by an enthusiastic new general manager keen to update and improve the plant.
564
 From about the 
same time it seems that the reporting and monitoring of the firm’s operations became more 
regular and standardised.  Indeed, it was at the same board meeting where concern was 
expressed over capital spending that the first cost reports, on the production cost of finished iron 
bars, was submitted.  Unfortunately, no comments are recorded in the minutes except that the 
board agreed that in future monthly cost should be presented along with a comparison with the 
previous month’s costs (in red).565  By early 1894 the presentation of a monthly cost report and 
also a report on the company’s financial position had become standard features of each meeting, 
with additional detail provided when specific issues were under discussion.  For example, in the 
March meeting of 1894 Panton was asked to report on the comparative labour costs at Britannia 
and other similar mills at a time when wages were causing concern.
566
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Figure 7.1a: Capital Expenditure Monthly Returns – An Example from 1908 
 
 
Figure 7.1b 
 Vote  
Expenditure 
to 31
st
 Jany 
 
Expenditure 
in Febry 
Total 
expenditure 
29
th
 Febry 
Amount 
still to 
expend 
 
  
Date 
 
Amount 
New finishing mill, 
wire works 
1907 
10
th
 
May 
3,500 3,561 -- 3,561 -- 
Additional mixer and 
new furnace (Britannia) 
 
7
th
 Aug 63,479 19,246 2,417 21,663 41,816 
Finishing and cogging 
mill, West Marsh 
 
Do 55,000 5,770 250 6,020 48,980 
New loco, Britannia 
 
10
th
 Sept 1,500 -- 1,530 1,530 -- 
Additional crane for 
soaking pits, Britannia 
1908 
11
th
 
Febry 
2,500 -- -- -- 2,500 
  125,979 28,577 4,197 32,774 93,296 
 
Source: DLDM vol. 3, 3 Mar. 1908, pp. 84-6. 
 
Gradually, over the years, this reporting became more extensive and comprehensive, reflecting 
the growing size and diversity of the business and the consequent need for detailed and complex 
information.  From October 1894 the reporting of new contracts was added to the monthly 
finance and production statements, and detailed reporting on the progress of capital spending 
was increased over the course of the 1890s.  From August 1896 there was a monthly statement 
of capital expenditure reported to the board and after September 1897 the progress of capital 
projects was presented in a tabulated form indicating each project that had been approved, the 
date of approval, the ‘vote’, the amount spent each month and how much was left from the 
233 
 
budget (Figure 7.1).
567
 In practice the actual monitoring of the day to day and week to week 
operations of the firm was even more strict and assiduous than the monthly reports to the board 
suggest as weekly reports were also prepared for the directors.  There are no surviving records 
of the reports, and it is impossible to judge how extensive or useful this weekly reporting was, 
but the fact that they were prepared for the directors demonstrates a recognition of the 
importance of keeping track of the firm’s operations as it grew.  Indeed, as new businesses were 
acquired, they too were included.  For example, in July 1899, shortly after the incorporation of 
the sheet and wire works into the company these two departments were also included in the 
weekly returns.
568
  
 
While it is not possible to say exactly how the directors used this information to exercise control 
over the firm, it is evident that by the end of the 1890s, and before the major expansion of the 
company after the takeovers of Bell Brothers and NESCo, the company had in place an 
extensive information system that could in principle be used to inform and support decision 
making.  The acquisition of two large companies prompted further changes in reporting and 
monitoring.  Moreover, what is interesting about these developments is that they clearly put the 
Dorman Long board at the centre of the Dorman Long group of companies and suggests that far 
from continuing to operate independently, pursuing their own interests as if they were separate 
businesses, both Bell Brothers and NESCo were subject to careful scrutiny by the parent 
company.  It did take some time for this to emerge, however.  The first step was in March 1903 
when the new manager at the Clarence steelworks, Walter L. Johnson, began to attend the 
monthly board meetings, and like his counterpart at Britannia, to prepare and present a report.
569
 
Second, and rather later, in 1905, the details of Bell Brothers’ operations (pig iron and mineral 
output) were reported at the Dorman Long board meetings.  This was followed in 1907 by 
monthly reports on NESCo’s production.570 These arrangements continued up to 1914 and 
beyond, and from time to time additional reports were added to the growing list. For example, in 
December 1908 the comparative costs of coke, pig iron and finished steel were presented to the 
board.  It is not specified exactly which plants were being compared, but it seems more than 
likely given the nature of the firm by that date it was a comparison between the three main 
Dorman Long works – Britannia, Clarence and NESCo.  If so, then this is an indication that the 
board was concerned with the comparative efficiency of its constituent businesses and 
presumably willing to take action should they get out of line. 
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While reporting and monitoring are necessary for effective management, they are not sufficient: 
a firm also needs a clear organisational structure for control and decision taking.  Once again, it 
appears that there was an awareness of the need for this, with an identifiable if embryonic 
management organisation and hierarchy emerging from the late 1890s.  At various times 
reviews of the ‘organisation of management’ were undertaken and reported to the board. For 
example, one was conducted by Charles Dorman in 1903, and another in 1905.  The precise 
content of these reviews is not known but the first review appears to be concerned with the 
whole Dorman Long group while the second refers solely to the Britannia works.
571
    In each 
case the board accepted Charles Dorman’s recommendations and a number of organisational 
changes followed, the most important of which was to set up a special management committee 
in 1903. 
 
As with the regular collection and reporting of production data, the organisational changes 
began some time before the two main takeovers.  After the incorporation of the wire and sheet 
works and the creation of the construction shop, the firm treated these as departments separate 
from the Britannia steel works and rolling mills. Further organisational changes followed the 
1899 and 1903 takeovers, and while neither Bell Brothers nor NESCo can in any way be 
regarded as departments of Dorman Long in the way that the sheet and wire works were, the 
Dorman Long board did establish special committees to deal with matters affecting the 
company and its subsidiaries.  The first of these was set up in early 1900 when a committee of 
directors was formed.  Its principal function seems to have been to deal with the administrative 
details of the Bell Brothers takeover, including the allocation of shares, issue of certificates and 
similar tasks.
572
  The committee lasted from January 1900 until November 1903, meeting once 
or twice each month and attended by Arthur Dorman, Charles Dorman, W.H. Panton, and, 
occasionally, Hugh Bell or Maurice Bell.  It was wound up on the completion of the Bell 
Brothers takeover.   
 
Of greater significance for the operation and overall control of the Dorman Long businesses was 
the creation of a managing committee.  This was first instituted in October 1900 following the 
initial takeover of Bell Brothers.  It was also at the time of Arthur Dorman’s first retirement 
from the managing directorship and the appointment of Panton and Charles Dorman as joint 
managing directors.  Arthur Dorman retained the chairmanship of the company.  The committee 
was made up of Arthur Dorman, Alexander Hay and Hugh Bell and its role was to provide a 
group of directors ‘with whom the managing directors may confer over the conduct of the 
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business…[and] to give advice and assistance.’573  It seems likely that rather than primarily 
acting as a means of coordinating the Dorman Long and Bell operations, it was designed to 
oversee the performance of the new managing directors, and perhaps principally as a means by 
which Arthur Dorman could continue to keep a close control over the firm without becoming 
involved in the day to day production and trading activities.  Nevertheless, the inclusion of 
Hugh Bell on the committee, unless it was in deference to his standing in the iron trade or in 
acknowledgement of his position as a major shareholder, suggest either that Arthur Dorman was 
keen to draw on Bell’s knowledge of the iron trade or that this was an early attempt to link the 
control of the two firms at the highest level. Bell was after all the managing director of Bell 
Brothers.  Although there are no surviving records of the committee’s meetings, discussions or 
decisions, it was considered to be performing an important function.  The members were well 
remunerated, with £1,000 p.a. paid to Arthur Dorman and £500 to the other two members in 
1900, and raised by £1,000 in total the next year. Its formation and role also warranted a 
reference in the chairman’s annual statement in 1900.574 
 
This particular management committee was short-lived, however; it ended sometime in 1902. In 
the middle of that year there was a ‘rearrangement of managements in several departments’ 
which Charles Dorman presented to the board in his monthly report.  It followed the full 
takeover of Bell Brothers that was completed in 1902 and led to Arthur Dorman taking up the 
managing director’s position once again, which for a time he shared with the current managing 
directors before later taking on the position on his own.  At the same time Arthur Dorman 
handed over the chairmanship to Lowthian Bell.
575
   
 
The notion of a managing committee was revived less than a year later after the acquisition of 
NESCo.  Comprising the managing directors of the three companies – Arthur Dorman, Hugh 
Bell and Arthur Cooper – it had a rather more explicit role than its predecessor: ‘to transact any 
business they may think to the advantage of the joint concern’.576  It is not certain how much 
this new committee or its objectives were influenced by Charles Dorman’s earlier management 
reorganisation plan that he had presented to the board in 1903, which in turn may have been 
prompted either by the company’s expansion or by Panton’s resignation as joint managing 
director in August 1903.  But bringing together the managing directors of the three firms in a 
single special committee not only facilitated greater inter-firm cooperation but was also 
conducive to the development of strategic thinking for the group as a whole.  The committee’s 
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formation was also indicative of the development of a Dorman Long group identity is shown by 
two other details.  First, each of the managing directors on the committee was also on the board 
of all three companies, apart from Arthur Cooper who was not on the Bell Brothers board. The 
second is that there is an explicit reference to the three companies as a ‘joint concern’.  This is a 
clear sign of the beginnings of a Dorman Long group identity and that, in spite of retaining their 
original names, having different sites and separate financial structures, it was the start of each 
firm being regarded as different parts of one company, rather than ‘a federation of distinct 
family firms’.577 
 
It is difficult to assess the contribution of the committee to Dorman Long’s operations; as with 
the earlier committees, there are no surviving minutes and no indication as to whether it met 
formally or informally, regularly or irregularly. In the directors’ minutes, however, there are 
references to the board delegating the implementation of decisions to the committee, and also to 
granting the committee discretion over how the firm’s policy should be carried out.  Thus in 
April 1904 the ordering of a new engine for the Britannia mill was left to the managing 
committee, and in the following month it was empowered to make the arrangements for a new 
issue of debentures, including drafting the prospectus and determining the terms of the issue.
578
  
Similar discretion was given to the three managing directors for the 1911 debenture issue.  But 
while these examples show that the managing committee was active in implementing the 
board’s decisions, it does not necessarily show that it initiated the plans.  However, given that as 
the managing directors, the committee members were in constant contact with, and in direct 
control of, the business it seems more than likely that they put forward many of the proposals 
that were brought to the board for approval.  Depending on the nature of the decision, some of 
these were subsequently implemented by the committee.  Moreover, given his forceful 
personality and his active involvement in the business, it is likely that many of the initiatives 
came from Arthur Dorman, either directly or indirectly through the committee. Indeed, if the 
board minutes in any way accurately reflect the relative influence of the different directors, it is 
clear that Arthur Dorman was very much a dominant presence and the source of many, if not 
most, of the strategic plans. 
 
This section has presented evidence that at the time of Dorman Long’s rapid expansion steps 
were taken to create a management structure that enabled control to be exercised over an 
increasingly diverse business.  It arose in a somewhat piecemeal fashion, developing in response 
to the demands of a growing company and the need to coordinate the different departments and 
subsidiaries.  There appears to be a sense that the constituent companies were all part of one 
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group and that this was ultimately under the control of the Dorman Long board.  Dorman Long 
directors monitored not only their own departments at the Britannia and West Marsh works, but 
increasingly the performance of the subsidiary firms.  Operations and strategy could be 
coordinated through the extensive degree of overlap in board membership and by the special 
management committee, the latter especially after 1904.  It is not suggested that the extent of 
corporate organisation in any way matched that achieved later in companies such as DuPont, 
Siemens or ICI.
579
  Nevertheless, Dorman Long’s organisational development does show an 
understanding both of the need for information to monitor performance and also that this was 
crucial to the coordination and control of the group’s activities.  It provided incentives to and a 
check on those in day-to-day control of the businesses.  Furthermore, to implement effective 
decision making required changes in management structure in a way that linked the different 
parts of the business. The constituent firms may outwardly have kept their identities and 
apparent independence, but behind the scenes there was a far greater degree of cohesion as well 
as indications of a common strategy.  It would be wrong therefore to see the three companies as 
separate businesses operating independently from each other, even though they kept their names 
and had separate boards.  Of course, organisational structure and information are not substitutes 
for good management, but they do provide a framework for, and a flow of intelligence on 
which, sound decisions can be taken, policies implemented and effective control exerted.  
Figure 7.2 presents an organisational chart for the firm circa 1910, with the three main 
companies constituting three departments of the Dorman Long group.  The chart also shows the 
marketing and distribution sections of the business, which by this time had become fairly 
extensive. 
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Figure 7.2: The Dorman Long Group, c1910 
 
 
Sources: Dorman Long, Works; Dorman Long, Pocket Companion; DLDM 1889-1914; DLDM 1890-
1914; BBDM 1899-1914; NESDM 1903-1914. 
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7.4 Products, Distribution and Marketing 
 
Building up an extensive distribution network was a central feature of Dorman Long’s growth 
after incorporation.  What is interesting about this network is that it was not just through the use 
of agents, which had been the traditional channel and for which British companies have been 
much criticised, that it distributed its products.
580
  Dorman Long had its own stockyards and 
branch offices in some of the major consuming markets both in Britain and across the world.  
Indeed, it is evident from the way the company set about developing its distribution system that 
it was keen not only to find new outlets for its products but also to exert control over their sale 
and marketing.  Chandler emphasised the importance of distribution as the key to achieving 
sales volume, thus supporting expanding productive capacity and securing the benefits of scale 
economies.
581
  To some extent this is evident in Dorman Long’s distribution and marketing 
policy from 1890, and possibly before.  But its expansion was based on much more than 
increasing the total volume of output – or ‘throughput” to use Chandler’s terminology: it 
involved an increasing diversity of products, pushing into markets – product and geographical – 
where there was potential to expand.   
 
Overall, in their approach to product development and marketing there appear to be four 
interrelated strands.  One was to expand the ‘downstream’ use of steel to provide an immediate 
outlet for its basic product, steel ingots.  This was achieved by developing or acquiring 
specialist processing facilities such as for wire and rods, and galvanised and corrugated sheets.  
As well as using their own steel, this helped to increase the firm’s presence in the more 
specialist, higher value end of the market – in modern parlance, increasing the firm’s value 
added.  Arthur Dorman’s comments to the AGM in 1912 on buying the Bowesfield Steel 
Company are instructive here: the acquisition would secure orders for steel bars from the rest of 
the company, creating what he calls ‘internal demand’ hence ‘continuing the policy which has 
guided [the directors] for many years... [to] extend their operations in a direction that will carry 
their manufactures to a more advanced stage.’582  Second, and closely related to the first, was 
the greater variety of output, which, as well as being part of the extension into higher value 
products, was also a way of spreading risks. Arthur Dorman in his 1906 chairman’s statement 
emphasised the importance of not being dependent on one product, but of having a range so that 
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‘if one trade is bad, we can fall back on another.’583 Third, this process of diversification 
involved the exploitation of complementarities between goods.  By producing and stocking 
products that customers were likely to buy together and which agents were willing to hold, the 
firm was able to achieve both greater sales and some degree of economies of scope.  Again, 
Arthur Dorman’s comments to shareholders reveal this line of thought.  In 1898, after the 
company had bought the sheet and wire businesses, the purchases were explained to 
shareholders thus: ‘wherever they sold joists the same people would only be too glad to handle 
sheets and wires.’584 Fourth, the company developed a speciality in constructional steel – joists 
and girders – that enabled it to carve out a niche in an expanding market, and one which ensured 
that it avoided head-on competition with the other bulk steel producers on Teesside and in the 
north east – Bolckow Vaughan, Consett, and later Cargo Fleet-South Durham – with their 
concentration on ship-plates and rails.  The company was already producing joists and girders 
and other building materials before 1890; it appears to have begun to move into this market as 
early as 1883, and over time this aspect of Dorman Long’s operations was to become 
increasingly important.
585
   
 
There is no precise data on the proportion of output, sales, or contribution to profit from 
constructional steel work, but an impression of its significance can be gained from the product 
range included in the company’s Pocket Companion of 1910.  This contains detailed 
specifications of their steel products ‘for the use of engineers, architects and builders.’586  Of the 
184 pages of steel products, 123 pages, approximately two-thirds, are devoted to the output of 
the constructional and bridge shops.  Part of this is accounted for by the inclusion of diagrams 
and additional notes, but the emphasis on construction products does show the specialisation of 
the firm in this area (see Figure 7.3).   
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Figure 7.3: Extracts from Dorman Long Pocket Companion, 1910 
a) Title page 
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b) Specifications 
 
 
c) Standardised bridges 
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d) Steel-framed building 
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The decision to specialise and expand the constructional steel side of the business coincided 
with a growth in the construction industry and changes in construction techniques.  Larger 
buildings were possible with the use of the lighter steel compared to iron as a building product, 
and from the beginning of the twentieth century there was also the development of steel-framed 
buildings.
587
  For example, the company supplied steel for a number of important early steel-
framed buildings, including the British Westinghouse factory at Trafford Park, the Midland 
Hotel in Manchester (both 1900) and the Savoy Hotel extension in London (1903), reputed to be 
the first fully steel-framed construction in London.
588
  As the Pocket Companion shows, by 
1910 the company was not only offering steel frames but also standardised bridge designs as 
well as a wide range of other products with a variety of specifications (Figure 7.3). Whether this 
was a deliberate strategy planned in advance, or a fortuitous benefit is not clear, but Dorman 
Long did make the most of the changes by developing its bridge and constructional shops.  
W.H. Panton, the first general manager of the incorporated Dorman Long, spent some time 
expanding the construction department, which had first been established in 1890, the year 
before his arrival at the firm.  In 1892, Panton put forward a proposal to improve the girder shop 
at a cost of just under £4,000, and over the following year he was instrumental in initiating the 
development of this side of the business.  In the twelve years up to 1903 investment in 
construction amounted to a substantial £91,000, with the most significant being the decision in 
1899 to build a new girder and bridge building shop at an estimated cost of £30,000.
589
  In the 
event, actual capital expenditure overshot the planned amount and the limit was raised to 
£37,000.  It was finally completed at the end of 1901 at a cost of £48,506.
590
  By the turn of the 
century Dorman Long was producing over 30,000 tons of structural steel and employing 600 
workers in these departments.  For the time the works were extensive.  There were four riveting 
shops (or bays), with the three largest (500 feet in length and spans of 60 to 70 feet) served by 
electrically driven equipment including cranes and gantries.
591
  Arthur Dorman reported to 
shareholders at the AGM of 1901 that the output of the department had greatly increased and 
that following the investment the shops ‘were fitted up with machines of the latest pattern and 
are up-to-date in every way.’592  The importance of this development to the firm can also be 
gauged from the company booklet published in the same year, in which the girder trade and 
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construction department receives some prominence.  Dorman Long described itself as ‘the most 
extensive producer of girders in the country... [with]...a large staff of men employed in drilling, 
cutting and riveting the girders up to the required length.’593   
 
The appointment of Alfred Mosscrop as manager of the construction department in 1903, and 
later as general manager to replace Panton, also points to Dorman Long’s intentions to 
consolidate and further expand its position as a leading supplier of constructional steel and a 
bridge builder.  He was recruited by Charles Dorman on his visit to the United States in 1903.
594
 
An American, Mosscrop was a university-trained civil engineer with a degree from Cornell 
University (1885) who already had had significant experience in the industry, first at the 
Rochester Bridge and Iron Works (Rochester, New York) and then as vice president and 
manager of the Baltimore Bridge Company, Delaware.
595
 Almost immediately after his 
appointment Mosscrop presented the board with plans for £11,500 of improvements, which 
were approved even before the cost estimates had been submitted.
596
  
 
The total capital spending on developing this side of the business over the 15 years from 1890 
amounted to over £100,000. And while some of this will have been replacement investment, a 
substantial proportion was a net expansion of capacity.  Table 7.4 gives details of the main 
investments over the period.   It was clearly a successful strategy with Arthur Dorman reporting 
to shareholders in 1912 that the department’s performance was ‘very remarkable’.  However, 
investment in construction and bridge yards seems to have ceased in about 1904 and this may 
well have constrained the firm’s expansion particularly during the upswings in trade.  As 
Dorman also indicated at the same AGM, the firm had been unable to keep pace with demand: 
‘the demand on our powers of production is still larger than we can cope with.’597   
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Table 7.4: Capital Spending on the Construction and Bridge Department, 1890-1905 
Date agreed Details Voted (£) Final 
Spending 
(£)* 
Comple-
tion * 
6/3/1890 New engineering shop at Britannia. 
 
7,400   
Under W.H Panton 
9/8/1891 Improvements: boiler chimney, rods for 
straightening plate, shearing machine for 
beams. 
 
900   
9/9/1891 Extension to girder shed. 
 
3,000   
1/6/1892 Improvements to girder bank: overhead 
crane, gantry, straightening machine. 
 
1,500   
19/7/1892 Further extension to girder bank. 
 
4.000   
5/12/1894 Electric driving at girder shop. 
 
2,500-3,000   
1/7/1896 Equip Cast Steel Foundry as girder shop. 
 
1,000   
12/1/1898 Gantry extension. 
 
3,500 3,545 30/4/1899 
14/7/1899 New girder and bridge shop. 
 
30,000       } 
      } 
}48,406 
 
 
 
30/11/1901 10/10/1900 Office extension for construction 
department. 
 
4,000 
8/1/1902 Extra bay to girder shop, overhead crane 
and sidings. 
 
 
6,500  
      } 
      } 
}18,350 
 
 
 
 
30/11/1902 
12/3/1902 New girder stockyard.  
 
5,500  
Under Arthur M. Mosscrop 
7/10/1903 Improvements to department: No. 4 Bay; 
air plant; machine shop; No.3 Bay; and 
other items. 
 
11,500 11,507 31/1/1905 
3/8/1904 New overhead crane. 
 
1,200 1,181 7/3/1905 
7/9/1904 Welding plant for beam bank. 
 
450 532 30/4/1905 
Total  83,450 104,421  
*Final spending and the completion dates are not recorded before 1898.  
Sources: DLDM, vols. 1-3, 1889-1914. 
 
In parallel with increasing its product range and productive capacity Dorman Long also put 
considerable effort into the distribution of its output.  The company shows an early recognition 
of the importance of having a direct link to customers, especially for the specialised, more 
specific and highly processed products.  For the girder trade there was an additional factor; it 
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was having a range of stock available close to the market so that customers had ready access to 
the products.  As Dorman emphasised at the AGM of 1892, to compete in the joist and girder 
market required holding a large stock and being able to deliver promptly.  The decision to 
establish a stockyard in London was therefore highly significant.  Not only was it a centre of 
international trade and hence export orders, it also provided a base from which the growing 
construction sector in and around the capital could be supplied – in Dorman’s words: ‘London is 
a great outlet for rolled joists’. Dorman also makes clear that the company had other reasons for 
embarking on a policy of distributing from its own yards; it was that by cutting out the 
merchants, not only could they secure the merchants’ share of the profits, but it would also 
make the company more competitive.
598
     
 
Dorman Long had already established a presence in London by 1890, with offices in Victoria 
Street, Westminster.  As there is no record of an earlier date and it seems likely that setting up 
the office coincided with the incorporation of the company.
599
    But even before this became the 
London office of the company, the board had already decided to establish a London yard for the 
girder trade.  The suggestion came from Dorman at a directors’ meeting in March 1890, and 
H.B. Powell was assigned the task of looking for a suitable location.  It did take some time to 
set up the yard, which eventually opened in late 1892 or early 1893, with the board initially 
debating the merits of buying an existing business or setting up their own, new premises.  They 
finally settled on the latter.
600
  In fact concern was expressed by some of the directors during 
1892 that delays in opening the yard were having an adverse effect on the business.
601
 A 
riverside site that offered 100 feet of river frontage at Nine Elms Lane, Vauxhall in south west 
London was secured, and at first it was leased (£425 p.a.), with an option to buy (within four 
years at a price of £9,000).  From the outset the arrangements appear to be well thought out; 
Powell was appointed manager of the yard as well as manager of the London office, with the 
power to hire and dismiss workers, and the two London sites were linked by a private telephone 
line.
602
  On its opening, much was made of the fact that that the yard was well stocked during a 
period low prices, thus keeping production going at the Middlesbrough plants when there was 
sluggish demand, as well as ensuring that the company was in a position to take advantage of 
the revival of trade and prices when it came.  It is also interesting to note that Dorman Long 
decided to set up the yard during a period of low profits and difficult trading conditions.  This 
decision to press ahead is an indication that the company was looking beyond short-term returns 
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and to its long term position in the girder and construction market, and significantly this was not 
the only project they remained committed to despite the poor immediate outlook.  
 
The importance of the yard at Nine Elms Lane was that it offered a means of direct contact 
between Dorman Long and its customers.  In fact Dorman at one stage referred to it as ‘our 
retail trade…offering prompt delivery of [an] increasing number of daily orders.’  For 
construction and the building trade where demand was varied and quick supply essential, this 
clearly gave Dorman an advantage over its competitors who would have to deliver from distant 
plants.
603
  The yard was not regarded as a sound investment throughout the period, however; for 
example in 1904 concern was raised over the size of the business (i.e. sales) relative to the stock 
and capital invested.
604
  Nevertheless, the firm maintained their commitment and the yard was 
expanded several times over the twenty years between 1893 and 1913.  Investment in equipment 
amounted to almost £10,000, including tools and machinery, gantries, cranes and even a steam 
vehicle (1902).  The site was also extended on at least seven occasions with the company 
renting or buying additional land as the opportunity and need arose.  In 1901 for example there 
was some concern raised at the board that the yard was too small and inefficient as customers 
had complained about delays in delivery.
605
 The response was to acquire extra land so that by 
1905 the yard comprised 11,560 square yards of freehold property, additional land on lease, and 
a freehold construction yard and shop.  The value of the freehold property was put at £35,000.  
In mid-1914 a further £25,000 of investment was proposed (by Lawrence Ennis), although the 
director’s minutes are not explicit about this next stage of expansion.606 
 
The development of the London yard was a central plank in the company’s distribution policy, 
and although it is not possible to measure its direct contribution to the profitability of the firm, it 
is possible to infer from the regular investment that it was regarded as a crucial element in the 
company’s successful expansion in the construction market.  The very presence of stocks in 
London as well as an office in the city gave Dorman Long a higher profile than it would have 
had it remained a Middlesbrough-based business.  The company offices in London were also 
expanded.  Additional space was rented at Victoria Street (1898 and 1910) and the firm 
eventually moved to larger premises in Central Buildings, also in Westminster.  An office was 
also opened in the City of London sometime before 1910 to deal specifically with orders for the 
sheet and wire departments.  Locating this at 23, Leadenhall Street among the iron and steel 
merchants and agents and close to the London metal exchange is another example of the way in 
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which the company’s distribution policy was designed to obtain direct access to customers and 
to bypass the traditional agent-based distribution route.
607
  
 
London was neither the only market that Dorman Long targeted nor the sole key to the success 
of its sales strategy.  There was a concerted effort to create and then expand the distribution 
network in the main consuming centres in Britain and to establish presence abroad, especially in 
the colonial markets. The first branch office outside London was opened in Birmingham in early 
1894.
608
  In other cities at first the agent channel was used for promotion and distribution, with 
agency offices in Manchester, Glasgow and Newcastle, although the Newcastle agent is 
probably best thought of as a branch as the firm was owned by the Dorman Long director Henry 
Echalaz.
609
  By 1910 these had all been replaced by branch offices staffed by the company’s 
own employees.
610
 Dorman Long at various times also considered opening up stockyards in a 
number of provincial cities, notably Manchester and Cardiff.  A Manchester yard on the new 
and Trafford Park Estate was first mooted in 1899 and the firm was on the point of leasing a 
7,000 square foot plot.  The negotiations were left to Arthur Dorman, but do not seem to have 
been successful.  The question of stockyards in Manchester and Cardiff was also considered by 
the board in 1911 at the suggestion of Dorman, but the concentration of the home distribution 
effort was on the development of the London yard and there were no further discussions of the 
proposals at board level before the war.
 611
   
 
Apart from the London venture, there was greater discussion of, and possibly more emphasis 
placed on, expansion overseas than in Britain.  From the early 1890s the firm demonstrated an 
understanding of the need to develop export markets. Dorman explained to shareholders in his 
1897 statement: ‘It is quite as important to find new markets and approved methods of 
distribution as to manufacture cheaply’.  Moreover, the company recognised the need for a 
visible presence in the markets by having a stock of goods immediately available as well as by 
having sales representatives.
612
 A number of early steps were taken to promote the firm abroad, 
including, at the suggestion of Dorman in 1891, sending a few small consignments of girders ‘to 
foreign countries as an advertisement’.613 Later, in December 1894, the board agreed to appoint 
Bernard Dean on a salary of £300 and with a budget of £1,000, as an ‘international traveller’.  
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Again, this was the suggestion of Dorman, who saw Dean’s role as one of raising the profile of 
the company with foreign buyers.  As the directors’ minutes note: ‘The chairman…called 
attention to the desirability of the company’s manufacturers being brought before the notice of 
government officials, engineers and others who design constructional work in India, Africa and 
other countries.’614  The board also discussed the possibility of setting up an export department 
to coordinate overseas sales.  This was at the suggestion of Henry Echalaz a merchant by 
profession and therefore well versed in the importance of marketing products.  It is not clear 
whether such a department was established at this time. These arrangements and discussions 
supplemented and prepared the way for the principal approach to promoting overseas sales, by 
securing agreements with agents, some of which were to supply Dorman Long products 
exclusively, and setting up their own branches and stockyards.    By 1910, as Table 6.6 
indicates, Dorman Long had branches and agency agreements in six countries and this 
continued to be extended up to 1914, by which time the network comprised distributors in nine 
countries, with three company branches and stockyards, two agents with stockyards and six 
agents.  The details of the development are shown in outline in Table 7.6. 
 
Table 7.5: Dorman Long Branches and Agencies in 1910 
Location Arrangement 
London 
 
Branch office and yard 
Manchester 
 
Branch office   
Newcastle 
 
Branch office   
Glasgow 
 
Branch office   
Birmingham 
 
Branch office   
Australia  
(Melbourne and Sydney) 
 
Branch office and yard 
India 
 
Agent  
South Africa  
(Durban and Johannesburg) 
 
Branch office  and yard 
Argentine Republic 
 
Agent 
Egypt 
 
Agent 
Source: Dorman Long, Pocket companion, p. iv. 
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Table 7.6: Overseas Branches, Agencies and Yards, 1892-1913 
Year Location Nature of distribution 
arrangement 
Agent and other 
details 
1892 Melbourne Agent and stock holder.  Austral Otis Elevator 
and Engineering. 
(£7,500 credit). 
 
Sydney Agent and stock holder. R.L. Scrutton and Co 
Ltd (£7,500 credit). 
 
1896 Calcutta Agent and 
representative. 
 
Jessop and Co. 
Japan Agent.  G.J. and H.J. Brindley. 
No details. 
 
1898 Australia Own branch and 
stockyard. 
 
 
Port Elizabeth, South Africa Agent on salary and 
commission. 
 
F. Searle and Co. 
1899 Cairo Agent.  F.C. Bevan. No details. 
 
1903 Cape Town, Johannesburg 
and one other city 
Own branches.  Manager: Ernest 
Petersen. 
 
1905 Straits Settlement and Malay 
Peninsular 
Agent.  Messrs Huttenbach and 
Co. No details. 
 
1906 Cape Town Johannesburg 
and one other city 
Own branches. Dorman Long (South 
Africa) Co Ltd. 
 
1908 Buenos Aires Agent.  Stanley W. Lewis. No 
details. 
 
1909 Durban and Johannesburg Branches and stockyards 
in a joint venture with C. 
Wade and Co. 
Wade and Dorman and 
Co Ltd. 
Manager: H. Wade. 
 
1910 Buenos Aires Own branch and 
stockyard. 
£6,000 to be invested.  
Outcome not known. 
 
1912 British Columbia Agent.  No details. 
 
1913 China Agent.  Part of Representative 
on British 
Manufacturers China 
Agency. 
 Sources: DLDM, vols. 1-3, 1889-1914; Dorman Long, Pocket companion, p. iv. 
 
The list in Table 7.6 shows that the emphasis of the export effort was very much on colonial 
markets, although not exclusively – there were ventures in Japan and South America (The 
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Argentine).  Aware of the growing competition from the US and German steel industries and 
the difficulties of penetrating the heavily protected continental markets of America and 
mainland Europe (see for example Arthur Dorman’s comments in the Annual Reports of 1892, 
1897 and 1900), it is not surprising that the firm was Empire orientated.  These, after all, would 
be the most accessible markets, with colonial customers often British themselves being 
predisposed to British firms.  This is not to say that there was an absence of competition; this 
came from other British firms and, as Dorman was only too well aware, from Germany and 
America.  His view expressed at the shareholders’ meeting in 1897 was that ‘there is a very 
good opening [in the colonial markets], and unless we take immediate advantage of it, others 
will, and we will be ousted from these markets.’615 This comment was aimed particularly at the 
firm’s developing interests in Australia and South Africa, where Dorman Long, saw the greatest 
potential for establishing profitable outlets, and to where most of its overseas efforts were 
directed. 
 
Australia received the most attention. Arthur Dorman himself visited for the first time in 1891, 
in part to assess the potential of the Australian market. During his tour he opened negotiations 
with Austral Otis Elevator and Engineering, the Melbourne-based subsidiary of the pioneering 
American elevator company Otis, to act as Dorman Long’s agent.  He also entered discussions 
with the Sydney iron and steel merchant R.L. Scrutton.  These were concluded in early 1892, 
with agreements that Austral Otis would stock and supply joists and girders to Victoria and 
South Australia, and Scrutton would provide the same for New South Wales.
616
 The trade 
appeared to prosper at first (‘trade in Australia has developed in a very satisfactory manner’, 
Annual Report 1892), but following the 1893 Australian banking crisis and subsequent 
recession, the business suffered considerably for some years.  Arthur Dorman returned to 
Australia in 1897 to review and restructure the operations there – it was part of a longer tour and 
business trip that took in South Africa – and the board gave him the freedom to take action ‘as 
he may consider desirable.’617  The board minutes do not record the details of the report he gave 
on his return, but the upshot of the his visit was that the company ended the arrangement with 
Austral Otis and decided to set up its own yard in Melbourne to supply South Australia and 
Tasmania.  Land was leased from Austral Otis, a Mr Timmins was appointed to manage the 
yard and given a budget of £1,000 for improvements to the equipment.  The agreement with the 
Sydney agents (Scrutton) was renewed.
618
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Over the next few years the Melbourne stockyard was extended; additional land was leased 
from Austral Otis in 1900, and there was a further investment of £2,100 in capital equipment.  
However, by the following year the business was again in trouble as result of a further recession 
in the Australian economy. The board discussed disposing of the yard, but in the end decided to 
dispatch J.H. Wright, who was later to become assistant secretary to the company, to Melbourne 
to report on ‘the position and prospects of the business in Australia.’619  Wright’s report must 
have been very optimistic since later in 1902 more land was leased at the Melbourne site and the 
services offered to customers were extended, including the addition of a bridge shop so that the 
company could offer not only joists and girders but also constructional services.  The short-term 
outlook, however, remained poor, with the annual reports of 1903, 1904 and 1905 all reporting 
that the Australian business was either making a loss or ‘not prospering’. This time the 
recession was explained by the effects of a severe drought. But in spite of these short-term 
setbacks, Dorman Long persisted with their Australian operations and by 1906 the Melbourne 
yard was reported to be ‘paying its way’ and both the Australian and South African businesses 
were ‘sending good orders home.’620  
 
As well as demonstrating long-term commitment to its investments, and even expanding them 
in difficult times, Dorman Long also responded to the effects of the recession in the traditional 
short-term way by seeking to limit competition and stabilise prices.  At the board meeting of 
January 1905 the directors discussed the Melbourne business, with Arthur Dorman explaining 
the nature of the competitive pressures on the firm.
621
  The outcome was that Timmins, the 
Melbourne manager, was instructed to open negotiations with Johns and Waygood, a competing 
local supplier, to fix prices and divide orders.
622
  There are no details of the nature of this 
agreement, how long it lasted, or whether it was ever implemented.  Furthermore, it is not 
possible to tell whether the return to profit at the branch the following year was the result of a 
general economic recovery or the supply restraint.  But the Australian operations did remain 
satisfactory, if not especially profitable for the remainder of the period before the War.  One of 
the few references in the directors’ minutes to the return on the Australian business was for 
1911-12.  The reported profit was just £3,998, which out of a total for the company of £233,016.  
Nevertheless, the total profit is not the sole criterion by which to judge the contribution of the 
Australian yards; total sales, which maintained production in Middlesbrough, and thus kept unit 
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costs lower, was also important as was the company’s very presence in the market.  It helped 
promote the firm’s profile and its sales elsewhere.  Economically, as long as profits are made at 
the margin, then the activity makes a positive contribution to the overall enterprise.  That the 
firm was satisfied with the performance is indicated by the fact that there were no further special 
discussions of the Melbourne yard or the Sydney agents by the board, except for periodic 
reports from the colonial businesses, until 1912 to 1913.  By this time trade had expanded and 
once again there were plans to enlarge and improve the site at Melbourne.  The planned 
expansion was significant, with the lease of more land, the purchase of an existing lease for 
£25,000 and £20,000 of capital investment in new buildings and plant and equipment.
623
  
 
South Africa was the other main market that Dorman Long set out to develop and to which it 
devoted considerable time, effort and resources.  And once again it was Arthur Dorman who 
played a central role, initiating the links and guiding the development.  Interestingly, however, 
the first approach came from a South African based businessman, D.M. Kisch, who contacted 
the company with a proposal to act as an agent and stockist for steel joists and small rails in 
Johannesburg.  Dorman met and negotiated with Kisch during 1896, presumably in London, but 
the decision was put off until the end of the following year when it was agreed that Dorman 
should travel to South Africa to make the necessary arrangements for a stockyard.
624
  His trip in 
the first half of 1898 did not result in the appointment of Kisch but of E. Searle and Co in Port 
Elizabeth.  This firm was to act as agent for the whole of South Africa, except the Cape and 
Western Province.  The distributor for these other areas is not known.
625
   
 
War interrupted expansion in South Africa and in 1899 the company reported that there were no 
stocks held in the country.  However, by 1902 there were again prospects for developing the 
trade.  This time plans were made to extend the company’s ‘direct business’ rather than supply 
through agents, and it was decided to send one or more staff ‘with a view to taking initiatory 
measures’.  J.H. Wright, who had previously been sent to Australia to improve the Melbourne 
yard, went in September 1902 to compile a report for the board, and was followed by Arthur 
Dorman the next month, empowered to make whatever arrangements were in the firm’s 
interests.
626
  By January 1903 a new organisation had been set up, this time in Cape Town, and a 
general manager, Ernest Petersen appointed.
627
  He also acted as chief engineer and contracting 
                                            
623
 DLDM vol. 3, 6 May 1913, pp. 239-41; 7 Oct. 1913, pp. 249-51.   
624
 DLDM vol. 1, 1 July 1896, pp. 179-81; 6 Aug. 1896, pp. 183-4; 11 Dec 1896, pp. 191-2; 8 Dec 1897, 
pp. 215-7.   
625
 DLDM vol. 1, 26 July 1898, pp. 232-4.   
626
 DLDM vol. 2, 5 Aug 1902, pp. 117-20. 
627
 Three branches may have established in South Africa at this time – in Cape Town, Johannesburg and 
one other.  Source: telephone interview on 7 Feb. 2011 with W. Pearce, director of Wade Building 
Services, formerly Charles Wade and Co Ltd and the company journal, Wade News, Centenary Issue, 38 
255 
 
agent, and was later joined by John Shore, who was sent by the company to replace Wright.
628
 
These arrangements did not last long; in October Petersen was dismissed and replaced by Shore.  
At about the same time the company began to consider a working relationship in Natal with a 
Birmingham-based construction company, Charles Wade and Co, which already had a base in 
Johannesburg and was supplying Dorman Long steel in competition with the Dorman Long 
branch.  The negotiations continued through until 1905, with details left as usual to Arthur 
Dorman, but short of noting that the companies had a ‘working arrangement’ they are not 
recorded in the board minutes.  Whatever they were, Dorman Long continued to develop its 
South African business, setting up a subsidiary company – Dorman Long and Co (South Africa) 
Limited – to replace the branch in 1906 and then investigating, under Dorman’s direction, the 
potential for a stockyard in 1908.
629
  Ever the inventive businessman with an eye for cost 
savings and reducing competition, rather than buy their own premises, Dorman decided to form 
a closer link with Wade to form a joint venture.  A new company of Wade, Dorman and Co was 
formed in early 1909 to take over Wade’s Durban business and stockyard and the Johannesburg 
branch, with ownership shared equally between the two companies.
630
  It clearly took some time 
for Dorman Long to find a formula for developing the South Africa market, but as with 
Australia, the firm persisted, eventually finding a satisfactory way of organising its interests 
there.  Early reports to the board record that Herbert Wade, the South Africa manager was 
sending back ‘good export orders.’631 
 
7.5 The Rudiments of a Strategy 
 
It is tempting to see Dorman Long’s growth as part of the late-nineteenth merger wave that 
marked the beginnings of large corporations in Britain.
632
  But as Payne points out, apart from 
the amalgamation of some steel firms with armaments businesses (Vickers and Maxim, 
Armstrong and Whitworth, and John Brown, Cammell and Laird), there were relatively few 
steel-only mergers of any size in the industry.
633
  A notable exception was Guest, Keen and 
Nettlefold.  Dorman Long’s expansion was not, therefore, part of a sector-wide movement 
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towards the creation of giant businesses, as occurred in textiles and brewing, but was much 
more specific to the region and the firm.  For Boswell, the explanation lies mainly in the 
personal influence of Arthur Dorman, whom he regards as a risk-taker and an optimist, ‘a 
formidable embodiment of late-Victorian and Edwardian enterprise’, all attributes that explain 
Dorman’s ‘growthmanship’.634  But the firm’s expansion was more than growth for growth’s 
sake, and although at times it appears piecemeal, with the firm (and Dorman) taking advantage 
of opportunities as they arose, it is possible to identify an underlying logic and to discern the 
rudiments of a strategy.  There were five elements to this.  The main aim was to increase the 
size of the business, but this was in conjunction with other closely related moves that supported 
expansion: vertically integrating operations; diversifying production; investing in new plant and 
technological developments; and creating organisational and marketing structures to manage a 
large scale business. 
 
There can be little doubt that the acquisitions of the 1898 to 1904 period set Dorman Long on its 
growth path.  But in fact the plan was even more expansionary than the takeover of Bell 
Brothers, NESCo and some smaller companies might suggest.  The intention seems to have 
been to absorb into ownership, and thus gain control of, a substantial proportion of the 
Cleveland industry.  Two failed large takeover attempts, in addition to the two successful ones, 
indicate the extent of the company’s expansionist ambitions. 
 
The first failed bid was in 1899 for Samuelson’s, which operated a large blast furnace plant, the 
Newport ironworks, adjacent to the Britannia works.  There are no indications of this bid in the 
directors’ minutes of either company, but a Barclays Bank Directors’ Committee discussed a 
possible application by Arthur Dorman for a loan of £300,000 for 18 months (at the Bank Rate) 
to finance the takeover.  The initial approach came through the bank’s Darlington branch and 
the decision was left to ‘the Lombard Street directors with Mr Backhouse (the Darlington 
director) to settle’, with the condition that the loan should be granted only if the security offered 
was satisfactory.
635
 As there are no further references to Dorman’s loan application or the 
takeover, it is not certain whether the failure to acquire the firm at this stage was the result of the 
loan being turned down or a decision by Samuelson’s, a family-owned firm and effectively a 
private limited company, to reject Dorman’s advances.  It was a merger that would have 
benefitted both firms and should be regarded as something of a missed opportunity. 
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A second, more adventurous, takeover proposal was for Bolckow Vaughan.  This was a 
considerably larger company, with total assets valued at £4.1 million compared to Dorman 
Long’s £1.2 million.636  Once again, there is no indication of the plan in the board minutes, but a 
letter from Barclay’s Darlington director, Jonathan E. Backhouse, to the chairman, Francis 
Bevan, in November 1901 provides some of the basic details.
637
   Backhouse noted that the plan 
was to unite four companies – Dorman Long, Bell Brothers, NESCo and Bolckow Vaughan – 
with Arthur Dorman and Hugh Bell leading the group.  Dorman and Bell had already built up a 
significant shareholding in Bolckow Vaughan and between them were proposing to buy £½ 
million additional shares with their own funds.  To gain a controlling interest, however, they 
needed a further £½ million of shares which they proposed to finance by borrowing from 
Barclays – a six- to 12-month loan at ½ per cent above the Bank Rate, with a 4 per cent 
minimum.  This had clearly been discussed with Backhouse, who forwarded the proposal to 
London with his enthusiastic support: ‘I strongly recommend this ask to the favourable decision 
of the Board, great interest is…involved, and the Syndicate is of tremendous influence 
and…represents the most money and the best talent in the Iron Trade’.  As in the bid for 
Samuelson’s, it is not clear why this one failed.  It was certainly unsolicited and from Bolckow 
Vaughan’s point of view, a hostile one.  As Backhouse put in his letter to Bevan, to avoid local 
publicity the £1 million of additional shares that were to be bought would be registered in 
London names.  It may have been that Bolckow and Vaughan’s directors were able to put up 
some kind of defence against the bid or to deter Dorman and Bell in some way.  But the most 
likely explanation is that Barclays was unwilling to supply the funds.  This is indicated by the 
secrecy surrounding the bid and especially by Barclay’s unwillingness to accept Bolckow 
Vaughan’s shares as security, even when the value of the shares offered was twice that of the 
loan.  As the Barclay’s committee minutes record: ‘We should not in any case wish shares in 
Bolckow Vaughan & Co to be placed in our names and that we should wish to know the names 
of the persons who would be liable for the amount.’638 
 
Arthur Dorman’s ambitions may have provided the impetus behind these bids, and the 
company’s expansion in general, but the involvement of Hugh Bell and comments by 
Backhouse in his letter to Bevan indicate that company amalgamations were clearly under 
discussion in the Cleveland industry at the time.  As Backhouse stated at the opening of his 
letter, ‘concentration and combination ideas in the Cleveland district are brought to the fore by a 
wealthy syndicate, headed by Arthur Dorman… one of our most important and wealthiest 
clients.’  However, in addition to whatever concerns there were in the industry as a whole, there 
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are a number of possible underlying motives for Dorman Long’s takeover bids.  One is that they 
were defensive moves in reaction to the creation of South Durham Steel from four smaller iron 
and steel firms by Christopher Furness in order to supply his Hartlepool-based shipyards.  
Another is that the mergers were attempts to control production and hence reduce competition in 
an industry where long-term agreements to restrict supply and stabilise prices had proved to be 
unsustainable.  This interpretation contrasts with Payne’s contention that because of the 
‘absence of statutory provisions for dealing with monopoly problems’, as existed in the US, 
there was little incentive for British iron and steel firms to amalgamate.  They could rely on 
widespread inter-firm agreements and temporary cooperation to achieve the same end.  But as 
Wengenroth points out, these cartel-type agreements frequently collapsed, and this instability 
may have been another prompt to mergers in Cleveland as firms sought a surer way of limiting 
competition.
639
  Perhaps most of all, Dorman’s expansionist tendencies demonstrated that he 
was acutely aware of the challenges from American and German competitors.  As he stated in 
the 1900 annual report, although the order books were full that year, ‘any fresh business, owing 
to American competition, will have to be taken at very much lower prices’.640  Dorman Long’s 
growth therefore was more than just increasing the scale of the business and dominating as 
much of the Cleveland industry as possible through a series of apparently haphazard takeovers.  
It was an expansion designed to reduce costs and maintain the firm’s market position.  This was 
the logic underlying the second strand of the firm’s growth strategy, vertically integrating 
production by acquiring iron smelting firms that also had substantial iron ore and coal interests.   
 
It is clear that Bell Brothers fits this explanation as does the attempt to takeover Samuelson’s.  
Indeed, Samuelson’s made more sense than Bell’s; the Newport works were next door to the 
Britannia steelworks, thus making the supply of molten iron feasible, and the company 
produced both hematite and Cleveland pig which Dorman Long could use in acid and basic 
open hearth furnaces respectively.  In the event, despite the failure of the initial bid, over time 
the interests of the two works and firms became more closely intertwined, first with short-term 
and then long-term agreements, for supplying iron.  Later, in 1912, Francis Samuleson, 
Samuelson’s chairman and managing director, joined the Dorman Long board, and eventually 
there was a full takeover in 1917.
641
  Bell Brothers works was less well placed, being on the 
opposite side of the Tees.  But with the development of the Clarence steelworks, leased and 
managed by Dorman Long, Bell’s effectively operated as the steelmaker’s iron-producing 
department.  To some extent even the attempted Bolckow Vaughan acquisition can be seen as 
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part of the same strategy; it offered considerable iron ore and coal resources and an enormous 
blast furnace capacity.  
 
For Dorman Long, a specialist steel producer that relied on buying-in its iron and coal supplies, 
this backward vertical integration was important on two grounds.  First it gave the security of 
supply for the main inputs, insulating it from market fluctuations and reducing the transaction 
costs of negotiating supply agreements.  Second, as Dorman Long shifted towards producing 
basic open hearth steel at both the Britannia and Clarence sites, substantial cost reductions could 
be obtained by supplying molten iron directly from the blast furnaces to the mixers and 
subsequently to the steel furnaces.  Acquiring blast furnace plant was one way of ensuring and 
coordinating this supply. 
 
The company’s vertical integration also took the form of a movement into downstream 
intermediate and final products.  This is probably best seen as part of the diversification process, 
and makes up the third strand of Dorman Long’s strategy.  It extended the product range beyond 
the staples of ship plate, angles and girders into wire, iron and steel sheets and the development 
of a wide ranging collection of construction and bridge building services.  Expansion in this 
direction was not entirely by acquisitions; it was more the result of internal growth through 
capital investment, especially on the construction side.  The aims were: to enabled the spreading 
of risks by creating a diversified iron and steel company; to make use of the basic output of the 
firm – bulk steel; and to exploit the complementarities between the products.  The last was most 
evident in the construction business, where the objective was to offer customers a broad product 
range, reducing the need to source different products from different suppliers.  In short, there 
was an understanding, though not explicitly stated, of the benefits of economies of scope. 
 
The Bell Brothers merger can also be seen as making a contribution to diversification.  Not all 
iron producing capacity of the Port Clarence blast furnaces was, or could be, used to supply the 
steel plant.  A substantial proportion was forge and foundry iron that could be produced very 
competitively in Cleveland and had a ready market both at home and as exports.  Bell Brothers’ 
coal interests also served a similar dual purpose, not only supplying the Dorman Long 
companies’ iron and steel production, but also acting as a separate business that was profitable 
in its own right.  Indeed, in the period from 1896 to 1902 most of Bell Brothers’ profits came 
from their coal sales rather than from iron production.
642
  Even the NESCo takeover contributed 
to process of diversification, although it is more difficult to place in the Dorman Long strategy.  
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The company provided Dorman Long with a basic Bessemer plant to complement its basic open 
hearth production, and gave it a way into the rail market. 
 
The fourth element of the strategy was technological.  First and foremost Dorman Long’s 
expansion would not have been possible without an ability to produce good quality steel in bulk.  
Central to this was the switch from iron to acid open hearth steel for the expanding ship plate 
market in the mid-1880s followed by the experimentation with, and adoption of, the basic open 
hearth process.
643
  This latter move broke Cleveland’s dependence on imported ore for the 
manufacture of mild steel by releasing the constraint on the use of Cleveland pig in steel 
production.  Up to that time Cleveland pig had been confined to the basic Bessemer process and 
had a fairly limited market, mainly for rails.  The effect was to enable exploitation of the 
district’s natural advantages of low quality, but cheaply produced, basic pig iron to be used to 
manufacture steel that was suitable for most markets.  That this was a deliberate long-term 
strategy is shown by the company’s persistence with trials in the basic open hearth process from 
the first experiments in 1891 to successful production in 1905-6 when the technical problems 
had been finally resolved.  For the latter part of the period this involved some sacrifice of 
profits, especially in 1904 and 1905 when the plant was not fully operational.  The link with 
Bell Brothers can also be seen as a way of buying-in expertise in basic open hearth methods, 
and of acquiring the necessary plant.  Initially, this was to allow experimental and 
developmental work on the process to be carried out at the Clarence steelworks while the 
Britannia furnaces maintained their profitable production of acid steel.  Later, after the new 
steelworks had been built at Clarence, the Britannia works could be changed over to the new 
process and the company’s steel production maintained.644 
 
The commitment to introducing new technology went beyond the basic process, and in a 
number of other areas Dorman Long was comparatively early to adopt new equipment and 
machinery, often following advances on the continent and in America.  Much of the influence 
may have been due to Arthur Dorman, whom Boswell describes as an ‘enthusiast for 
technological progress’.645  On numerous occasions, Dorman justified to shareholders 
investment in new technology, such as in 1900 when he stated in the annual report: ‘It is 
necessary constantly to discard old machinery in favour of more modern appliances, what is 
new today is often obsolete and out of date tomorrow… our eyes are open to the superior 
mechanical contrivances of other countries, it only remains for our engineers and managers to 
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apply them.’646  One example, electrification, is sufficient to illustrate the firm’s interest in new 
technology. 
 
In a series of four papers in the JISI between 1894 and 1910, Selby-Bigge, an electrical engineer 
from Newcastle, was repeatedly critical of the slow adoption of electrical plant by British iron 
and steel manufacturers.
647
  Writing in 1907 he commented that ‘with few exceptions, far 
greater attention has been given to this subject (electrification) on the Continent than in this 
country, and it is undoubtedly high time that engineers in Great Britain fully realised this fact, 
and having studied the subject more closely, acted on the results of their investigation.’648  He 
does note, however, that there were some exceptions and ‘pioneers’; the two he identified were 
Dorman Long and Bell Brothers.  The first electrical installations at Dorman Long were in the 
Britannia works’ girder shops in 1894 where electric motors replaced steam, hydraulic or 
pneumatic drives for machinery such as saws, straighteners, punching machines and overhead 
travellers.
649
  The electricity was generated by the firm’s own power station.  Selby-Bigge, who 
given his contacts with Dorman Long, may well have had a significant influence on the 
electrification of the works, estimated a cost saving of this early equipment of 30 tons of coal 
per week.
650
  Over the next few years the use of electrical appliances was extended across the 
plant to include cranes, lifting gear and live rollers used to transport steel between the different 
rolling mills. Bell Brothers also introduced electrical equipment in the late 1890s, again 
including live rollers for the mills. 
 
The use of electric motors to drive rolling mills was introduced in the industry at a rather later 
date.  Even in Germany, as Daelen reported in 1902, electricity was used mainly for the 
ancillary machinery.
651
  It was employed first in light rolling such as in wire-drawing, and 
Dorman Long operated one of the earliest electrical mills in Britain at the Cleveland Wireworks.  
This plant had been built between 1894 and 1895 by the Bedson Wire Company but taken over 
by Arthur Dorman in1896 (as R.P. Dorman and Co) and two years later became part of the 
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Dorman Long.
652
  For heavy duty primary rolling in reversing mills (cogging mills and roughing 
mills) it was not until 1906-7 that a satisfactory electric motor (based on the Ilgner system) had 
been developed in Austria.
653
  Once again Dorman Long was early to install the new 
technology, first converting two mills at the West Marsh site and later installing two new ones 
at Britannia.  By 1912, after some initial problems, the firm had four electric mills in operation, 
one reversible cogging mill, one roughing mill and two finishing mills.
654
  This is not to say that 
other Cleveland firms, or iron and steel firms elsewhere, did not electrify their works.  In fact, 
by 1900 many of the larger works on Teesside had their own plant powered by waste steam 
from blast furnaces or gas from steel furnaces to generate electricity for lighting and to power 
other equipment.  For example, by 1908 Bolckow Vaughan generated its own electricity, and 
rather earlier, in 1902, Selby-Bigge reported that two engineering companies, Richardson 
Westgarth (Hartlepool) and Head Wrightson (Stockton) had installed electric motors to replace 
steam engines.  And following the successful use of electric motors in reversible mills, Henry 
Crowe commented at an ISI discussion that there was considerable interest in Cleveland, with 
the new steelworks being built at Skinningrove considering an electric mill.
655
  However, it 
remains the case that Dorman Long was among the earliest of the British firms to introduce 
electrical equipment, and this was despite an unsettled dispute in the industry over the reliability 
and cost advantages of electric mills over their steam driven counterparts.  The influential 
rolling mill engineer and designer, Lamberton, was sceptical, and in 1911 there were even 
reports that some German mills were reverting to steam.
656
  A measure of British steelmasters’ 
scepticism, or as Selby-Bigge put it ‘apathy…and lack of enterprise’, is shown by a comparison 
of the electric rolling mill capacity installed in Britain and on the Continent between 1907 and 
1910.  Citing figures from two of the main electrical manufacturers, Selby-Bigge states that 
while 605,000 bhp was installed on the continent, just 20,000 bhp in Britain, just one-thirtieth of 
the capacity.
657
  In its attitude to technological strategy, therefore, it appears that Dorman Long 
was closer to its European and American competitors than some of its British ones. 
 
Lastly, in the fifth strand of the strategy, developing the managerial and sales aspects of the 
organisation, the company was also making changes along the American lines, although there is 
no evidence of any direct influence. In comparison with later advances management 
organisation, Dorman Long’s were very basic, but they did demonstrate an understanding of the 
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importance of coordinating the different parts of the firm and having the information to do this.  
Thus the main Dorman Long board received regular reports from various parts of the firm and 
its subsidiaries to help monitoring and a management committee of the managing directors of 
the three constituent firms was set up.  This was responsible for the overall coordination and 
strategy of the business and shows that while the companies maintained their independence in a 
nominal sense, they were effectively part of the Dorman Long ‘Group’.  On the sales and 
marketing side, there was an effort to exercise increasing control over distribution and move 
closer to customers.  The firm established branches and stock yards both at home and abroad in 
order to reduce the dependence on the traditional mode of distribution through agents.  It was a 
policy that was associated closely with the development of the firm as a supplier of 
constructional steel and construction services. 
 
Taken together, these five features indicate a marked strategic element behind Dorman Long’s 
expansion.  This was not a strategy in the modern business sense of a precise vision of the 
position of the company at some time in the future that would be realised by the implementation 
of a carefully formulated plan.  It was more a case of an identifiable general aim, not necessarily 
very clearly specified, and a discernible consistency in the steps taken to achieve it.  Not all the 
steps were mapped out in advance – some may have developed in response to changing 
circumstances – but in retrospect they can be seen as complementary.  For Dorman Long the 
broad objectives were to grow, remain competitive and profitable, and this was supported by 
acquisitions, investment in new plant and technology, and the marketing and organisational 
changes that the firm made to manage the growing size and scope of its business.  It may be the 
business and economic historians’ vice to see a strategy when what is actually being observed is 
a business success resulting from chance, when a firm’s right (or wrong) past decisions later 
enable it to take advantage of favourable changes in external circumstances.  There was an 
element of this for Dorman Long; for example the failure of the bid for Bolckow Vaughan may 
have had unanticipated beneficial effects.  Had it been successful the company may have grown 
too quickly, and there must be some doubt as to whether the necessary managerial changes 
would have been made.  Indeed, a possible outcome is that it would have remained a separate 
business operating along the lines of US Steel, where the parent company ‘did little more that 
form an office to help set the price and production schedules for the many almost completely 
autonomous divisions.’658   
 
Nevertheless, in spite of the qualifications, there were a sufficient number of deliberate policy 
decisions and long-term commitments to conclude that Dorman Long was managed with a 
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degree of strategic foresight.  It was more than just chance, therefore, that the company was in a 
reasonably strong position to take advantage of a buoyant iron and steel market in the years 
immediately up to 1914, and to weather depressed periods without making losses, apart from 
during the obviously difficult years of 1903 to 1905.  Profits rose for much of the period after 
incorporation, and from 1900 exceeded £100,000 in nine out of fifteen years.  After talking 
account of the highly cyclical nature of the industry, profits on average increased fourfold 
compared to Bolckow Vaughan and Consett, whose profits doubled (Figure 7.4, Table 7.7).  
Much of this reflected the increasing size of the company and when measured by indicators of 
financial performance, Dorman Long’s profitability was considerably more modest (Table 7.7, 
Figure 7.5).  The 6.8 per cent return on capital employed was broadly in line with other firms on 
Teesside, e.g. 6.6 per cent for Bolckow Vaughan, and well below the 20.8 per cent for Consett, 
acknowledged to be one of the most profitable iron and steel companies at the time.
659
  
Consequently, Consett was able to pay a dividend for ordinary shareholders of 28.6 per cent.  
By contrast, Dorman Long’s shareholders received a dividend rate of 6.1 per cent on average, 
which was marginally higher than that for Bolckow Vaughan (5.6 per cent) but barely above the 
rate on debentures (4 to 6 per cent).  With a coefficient of variation for the dividend payments of 
63 per cent and two years without any (1904 and 1905), the returns were clearly inadequate 
compensation for the additional risks to share- over bond holders.  It is not surprising that the 
firm relied on issues of debt to finance its expansion rather than new issues of shares.
660
  On the 
other hand, the difference in the dividend yield was far less marked, suggesting that stock 
markets were pricing the shares reasonably efficiently.
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Table 7.7: Comparative Financial Performance, 1890-1914 
Profit (after interest) £ 
 
Dorman Long Bolckow Vaughan Consett 
1890-4 38,403 140,067 207,096 
1895-9 45,238 109,744 250,182 
1900-4 63,025 255,130 405,812 
1905-9 103,116 341,334 332,814 
1910-4 169,289 279,315 395,369 
Mean 83,814 225,118 318,255 
 
Return on Capital Employed (per cent)
a 
 
Dorman Long Bolckow Vaughan Consett 
1890-4 7.4 3.7 19.5 
1895-9 7.4 7.2 21.9 
1900-4 5.7 7.5 22.2 
1905-9 5.2 8.0 18.5 
1910-4 8.5 6.4 21.9 
Mean 6.8 6.6 20.8 
 
Dividend Rate on Ordinary Shares (per cent) 
 
Dorman Long Bolckow Vaughan Consett 
1890-4 6.6 3.2 20.3 
1895-9 5.8 5.2 19.1 
1900-4 6.7 6.5 36.0 
1905-9 4.6 6.4 29.2 
1910-4 6.9 6.6 38.2 
Mean 6.1 5.6 28.6 
Coefficient of 
variation
b
  63% 38% 45% 
 
Dividend yield (per cent)
 
 
 
Dorman Long
 
Bolckow Vaughan Consett 
1890-4 -- 4.9 5.8 
1895-9 -- 5.9 5.2 
1900-4 3.2 5.8 8.0 
1905-9 5.2 6.0 6.3 
1910-4 7.3 6.5 8.2 
Mean 5.2 5.8 6.7 
Notes: 
a:capital employed is defined as shareholders’ funds plus total long-term liabilities. b: the 
coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.   
Sources:  
1. Data for Dorman Long and Bolckow Vaughan are derived from the companies’ annual reports and 
directors’ minutes - DLAR, 1890-1914, DLDM, 1890-1914; BVAR, 1890-1914, BVDM, 1890-1914. 
2. Dividend yields are calculated on the share price at the time of the dividend announcement and 
publication of the annual report.  Share prices for Dorman Long are recorded in the directors’ 
minutes; they were not listed on the London Stock Exchange before 1900.  For Bolckow Vaughan, 
the share price is taken from The Investors Monthly Manual, (1890-1914) available at: 
http://icf.som.yale.edu/imm/index.shtml 
3.  Consett data are taken from Richardson and Bass, ‘Profitability of Consett’, pp. 91-2. 
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Figure 7.4: Dorman Long Profits, 1890-1914 (£) 
 
Sources: DLAR, 1890-1914. 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Return on Capital Employed, 1885-1914 (per cent p.a.) 
 
Sources: Dorman Long – DLAR, 1890-1914; Bolckow Vaughan – BVAR 1885-1914; Consett – 
Richardson and Bass, ‘Profitability of Consett’, pp. 91-2. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
 
This close examination of Dorman Long has shown that there was a degree of strategic design 
behind the firm’s expansion.  The conclusion that British firms at the end of the nineteenth 
century lacked a strategic outlook or failed to adapt to technical or organisational changes is not 
the case for all firms.  Dorman Long successfully converted from a specialist puddling and iron 
rolling firm to a steelmaker and then to a vertically integrated and diversified steel company.  
This was achieved largely, though not exclusively, through a series of takeovers, which for a 
relatively late entrant to Teesside’s industry was the most feasible route for growth.  Since most 
of the critical resources – iron ore, coal and a riverside production site – were already under the 
ownership of existing firms, the almost exclusively internal growth path pursued by Bolckow 
Vaughan and Consett was not open.  There was, nevertheless, an important internal growth 
element, with Dorman Long diversifying output, developing a distribution network and, perhaps 
most of all, adopting new technology as soon as practicable, notably acid open hearth in the 
1880s and basic open hearth process in the 1900s.  The firm also took some rudimentary steps 
to manage a large and diverse group of businesses, controlling them through the Dorman Long 
board and the management committee of the group’s managing directors. 
 
The process, however, was not fully carried through and this left a legacy of separate plants in 
different locations across Teesside.  While potential problems were disguised for a time by the 
War and the boom immediately afterwards, the failure to integrate and modernise its production, 
or to develop further the managerial and organisational structures, meant that Dorman Long 
found it difficult to deal with the deteriorating economic conditions during the 1920s.
661
  In 
short, the company made a promising start to the transition to a large corporation, but failed to 
capitalise on this early advantage. 
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 Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
This study had two broad aims.  The first was to examine and assess the contribution of 
business networks to the initial development and early growth of the iron and steel industry in 
Cleveland. The second was to investigate the transition of the industry from the 1870s to 
determine how effectively the district’s firms responded to significant changes in technology, 
international competition, corporate legislation and financial markets.  Thus it was intended that 
the thesis would add to an understanding of the growth of an industry and industrial district, and 
also of the way in which prosperity can be sustained in the face of changing circumstances.  In 
addition, by looking at a crucial sector of Britain’s economy at a critical time the study would 
provide if not a new perspective, then more evidence in the debate over Britain’s industrial 
decline that has been seen by many historians as rooted in the late Victorian and Edwardian 
period.
662
 
 
The conclusions can be summarised as follows.  Firstly, the operation of business networks was 
important for the early development of the Cleveland iron cluster, providing the means of 
marshalling resources and stimulating the entry or formation of new businesses in the industry.  
Secondly, the district made the transition from iron to steel successfully despite difficult 
domestic resource and market conditions, and an international environment in which trade 
protection by, and the rate of expansion in, the US and Germany put British producers at a 
considerable disadvantage.  Thirdly, in the process of adaptation, Cleveland firms made use of 
developments in financial markets and changes in corporate legislation to finance and expand 
successful businesses.  Fourthly, the evidence from some of Cleveland’s largest firms shows 
that far from being technologically backward, slow to look to new markets or to introduce 
organisational changes, they made both rational and entrepreneurial decisions as and when 
conditions permitted.   
 
In Part 1, analysis both from theoretical (Chapter 2) and empirical (Chapter 3) perspectives 
show that business networks do play a role in the growth and industrial clustering process.  
Research on the origins and connections between firms entering Cleveland from 1850 reveal, 
unsurprisingly, that many were already linked to the industry, either regionally or nationally.  
Many of the other, later entrants also had pre-existing connections to the developing industrial 
district.  The main finding, however, is that at the beginnings of the industry a disproportionate 
number of firms and entrepreneurs were connected to the Quaker family and business network 
centred on the Darlington-based Pease and Backhouse interests.  Moreover, these firms were 
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more likely to survive for a longer period.  Consequently, this group made a significant 
contribution to the growth of the industry in its first ten to twenty years.
663
 
 
It is not suggested that the impact of the Quaker network and the high proportion of Quaker-
linked firms was due directly to the application of Quaker attributes or outlook to the conduct of 
business.
664
  The reasons for its influence are twofold.  First, as Kirby, Orde and Cookson have 
all noted in connection with the S&DR, the family networks were extensive, close and 
cohesive.
665
  The nature of the group was such that Quaker families were not only keen to find 
Quaker husbands and wives for their daughters and sons, but to set up the sons in occupations or 
business, and where possible supply the finance.
666
  The developing Cleveland iron industry 
provided opportunities for those with business and engineering talent and as a result there were 
a significant number of ironmasters with Quaker origins – Isaac Wilson, William and Thomas 
Whitwell, Edgar Gilkes, William Leatham, Jeremiah and Charles Head, J.B. Pease and Edward 
Crewdson were all partners in iron firms.  However, the family-cum-religious links between 
firms is not a full explanation. 
 
There is a more convincing reason: there had to be an incentive for the Pease-Backhouse 
interests to encourage inward investment and the development of the district.  This arose from 
their own investments in existing local businesses, notably the transport system, mines, property 
in Middlesbrough and banking services.  All of these stood to gain from the development of an 
iron industry.  It was then by using the family and religious connections that this Quaker 
network successfully attracted and supported the entry of firms into the industry.  Moreover, 
new entrants did not just replicate plant at the same stage of production; they added to the 
development of the district by downstream processing of pig iron and diversification into 
closely related activities.   
 
At a more general level, the Cleveland example suggests there are a number of conditions that 
have to be met at the beginning of the growth and clustering process.  First, there has to be some 
locational advantages to start development.  Second, there needs to be a means through which 
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new firms are attracted to the industry in order to generate expansion.  This is provided by 
business networks, the connections between entrepreneurs that transmit information about 
potentially profitable investments, and which also coordinate and supply the necessary 
resources.  The third condition is for the presence of an incentive to localise industry and thus 
concentrate development in the district.  One possible explanation arises from the ownership of 
the local infrastructure.  For physical capital such as railways and ports, there is a powerful 
incentive for investors in these assets to stimulate increased usage – with high fixed costs, unit 
costs fall and profits rise as they are used more intensively.  For other services such as banking 
and shipping, increased development raises demand, creating opportunities for business 
expansion.  The effects are also cumulative, resulting not only from the benefits of clustering 
that stem from agglomeration economies, an expanding network and a growing institutional 
infrastructure (see Figure 2.3) ; there are also incentives to improve the physical  infrastructure 
(e.g. railways), thus further adding to the advantages of the district. 
 
This interpretation lends support to the ‘history matters’ view of regional economic 
development.  Arthur, David and Rosenbloom, and Krugman have all shown that historical 
events, even small ones, can have major and lasting impacts on the location of firms and the 
development industrial districts.
667
  A small accident of history that places the initial site of an 
industry in a particular town may over time have a cumulative effect leading to the town 
becoming a centre of a specialist industrial cluster. It may be that originally the location was 
almost a random event, perhaps one of several equally appropriate places, the product of the 
preferences of workers, or of entrepreneurs over where to set up in business.  As industry 
develops in this location, it acquires the benefits of agglomeration, advantages that grow as the 
industry grows.  What this suggests is that even at the outset the development of an industry is 
not necessarily determined by ‘natural’ geographical or geological factors.  The incentives 
facing, and choices made by, entrepreneurs setting up the first businesses in the industry are 
crucial, and subsequent expansion is influenced by the networks to which they are connected.  
Cleveland is perhaps an example of this process, though at first sight not an obvious one. 
 
The emphasis that has been placed on networks contrasts with the impersonal market 
mechanism view of standard economic theory in which economic agents react to price signals.  
But it can be argued that the two approaches are complementary.  Markets work in a social 
context, decisions have to be taken by, and actions co-ordinated between, people.  Recognising 
networks as the channel through which signals are sent, especially where organised and well-
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developed markets do not exist, adds detail and richness to the analysis, and helps to uncover 
causal links that may not otherwise be identified.  On the other hand, the contribution of 
networks should not be overstated.  The setting in which they have been used in this study is 
one of industrial expansion.  They provided the means through which expansion could occur, 
but without underlying incentives – an underutilised infrastructure and a strong demand for the 
product – there would have been no development.  In general the findings and interpretation in 
this study are largely consistent with the results of the cases in Wilson and Popp’s Industrial 
Clusters.  These studies stressed the importance of networks to the initial development of 
industrial clusters, especially in underdeveloped regions, as Teesside was in the 1850s, with 
religion and family ties providing ‘supportive social structures to the creating of effective 
business structures’.668  Wilson and Popp, following Casson, also suggest that leadership is 
crucial, and in Cleveland’s case this was provided by Joseph Pease from the Quaker side, and 
by industrialists such as Lowthian Bell, Henry Bolckow and Isaac Wilson.
669
 
 
While the absence of networks may hamper development, their presence does not guarantee 
good business or economic performance.  Entrepreneurs also have to take advantage of, or 
indeed make, opportunities.  It may be that in new industries or industrialising districts this is 
more likely than in established ones, where networks may become sclerotic and used to defend 
the interests of existing businesses, e.g. by enforcing cartel agreements or other anti-competitive 
practices, rather than as means for economic growth or renewal.  An example is the Manchester 
cotton industry in the early part of the twentieth century.
670
  Overall, therefore, the existence of a 
business network is a necessary condition for economic growth, but it is not in itself sufficient; 
there is no substitute for the quality of enterprise.  Networks may function well, but 
entrepreneurs still have to respond to the signals. 
 
The second part of the thesis suggests that Cleveland’s iron- and steel-masters did respond 
appropriately, at least in a number of important cases, when there were signs by the mid-1870s 
that the district’s iron-based prosperity was flagging and at risk of petering out.  Yasumoto has 
recently argued that ‘it [Middlesbrough] experienced the full life cycle of an industrial district 
over these years [1850 to 1880]’.671  But the evidence indicates that by adapting to the shifting 
external conditions, in the time up to 1914 Cleveland was able to maintain its position as one of 
Britain’s principal iron and steel producing districts.   
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The key to the industry’s continued prosperity was for the manufactured iron producers to make 
a transition to steel by adopting the new developments in bulk steel production technology.  A 
number of Teesside firms, though by no means all, did respond, and even though the spectacular 
growth of the early years was not repeated, something that would have been highly unlikely in a 
mature industry, the changeover prevented the industry entering an inexorable and terminal 
decline, or at the very least contracting to settle at a lower level.  
 
If, as has been claimed, there was a relatively slow take up of new steel technology compared to 
the US and Germany, then there were often sound market and technical reasons.  First, a boom 
in demand for iron ship-plate as the iron rail market declined did delay the introduction of the 
acid open hearth process, but the switchover was rapid once it became apparent in the mid-
1880s that shipbuilders preferred steel.  Second, Bessemer steel was never accepted in the high 
quality (mild) steel market that became so important to British producers.  Third, although two 
Cleveland firms pioneered the basic Bessemer process, the technical problems of using 
Cleveland pig left them at a cost disadvantage and prevented the spread of the technology both 
in Cleveland and Britain.  Fourth, market resistance to basic steel of any description, the success 
of acid open hearth steel, and the technical problems of using Cleveland’s moderately high 
phosphorus pig iron in the basic open hearth furnace may also have slowed the introduction of 
the process that eventually came to dominate the industry – the basic open hearth.  Nevertheless, 
there is ample evidence of widespread interest in the method across the British industry.  Trials 
started in the early 1880s and technical information was exchanged between firms through the 
meetings and publications of the industry’s technical institutions and in the trade’s newspaper 
(ICTR).  There were personal contacts with and visits to producers in the US and continental 
Europe, and some exchange of technical staff.  In Cleveland experiments using the basic open 
hearth started from the late 1880s and the process was adopted from 1900, both clear signs that 
at least some producers were aware of its potential and understood the implications for the 
district. One, Dorman Long, stands out as willing to take the risk of making an early 
commitment.  On the evidence it would be difficult to conclude that Cleveland’s firms, and 
perhaps Britain’s industry, were neglectful of basic open hearth steel. It has not been possible to 
judge whether the optimum technological choices were made, but as a general point, 
comparisons with US and German industry on which previous assessments of relative 
performance were based have not always taken account of local circumstances.
672
  Firms in all 
three countries faced very different resource and market conditions that affected the selection of 
technology and the timing of its introduction. 
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A feature of this later period is the emergence of a more corporate-style economy in which large 
firms began to replace the family-firm based capitalism that characterised the early stages of 
development.  The change was made possible by the free availability of corporate status, which 
Cleveland firms used flexibly and in a variety of ways.  Large corporate businesses were slow to 
appear, however.  For many the primary motivation for converting to a joint stock company was 
to obtain the protection of limited liability whilst at the same time enabling the original partners 
or their families to retain ownership and control.  An important implication of the predominance 
of what were essentially private limited companies is that access to the capital market for 
investment funds was clearly not a prime motivation for conversion.  Indeed, like incorporation, 
the capital markets were also used flexibly, as the examples of Bolckow Vaughan and Dorman 
Long indicate.  In the case of Bolckow Vaughan the ability to issue equity and debt meant that 
the firm was able to balance three demands on the business: the desire of the original partners to 
capitalise their business assets with high dividend payments to shareholders, including 
themselves, and the need for funds to finance capital investment.  In terms of the type of capital 
issued, the two detailed examples show that in line with national trends, there was an increasing 
use of debt securities.  As well as reflecting investor preferences for stable returns, there were 
also benefits to the companies.  It gave firms the ability to raise low costs funds, to manage 
liabilities through the retirement debt when profits were high and may also have reflected a 
desire not to dilute control or spread dividend payments more thinly.  Moreover, the ease with 
which both Bolckow Vaughan and Dorman Long were able to raise finance through new issues 
indicates that investment does not appear to have been constrained by a general shortage of 
funds. 
 
By about 1900 large incorporated enterprises began to dominate, and the industry in Cleveland 
became increasingly concentrated.  Bolckow Vaughan, already a large vertically integrated 
company at the time of its incorporation in 1865, was joined by Dorman Long and the South 
Durham-Cargo Fleet group; but unlike Bolckow Vaughan, which grew internally, Dorman Long 
and South Durham expanded principally by a series of mergers and takeovers.  It was 
developments in the securities markets that facilitated the increasing concentration in the sector, 
operating through mechanisms such as issuing debentures to raise cash to finance acquisitions, 
exchanging shares or issuing new shares to exchange for those of the acquired company.  Thus 
the importance of financial market developments lay not just in whether they eased restrictions 
on the supply of finance for capital investment, but also in providing a means through which 
successful firms could expand.  In short, they formed the basis for the growth of large 
corporations.   
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Running alongside the growth in corporate enterprise and finance, other features of Cleveland’s 
industry that can be identified are the beginnings of corporate strategy and of a more managerial 
style of capitalism.  This is demonstrated by the case study of Dorman Long.  Outwardly, the 
firm was made up of three separate and independently managed companies linked only by 
ownership; but this is misleading.  Although only nascent, the parent company established 
mechanisms to coordinate the management and strategy of the three firms.  This operated 
through interlocking membership of the boards and by setting up a committee of managing 
directors to oversee operations and make crucial decisions.  There was also the regular 
collection and monitoring of information on the three businesses by the Dorman Long board.  
And although founding families often dominated boards and held senior management positions, 
there was an increasing reliance on professional managers and technical experts brought in from 
outside or promoted through the firm (e.g. Panton and Mosscrop at Dorman Long and Benjamin 
Talbot at South Durham-Cargo Fleet).  Along with the organisational changes, Dorman Long 
itself adopted identifiable strategies: towards marketing by controlling distribution and getting 
close to customers; by diversifying the product range; and through the acquisition of assets to 
support the shift from acid to basic open hearth steel.  Although these developments were more 
rudimentary than contemporary moves in US business, and the later shifts Britain, they do mark 
the beginnings of the evolution of a more corporate form of business, and were perhaps more 
advanced than is sometimes assumed.
673
  
 
Lastly, the moves towards a corporate economy brought changes to the nature of the networks 
operating in the industry. The connections that linked iron- and steel-masters who had interests 
in different businesses remained, but by the end of the nineteenth century they had evolved.  
This was partly the result of the decline in the relative importance of the Quaker business 
interests, but perhaps more important was the effect of incorporation, which shifted the linkages 
from a series of overlapping partnerships in a number of family-owned firms to interlocking 
directorships.
674
  And as consolidation and concentration of the industry into fewer firms 
progressed, the external networks were eventually replaced by ones internal to companies, 
comprising departments, distribution branches and subsidiaries.  The external networks that 
became increasingly important were the industry associations and, as suggested in Chapter 6, 
the professional organisations of technical experts through which advances in technology were 
transmitted.  In terms of Toms and Filatotchev’s general framework in which network 
characteristics and their effects on economic performance shift as the underlying resource base 
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and dependence of an industry changes, Cleveland at this time does not seem to fit the model 
especially well.
675
  Or, at least, the match is not as close at that with the Lancashire cotton 
industry, where the growing self-reliance of firms and interlocking directorships resulted in 
opaque networks.  The consequences were reduced accountability and thus weaker incentives to 
make the investments needed to ensure the longer-term health and survival of the industry.
676
  
The move to larger, integrated firms in Cleveland did reduce resource dependence, and with 
control often vested in family members, it would appear that there was limited transparency and 
accountability to external stakeholders, especially shareholders.  Nevertheless, the industry 
made the transition to steel and a more corporate form of enterprise, and significantly, it was in 
the most successful firms where the family presence on the board was greatest – i.e. at Dorman 
Long and South Durham-Cargo Fleet.
677
  The crucial element therefore seems to be the quality 
of the entrepreneurial decisions made, particularly by Arthur Dorman at Dorman Long and 
Christopher Furness and Benjamin Talbot at South Durham-Cargo Fleet.  In short, performance 
and the ability to adapt to changing external circumstances may owe more to factors specific to 
an industry at a particular time than they do to the structure of ownership and control. 
 
The Cleveland iron and steel industry and industrial district did not pass through the full life 
cycle in a single generation after 1850.  The transition to steel was successfully completed in 
three main stages as the more forward-looking firms adopted new processes when technological 
and market conditions allowed.  There is also evidence that entrepreneurial vitality persisted, 
with the most successful steelmasters building their businesses into large corporate enterprises.  
Consequently it is difficult to conclude that Cleveland’s, and thus Britain’s, iron and steel 
industry was backward as a whole and in decline before 1914, although there were underlying 
weaknesses that would be revealed in the 1920s after the post-war boom evaporated.  The 
results, along with the approach, of this thesis complement those of McCloskey and 
Wengenroth, who similarly concluded that there was little indication of entrepreneurial failure.  
McCloskey inferred his claim that ‘late nineteenth-century entrepreneurs in iron and steel did 
not fail…in fact they did very well indeed’ from estimates of US and British productivity, to 
which this study adds direct and detailed evidence from the investigations into the development 
of the basic open hearth process and the decision-making in major Cleveland iron and steel 
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companies.
678
  The work also extends Wengenroth’s research into the development of the acid 
open hearth process, pioneered in Scotland in the 1880s, to the basic open hearth process that 
made such an impact in Cleveland from the 1890s.
679
    
 
As for the industrial district on Teesside, other industries emerged out of iron and steel.  These 
were in the closely-related engineering and shipbuilding sectors, but also included gas 
production, electricity generation and chemicals, all of which developed from the by-products of 
iron and steel firms.  The study of the development of these industries would add a further 
dimension to an understanding of how the life cycle of industrial districts is maintained.  
 
 
 
  
                                            
678
 McCloskey, Economic Maturity, pp. 73-4, 124-5, 127. 
679
 Wengenroth, Enterprise. 
277 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Iron and Steel and Engineering Firms on Teesside 
 
The firms in this appendix provide the data for Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Abbreviations 
n.a.: information not available 
 
Sector (col. 2) 
IS: iron smelting (blast furnace plant). 
IP: iron and steel processing (puddling and rolling mills). 
IF: iron forge and foundry. 
IM: manufactured iron products (e.g. fire grates, fish plates). 
II: integrated or multi-product works (blast furnaces and processing). 
NFM: non-ferrous metals. 
I (n.a.): information not available. 
E: engineering. 
Sh: shipbuilding 
 
Outcome (col. 4) 
B: proprietor or partners bankrupt. 
D: partnership dissolved. 
M: merger. 
N: nationalised. 
L: liquidation. 
S: works (or part of) sold. 
T: takeover. 
 
Sources (col. 6) 
AWJ: Aberdeen Weekly Journal. 
BDP: Birmingham Daily Post. 
CITB: Teesside Archives’ Card Index of Teesside Businesses. 
CJSDA: Cleveland Journal and South Durham Advertiser. 
ICTR: Iron and Coal Trades Review. 
IME: Institution of Mechanical Engineers Proceedings. 
JISI: Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute 
LG: London Gazette. 
LM: Leeds Mercury. 
LpM: Liverpool Mercury. 
MT: Manchester Times. 
NC: Newcastle Courant. 
NE:  Northern Echo. 
NEG: North-Eastern Daily Gazette. 
TCCMJ: Teesside Chamber of Commerce Monthly Journal. 
YH: York Herald. 
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Firm Sector 
Est. on 
Teesside 
Date of 
closure, take-
over or 
merger 
Incorp-
orated BT 31 Reference and other sources 
Acklam Iron Co Ltd. 
 
I (n.a.) 1888 1893 1888 BT31/4215/27281. 
YH, 2 Jul. and 4 Oct. 1888; NEG, 7 Aug. 1888.  
 
Allan and Co Ltd. IF 1880 1936 
M 
 
1889 BT31/4314/28030; 112507/99524. 
CITB. 
 
Anderston Foundry Co Ltd. 
 
IM 1874 1962 
L 
 BT31: n.a. 
Hargrave thesis. 
 
Archer, John 
 
I (n.a.) c. 1880 1896  CITB. 
Armstrong, William, and Co. 
 
IF/NFM c. 1880 1898  CITB. 
Ashmore and White 
(Later Ashmore, Benson, Pease and 
Co Ltd.). 
 
IP/E 1871 1885 
T 
 TA: u/cc/4/6; Sowler, Stockton; NE, 31 Mar. 1885; CITB. 
 
Ashmore, Benson, Pease and Co Ltd. 
 
E 1885 1901 
T 
1885 TA: u/cc/4/6; Sowler, Stockton; NE, 31 Mar. 1885; LM, 27 April 
1885; CITB. 
 
Atlas Foundry Ltd. IF 1904 
 
1907 n.a. CITB. 
Avery, W. and T. Ltd. 
 
I (n.a.) 1891 1906 1891 BT31/5022/33668. 
CITB. 
 
Aydon, A.H. 
 
 
n.a. c. 1885  1939  CITB. 
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Bacon , William, and Co. 
 
IP By 1873 1876 
B 
 Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1873; NE, 3 Feb. 1876. 
 
Bagnall, C. and T. 
(Grosmont Ironworks Co Ltd.) 
 
IS 1860  1891 
L 
1860 BT31/511/2033. 
 LM, 15 Aug. 1864; NE, 1 Nov 1879; 20 Jul. 1891; Harrison, ‘Pig 
iron’, p. 67. 
 
Barningham Brothers 
 
IF 1850 
 
1856 
L 
 Ward’s Directory, 1851; Jeans, Pioneers, pp. 178-90. 
 
Bastow, Samuel 
  
 
IF/E 1846 1867 
L 
1865 The Examiner, 17 June 1865; Daily News, 10 Aug. 1866; Daily News, 
28 Aug. 1867; Leeds Mercury, 20 Aug. 1869; Northern Echo, 24 
Mar. 1870; Birmingham Daily Post, 26 April 1871; CITB. 
 
Bedford and Leach 
 
IM By 1873 n.a.  Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1873.  
 
Bedson Wire Company Ltd. 
 
IM 1892 
 
c. 1896 
T 
1892 BT31/5389/37078. 
Dorman Long, Works, p. 12. 
 
Bell Brothers. 
 
IS 1844 1899 
T 
1873 BT31/1916/7855. 
Dorman Long, Works, pp. 39-61; ICTR, 2 Oct. 1908; BS.BB. 
 
Blackett, Hutton and Co Ltd. 
 
IF/E 1862 1947 n.a. BT31: n.a. 
CITB 
Blair and Co 
Ltd. 
 
E 1865 1931 
L 
1865 BT31/1184/2603C. 
 Industries of Stockton, 1890, p. 24; CITB. 
 
Bland Bros. Ltd. 
 
I (n.a.) By 1896  n.a. 1902 BT31/9642/71669. 
CITB. 
 
Bolckow Vaughan and Co Ltd. 
 
II 1840 1928 
T 
1865 BT31/30734/1705C. 
Jeans, Pioneers, pp. 47-66, 67-83; BS.BV. 
 
Bolsover Bros Ltd. 
 
E 1903 1917 1903  BT31/16976/76454; CITB. 
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 Bower, George 
 
IF 1876 c. 1896 1876 CITB. 
Bowesfield Iron Co Ltd. IP 1870  c. 1890 1870 and 
1871 
BT31/1565/5088; 1643/5670. 
Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871, 1873; Industries of Stockton, 
1890, pp. 34; Jeans, Pioneers, pp. 94-116; Harrison, ‘Malleable iron’, 
p. 136; NE, 9 Sept. 1890 . 
 
Bowesfield Steel Co Ltd. 
 
IP 1896 1912 
T 
1896 BT31/31448/48431. 
BS.BOW.  
 
Britannia Iron Works Co Ltd. 
 
 
IP 1870  
 
1876 
L 
1870/1872 BT31/1551/4982; 1753/6529. 
 NE, 15 Dec. 1870; BDP, 11 April 1871, 7 Dec 1872; Burdett and & 
Hood, Directory 1873.  
 
British Chilled Roll and Engineering 
Co Ltd. 
 
IP 1907 1937 
T 
1907 TCCMJ, July 1930; correspondence with Frances MacLennan, see 
note 135; CITB. 
  
British Metal Expansion Co Ltd. 
 
IP/E 1889 n.a. 1889 BT31/4527/29609. 
CITB. 
 
Brown Bros. 
 
E c. 1884 1911-12  CITB. 
Brown, Andrew, and Co. (Later 
James Brown and Sons Ltd.) 
 
NFM 1860 After 1930 
 
n.a White’s Directory of the North Riding, 1867; Industries of 
Middlesbrough, 1890, p. 40; TCCMJ, July 1930; CITB. 
 
Brown, Francis Ltd. 
 
E 1903 Still open in 
1976  
 
 CITB. 
Brown, George and Brothers Ltd. 
(Originally Andrew Brown.) 
IF/E 1800 1970 
 
n.a. White’s Directory 1847; Northern Echo, 7 May 1879; TCCMJ, July 
1930; CITB. 
 
Brown, James and Sons Ltd. 
 
NFM 1860 After 1930 n.a. BT31: n.a. 
CITB. 
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Bulmer, W., later 
The Patent Brick Machine Company 
 
E 1865 n.a. 1903 BT31/10434/78621. 
Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871; Industries of Middlesbrough, 
1890, pp. 22-3. 
 
Burr, F 
 
I (n.a.) 1908 c. 1912  CITB. 
Cargo Fleet Iron Co Ltd. IS 1883 1900 
T 
 
1883 BT31/42890/17822; 42891/17822. 
 White’s Directory, 1885-6; Willis, South Durham, p.4;   CITB. 
 
Cargo Fleet Iron Co Ltd. IS 1901 
 
1928 
T 
 
1900/1904 
 
BT31/42890/17822; 42891/17822. 
Willis, South Durham, p.4; BS.CFI; CITB. 
 
Carling and Son 
 
E c. 1884 1958  CITB. 
Carlton Iron Co Ltd 
Also known as: 
North of England Industrial Iron and 
Coal Co Ltd. 
 
IS 1870 
 
1921 
T 
1870 BT31/1538/4891(1914: 32189/136855). 
 NE 19 Jan. 1877; Tuffs, Green Hill; CITB. 
 
Carr House Iron Co. 
 
IF c. 1880 1896  CITB. 
Chapman, C.W. 
 
E 1906 1933  CITB. 
Clay Lane Iron Co Ltd. IP 1882 1899 
T 
 
1882 BT31/2929/16285. 
 White’s Directory, 1885-6; GH, 31 Oct. 1899; NEG, 5 Jan. 1900; 
CITB. 
  
Cleveland Nut and Bolt Co. 
 
IM By 1870. 1876 
L 
 Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871. 
 
Cochrane and Co 
 
IS 1854 1960 
T 
 
1902 G.D. Cochrane, ‘Notes on company history’, 1953 (BS.COC – 
7/1/19); Hadfield thesis; CITB. 
 
Cochrane, Grove and Co. IF/E 1861 1902 1894 BT31/6052/42803. 
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 M  G.D. Cochrane, Notes on company history, 1953 (BS.COC – 7/1/19); 
Hadfield thesis; CIBT. 
 
Copeland and Co. 
 
 
E 1902 c. 1917  CITB. 
Copley and Co Ltd. (I. Copley & 
Co.) 
 
IF/E 1873  
or 1874 
c. 1892-93 1873 BT31: n.a. 
Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, pp. 20-1; CITB. 
 
Copley, Turner and Co Ltd. 
 
E 1892 
 
n.a. 21892 BT31/15223/36138. 
CITB. 
 
Crewdson, Hardy and Co. 
 
IM 1873 1930s 1899 BT31: n.a. 
TA: u/s/1785; correspondence with Frances MacLennan, see note 
135. 
 
Crossley, Ingham and Co. 
 
E 1884 1933  CITB. 
Crosthwaite, R.W. 
 
IM 1879 After 1930 1902 BT31: n.a. 
 Industries of Stockton, 1890, pp. 27; TCCMJ, July 1930; CITB. 
 
Cuthbertson and Co. 
 
E 1908 n.a.  CITB 
Dabron, R. 
 
 
E 1898 1909  CITB. 
Davy and United Roll Foundry Ltd 
 
IP/E 1912 Open 1909 CITB 
Dorman Long and Co Ltd. 
 
IP 1875 
 
1967 1889 BS.DL; Dorman Long, Works. 
 
Downey and Co. 
 
IS 1871 1893 
L 
 Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871; CITB. 
 
Downing, N. and Sons Ltd. IF 1875 n.a. n.a. CITB. 
283 
 
 
Drysdale, Kirkpatrick and Co. 
 
IF By 1867 
 
n.a.  White’s Directory, 1867. 
 
Dun Thompson and Co. 
 
I (n.a.) c. 1880 c. 1896  CITB. 
Egglescliffe Iron Foundry Ltd. 
(originally Smith and Stoker). 
 
IF 1878 1894 
L 
1893 BT31/5493/38036. 
Wardell, History of Head Wrightson, (TA: U/HW/8/1). 
   
Elliott, R. and Sons 
 
E 1906 1911  CITB. 
Elwon, Malcolm and Co. (Clay Lane 
Iron Co.) 
 
IS 1855 1867 
D 
 
n.a Harrison, ‘Pig iron’, p. 59; LG, 14 Jul. 1868; Hadfield thesis; CITB. 
 
Elwon, T.L. 
 
IS 1853 1853  Harrison, ‘Pig iron’, p. 59. 
Engineering and Repairing Co Ltd. 
 
E 1906 1907  CITB. 
Engineering Supply Company Ltd. 
 
E/IP 1889  1897 
L 
1889 BT31/4398/28592. 
 Industries of Stockton, 1890, pp. 37-9; Wardell, History of Head 
Wrightson, (TA: U/HW/8/1). 
  
Erimus Iron Co Ltd. 
  
IP 1873 1879 
L 
 
1872 BT31/1722/6294. 
Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1873;   
 
Eston Grange Iron Co. IS 1874 1876 
B 
 
 NE, 23 Sept. 1874; 3 Feb. 1876; AWJ, 22 Sept 1879.  
 
Evans, J. 
 
E 1898 1906  CITB. 
Ferryhill Iron Co 
(James Morrison) 
Later Rosedale and Ferryhill Coal 
and Iron Co Ltd. 
IS 1859 1879 
L 
1864 BT31/968/1374. 
Jeans, Pioneers CITB. 
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Firth and Hodgson 
(Glaisdale Smelting Co. or South 
Cleveland Iron Co.) 
 
IS By 1863 at 
latest 
By 1868 
L 
 White’s Directory of the North Riding, 1867; Harrison, ‘Pig iron’, pp. 
67-8; CITB 
 
Flintoft, A.N. 
 
IF By 1867 n.a.  White’s Directory, 1867. 
 
Fossick and Hackworth E 1839  1865 
T 
 
 White’s Directory, 1847; CITB. 
Fox, Head and Co IP 1863 1888 
D 
 
 Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871; Directory 1873; Jeans, 
Pioneers, pp. 268-81; ‘Obituary’, JISI, (1899), pp. 263-4; CITB. 
 
Gilkes, Wilson and Co. 
 
E 1844 
 
1865 
M 
 Jeans, Pioneers, pp. 84-93, 117-27; Kirby, Men of Business; CITB. 
 
Gilkes, Wilson, Leatham and Co 
 
IS 1852 1879 
L 
 Jeans, Pioneers, pp. 84-93, 117-27; Kirby, Men of Business; CITB. 
 
Gilkes, Wilson, Pease and Co. 
 
IS 1858 1881  Jeans, Pioneers, pp. 84-93, 117-27; Kirby, Men of Business; 
Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, pp. 14-15; CITB. 
 
Gjers Mills and Co 
 
IS 1870 1965 n.a. BT31: n.a. 
Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, pp.14-15; Harrison, John K., John 
Gjers CITB. 
 
Glaisdale Iron Co Ltd (also known as 
George Wilson and Co). 
 
IS 1868 1871 
L 
1870 BT31:1708/4709. 
Gray, Wm. and Co. Sh/E 1883 n.a. 
M 
 
 Grace’s Guide; CITB. 
Hall, Robert 
 
IF/E By 1847  n.a. n.a. White’s Directory, 1847; CITB. 
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Hanson, R. 
 
E 1910 1921 n.a. CITB 
Hardy, J. and Son 
 
 
E c. 1884 n.a.  CITB. 
Hardy, J.J. and Sons 
 
E By 1896 n.a.  CITB 
Harker and Sons (Engineers) Ltd 
 
E 1856 After 1976 
T 
n.a. CITB. 
Harker, Alfred 
 
E 1898 By 1920  CITB. 
Harker, Francis Todd 
 
E 1878 c. 1932?  CITB. 
Harris, Short and Co. 
 
 1867 1880?  CITB 
Hartlepool Iron Co./Hartlepool 
Rolling Mill Co. 
 
IP 1864 
 
n.a  BT 31/932/1180c, 1276/3186. 
Richmond, Local Records. 
 
Head Wrightson and Co Ltd. 
 
IP/E 1866 1975 
T 
 
1890 BT31: n.a. 
Wardell, History of Head Wrightson, (TA:U/HW/8/1); TCCMJ, July 
1930; CITB. 
 
Head, Ashby and Co. 
 
E 1859 1866  Wardell, History of Head Wrightson, (TA:U/HW/8/1); TCCMJ, July 
1930; CITB. 
 
Hill, J. and Co. 
 
IP By 1888 1910  Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, pp. 24-5; CITB. 
 
Hill, Richard, and Co Ltd. (originally 
Hill and Ward). 
 
IM 1868 
 
1955 
T 
1891 BT31/5208/35277. 
Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, p. 25; CITB.  
 
Hind, E. (South Bank) Ltd. 
 
 1897 n.a. 1912 BT31/20474/120289. 
CITB. 
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Hjerleid and Spence 
 
 
IM/E c. 1871 By 1881   Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871; CITB. 
 
Holdsworth, Bennington, Byers and 
Co Ltd. 
 
IS 1856 1864 n.a. Harrison, ‘Pig iron’, p. 63; Harrison, ‘Malleable iron’, pp. 131, 135, 
136; CITB. 
 
Holdsworth, J. and Co. 
 
 
IP 1866 1882 
T 
 Engineer, 19 Oct. 1866; Harrison, ‘Malleable iron’, pp. 131, 135, 
136; CITB. 
 
Holdsworth, John, and Co Ltd. 
 
IP 1880 n.a. n.a. CITB. 
Hopkins, Gilkes & Co. 
 
 
IP/E 1861 1865 
M 
 Lillie, Middlesbrough p. 99; Jeans, Pioneers, pp. 117-27, 149-63; 
Tighe, Teesside Bridge; CITB. 
 
Hopkins, Gilkes and Co Ltd. 
 
 
II/E 1865  1879 
L 
1865 BT31: n.a. 
MT, 21 Jan. 1865; NE, 15 May 1879, 19 Dec. 1879; Jeans, Pioneers, 
pp. 117-27, 149-63; IME, 1893, pp. 346-7; Tighe, Teesside Bridge; 
CITB. 
 
Horne, C. and Co. 
 
E 1910 c. 1980 n.a. CITB. 
Howcroft Carriage and Engineering 
Co. 
 
E 1900 n.a.  CITB. 
Imeson Finch and Co Ltd. 
 
E 1908 n.a. 1908 BT31/12357/97639. 
CITB. 
 
Irvine and Co Ltd.  
 
E 1896 1898 1896 BT31/7047/49640 
CITB. 
 
Jackson, Gill and Co (Ltd.). 
 
IM 1870  c. 1879 
 
1872 BT31/1786/6633 
Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871; CITB. 
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James Butler (or Smithson and 
Butler) 
 
IP 1879 1887 
B 
 LM, 19 Jul. 1879; NE, 24 Oct. 1879. 
James Ritchie IM c. 1880 
 
After 1890  Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, pp. 21. 
 
Jaques, R. & Co 
Also referred to as R. Jaques and Son 
 
IP 1871 1875 
B 
 JISI (1872); BDP, 30 Dec 1872; NE, 20 Sept. 1875. 
Jones Bros and Co Ltd. IP 1870 1898 
T 
 
1874/ 
1881 
BT3/1977/8438; 2782/15189. 
Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871 , 1873; CITB. 
 
Jones, Dunning and Co IS 1859 1890 
T 
 Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871; White’s Directory, 1885-6 
CITB. 
 
Joy and Co (David Joy) 
 
IP/E 1862 n.a.  Armstrong, Industrial Resources, pp. 103, 113. 
 
Lackenby Iron Co. 
 
IS 1871 1876 
T 
 
 Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1873; CITB. 
 
Lee, J. 
 
E 1902 1906  CITB. 
Linthorpe-Dinsdale Smelting Co Ltd. IS c. 1900 1931 
L 
 
1903 BT31/16997/76930. 
Pallister, A., Middleton St George, p. 159. 
 
Lishman & Leng 
 
IM 1866 1872 
T 
 
 Industries of Stockton, 1890, pp. 37-9; Wardell, History of Head 
Wrightson, (TA: U/HW/8/1). 
 
Livingston, John 
 
NFM By 1871 n.a.  Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871; White’s Directory of Yorkshire, 
1885-6. 
 
Lloyd and Co 
(sometimes known as Hopkins, 
Lloyd and Co.) 
IS 1864 1879 
 
 White’s Directory of the North Riding, 1867; Burdett and & Hood, 
Directory 1871; Harrison, ‘Pig iron’, pp. 84-5.  
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Loftus Iron Co Ltd.  IS 1872 1878 
L 
 
1872 BT31/1730/6354. 
Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1873; NC, 15 Nov. 1878; Willis, 
South Durham Steel.  
 
Long Hill Foundry 
 
IP/E 1902 1908  CITB. 
Lumley Steel Co. 
 
n.a. 1904 c. 1910  CITB. 
Mainwaring, John and Co. 
 
 
IM By 1847 1879 
T 
 
 White’s Directory, 1847; John Wardell, History of Head Wrightson, 
(TA: U/HW/8/1); CITB. 
 
Malthouse, William, later Robert 
Hunter Malthouse 
 
IF/E By 1847  n.a.  White’s Directory, 1847; Ward’s Directory, 1851. 
 
McDonald and Bulman (later 
McDonald and Co). 
 
IF 1870 at 
latest 
1904  Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871; Porter’s Directory, 1881; 
White’s Directory, 1885-6; CITB. 
  
Meredith Bros Ltd. 
 
IF c. 1896 c. 1910  CITB. 
Middlesbrough Galvanizing Co. 
 
IM 1880 n.a.  CITB. 
Middlesbrough Nut and Bolt Works 
(Watteau, E.) 
 
IM By 1873  n.a.  Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1873; White’s Directory, 1885-6. 
 
Middlesbrough Wrought Nail Co 
Ltd. 
 
IM 1872 n.a. 1872 BT31/1720/6273. 
Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1873.  
 
Milton Forge and Engineering Co 
Ltd. 
 
IF/E 1898 By 1912 1899 BT31/8379/60098. 
CITB. 
Moor Steel and Iron Co. 
(originally Shaw, Johnson and Reay). 
IP 1885 1898 
T 
1885 BT31/3480/21116. 
LpM, 11 May 1885; Harrison, ‘Malleable iron’, p. 136;  
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Morrison, J. 
 
E 1913 1922  CITB. 
Mudd, P.A. and Co. 
 
E 1906 1922  CITB. 
Muir, J and Co Ltd. 
 
IF 1896 c. 1900 1886 BT31/3886./22745. 
CITB. 
 
Normanby Iron Works Co Ltd. 
 
IS 1895/ 
1900 
c. 1912 
L 
1895 BT31/6432/45380; 16438/66673. 
NE, 23 Jul 1900. 
 
Norrie, J.  
 
IF/NFM By 1867 After 1881  White’s Directory, 1867; Porter’s Directory, 1881. 
 
North Eastern Steel Co Ltd.  
 
IP 1881 
 
1923  
T (1904) 
1881 
 
BT31/ 0960/15639. 
BS.NESC; CITB. 
 
North Yorkshire Iron Co Ltd. 
 
IP 1869 
 
1873 
L 
1869 BT31/1470/4465. 
Jeans, Pioneers, p. 106; CITB. 
 
Northern Engineering and 
Construction Co Ltd. 
 
E 1907 1919  BT31/18623/95550. 
CITB. 
Norton Iron Co Ltd. 
 
 
IS 1865 After 1886 1865 BT31/1145/2382C. 
Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871; Middlesbrough Directory 
(1885-6). 
  
Norwegian Titanic Iron Company 
Limited 
I 1869 1876 
Norton works 
closed. 
1863 BT31/831/686C. 
NE, 12 Jan. 1870; 18 Sept. 1870. 
Pettigrew, G and Co Ltd. 
 
E 1907 n.a. 1907 n.a. 
Pickerings Ltd. 
 
E 1854 Still open  Historical documents held by the company and interview with D. 
Fothergill (managing director, company, 30 Mar. 2009); CITB.  
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Pickersgill, R. and Sons Ltd 
 
E 1860 n.a  CITB. 
Pile, Spence and Co 
 
IP/IF/Sh 1854  1866 
L 
 
1865 BDP, 11 Jan. 1865; LM, 11 Jan 1867; Harrison, ‘Malleable iron’, p. 
129;  North, Economic Heritage, p. 35; CITB. 
 
Potter, Edwin 
 
IF By 1867  n.a.  White’s Directory, 1867. 
 
Richards, W. and Sons Ltd. 
 
I By 1871 After 1885  Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871; CITB. 
 
Richardson, Johnson and Co. 
 
 
IP 1864 1868 
T 
 Harrison, ‘Malleable iron’, p. 130-1; CITB. 
 
Richardson, T. and Co 
 
 
IS/IP 1866 1875 
L 
 CITB 
Richardson, Thomas, and Sons 
 
IS/IP/E 1837 1875 (IS/IP)-S  
1900 (E)-T 
 
 Armstrong, Industrial Resources, p. 307; Richmond, Local Records; 
CITB. 
 
Richmond Iron and Steel Co. 
 
IP c. 1900 n.a.  CITB. 
Richmond Ironworks Ltd  
 
IP 1890 c. 1896 
L 
 
 BT31/4688/30866. 
LM, 28 Feb. 1890; BDP, 3 Mar. 1890. 
 
Richmond Rolling Mills Co Ltd. 
 
IP 1896   n.a. 1896 BT31/7099/50052. 
NE, 20 Nov. 1896. 
 
Ridley, T.D and Sons 
 
E 1898 n.a.  CITB. 
Riley Bros. 
 
E 1865 n.a 1900 BT31/9007/66622. 
Industries of Stockton, 1890, p. 17. 
 
Robert Punch IM c. 1877 After 1890  Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, pp. 17. 
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Robert Sherwood and Henry Smith E 1841 1844 
T 
 
 TA: Box 04555 - Group (Cleveland RO), Location 19/4. 
 
Robinson, Anderson and Co. 
 
IF/E 1842 1920  Armstrong, Industrial Resources, pp. 112, 114; CITB. 
 
Robinson, R,W. 
 
E 1900 1906  CITB. 
Robinson, Stephen 
 
IF By 1851  n.a.  Ward’s Directory, 1851. 
 
Robson, Maynard and Co. IS 1873 1881 
T 
 CJSDA, 25 Sept. 1873; Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1873; CITB. 
 
Roger, Robert and Co. 
 
I/E 1847 
(1844?) 
1927 
L 
1900 BT31/16388/65753. 
White’s Directory, 1847; 
Industries of Stockton 1890, p. 27; CITB. 
 
Ross, Willis and Co. 
 
I(n.a.) By 1873  n.a.  Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1873. 
 
Scott, G and Sons 
 
E c. 1884? 1933  CITB. 
Seaton Carew Iron Co Ltd. 
 
IS 1881 1928 1882 BT31/14705/16711. 
CITB. 
 
Shaw, Johnson and Reay (later 
Johnson and Reay). 
 
IP 1872 1882 
B 
 NE, 17 May 1882; 11 Jul. 1883; Harrison, ‘Malleable iron’, p. 136.  
 
Sir Bernard Samuelson and Co. 
 
IS 1854 1917 
T 
1887 BT31/31076/25072. 
Jeans, Pioneers, pp. 216-34; Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, pp. 
25-6; BS.SBS; CITB. 
 
Sir Christopher Furness, Westgarth 
and Co Ltd. 
 
E 1896 After 1914 1896 BT31/6939/48825. 
NE, 12 Oct. 1896. 
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Skinningrove Iron Co Ltd. 
 
IS 1880 1963 
T 
1880 BT31: n.a. 
BS.SKI; NC, 15 Nov. 1878; Willis, Skinningrove; CITB. 
 
Smithers and Jeynes Ltd 
 
E 1905 1912 
L 
1905 BT31/11216/85647. 
CITB. 
 
Snowden, Hopkins and Co  
 
IS 1853 1865 
M 
 Lillie, Middlesbrough,  p. 99; Jeans, Pioneers, pp. 117-27, 149-63; 
Tighe, Teesside Bridge; CITB. 
 
South Bank Iron Co IS 1863 1867 
D 
 
 LG, 14 Jul. 1867; Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871; Hadfield 
thesis, p. 380. 
 
South Bank Iron Co Ltd. IP 1881 1883 
L 
 
1881 BT31/2909/16198; CITB. 
South Cleveland Iron Works Co Ltd.  
 
IS 1872 1875 
L 
1872 BT31/1684/6003. 
Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1873; Kelly’s Directory, 1887; 
Harrison, ‘Pig iron’, p. 67; CITB.  
 
South Durham Steel and Iron Co Ltd. 
 
IP 1898 1967 
N 
1898 BT31/42914/60098. 
Willis, South Durham; BS.SDS. 
 
South Stockton Iron Co. 
(Charles Henry Skinner)  
 
IF/E 1840 1854 
T 
 North, Economic Heritage, p. 18; White’s Directory, 1847; John 
Wardell, History of Head Wrightson, (TA:U/HW/8/1); CITB. 
 
South Stockton Iron Company Ltd. 
 
IP 1881 n.a. 1881 BT31/2937/16399.  
Steel Casting Co Ltd. 
 
 
IF 1877 n.a. 1877/ 
1904 
BT31/2371/11715. 
CITB. 
Stevenson, Jacques and Co. 
 
IS 1865 1888 
L 
-- IME, 1893, pp. 344-5; Harrison, ‘Pig iron’, p. 71; CITB. 
 
Stockton Forge Co. IM 1872 1889  Wardell, History of Head Wrightson, (TA: U/HW/8/1).  
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 L 
 
 
Stockton Iron Furnace Co Ltd.  
 
 
IS 1864  1877 
L 
1864 BT31/1036/1750, 1036/63715. 
NC, 2 Nov. 1866; NE, 17 Jul. 1877; Burdett and & Hood, Directory 
1871; CITB. 
 
Stockton Ironworks 
(John Jackson) 
 
IP  c. 1791  1844 
T 
 Industries of Stockton 1890, p. 27, CITB. 
 
Stockton Malleable Iron Co Ltd. 
 
IP 1861 1898 1861 BT31/559/2281. 
; Griffiths’ Guide; Industries of Stockton, 1890, pp. 33; Harrison, 
‘Malleable iron’, p. 130; CITB. 
 
Stockton Rail Mill Co Ltd. 
 
IP 1864 1874 
L 
1864 BT31/1036/1749C; Harrison, ‘Malleable iron’, p. 136, 152; CITB. 
 
Stranton Iron and Steel Co Ltd. 
 
IP 1871 1873 
L 
1871 BT31/1666/5857; LM, 8 Aug. 1873; 11 Dec. 1873. 
 
Swan Coates and Co 
 
IS 1864 1876 
B 
 White’s Directory of the North Riding, 1867; Burdett and & Hood, 
Directory 1871: Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, pp.11-2; CITB. 
 
Tait, J. 
 
E By 1874 1921  CITB. 
Tait, Wright and Co. 
 
IF By 1867  By 1884  White’s Directory, 1867; White’s Directory of Yorkshire (1885-6); 
Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, p. 21. 
 
 
Teasdale Bros. 
 
E 1900 Open in 1976 
 
 CITB. 
Tees Bridge Iron Co Ltd. IS 1870  1930 
L 
 
1871 BT31/14425/5585. 
Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871, Kelly’s Directory 1887; CITB. 
 
Tees Furnace Co Ltd. 
 
IS 1896 1924 1896 BT31/15642/48714. 
NE, 25 Jul. 1896. 
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Tees Nut and Bolt Co Ltd. 
 
IM 1876 n.a. 1876 BT31/224110654. 
Tees-side Iron and Engine(ering) 
Works Co Ltd. 
 
IS/IP/E 1889 
 
1895 
L/T 
1889 BT31/4541/29728. 
Tighe, Teesside Bridge CITB. 
  
Telford, James 
 
IM By 1851  n.a.  Ward’s Directory, 1851. 
 
The Cast Steel Foundry Company 
Ltd. 
IP  1887 1891 
L 
1887 BT31/3867/28489. 
Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, p. 47. 
 
The Expanded Metal Company Ltd. 
 
IP 1892 After 1930 1892/1900 BT31/5341/36610;48431. 
TCCMJ, July 1930  
The Patent Lubricating Bag 
Company Ltd. 
 
R 1885 n.a. 1885 BT31/3497/21259. 
Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, pp. 32-. 
 
The Stockton Steel Foundry Co Ltd. 
 
IP 1905 1927 
T 
1906 Wardell, History of Head Wrightson, (TA: U/HW/8/1). 
 
The Tees Scoriae Brick Company 
Ltd. 
 
R c. 1874 After1890 1874 BT31: n.a. 
Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, pp.19-20. 
 
Thunderbolt Patent Governor Co 
Ltd. 
 
E 1902 1907  BT31/10007/74769. 
CITB. 
Turner, J. and Co. 
 
E 1887 c. 1919   CITB. 
Turner, John. 
 
IF/E By 1873  c. 1892   Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1873.  
 
Union Foundry. IF 1875 1928 
T 
n.a. CITB. 
Vaughan, T. and Co. 
 
IS/IP 1867 1876 
B 
 
 Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871; LG, 14 Jul. 1868, 5 Sept. 1876; 
Harrison, ‘Pig iron’; Hadfield thesis, p. 380; CITB. 
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W. Shaw, Kirtley and Co. 
  
IP 1889 
 
1892 
D 
 Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, pp. 13-4; LG, 12 Mar. 1892; 
CITB. 
 
Wake and Co. 
 
E c. 1896 n.a.  CITB 
Walker Maynard and Co. IS 1875 1915 
T 
 
1900 BT31/9166/67934; 16534/68092. 
BS.DL; CITB. 
 
Warner and Co 
(originally Warner, Lucas and 
Barrett) 
 
IS 1855 1968 
T 
1900(?) Harrison, ‘Blast furnace’, p. 97; North, Economic Heritage, p. 24; 
JISI, (1875), pp. 427-40;CITB. 
 
Weardale Iron & Coal Co Ltd 
 
 
IS/IP 1845 1899 
T 
1863 BT31/806/589C. 
Jens, Pioneers, Ch.1. 
 
Weardale Steel, Coke and Coal Co 
Ltd. 
 
IS/IP 1899 1947 
N 
1899 BT31/37193/63715. 
LpM, 3 Oct. 1896; Willis, South Durham; BS.SDS/1/11/1. 
 
West Hartlepool Iron Co Ltd. 
 
 1874 n.a. 1874 BT31: 1976/8431. 
NE, 9 Jun. 1874. 
 
West Hartlepool Steel and Iron Co. 
(Gray and Gladstone). 
 
IP c. 1881 1898 
T 
 NC, 10 Aug. 1888; BS.SDS; CITB. 
West Marsh Iron Co Ltd. (originally 
Smith and Thomson, T.J.). 
 
IP 1867 1873 1873 
L 
BT31/1923/7928. 
Burdett and & Hood, Directory 1871; Dorman Long, Works, pp. 7-8; 
Harrison, ‘Malleable iron’, p. 136; CITB. 
 
West Stockton Iron Co Ltd . 
 
IP 1865 1889 
L 
1865 BT31/1204/2725C. 
NE, 17 Jul 1891; Harrison, ‘Malleable iron’, p. 136; CITB. 
 
West, Davies and Co. 
 
IF 1867 n.a.  White’s Directory, 1867. 
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Westgarth, English & Co.  E 1881 1896 
T 
 
 NE, 12 Nov. 1881, 12 Oct. 1896. 
 
White, J. and Sons 
 
IF c. 1896 c. 1900  CITB. 
Whitwell, William and Co. 
 
IS 1859 By 1890 n.a BT31: n.a. 
Thomlinson, Thomas Whitwell; Industries of Stockton, 1890, pp. 15-
7; CITB. 
 
Wilkinson (Thornaby) Ltd. 
 
IP 1914 n.a. n.a. CITB. 
Williams, Edward 
 
IS 1879 n.a.  White’s Directory, 1885-6; CITB. 
 
Wilson, Copley and Co. 
 
E 1898 n.a.  CITB. 
Wilson, F.C. and Co. 
 
E 1900 1909  CITB. 
Wilson, Pease and Co, Ltd. 
 
IS/E 1881 1889 
L 
1881/1901 BT31/9518/70712. 
Industries of Middlesbrough, 1890, pp. 23-4; Tighe, Teesside Bridge. 
 
Wood, C. Ltd. 
 
I (n.a.) 1900 c. 1906 n.a. CITB. 
Woolley, James 
 
IF By 1867 n.a.  White’s Directory, 1867. 
 
Worth Mackenzie and Co Ltd. 
 
E c. 1870 1936 
L 
1883 BT31/3089/17826. 
Industries of Stockton, 1890, pp. 20-1; TCCMJ, July 1930; CITB. 
 
Wythes, George, and Co. 
 
IS 1864 1881 
L 
 JISI, (1871, no. 2), p. iii; Pallister, A., Middleton St George, pp. 131, 
134-5, 147. 
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Appendix 2: Firms used in Logistic Regression Model 
 
 
Key 
S5: survived more than 5 years. 
S10: survived more than 10 years. 
S15: survived more than1 5 years. 
S80: survived after 1880. 
 
QR: Quaker partner/investor, or from Quaker family. 
QPB: partner/investor related Pease or Backhouse family. 
RM: partner/investor connected with S&DR. 
QF:firm financed by Quaker investor or bank. 
 
Before: partner/investor in iron and steel before Cleveland. 
 
Otherinv: partner/investor has interests in other Cleveland firms. 
 
Sector variables 
w: malleable iron 
p: pig iron 
e: engineering 
d: diversified 
m: other metals 
 
Time: date established in Cleveland less 1850 (beginning of the iron industry in Cleveland). 
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